Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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CHAPTER TWO
ON THE EAST EUROPEAN CHESSBOARD.
THE CRIMEAN KHANATE AND POLAND-LITHUANIA
IN THE YEARS 1523–1671
e troubled decade of Sa‘adet and Islam Girays (1523–1532)
e violent death of Mehmed Giray was followed by a decade of
domestic chaos. Having disposed of the khan, the Nogays invaded and
devastated the Crimean peninsula. Mehmed’s teenage son, Ghazi
Giray, who was once to be sent as hostage to Vilnius, assumed the
throne, but simultaneously Sa‘adet Giray set out from Istanbul to
Caa. Invited by the Shirins already during Mehmed’s life and sup-
ported by Sultan Suleyman, Sa‘adet Giray assumed the throne and exe-
cuted his nephew.
195
e new khan, who had spent many years at the
Porte, aimed to strengthen his rule by developing infantry and artillery
formations, shaped aer the Ottoman models, and modernizing key
fortresses, beginning with Ferahkerman (Perekop). A strengthening of
the khan’s power was certainly not the Shirins’ aim when they had pro-
posed to Sa‘adet Giray the throne of his brother. Consequently, when
Islam Giray, the oldest living son of Mehmed Giray, returned from
Nogay captivity late in the year 1523, many nobles gathered around
him initiating a new conspiracy. A ri also occurred within the Shirin
clan: while most of its members, including the qaraçı bey Memesh,
supported Islam Giray, Bakhtıyar remained loyal to Sa‘adet Giray.
196
Sa‘adet Giray promptly notied the Polish court of his accession,
expressing his wish to maintain the ancient friendship.
197
Yet, the internal
195
Hajvoronskyj convincingly dismisses an alternative version, according to which
Ghazi Giray ruled until 1524 and then held the post of qalga for another three months;
see idem, Poveliteli dvux materikov, vol. 1, p. 182, n. 13. e latter version is also con-
tradicted by the fact that already in 1523 Sa‘adet Giray addressed the Polish court as
the new khan; cf. n. 197 below.
196
On Memesh and Bakhtıyar, see Document 22, notes 7–8.
197
Tartarus novus precopensis a Turco constitutus misit huc suam amicitiam oer-
ens et a nobis talem optans, qualis erat cum defuncto; see the letter of Andrzej Krzy-
cki, the bishop of Przemyśl and former royal secretary, to the vice-chancellor Piotr
Tomicki, dated 26 July (in crastino S. Jacobi) 1523; published in Acta Tomiciana, vol.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 65
crisis in the Crimea encouraged Sigismund to reverse his policy.
In 1523, Lithuanian troops led by Ostaj Daškovyč, the starosta of
Čerkasy and Kaniv, destroyed the Tatar fort of Islamkerman on the
lower Dnieper and took along its captured artillery to Čerkasy.
198
Hav-
ing concluded an armistice with Muscovy in 1522, Sigismund did not
fear a rapprochement between Moscow and Qırq Yer, especially as
the potential allies were conicted over the Kazan issue. At the same
time, the king received an embassy from the Nogay leaders Agısh
and Mamay, who had engineered the murder of Mehmed Giray. e
Nogays asked Sigismund to release Sheikh Ahmed from Lithuanian
custody, oering in return their assistance in a conquest of Očakiv
and Islamkerman, whose permanent garrisoning by Lithuanian troops
would prevent future Crimean invasions.
199
In the summer of 1524, the Tatars led by two brothers, Islam and
Özbek Girays, raided the Polish Crown’s southeastern provinces.
In his later correspondence, Sa‘adet Giray presented this raid as a
6, p. 299. e khan’s letter, sent from Ottoman Caa to Cracow (dated in the Muslim
year 929 A.H., i.e., between 20 November 1522 and 9 November 1523), is entered in
the Lithuanian Register; see Moscow, Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arxiv drevnix aktov
[hereaer, RGADA], fond [hereaer, f.] 389, no. 7, pp. 884–885.
198
On Islamkerman, cf. Document 9, n. 31, and Document 22, n. 12. On Daškovyč,
the famous border commander who had previously assisted the Crimean troops in
their invasion of Muscovy (1521) and delivered the royal gis to the khan (1522), see
Kazimierz Pułaski, “Osta Daszkiewicz,” in: idem, Szkice i poszukiwania historyczne
(Cracow, 1887): 237–256, and Borys Čerkas, “Ostaj Daškovyč—čerkas’kyj i kanivs’kyj
starosta XVI st.,” Ukrajins’kyj istoryčnyj žurnal (2002), no. 1: 53–67. Čerkas corrects
Pułaski’s misassumption that Daškovyč destroyed Očakiv as well. e impression le
by Daškovyč’s raid of Islamkerman was admittedly so strong that it resulted in gossip
about the capture of Očakiv by a huge Polish-Lithuanian army, which spread early in
the year 1524; cf. Čerkas, “Polityčna kryza v Kryms’komu xanstvi i borot’ba Islam-
Gireja za vladu v 20–30–x rokax XVI st.,” in: Ukrajina v Central’no-Sxidnij Jevropi.
Studiji z istoriji XI–XVIII stolit’, [vol. 1] (Kiev, 2000): 97–118, esp. p. 101, and idem,
“Vojenna kampanija Velykoho knjazivstva Lytovs’koho ta Korony Pol’s’koji 1524 r. na
ukrajins’kyx zemljax,” in: Ukrajina v Central’no-Sxidnij Jevropi (z najdavnišyx časiv do
XVIII st.), vol. 2 (Kiev, 2002): 200–209, esp. p. 201.
199
Il’ja Zajcev, “Šejx-Axmad—poslednij xan Zolotoj Ordy (Orda, Krymskoe xan-
stvo, Osmanskaja imperija i Pol’sko-Litovskoe gosudarstvo v načale XVI v.),” in: Ot
Stambula do Moskvy. Sbornik statej v čest’ 100–letija professora A. F. Millera (Moscow,
2003): 31–52, esp. pp. 43–44; Borys Čerkas, “Ordyns’ka polityka Velykoho Knjazivstva
Lytovs’koho v epoxu peršoho lytovs’koho statutu,” in: Pirmasis Lietuvos Statutas ir
epocha. Straipsnių rinkinys. Edited by I. Valikonytė and L. Steponavičienė (Vilnius,
2005): 226–241, esp. p. 231; a slightly dierent version of the above article was earlier
published as “Ukrajina v polityčnomu protystojanni Velykoho knjazivstva Lytovs’koho
z Moskovs’koju deržavoju i Krymom u 20–x—30–x rr. XVI st.,” in: Ukrajina ta Rosija:
problemy polityčnyx i sociokul’turnyx vidnosyn. Zbirnyk naukovyx prac’ (Kiev, 2003):
11–24.
66 part one—chapter two
revenge for Daškovyč’s action, but in fact the khan faced too many
dangers to consider a full-scale invasion of Poland-Lithuania. e raid
was rather related to several other reasons: the Ottoman pressure on
the khan to attack Poland and thus distract Cracow’s attention from
Suleyman’s planned invasion of Hungary, usual economic factors that
made slave raids so popular among the Tatars, and, last but not least,
Sa‘adet Giray’s desire to keep the sons of Mehmed Giray far from the
Crimea. In the fall of 1524, Islam Giray returned from the Polish cam-
paign and openly claimed the throne. In the ensuing civil war, Islam
initially gained the upper hand, but Sa‘adet successfully withheld a
siege in the fortress of Ferahkerman. e khan was assisted by Sahib
Giray, who had le the throne of Kazan to his nephew, Safa Giray,
and arrived in the Crimea, assuming the post of the qalga. During the
domestic conict, both rivals aimed at securing foreign aid. In Febru-
ary 1525, Sa‘adet Giray sent a şartname to Moscow, inviting Vasilij III
to jointly attack Sigismund.
200
In turn, in August 1525, Islam Giray
notied Sigismund of his accession simultaneously inquiring about a
possible refuge in Lithuania.
201
e civil war ended in 1526 when both
sides reached reconcilement. As the price of agreement, the post of
the qalga was taken away from Sahib Giray and given to Islam Giray,
while Memesh, whom Sa‘adet had earlier deprived of the qaraçı post
in favor of Bakhtıyar, was reinstalled in this dignity.
202
e Crimean temporary reunication resulted in a large raid of
Lithuania, commanded by Sahib Giray. It proved unsuccessful and in
February 1527 the invaders were defeated near Čerkasy. If the raid
aimed to warn Sigismund against any rapprochement with the Nogays
and to prevent the release of Sheikh Ahmed, the eect was opposite. In
April 1527, the former khan le Vilnius and, escorted by Lithuanian
and Nogay cavalrymen, proceeded through Sluck, Kiev, and Čerkasy
to Astrakhan, where he soon managed to assume the throne.
203
200
Published in “Istoričeskoe i diplomatičeskoe sobranie del proisxodivšix meždu
rossijskimi velikimi knjaz’jami i byvšimi v Kryme tatarskimi carjami s 1462 po 1533
god.” Collected by A. Malinovskij [hereaer, Malinovskij, “Istoričeskoe sobranie”], in:
Zapiski Odesskago Obščestva istorii i drevnostej, vol. 5 (Odessa, 1863): 178–419, esp.
pp. 415–417. e military and political situation of Sa‘adet Giray was apparently so
desperate that he chose not to raise the touchy issue of Kazan; cf. Čerkas, “Polityčna
kryza v Kryms’komu xanstvi,” p. 103.
201
Čerkas, “Polityčna kryza v Kryms’komu xanstvi,” p. 104; idem, “Ordyns’ka poli-
tyka Velykoho Knjazivstva Lytovs’koho,” p. 230.
202
See Hajvoronskyj, Poveliteli dvux materikov, vol. 1, p. 173 and Document 22.
203
Čerkas, “Ordyns’ka polityka Velykoho Knjazivstva Lytovs’koho,” pp. 230–231.
On Sheikh Ahmed’s departure from Vilnius, see Acta Tomiciana, vol. 9 (Poznań, 1876),
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 67
Only then, the Crimeans reverted to diplomacy. A tting pretext to
resume peace negotiations was the arrival of a royal courier, Myxajlo
Hryhorevyč, dispatched to the Crimea already in 1526. e courier
delivered Sigismund’s request that a new hostage from the Shirin clan
should be sent to Lithuania in order to replace Djan Giray, the son of
Bakhtıyar, who had been detained since 1522.
204
Probably in the summer of 1527, Sa‘adet Giray sent an oath-yarlıq
(Ruth. jarlyk prysjažnyj) to Cracow. e document contained a long
list of accusations and complaints, but also a sworn engagement to
keep peace in the future. Having invoked the ancient friendship from
the times of Hadji Giray, the author regretted that in the times of
Mengli Giray and Casimir the latter had chosen to unite with Khan
Ahmed and his children, who had ruled the Trans-Volgine state (i.e.,
the Great Horde). In result, having no other choice, Mengli had allied
with “unworthy slave Ivan” (i.e., Ivan III) who, although being of low
descent, had never delayed sending his gis. Interestingly, Sa‘adet
Giray covered with silence his own overture towards Vasilij III, dating
as recently as 1525. e khan went on explaining the rise of Muscovy
and the territorial losses suered by Lithuania by the lack of coopera-
tion between Vilnius and Qırq Yer. He also expressed his amazement
that Sigismund preferred unruly Nogays to the Girays and treated the
Crimea “as if nobody had remained in the Crimean state and as if this
state had no foundation, being reigned by a petty ruler.”
Referring to the recent Crimean civil war, Sa‘adet Giray triumphantly
noticed that Islam Giray had prostrated before him “having placed a
wooden bar on his neck,” and had apologized for his ill-advised rebel-
lion. e khan, requested by Memesh, Bakhtıyar, and other council-
ors to forgive his nephew, granted him the post of qalga whereas the
former qalga, Sahib Giray, received in compensation several forts on
the lower Dnieper.
Referring to his relations with Sigismund, the khan expressed his
regret that the latter had never sent him embassy or gis “as was
customary among brothers.” On the contrary, Sigismund’s men had
destroyed the Tatar forts on the Dnieper and recently delivered Sheikh
p. 212. Having arrived at Astrakhan, the old khan notied King Sigismund that he
was well received in the Horde and his nephew, Qasım, resigned from the throne in
his favor; see RGADA, f. 389, no. 7, pp. 1010–1011.
204
On Myxajlo Hryhorevyč and Djan Giray, see Document 22, notes and 17–18.
Djan Giray earlier replaced his uncle Evliya (see above), who was allowed to return to
the Crimea only aer the former’s arrival.
68 part one—chapter two
Ahmed to the Nogays. e khan, whom the king “treated as a nobody,”
had therefore no other choice but to send troops against Poland-
Lithuania, rst commanded by Islam and Özbek Girays (i.e., in 1524),
and recently by Sahib Giray.
Notwithstanding the previous hostilities, the khan proposed to
Sigismund to restore friendship and jointly attack Muscovy on the
condition that the king would send him the overdue gis for the pre-
vious years, accompanied with tting presents for the qalga, the four
qaraçıs, and other Crimean notables. Having sworn, along with his
retinue, to keep friendship and set out against Muscovy, the khan
sent his oath-yarlıq through an envoy named Yankura (or perhaps
Yanchura). A great embassy was to follow, headed by Ma‘qul Mirza,
another son of Bakhtıyar and the khan’s nephew. In return, Sigismund
was to send his great embassy and release Djan Giray.
205
Islam Giray could not allow Sa‘adet to communicate with Sigismund
behind his back. erefore, he also sent an embassy to Cracow, invok-
ing the ancient friendship and regretting past disagreements. One state-
ment contained in his letter was much telling: “by the grace of God
I am also a son of the ruler in my state, hence I can prove friendship
to our friend or—along with my troops—I can really prove enmity
to our enemy.” Islam presented himself and his supporters from the
Shirin and Barın clans as Sigismund’s loyal friends, who had per-
suaded Sa‘adet to revive an alliance with Poland-Lithuania and attack
Muscovy. In analogy with the khan’s document, Islam Giray issued
his own oath-letter (lyst prysjažnyj). e document referred to an oath
taken by the qalga and his retinue members. e qalga’s court was
modeled aer the khan’s one and even included a senior councilor
from the Shirin clan, Aydıshke. In return for all his goodwill, Islam
asked Sigismund, to whom he referred to as his father, to send him
gis in the amount that used to be sent to his older brother Bahadır,
the late qalga of Mehmed Giray. Islam’s embassy, headed by Buydalı
Mirza, reached Cracow at the same time as the embassy of Sa‘adet
Giray.
206
e procedure of reconciliation, that was to culminate in Ma‘qul
Mirza’s great embassy, was interrupted by the outbreak of new hostili-
ties in the Crimea. In 1528 Sa‘adet Giray executed the Shirin qaraçı,
205
See Document 22.
206
See Document 23.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 69
Memesh, and defeated Islam Giray. e latter took refuge in Lithu-
ania, where he was granted pasturelands near Čerkasy.
207
In 1529, an
exotic coalition against Sa‘adet Giray was negotiated with Lithuanian
support between Sheikh Ahmed and Islam Giray. Yet, Sheikh Ahmed
died soon aer and Islam again reconciled with the khan.
208
Aer a relatively quiet year 1530, early in the year 1531 Ma‘qul
was nally sent to Sigismund as a great envoy and honorary hostage.
Unfortunately, later that year Sa‘adet Giray discovered a new Shirin
conspiracy. Bakhtıyar, Ma‘qul’s father, the khan’s former supporter
and the qaraçı since the death of Memesh, was executed along with
his brother Evliya and several cousins. e power of the Shirins was
seriously weakened and Sa‘adet Giray notied Sigismund that Ma‘qul
lost his diplomatic status.
209
In the last years of Sa‘adet Giray’s reign, the Crimean Khanate was
in fact divided. e peninsula, along with its main centers, was in the
khan’s hands, while the steppes on the lower Dnieper were controlled
by the qalga. Sometimes the two reconciled, to restart their ghting
on the nearest occassion. Whenever Islam was defeated, he could nd
refuge in Lithuania, protected by the powerful starosta of Čerkasy,
Ostaj Daškovyč. Daškovyč not only supported Crimean malcontents,
but oen raided Tatar territories along with regular as well as irregu-
lar troops that would later become known as cossacks. His protable
activity was sometimes undertaken with Sigismund’s consent, and
sometimes without royal knowledge. In February 1532, Sa‘adet Giray
set out against Čerkasy, irritated by the notorious activity of its com-
mander. Unlike in typical Tatar raids, the khan’s army was furnished
with artillery, but Daškovyč
withheld the two-weeks siege in March
1532.
210
207
Oleksa Hajvoronskyj explains the execution of Memesh and the outbreak of
new hostilities between the khan and the qalga by the raid of Muscovy, undertaken
by Islam and Memesh without the khan’s consent in the fall of 1527; see idem, Pov-
eliteli dvux materikov, vol. 1, p. 174. Yet, in the light of the documents sent earlier
by Sa‘adet and Islam to Sigismund, a Crimean attack against Muscovy was not so
unpredictable.
208
Čerkas, “Ordyns’ka polityka Velykoho Knjazivstva Lytovs’koho,” pp. 232–234.
209
On Ma‘qul Mirza, cf. Document 22, n. 19.
210
Čerkas, Ukrajina v polityčnyx vidnosynax, pp. 194–198; cf. Acta Tomiciana,
vol. 14 (Poznań, 1952), pp. 250–251, 254, 257. Anticipating his Lithuanian campaign,
in November 1531 Sa‘adet Giray renewed peace with Muscovy; his şartname, issued
“in November of the year 938” (the Muslim year 938 A.H. lasted from 15 August 1531
to 2 August 1532), is published in Malinovskij, “Istoričeskoe sobranie,” pp. 417–419.
70 part one—chapter two
Soon aer the failed siege of Čerkasy, new envoys arrived from both
Sa‘adet and Islam Girays and negotiations were resumed. In the sum-
mer of 1532, Sigismund decided to send two separate embassies: Andrej
Mackevyč to Sa‘adet Giray and Hleb Es’man to Islam Giray, explaining
in his letter to the Lithuanian Council that “in the present time there
are two khans in this Horde.”
211
e king also resolved that in order
to appease both Crimean rulers, they should receive 2,000 orins each,
but there was no need to send them more in the amount known from
the times of Mengli and Mehmed Girays. He argued that the horde
was weakened and did not pose a great danger; besides, the formerly
sent gis had not prevented Tatar raids.
212
Mackevyč was instructed
to ask the khan to swear an oath to keep peace with Sigismund and
send him a letter of agreement (dokončan’e) through the royal envoy.
Sa‘adet Giray was also expected to send his great envoy, in whose pres-
ence Sigismund would swear his oath and send him back along with a
royal letter of agreement. An analogous procedure was to be followed
by Islam Giray, although the royal instruction did not refer to the
qalga’s future envoy as “great envoy.”
213
Before the royal envoys le Lithuania, news arrived from the Crimea
about the abdication of Sa‘adet Giray and his departure to Istanbul.
Mackevyč returned from Kiev, asking for new instructions, and was
prompty sent again to the new khan, Islam Giray. Sigismund decided
that the gis previously prepared for Sa‘adet should be now given to
Islam and even augmented, since there was again only one ruler in the
Crimea. On the request of Islam, who had always kept good relations
with the Shirins, Sigismund also released Ma‘qul Mirza.
214
Aer Sa‘adet Giray, disenchanted aer so many years of contested
rule, abdicated and le for Istanbul, Islam Giray nally assumed the
long awaited throne. Yet, he was afraid of the Ottoman reaction and
desperately needed Sigismund’s support. is explains the fact that he
warmly received Mackevyč and immediately sent him back, provided
211
Teperešneho času na toj Orde dva cary zostaly; see Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr.
15 (1528–1538). Užrašymų knyga 15. Edited by A. Dubonis (Vilnius, 2002), p. 174.
212
Ibidem, pp. 173–174; cf. Čerkas, “Ordyns’ka polityka Velykoho Knjazivstva
Lytovs’koho,” pp. 237–238, and Ludwik Kolankowski, Zygmunt August, wielki książę
Litwy do roku 1548 (Lwów [L’viv], 1913), pp. 120–121.
213
Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 15, pp. 183–185.
214
See Sigismund’s letter to the Lithuanian Council sent in the fall of 1532, pub-
lished in ibidem, pp. 176–179. In the king’s absence, the Council was chaired by the
Lithuanian chancellor, Olbracht Gasztołd.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 71
with a solemn yarlıq. Curiously, this yarlıq was an almost literal copy
of the instrument issued in 1517 by Bahadır Giray during his meeting
with Olbracht Gasztołd in Čerkasy.
215
It is possible that Gasztołd, who
had become the Lithuanian chancellor in 1522, provided Mackevyč
with a copy of that old document when he was sending the envoy
from Vilnius in the royal absence. In his earlier correspondence
with Sigismund, Islam Giray had always invoked with esteem the
name of his late older brother. us, he apparently did not mind to
treat Bahadır’s instrument as a model for his own, new yarlıq. Has-
tened by an imminent Ottoman intervention, the khan simply cor-
roborated Bahadır’s document with his oath and seal, and sent it back
through Mackevyč.
216
e document again “granted” numerous lands
to Lithuania and provided for an alliance against Muscovy or any
other enemies.
217
e reign of Sahib Giray (1532–1551)
Islam Giray could not ignore the Ottoman power. In a vain eort to
gain the Porte’s favor, he ocially asked the sultan to designate a new
Crimean khan, hoping that he would be the chosen one. Yet, Suley-
man chose Sahib Giray, the former Kazan khan and Crimean qalga,
who had spent the previous year at the sultan’s court. Provided with
215
Cf. Document 18. Feliks Šabul’do, who by the way confuses Islam Giray with
Sa‘adet Giray, claims that the yarlıq from 1532 was based on an earlier yarlıq of
Mehmed Giray from 1515 (today unpreserved), and not Bahadır’s instrument from
1517. He argues that the engagement to send a Crimean prince to Vilnius, which
was entered in the document from 1532, could not have originated in 1517. Besides,
he maintains that the instrument from 1532 is stylistically closer to Mengli’s yarlıqs
from 1513–1514 than to Bahadır’s instrument from 1517; cf. idem, “Jarlyki,” pp. 262,
265–266. Although the now lost yarlıq from 1515 probably existed, the assertion that
the instrument from 1532 was based directly on that yarlıq seems unfounded. Con-
trary to Šabul’do’s statement, the promise to send a Crimean prince to Vilnius is also
present in the document from 1517. Stylistic dierences between the instruments from
1532 and 1517 can be explained by the possibility that Islam’s instrument, admittedly
more carefully edited, was based on another, today unpreserved copy of Bahadır’s
instrument, and not the one that is extant today, entered in the Lithuanian Register.
216
Such an explanation was already proposed by Borys Čerkas in idem, “Ordyns’ka
polityka Velykoho Knjazivstva Lytovs’koho,” p. 240. Residing outside of Qırq Yer,
Islam Giray was also deprived of a proper chancery that could issue a more sophis-
ticated document.
217
See Document 24. In comparison with Document 18, Byryn and Mumyš (unin-
dentied) are missing, while Karaul reappears; these dierences are certainly due to
careless copying.
72 part one—chapter two
Ottoman janissaries and artillery, the new khan set out from Istanbul
while Islam Giray—to his great disappointment—was again appointed
the qalga. Aer the events of 1475, 1478, and 1523, this was the fourth
Ottoman intervention that resolved the question of the Crimean
throne, and certainly not the last one.
e Ottoman-Polish relations, which had been hostile on the turn
of the 15th century, evolved in the following decades towards a cohab-
itation and then a formal alliance. In 1525, King Sigismund concluded
a peace with Sultan Suleyman, securing his domains at the cost of
abandoning Hungary on the eve of an Ottoman invasion. Aer
Sigismund’s nephew, the last Jagiellonian king of Hungary, perished in
the battle of Mohács, the Polish king unwillingly honored the Treaty
of Vienna (1515) that le Hungary to the Habsburgs, but unocially
favored an anti-Habsburg claimant to the throne in Buda, John Zapolya
(r. 1526–1540), who was also supported by Suleyman. In 1533, Suley-
man and Sigismund concluded an unprecedented treaty that belied
the ideology of Crusade or Djihad, ocially professed by both part-
ners, and—contrary to the Muslim law—was not limited to a certain
period of time. In 1536, an analogous treaty was concluded between
Suleyman and Francis I. In consequence, France and Poland-Lithuania
became the two pillars of Ottoman policy in Europe, directed against
the Habsburgs.
Given the rising Ottoman inuence in the Crimea, the rapproche-
ment between the king and the sultan should have positively inu-
enced the relations between the king and the khan as well. A relevant
question arose whether the Polish-Tatar relations were to be still regu-
lated between Cracow and Qırq Yer, or between Cracow and Istanbul.
In 1531, a Polish envoy returning from the Porte brought a letter from
Sultan Suleyman, who stressed that Sigismund did not need to negotiate
separately with Sa‘adet Giray since the khan was not a sovereign ruler,
owing his position to the sultan and obliged to obey him.
218
e same
question returned with the accession of Sahib Giray. Piotr Opaliński,
218
[. . .] calchularete che talle han non sia principe da per si ne in dyparte; see AGAD,
Archiwum Koronne Warszawskie [hereaer, AKW], Dział turecki, karton 66, teczka
29, no. 66; cf. Abrahamowicz, Katalog dokumentów tureckich. Dokumenty do dziejów
Polski i krajów ościennych w latach 1455–1672 (Warsaw, 1959), p. 41. e letter is
preserved only in Italian and Latin translations; for the Latin one, see Acta Tomiciana,
vol. 13 (Poznań, 1915), pp. 150–153. On the Polish embassy to Istanbul, headed by
Jan Ocieski in 1531, see Andrzej Dziubiński, Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko-tureckie w
latach 1500–1572 w kontekście międzynarodowym (Wrocław, 2005), pp. 82–85.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 73
a Polish envoy traveling to the Porte in order to negotiate the already
mentioned “permanent” peace between Sigismund and Suleyman, met
in Rumelia, in November 1532, both Suleyman and the new khan, the
latter on his way to the Crimea.
219
When the Polish envoy asked the
sultan to forbid Sahib Giray to attack the royal domains, he heard in
response, alluding to Islam Giray, that the king should not assist Tatar
malcontents. Both provisions were promptly registered in the Otto-
man ‘ahdname issued in Istanbul in January 1533:
Al prezente lo inperator di Tartaria, potentisimo, nominato Sachip
Cheraichan, el qual è cresuto a la nostra felicisima Porta e ne le nostre
inpreze ett operation suefato tanto, che li è nostro ol, ett esendo tra
noi l’amicitia, li avemo dito che ancor lui vi sia amicho, bisognia che voi
eciam teniati con lui bona amicitia ett operar di sorte, che Tartari over
parenti del dito inperator che non li siano obedienti ett scanpando da lui
abino da voi recapito e cercando aiuto, non li ascoltareti anci schazarli
del vostro paeze e perseguitarli.
220
e king was still unsatised with this clause and asked the powerful
Ottoman vizier, Ibrahim Pasha, to strongly order the khan to keep
peace with Poland-Lithuania. Ibrahim’s letter, written in July 1533,
contained a Pythian answer. Admitting that Sahib Giray was like a son
to Suleyman and owed his throne to the sultan, the vizier yet stressed
that the khan was a sovereign monarch and it was not tting to include
him in the instruments exchanged between other rulers.
221
Neverthe-
less, he promised to write to the khan, expecting that the latter would
maintain friendship with the king. In the years to come, the royal side
would oen try to inuence the khan by resorting to the Porte, but
it would not resign from maintaining direct diplomatic contacts with
the Crimea.
Having ascended the throne, Sahib Giray reconrmed Islam Giray
in the post of qalga and unwillingly accepted his rule in the northern
219
Dziubiński, Stosunki dyplomatyczne polsko-tureckie, p. 97.
220
e document, preserved only in Italian translation, is published in Kołodziejczyk,
Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 230–231. An analogous clause was entered
in the royal document, issued in Cracow in May 1533; see ibidem, pp. 232–233.
221
lakin müstakil selatin ‘ıdadından olub başka memlekete vali ve hakimdır bunların
‘ahdnamelerinde anun ahvali bile zikr olunub mukayyed olması münasib görülmeyüb
zikr olunmadı; see AGAD, AKW, Dział turecki, karton 67, teczka 35, no. 78; cf. Abra-
hamowicz, Katalog dokumentów tureckich, pp. 45–46; a contemporary Polish transla-
tion is published in Acta Tomiciana, vol. 15 (Wrocław-Cracow, 1957), pp. 68–69, and
Listy polskie XVI wieku. Edited by K. Rymut, vol. 1 (Cracow, 1998), pp. 39–40.