Page 240
the parties to make torture a criminal offence subject to quasi-universal jurisdiction.)
39
The
prohibition is now also customary international law.
The European Court of Human Rights decided in Soering that the extradition of a person to any
(in practice, non-ECHR) state where he is wanted for a crime for which he could be sentenced to
death, would, if he would then be likely to spend a lengthy period on death row, be a breach of
Article 3.
40
This obstacle can be overcome if the requesting state gives an undertaking that the
person will not be executed. But, nevertheless, it has had severe repercussions for ECHR states that
wish to extradite or deport a person who may be a threat to its security, but who might suffer ill-
treatment by the authorities of the destination state. The prohibition in Article 3 is absolute and not
subject to any national security exception, express or implied.
41
Prohibition of slavery and forced labour (ECHR Article 4, ICCPR Article 8)
The two Articles are identical in substance. Forced or compulsory labour does not include labour as
part of a criminal punishment, military service, to deal with emergencies, or normal civil
obligations.
Right to liberty and security (ECHR Article 5, ICPPR Article 9)
Although the ECHR is rather more detailed, the two Articles are the same in substance. No one shall
be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with law. Anyone arrested or detained shall be told
the reason and the charge, and shall be brought promptly before a judge and entitled to trial within a
reasonable time. He shall be entitled to challenge without delay the lawfulness of his detention
before a court, for example by
39. ‘[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing
him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
in or incidental to lawful sanctions.’
40. Soering, App. No. 14038/88; Series A, No. 161, 1989; ILM (1989) 1063; (1989) 11 EHRR 439; 98
ILR 270. See also Rehman [2003] 1 AC 153, para. 54.
41. Chahal (1997) 23 EHRR 413; 108 ILR 385.