
Conclusion 195
over-egging the justification but, in essence, what he planned to say was
a genuine reflection of the bishops’ position; they did not believe they
had conspired to be seditious, they had not rebelled against the civil
power, they had not resisted lawful authority – indeed they had been
passively obedient for too long. But they were willing to reject unlawful
government and resist a tyrant who was threatening the Church.
There the consensus ended. As far as the way forward, Lloyd and
Trelawny – after the acquittal – had crossed the Rubicon and were
committed to ejecting James; this was because they could not conceive
of James as a ruler they could trust. Sancroft, Turner, Ken, White
and Lake were content to support him, if James would stand by his
commitment to the ‘ten advices’ they had forced on him in the autumn
of 1688. Thus a conservative Anglican revolution, perhaps with an ele-
ment of the toleration of Dissent, was acceptable to the majority of the
bishops. But, by opposing James, and getting away with it, they had set
in train events which could not be controlled. The reality of the situa-
tion was, as Straka claimed, ‘from the Summer of 1688 and through the
Winter of 1689, the Church found itself less and less able to cope with a
revolution that it had to a large degree started’.
2
Others had seen in the
bishops’ petition, imprisonment, trial and acquittal that not only was
James in error, but that he did not enjoy popular support and could be
resisted. The aristocracy, the politicians and those who had disengaged
from James and stood on the sidelines, the man and woman in the pew,
the parson in his pulpit – all of them knew it, and that knowledge gave
them the courage and strength they had lacked before.
It is difficult to look at the trial of the bishops without indicting
James. The revisionists who have defended him are perhaps right that
such an approach is unhelpful. But, equally, the revisionists have given
James the benefit of the doubt that fails to take into account either
James’s own character, or the circumstances in which his opponents
found themselves. The problem for James’s revisionists is that even those
to whom he was closest did not trust him. In January 1689, Sunderland,
admittedly not one of James’s most truthful or consistent loyalists,
published The Earl of Sunderland’s Letter to a Friend, which argued that
he had tried to advise James well but that James was headstrong and
refused good counsel. Certainly this is consistent with Sunderland’s
dealings with James on the packing of Parliament, the postponement
of elections and the legal action James took against the seven bishops.
3
Nevertheless, Sunderland’s role, as J. P. Kenyon asserted, is open to the
question; if James was so impervious to his advice why did Sunderland
remain? But this denied the Cavalier Tory optimism, which Sancroft