866
CHAPTER
FORTY:
work
held
out
hopes
of an atomic
bomb
before
the
end
of
the
war;
and
in
the
autumn,
on Roosevelt's
suggestion,
British
and
American
scien-
tists
began
to collaborate on the
project.
Now
it
had reached the
stage
where it
seemed to
justify
the
construction
of
large-scale
production
plants.
It
would be
folly
to
erect
them
in
Britain,
under
constant
enemy
air
reconnaissance
and
danger
of
bombing.
Therefore
Churchill
urged
that
the
two countries
pool
all
their
information
and
undertake
jointly
the new
phase
of
the
project
in the
United
States.
If
the
American
government
was
not
willing,
he would
turn
to the
Canadian
govern-
ment;
and
if
it
failed
him,
he
was
prepared
to
undertake
thie
venture
in
some
other safe
part
of
the
empire.
He
got
the
decision
he
wanted
from
Roosevelt.
High
strategy
was
the
other
issue.
The
policy
of
"Germany
first"
had come
under
question
in
Washington,
and
there
was
no
definite
decision on
where, when,
and
how
American forces
should
engage
in
tie task of
smashing
Hitler's
might.
For
a
year
Stalin
had been
de-
manding,
more
or
less
truculently,
the immediate
opening
of a
second
front
in
western
Europe
that would relieve the
dangerous
pressure
on
the
Russian
front;
and
during
the
spring
both
London
and
Washington,
spurred by
a
visit
from
Molotov,
began
to
toy
with
the idea of
a
cross-
Channel
invasion,
at least to
establish
a
bridgehead,
in the late
summer
or
early
autumn of 1942. The
more
Churchill
thought
about
it,
the
less
he
liked
it. He had no relish for another
military
disaster,
which
he
was sure
would follow
because
not
enough fully
trained
and
armed
forces would
be
available
that
year
for
a
successful
landing
in
France.
He
still
thought
that
they
would
be
ready
in
1943 and that
the best
theater for
Anglo-American operations
in 1942
was
French
North
Africa,
which
he
feared
might
suddenly
be seized
by
the
Nazis.
During
his mission to
Washington
in
June
1942,
it
was
agreed
that
plans
for
the
major
cross-Channel invasion
in
1943
should be
prepared
in
Lon-
don
with all
the
energy
and
on the
largest
scale
possible,
that
a minor
crossing
in 1942
should not be ruled out unless
a
more
careful examina-
tion showed that it was not
feasible,
and
that
plans
for
the
operation
in
French North Africa should be
worked out
fully
and
speedily
in
Washington.
The crucial
decision
did not
come
until late
in
July,
a
month
after
the
prime
minister returned home.
The
American
chiefs of staff
were
set on
a
Channel
crossing
in
1942
and
against
the
invasion of
French
North
Africa.
Then
Roosevelt overruled
them,
to
the
great
relief
and
joy
of
Churchill,
and issued
orders
for
the
invasion
to
begin
not
later