FROM LOUIS XIV TO NAPOLEON
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A second, and related, conceptual thesis is the notion that international relations, both in
Europe and in the world, were fluid. The notion that the European warfare of the period was
indecisive is inaccurate.
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So also is any understanding of international relations as rigid and
limited. This is the case not only for the age of the French Revolution, but also for the
preceding period of the ancien régime (1661–1789). That was an age that saw major changes
in European power politics and territorial control, as well as a massive expansion of European
power elsewhere in the world, particularly in North America and India.
The resulting sense of fluidity, that also owed much to cyclical notions of decadence and
long-term historical flux,
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was accompanied by one of unpredictability. The latter owed
much to the central role of monarchs, both French and foreign, and their personalities.
Huxelles, the foreign minister, observed in 1717 that ‘events often lead to situations that it
is difficult to predict’.
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The French envoy in Berlin complained in 1732 of Frederick William
I of Prussia ‘ni luy, ni ses ministres n’ont jamais de plan fixe’.
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Hereditary monarchy also entailed the vagaries of dynastic chance. Born in 1638, Louis
XIV came to the throne in 1643. In 1661, when the powerful first minister Cardinal Mazarin
died, the personal rule of the young and dynamic Louis began. He ruled until 1715, personally
directing his kingdom throughout this period and holding the reins of power until his death.
In 1665, in contrast, the sickly Charles II came to the throne of Spain. He failed to provide
strong direction and died in 1700, without providing the prime obligation of a monarch, a
son.
Had each of these two men succeeded, instead, to the other’s kingdom then it is interesting
to speculate how this would have affected international relations. Under more powerful
monarchs, Philip V (r. 1700–46), Louis XIV’s younger grandson, and, in particular, Charles
III (r. 1759–88), eighteenth-century Spain was to show itself more dynamic. On the other
hand, the divisions and political disorder of France in the 1610s and 1640s had indicated the
problems posed by French monarchs who were unable, in their case for reasons of youth, to
cope with the difficulties of maintaining the political momentum of personal monarchy.
Louis XIV’s reign also exemplified another aspect of dynastic anxiety, the succession. While
unmarried, he had a near-fatal illness on campaign in 1658. Later, he had only one son who
survived, and even this son, the Grand Dauphin, predeceased him. These problems encouraged
Louis to legitimate illegitimate children and to attempt (unsuccessfully) to have two of his
legitimated sons recognized as possible successors to the throne.
As another illustration of dynastic chance, in 1730 the young Peter II of Russia died of
smallpox, leading to a major change of direction in Russian policy. Two years earlier, Louis
XIV’s great-grandson the young Louis XV (1710–72, r. 1715–72) had also been attacked by
smallpox. Although married, he then lacked a son, and his uncle, Philip V of Spain – formerly
Philip, Duke of Anjou – made preparations to take the throne. Such a step would have led to
a major change in French foreign policy, not least by dissolving the Anglo-French alliance,