VII. Debt Financing 25. The Many Different
724 PART VII Debt Financing
In other countries the bankruptcy rules are often “creditor-oriented”; their ob-
ject is to recover as much as possible for the lenders and to ensure that the senior
claimants get first peck. For example, the bankruptcy procedures in Germany, Swe-
den, and the UK have much in common with Chapter 7 in the United States.
58
In
other words, an outside official is appointed to take over the company and to sell
the assets either piecemeal or as a going concern.
59
The proceeds are then distrib-
uted to creditors according to the priority of their claims.
Of course, the grass is always greener elsewhere. In the United States, critics of
Chapter 11 complain about the costs of trying to save businesses that are no longer
viable. By contrast, in Europe, bankruptcy laws are blamed for the demise of
healthy businesses and governments there have looked for ways to encourage re-
habilitation rather than liquidation.
58
See, for example, M. J. White, “The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A U.S.–European Comparison,”
in J. S. Bhandari and L. A. Weiss (eds.), Corporate Bankruptcy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
1996; and P. Stromberg, “Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory
and Tests,” Journal of Finance 55 (December 2000), pp. 2641–2692.
59
Alhough the bankruptcy codes in these countries contain provisions to keep the firm operating, they
are relatively rarely invoked.
FURTHER
READING
A useful general work on debt securities is:
F. J. Fabozzi (ed.): The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities, Frank J. Fabozzi Associates, New
Hope, PA, 2000.
The articles by Brennan and Schwartz and by Kraus are general discussions of call provisions:
M. J. Brennan and E. S. Schwartz: “Savings Bonds, Retractable Bonds and Callable Bonds,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 5:67–88 (1977).
A. Kraus: “An Analysis of Call Provisions and the Corporate Refunding Decision,” Midland
Corporate Finance Journal, 1:46–60 (Spring 1983).
Smith and Warner provide an extensive survey and analysis of covenants:
C. W. Smith and J. B. Warner: “On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 7:117–161 (June 1979).
Discussions of project finance include:
R. A. Brealey, I. A. Cooper, and M. Habib: “Using Project Finance to Fund Infrastructure In-
vestments,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9:25–38 (Fall 1996).
B. C. Esty: “Petrozuata: A Case Study on the Effective Use of Project Finance,” Journal of Ap-
plied Corporate Finance, 12:26–42 (Fall 1999).
P. K. Nevitt and F. J. Fabozzi, Project Financing, American Educational Systems, London, 7th
ed., 2000.
Altman’s book is a general survey of the bankruptcy decision, while Bhandari and Weiss provide a
useful collection of readings. Also listed below are several good studies of the conflicting interests
of different security holders and the costs and consequences of reorganization:
E. A. Altman: Corporate Financial Distress and Bankruptcy: A Complete Guide to Predicting and
Avoiding Distress, and Profiting from Bankruptcy, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 2nd ed., 1993.
J. S. Bhandari and L. A. Weiss (eds.), Corporate Bankruptcy, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 1996.
M. White: “The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3:129–152
(Spring 1989).
J. R. Franks and W. N. Torous: “An Empirical Analysis of U.S. Firms in Reorganization,”
Journal of Finance, 44:747–770 (July 1989).
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