
2010 Methods of Human Rights Research 181
  3.  Jan M.  Smits,  Redefining Normative Legal Science: Towards an Argumentative Disci-
pline, in mE t H o d s  o f  Hu m a N  RI g H t s  RE s E a R C H  45 (Fons Coomans, Fred Grünfeld & Menno 
T. Kamminga eds., 2009).
  4.  Eva  Brems,  Methods  in  Legal  Human  Rights  Research,  in  mE t H o d s   o f  Hu m a N  RI g H t s  
RE s E a R C H , supra note 3, at 77.
  5.  Id. A recent study of methodological choices made in legal Ph.D. dissertations in the 
Netherlands found a similar trend. HE R v é  Ed o u a R d  tI J s s E N , dE J u R I d I s C H E  d I s s E R t a t I E  o N d E R  d E  
l o E p : dE v E R a N t w o o R d I N g  v a N  m E t H o d o l o g I s C H E  k E u z E s  I N  J u R I d I s C H E  d I s s E R t a t I E s  (2009). 
the effectiveness of international and domestic  enforcement mechanisms, 
the degree of compliance with human rights standards by states and non-
state actors, the role of human rights in foreign policy, the history of human 
rights,  or  philosophical  questions.  Although  human  rights  scholarship  is 
often regarded as the exclusive province of lawyers, it covers a much wider 
range of disciplines.
If there is, in fact, a methodological deficit in human rights scholarship, 
it appears to affect legal research more than research performed by social 
scientists. This distinction may be caused by the different approaches of these 
disciplines.  Lawyers are  system builders;  they  rely  on  logic to  determine 
whether arguments are compatible with an existing normative framework. 
Human rights may  be, but  are not necessarily, part of this normative  set-
ting.
3
 Legal scholarship, therefore, has little to say regarding the impact of 
legal systems on the ground. It makes implicit assumptions in this regard 
and runs the risk of remaining disconnected from reality. Social scientists, 
on the other hand, attempt to understand and explain social phenomena. 
Their findings can  be empirically challenged and verified. However, they 
risk ignoring or misinterpreting applicable legal standards.
A survey carried out among twenty-eight legally trained human rights 
scholars found that only half of them had received any formal training in 
methodology.
4
 The others had simply learned along the way. Even more alarm-
ingly, only thirteen of the respondents said they always reflected on the most 
appropriate research method when starting work on a new research topic. 
And only three responded that, as a rule, they included in their published 
work information on the research method used. A 2006 survey of scholarly 
articles contained in seven leading  human  rights  law  journals  found that 
twenty-two out of ninety articles contained no explicit information on the 
method used.
5
 
We are not aware of a similar survey of human rights scholarship by 
social  scientists.  Our  impression,  however,  is  that  while  social  scientists 
conducting research in the field of human rights tend to do better than their 
legal colleagues, their work also frequently leaves something to be desired 
from a methodological point of view. Social scientists also demonstrate a 
tendency,  for example,  to omit  an explanation  of  their  research  methods 
in their publications. A survey of articles published in the interdisciplinary