Hillstrom K., Hillstrom L.C. Vietnam war. Almanac
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administration sent a new wave of American
advisors into the country.
Warnings of collapse
During the spring of 1964, Johnson
received a number of reports about the situa-
tion in South Vietnam. When Defense Secre-
tary Robert McNamara (1916–) returned from a
trip to the troubled country, he told the presi-
dent that the Viet Cong had established con-
trol over large sections of South Vietnam,
including areas surrounding the capital city of
Saigon. “Large groups of the population are
now showing signs of apathy and indiffer-
ence,” McNamara stated. He added that the
South Vietnamese army was struggling to stay
at full strength because of high desertion rates
(soldiers leaving the armed forces illegally
before their terms of service had ended) and
widespread “draft dodging” (avoiding the military draft). At
the same time, he noted that “the Viet Cong are recruiting
energetically and effectively.” McNamara and most other advi-
sors warned Johnson that unless the situation changed in a
hurry, the Viet Cong might take control of South Vietnam
within a matter of months.
As Johnson and his advisors debated over how to pro-
ceed in South Vietnam, everyone agreed that none of the
options was very appealing. The Americans did not want to
pull out of the country, because they were certain that the
Communists would take it over within weeks of their depar-
ture. After all, South Vietnam’s government was in terrible
shape, and its military seemed dazed and discouraged by the
deadly guerrilla campaigns of the Viet Cong. But Johnson and
other top U.S. military and political leaders were also reluctant
to devote more troops, equipment, and funds to such a messy
situation.
Not surprisingly, many members of the Johnson
administration adopted a very negative view of South Vietnam
as a whole around this time. As Robert Shulzinger writes in A
Time for War, “the frustrations of U.S. officials boiled over into
80 Vietnam War: Almanac
U.S. Secretary of Defense
(1961–68) Robert
McNamara.
Reproduced by permission
of AP/World Wide Photos.
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a contempt for the South Vietnamese, the very people they
ostensibly [outwardly] wanted to help with their program of
assistance and military activities in the war.”
By mid-1964, the Johnson administration concluded
that it would probably have to take a more active role in Viet-
nam. “One by one, President Johnson’s advisors lobbied him
to send American ground forces and warplanes to Vietnam,”
writes Elizabeth Becker in America’s Vietnam War. “They
believed that if the United States did not fight the war and win
it, the South Vietnamese would fight it and lose, dragging
down the United States and most of the free world.”
Vietnam and the 1964
presidential election
At the same time, the Johnson administration had
begun planning for a wide range of operations related to the
war in Vietnam. These activities included instituting a military
draft to boost the size of the U.S. military, launching bombing
campaigns against North Vietnam, and sending American
ground troops to protect South Vietnam from the Viet Cong.
The officials hoped to avoid using these “contingency plans,”
(plans that are devised to prepare for possible emergencies or
events in the future) but they wanted to be ready if necessary.
President Johnson, however, did not publicize these
contingency plans. He faced a tough presidential election cam-
paign against Senator Barry Goldwater (1909–1998) of Ari-
zona, the Republican Party nominee. Johnson did not want to
bring Vietnam to the attention of the American public, which
still viewed the struggle there as a minor conflict. After all,
Vietnam was on the other side of the world, and U.S. military
personnel stationed there were serving as advisors rather than
combat troops. Fortunately for Johnson, Goldwater quietly
agreed not to argue about America’s military presence in Viet-
nam. Goldwater was fiercely anti-Communist, and he believed
that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was necessary.
Freed from defending American policies in Vietnam,
Johnson campaigned on his “Great Society” plans. He guided
a variety of education, anti-poverty, and anti-discrimination
legislation into law during this time, including the Civil Rights
Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) 81
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Bill of 1964 (a wide-reaching law that banned discrimination
in voting, jobs, and public institutions). Meanwhile, he pri-
vately expressed hope that he could avoid making big deci-
sions on Vietnam until after the election. He did not want to
lose South Vietnam to the Communists before the election. At
the same time, however, he did not “want to get the country
into war” before the vote either. The president knew that
either development would probably cost him a lot of votes.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident
On July 28, 1964, the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Maddox
was ordered to sail to the Gulf of Tonkin, a part of the South
China Sea. The ship’s mission was to provide support for South
Vietnamese commando raids along the North Vietnamese
82 Vietnam War: Almanac
The Vietnam War is often referred
to as an “undeclared war.” The U.S.
Constitution gives Congress the power to
declare war. It also grants the president of
the United States special powers during
times of war as commander in chief of the
American military. But the president does
not have the power to decide, by himself,
whether or not the nation goes to war.
In August 1964, U.S. warships
operating off the coast of Vietnam in the
Gulf of Tonkin reportedly came under
attack from North Vietnamese torpedo
boats. Even though it was unclear what
actually happened, U.S. President Lyndon
Johnson (1908–1973; president
1963–1969) chose to view this incident as
an act of war by North Vietnam against
the United States. He asked Congress to
pass a resolution that would authorize him
to take “all necessary measures” against
further attacks.
After Congress passed the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, Johnson used it as
permission to send troops to Vietnam.
From this point on, he and President
Richard Nixon (1913–1994; president
1969–1974) used their war powers as if
Congress had issued a formal declaration
of war. But the United States never did
declare war against North Vietnam. For
this reason, critics of U.S. policy toward
Vietnam have often referred to the conflict
as an “undeclared war.”
An “Undeclared War”
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coast. These raids were designed to gather intelligence on radar
sites and other defenses in North Vietnam.
The Maddox’s first few days in the Gulf of Tonkin
passed quietly. On August 2, however, three North Vietnamese
torpedo boats attacked the Maddox while it was on patrol. The
destroyer returned fire, sinking two boats. The last boat then
sailed off, chased by American fighter planes from a nearby U.S.
Navy aircraft carrier. On August 3, the Maddox was joined by
Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) 83
U.S.S. Turner Joy.
Reproduced by permission
of Corbis-Bettman.
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84 Vietnam War: Almanac
In early August 1964, a U.S. Navy
destroyer called the Maddox and a handful
of North Vietnamese torpedo boats
engaged in a brief fight in the Gulf of
Tonkin, off the shores of North Vietnam.
Two days later, the U.S. Navy incorrectly
reported that its ships had been attacked
by Communist forces for a second time.
The U.S. Senate and House of
Representatives reacted to this news by
overwhelmingly approving the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution. Over the next several years,
U.S. President Lyndon Johnson (1908–
1973; president 1963–1969) and his
administration used this resolution to
dramatically increase U.S. military
involvement in Vietnam.
What follows is the full text of the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution:
To promote the maintenance
[continuation] of international peace and
security in southeast Asia.
Whereas naval units of the
Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation
of the principles of the Charter of the Union
Nations and of international law, have
deliberately and repeatedly attacked
United States naval vessels lawfully present
in international waters, and have thereby
created a serious threat to international
peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a
deliberate and systematic [organized]
campaign of aggression that the
Communist regime [government] in North
Vietnam has been waging against its
neighbors and the nations joined with
them in the collective defense of their
freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting
the peoples of southeast Asia to protect
their freedom and has no territorial,
military, or political ambitions in that area,
but desires only that these people should
be left in peace to work out their own
destinies in their own way: Now, therefore,
be it Resolved by the Senate and House
of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the
Congress approves and supports the
determination of the President, as
Commander in Chief, to take all necessary
measures to repel [resist] any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and
to prevent further aggression.
Sec. 2. The United States regards as
vital to its national interest and to world
peace the maintenance of international
peace and security in southeast Asia.
Consonant [in agreement] with the
Constitution of the United States and the
Charter of the United Nations and in
accordance [agreement] with its obligations
under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty, the United States is, therefore,
prepared, as the President determines, to
take all necessary steps, including the use
of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting
assistance in defense of its freedom.
Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire
when the President shall determine that
the peace and security of the area is
reasonably assured by international
conditions created by action of the United
Nations or otherwise, except that it may be
terminated earlier by concurrent
[simultaneous] resolution of the Congress.
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution
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another destroyer called the USS Turner Joy. One night later, the
two ships, relying on radar information, reported that North
Vietnamese ships had launched a second attack. The American
destroyers returned fire based on their radar readings. They also
requested assistance from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga, which
promptly sent fighter planes to the area.
Reports of this second attack by North Vietnamese
forces triggered a strong response from President Johnson.
Stung by criticism that he should have reacted more strongly
to North Vietnam’s August 2 torpedo boat attack, Johnson
took advantage of the reports of a second attack to order an
immediate aerial assault on the North Vietnamese coastline. A
short time later, fighter bombers from U.S. aircraft carriers sta-
tioned in the South China Sea struck North Vietnamese patrol
boat bases and an oil storage facility along the coast. The
attack was America’s first major air strike on North Vietnam.
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Johnson also used reports of the second attack to ask
Congress for special authority to take additional military
action against North Vietnam if it became necessary in the
future. Working together, the president and members of Con-
gress composed a resolution that would give Johnson the
power to “take all necessary measures to repel an armed attack
against the forces of the United States and to prevent further
aggression.”
Johnson and his allies told the American people that
Congress’s vote on this resolution—known as the Tonkin Gulf
Resolution—was very important. They presented the vote as a
test of U.S. unity in the face of an “unprovoked attack” (an
attack for no reason) on American forces. Johnson and other
lawmakers hoped that the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would scare
the North Vietnamese into accepting the division of the coun-
try into North and South once and for all.
“[The Johnson administration] made it appear that
this was very important to support the President and that if he
had the backing of this great country, that we could make
North Vietnam understand that the United States couldn’t be
pushed around in this fashion and that they would in effect
Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) 85
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sue for peace, and it would end the thing there,” confirmed
Senator William Fulbright in The Bad War: An Oral History of
the Vietnam War. “That was the main reason for the urgency, to
create the psychological impact.”
The Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed easily. It passed in
the U.S. House of Representatives by a unanimous 416 to 0
vote. It also passed overwhelmingly in the Senate by an 88 to
2 vote. Only two senators—Democrats Ernest Gruening of
Alaska and Wayne Morse of Oregon—voted against the resolu-
tion. Gruening called U.S. involvement in Vietnam a “putrid
mess” and argued that “all Vietnam is not worth the life of a
single American boy.” Morse was outspoken in his criticism as
well. But they remained alone in their opposition, and John-
son signed the resolution on August 10.
Attack probably never happened
In the meantime, a U.S. Navy investigation into the
events of August 4 revealed that reports of a North Vietnamese
attack on the Maddox and the Turner Joy were almost certainly
wrong. Investigators discovered that stormy weather, false
radar readings made by inexperienced personnel, and misun-
derstood North Vietnamese radio messages all combined to
convince the ships that they were under attack, when actually
they were in no danger. But Johnson chose to keep this infor-
mation quiet. He wanted the increased military authority that
would come with passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.
As it turned out, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution failed to
convince the Communists in Vietnam to halt their efforts to
take over the South. The Viet Cong and their North Viet-
namese allies realized that the United States was a mighty mil-
itary power. Despite the threat of increased American military
involvement, however, they continued trying to unite Viet-
nam under a single Communist government. Viet Cong oper-
ations proceeded without pause, supported by North Vietnam.
Passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution did end up
being a very important event in the Vietnam War, however. In
the years following its passage, the Johnson administration
used the authority granted by the resolution to increase Amer-
ican military involvement in South Vietnam. These new activ-
86 Vietnam War: Almanac
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ities ranged from launching massive bombing campaigns
against North Vietnam to sending U.S. combat troops into the
conflict. In effect, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution granted Johnson
the legal right to wage war without actually declaring war.
Years later, however, Johnson admitted that the initial reason
for the resolution—the alleged North Vietnamese attack of
August 4—probably never even took place. “For all I know, our
navy was shooting at whales out there,” he said.
Johnson beats Goldwater
As the 1964 presidential election approached, Johnson
did not reveal his plans for Vietnam. He told voters that he was
determined to use the American military to help South Viet-
nam defend itself from Communist aggression. But he also
reassured them that the war would have to be won by South
Vietnamese troops rather than U.S. soldiers. “We are not about
Lyndon Johnson and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964) 87
Lyndon Johnson (left),
sitting with Robert
McNamara, reacts to new
problems in Vietnam.
Reproduced by permission
of Corbis-Bettman.
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to send American boys away from
home to do what Asian boys ought to
be doing for themselves,” Johnson
declared in October 1964.
In the meantime, Republican
candidate Barry Goldwater made strong
anti-Communist statements during the
presidential campaign. In fact, he once
remarked that the United States should
have dropped an atomic bomb on
North Vietnam ten years earlier. Such
comments allowed Johnson to position
himself as the so-called “peace” candi-
date. As the election grew near, the
American public saw him as someone
who would be less likely than Goldwa-
ter to involve the United States in war,
whether in Vietnam or elsewhere.
Boosted by public approval for
his “Great Society” programs and voter
distrust of Goldwater’s conservative
political views, Johnson marched to an
easy victory in the 1964 presidential
election. He won 61.2 percent of the
popular vote and helped the Democratic Party gain big majori-
ties in both the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Johnson prepares to increase American
presence in Vietnam
After his election victory, Johnson turned his attention
once again to South Vietnam. By this time, American officials
viewed General Khanh as a corrupt dictator who had no idea
how to beat the Viet Cong. In addition, widespread demon-
strations against Khanh’s government showed that he had no
popular support. Torn by economic, military, and social prob-
lems, South Vietnam seemed paralyzed by what U.S. Ambas-
sador Maxwell Taylor called “war weariness and hopelessness.”
Not surprisingly, these reports convinced the Johnson admin-
istration that the Saigon government was on the verge of polit-
ical collapse.
88 Vietnam War: Almanac
Barry Goldwater, a strong
opponent of communism,
was defeated by Johnson for
the U.S presidency in 1964.
Reproduced by permission of
Archive Photos.
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In December 1964, a group of South Vietnamese mili-
tary officers known as the “Young Turks” seized control of the
government in yet another coup. But American officials did not
believe that this new leadership was any better than the old
government. During this period, a few people advised Johnson
to withdraw American military support for South Vietnam and
accept the fact that the nation was doomed to fall to the Com-
munists. Senator Mike Mansfield, for instance, warned Johnson
in December that “we remain on a course in Vietnam which
takes us further and further out onto the sagging limb.”
Some officials also told the president that the expense
of increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam might prevent him
from pursuing his domestic programs. This possibility pained
Johnson greatly. “If I left the woman I really loved—the Great
Society—in order to get involved with that . . . war on the
other side of the world, then I would lose everything at home,”
Johnson later stated. “All my programs. All my hopes to feed
the hungry and shelter the homeless. All my dreams to provide
education and medical care to the browns and the blacks and
the lame and the poor. But if I left that war and let the Com-
munists take over South Vietnam, . . . there would follow in
this country an endless national debate—a mean and destruc-
tive debate—that would shatter my Presidency, kill my admin-
istration, and damage our democracy.”
After weighing his options, Johnson reluctantly pre-
pared to increase U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. He
decided that America’s political interests and international
reputation would not allow him to pull out of the war-torn
country.
But even as the Johnson administration prepared to
expand the U.S. military role in Vietnam, Communist victories
mounted. By late 1964, many provinces in the South were
under the practical control of the Viet Cong. Even the heavily
populated cities, with their large South Vietnamese military
presence, were not immune from Viet Cong activity. On
Christmas Eve 1964, a Viet Cong bomb destroyed a U.S. officer
barracks in downtown Saigon, killing two soldiers and wound-
ing dozens of other soldiers and civilians. Such incidents made
it clear that America’s looming battle against the Viet Cong
and their North Vietnamese leadership was going to be a grim
and bloody one.
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