2
n e o l i b e r a l   af r i c a
and Seabrook 2007; Engel and Rye Olsen 2005); it is also a product 
of  the  arguments  and  reflections  of  many  scholars  who  are  par-
ticularly  interested  in  Africa  (for  an  illustrative  set  of  examples, 
see Sender 1999: 89–90; for the orthodox view, see Nissanke and 
Thorbecke  2008: 1).  In the West more  generally, Africa is repre-
sented in the media and mainstream culture as remote, exceptional 
and  characterised  as  lacking  to  some  degree  or  other  the  proper 
properties held by the ‘international community’ or ‘globalisation’ 
(Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000: 245; Werbner and Ranger 1996). In 
broad sweep, and not without a little licence for flair of expression, 
Achille Mbembe makes a striking summary:
Africa … is portrayed as a vast dark cave where every benchmark and 
distinction come together in total confusion, and the rifts of tragic 
and unhappy human history stand revealed; a mixture of  the half-
created and the  incomplete, strange  signs, compulsive movements, 
in short a bottomless abyss where everything is noise, yawning gaps 
and primordial chaos. (2001: 3)
There  is  a  lot  to  take  in  and  unpack  here,  but  it  is  difficult  to 
disagree  with  the  import  of  this  overview:  public  and  popular 
cultures in the West tend to represent Africa in terms of absences, 
delinquencies  or  alienness  –  each  of  which  serves  to  reinforce  a 
sense of Africa’s marginality from any sense of global convergence 
and/or progress.
The  robustness  of  this  general  trope  is  all  the  more  striking 
for  the  fact  that  it  has  persisted  throughout  a  period  in  which 
another  discourse,  that  of  globalisation,  has  worked  to  represent 
the world as increasingly interconnected and converging (Rupert 
2000; Hay and Marsh 1999). Discursively, talk of globalisation can 
be understood as a recent and virulent incarnation of an expansive 
liberalism  (Hovden  and  Keene  2001)  which  aims  to  encapsulate 
national, cultural and economic differences as ephemeral: either as 
differences that don’t make a difference, as ‘historically contingent’ 
(Tsakalotos 2005: 894) or as ‘rigidities and vestiges’ (Bourdieu 1998) 
that  temporarily  encumber  liberal  realisations.  Within  this  view,