
40 Chapter 2
Without this understanding, it is not possible for sociologists to develop an
adequate view of human personality, which must include a super-sensory,
super-rational dimension. The assumption of this aspect of human reality
is also necessary for a new ethics of absolute values, grounded in love and
asserting the spiritual unity of all human persons and the sacred value of all
human life. Such an ethos is the key to conflict resolution, and especially to
the prevention of global warfare that might destroy life on earth.
4. Burawoy’s emphasis on the values of freedom and liberation must be
counter-balanced by an emphasis on self-control and responsibility. Although
compulsory relationships (domination, oppression, etc.) are an extremely
important problem, the value of freedom is not, by itself, a complete or
adequate solution. Examination of the historical record shows clearly that,
during periods of warfare and revolution, there is often an excessive freedom
that ignores the restraints of law and morality and leads to indescribable
atrocities. Even in peacetime, excessive freedom is often destructive, when
it takes the form of extreme hedonism and licentiousness that undermine
social relationships, beginning with those in the family. Therefore, the quest
for freedom and liberation must be matched by a search for responsibility
and self-restraint.
5. Burawoy’s approach tends to regard justice as the ultimate value to be
served by sociology; but there are still higher values that sociology must also
serve. The historical record shows conclusively that the value of justice, by
itself, can be associated with intense and often violent social conflicts, as
each side struggles to acquire what it believes is its due, using whatever
means are necessary. This is easily seen, if we keep in mind that justice—es-
pecially in a legalistic sense—involves mainly “contractual” relationships,
with some elements also of “compulsory” social relationships (e.g., coer-
cion by the state). In other words, the parties in a relationship of justice do
not completely identify with one another; significant differences remain.
In order to attain social harmony and lasting intergroup peace, other
and higher values must be pursued, especially compassion, non-violence,
mutual aid, and unlimited love. Indeed, the very “hunger and thirst for
justice” implies that these other values, or virtues (see Jeffries 1998, 2002),
are already at work, especially when there is a manifest desire for justice for
other groups. These values are inherent in “familistic” relationships, which
involve the greatest unity of social persons and groups, and are the basis
of the greatest ethical systems, all of which preach some version of “the
human family.” Sociologists therefore should look beyond the objective of
legalistic justice, and pursue familistic ethics as their ideal.
If sociology does move in this direction, a new type of work may
emerge, one that is positive, hopeful, and even joyful. It is doubtless true,
as Burawoy contends, that many well-intentioned reformers have been
attracted to sociology in recent decades. But these have also often been