
was not simply due to lack of public support or the media overstepping their bounds. The
McNamara-designed Pentagon proved unable to reach even its own distorted objectives,
let alone other strategic objectives a president might set. President
Carter’s
1980 disaster
attempting to rescue the American hostages in Teheran looked worse against the crisp
efficiency of the Israelis flying into Entebbe (1976) to rescue their hostages.
Hollywood
decided to make movies of the Israelis, not the Americans!
Reagan attempted to refashion the Pentagon, partly by “throwing money at the
problem” in another military build-up. His Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger,
elieving that the problem lay in the extent of civilian control at the Pentagon itself,
attempted to diminish this element. In the eyes of many, however, this left a vacuum in
lace. The armed forces merely continued to think in terms of old foes, like the Soviet
Union, rather than reorienting themselves towards new conflicts worldwide.
Engagements in
Grenada
under Reagan, and then
Panama
under Bush, re-established a
sense of the American armed forces as a viable fighting force. Newer, sophisticated
weapons and machines seemed vastly superior to what the Soviets had available, while
Soviet forces became mired in their own “Vietnam” in Afghanistan. The long-held belie
that the Red Army had western Europe at its mercy was shown to be entirely erroneous.
Towards the end of Reagan’s administration, changes began to occur at the Pentagon.
Frank Carlucci replaced Weinberger as Secretary of Defense and General Colin
Powell,
a
relative military visionary was appointed to head the National Security Council. Carlucci
suggested a more conciliatory approach towards the Soviet Union, which was beginning
to collapse, while Powell began to plan for what he saw as the likely conflicts of the
future, particularly those focusing on resources like
oil
.
This culminated in the
Gulf War
in 1991, one of the first military engagements for
which American military strategists were actually prepared in advance. In the process,
Powell and General Norman Schwarzkopf re-established the superiority of US armed
forces. It was not merely the fact that the Americans defeated Saddam Hussein’s forces, it
was the manner in which they did so, leaving an army of tanks utterly devastated.
Under President Bill
Clinton
the Pentagon has once again been subordinated to
olitical considerations. While there were at first hopes of reorienting the economy in the
aftermath of the
Cold War,
the perceived need to intervene abroad militarily has kept the
military budget growing, and defense contractors, albeit less in the heavyindustry sector
and more in high technologies, have remained producing. In addition, such military
intervention, like Clinton’s, has been undertaken with one eye on public reaction,
evidenced by the
polls
.
Somalia
was a necessary humanitarian intervention until a few
American lives were lost; the Rwandan genocide had to be overlooked because of the
disaster in Somalia. Similarly intervention in Kosovo was necessary because of the
failure to act in Rwanda. All the while, actions against Iraq seemed to occur based on a
schedule set by the
Independent Counsel
Starr, rather than global strategic
considerations.
But such politicization is almost inevitable in a world where the old Cold-War
certainties no longer remain. Indeed, Powell’s visionary approach to shaping the
Entries A-Z 863