
Truthful Multicast T 975
Theorem 4 The non-VCG mechanisms designed for the
multicast structures LCPT, PMST, LST, VMST, NST are
not only truthful, but also achieve the minimum payment
among all truthful mechanisms.
Applications
In wireless ad hoc networks, it is commonly assumed that,
each terminal contributes its local resources to forward the
data for other terminals to serve the common good, and
benefits from resources contributed by other terminals to
route its packets in return. On the basis of such a funda-
mental design philosophy, wireless ad hoc networks pro-
vide appealing features such as enhanced system robust-
ness, high service availability and scalability. However, the
critical observation that individual users who own these
wireless devices are generally selfish and non-cooperative
may severely undermine the expected performances of
the wireless networks. Therefore, providing incentives to
wireless terminals is a must to encourage contribution and
thus maintains the robustness and availability of wireless
networking systems. On the other hand, to support a com-
munication among a group of users, multicast is more ef-
ficient than unicast or broadcast, as it can transmit pack-
ets to destinations using fewer network resources, thus
increasing the social efficiency. Thus, most results of the
work of Wang et al. can apply to multicast routing in wire-
less networks in which nodes are selfish. It not only guar-
antees that multicast routing behaves normally but also
achieves good social efficiency for both the receivers and
relay terminals.
Open Problems
There are several unsolved challenges left as future work
in [8]. Some of these challenges are listed below.
How to design algorithms that can compute these pay-
ments in asymptotically optimum time complexities is
presently unknown.
Wang et al. [8] only studied the tree-based structures
for multicast. Practically, mesh-based structures may
be more needed for wireless networks to improve the
fault tolerance of the multicast. It is unknown whether
a strategyproof multicast mechanism can be designed
for some mesh-based structures used for multicast.
All of the tree construction and payment calculations
in [8] are performed in a centralized way, it would be
interesting to design some distributed algorithms for
them.
In the work by Wang et al. [8] it was assumed that the
receivers will always relay the data packets for other re-
ceivers for free, the source node of the multicast will
pay the relay nodes to compensate their cost, and the
source node will not charge the receivers for getting the
data. As a possible future work, the budget balance of
thesourcenodeneedstobeconsideredifthereceivers
have to pay the source node for getting the data.
Fairness of payment sharing needs to be considered in
a case where the receivers share the total payments to
all relay nodes on the multicast structure. Notice that
this is different from the cost-sharing studied in [2], in
which they assumed a fixed multicast tree, and the link
cost is publicly known; in that work they showed how
to share the total link cost among receivers.
Another important task is to study how to implement
the protocols proposed in [8] in a distributed manner.
Notice that, in [3,9], distributed methods have been de-
veloped for a truthful unicast using some cryptography
primitives.
Cross References
Algorithmic Mechanism Design
Recommended Reading
1. Anderegg, L., Eidenbenz, S.: Ad hoc-VCG: a truthful and cost-
efficient routing protocol for mobile ad hoc networks with self-
ish agents. In: Proceedings of the 9th annual international con-
ference on Mobile computing and networking. pp. 245–259
ACM Press, New York (2003)
2. Feigenbaum, J., Papadimitriou, C., Shenker, S.: Sharing the cost
of multicast transmissions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 63(1), 21–41
(2001)
3. Feigenbaum, J., Papadimitriou, C., Sami, R., Shenker, S.: A BGP-
based mechanism for lowest-cost routing. In: Proceedings of
the 2002 ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Com-
puting, pp. 173–182. Monterey, 21–24 July 2002
4. Klein, P., Ravi, R.: A nearly best-possible approximation algo-
rithm for node-weighted Steiner trees. J. Algorithms 19(1),
104–115 (1995)
5. Nisan, N., Ronen, A.: Algorithmic mechanism design. In: Proc.
31st Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC99),
Atlanta, 1–4 May 1999, pp. 129–140 (1999)
6. Takahashi, H., Matsuyama, A.: An approximate solution for the
Steiner problem in graphs. Math. Jap. 24(6), 573–577 (1980)
7. Wang, W., Li, X.-Y.: Low-Cost routing in selfish and rational
wireless ad hoc networks. IEEE Trans. Mobile Comput. 5(5),
596–607 (2006)
8. Wang, W., Li, X.-Y., Wang, Y.: Truthful multicast in selfish wire-
less networks. In: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Annual inter-
national Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking,
Philadelphia, 26 September – 1 October 2004
9. Zhong, S., Li, L., Liu, Y., Yang, Y.R.: On designing incentive-
compatible routing and forwarding protocols in wireless ad-
hoc networks –an integrated approach using game theo-
retical and cryptographic techniques. In: Proceedings of the
11th ACM Annual international Conference on Mobile Com-
puting and Networking, Cologne, 28 August – 2 September
2005