Gawrych George W. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory (Leavenworth Papers No.21)
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Dr.
George
W.
Gawrych
Dr.
George
W.
Gawrych
obtained
his
Ph.D.
in
Middle
East
history
from
the
University
of
Michigan
in
May
1980.
Since
then,
he
has
taught
at
the
University
of
Hawaii
(Manoa),
the
University
of
Kansas,
and
the
School
of
International
Studies,
Fort
Bragg,
North
Carolina.
Dr.
Gawrych's
publica-
tions
on
modern
Middle
East
history
have
appeared
in
The
International
Journal
of
Middle
East
Studies,
The
IntemationalJournal
of
Turkish
Studies,
Armed
Forces
and
Society,
The
Journal
of
Strategic
Stud-
ies,
The
Journal
of
Contemporary
History,
and
Mili-
tary
Review.
His
first
monograph,
Key
to
the
Sinai:
The
Battles
for
Abu
Ageila
in
the
1956
and
1967
Wars,
was
published
by
the
Combat
Studies
Insti-
tute
in
1990
as
Research
Survey
No.
7.
In
Novem-
ber
1989,
Gawrych
received
the
Turkish
Studies
Association's
biennial
prize
for
the
best
published
article.
Dr.
Gawrych
has
been
on
the
faculty
of
USACGSC
since
July
1984
as
a
member
of
the
Combat
Studies
Institute.
COMBAT
STUDIES
INSTITUTE
Missions
The
Combat
Studies
Institute
was
established
on
18
June
1979
as
a
department-level
activity
within
the
U.S.
Army
Command
and
General
Staff
College,
Fort
Leavenworth,
Kansas.
CSI
has
the
following
missions:
1.
Prepare
and
present
instruction
in
military
history
at
USACGSC
and
assist
other
USACGSC
departments
in
integrating
military
history
into
their
instruction.
2.
Publish
works
in
a
variety
of
formats
for
the
Active
Army
and
Reserve
Components
on
historical
topics
pertinent
to
the
doctrinal
concerns
of
the
Army.
SYNOPSIS
OF
LEAVENWORTH
PAPER
21
Armies
appear
to
learn
more
from
defeat
than
victory.
In
this
regard,
armed
forces
that
win
quickly,
decisively,
and
with
relative
ease
face
a
unique
challenge
in
attempting
to
learn
from
victory.
The
Israel
Defense
Forces
certainly
fell
into
this
category
after
their
dramatic
victory
over
the
combined
armies
of
Egypt,
Jordan,
and
Syria
in
the
Six
Day
War
of
June
1967.
This
study
analyzes
the
problems
that
beset
Israel
in
the
aftermath
of
its
decisive
victory
in
the
Six
Day
War
over
the
Arabs.
In
the
1973
War,
Anwar
Sadat,
Egypt's
president,
was
able
to
exploit
Israeli
vulnerabilities
to
achieve
political
success
through
a
limited
war.
An
important
lesson
emerges
from
this
conflict.
A
weaker
adversary
can
match
his
strengths
against
the
weaknesses
of
a
superior
foe
in
a
conventional
conflict
to
attain
strategic
success.
Such
a
strategic
triumph
for
the
weaker
adversary
can
occur
despite
serious
difficulties
in
operational
and
tactical
performance.
The
author
suggests
a
striking
parallel
between
the
military
triumphs
of
Israel
in
1967
and
the
United
States
in
1991.
In
both
cases,
success
led
to
high
expectations.
The
public
and
the
armed
forces
came
to
expect
a
quick
and
decisive
victory
with
few
casualties.
In
this
environment,
a
politically
astute
opponent
can
exploit
military
vulnerabilities
to
his
strategic
advantage.
Sadat
offers
a
compelling
example
of
how
this
can
be
done.