Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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104 part one—chapter two
and sent it through Broniowski and a Tatar envoy, Kazan Agha.
312
In
the same year, King Stephan declared war on Muscovy and recon-
quered Polack, lost by Lithuania in 1563. Aer another two years of
campaigns, in 1582 a peace was reached between Stephan and Ivan IV,
securing not only the restoration of Polack, but the annexation of
Livonia to Poland-Lithuania.
e Crimean-Polish reconciliation was favored by the Ottomans,
who needed Tatar assistance in their new war against the Safavids. In
the Transcaucasian campaign of 1578, Crimean auxiliaries were com-
manded by the khan’s brother and qalga Adil Giray, who fell pris-
oner and was executed in Iran a year later due to an illicit love aair.
In 1579, Crimean auxiliary troops were led in person by Mehmed II
Giray.
313
As the captivity and death of Adil Giray vacated the post of qalga,
Mehmed II Giray intended to grant it to his son, Sa‘adet Giray. e
move caused vehement reaction of the khan’s brothers, who felt that
their rights were violated. In the spring of 1581, the khan’s two cadet
brothers, Alp and Selamet Girays, ran from the Crimea heading for
Istanbul, but they were captured by the Cossacks in the Polish Ukraine
and delivered to the starosta of Čerkasy, Myxajlo Vyšnevec’kyj. Aer
intensive deliberations within the Polish Royal Council and interven-
tions from Istanbul and Baghchasaray, the Tatar princes were set free,
being rst made to solemnly swear that in the future they would keep
friendship with the Commonwealth.
314
Meanwhile, a compromise was
negotiated in the Crimea. Alp Giray became the qalga while Sa‘adet
Giray was given in compensation the new post of nureddin, created
especially for him. e introduction of the new dignity, reserved for
312
On the return of Broniowski and Taranowski from the Crimea and their fol-
lowing missions, respectively to Baghchasaray and Istanbul, see Dopierała, Stosunki
dyplomatyczne Polski z Turcją, pp. 84–88 and 93–97. e name of the Tatar envoy
who joined Broniowski, not provided by Dopierała, can be learned from later cor-
respondence (see n. 315 below). e text of Mehmed II Giray’s instrument is not
preserved.
313
Akif Farzaliev, Južnyj Kavkaz v konce XVI veka. Osmano-sefevidskoe soperničestvo
(St. Petersburg, 2002), pp. 87–97; Mustafa Eravcı, “e role of the Crimean Tatars in
the Ottoman-Safavi war (1578–1639),” Historical Yearbook 4 (2007): 153–160, esp.
pp. 155–158.
314
Dopierała, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski z Turcją, pp. 108–111; the younger of
the two princes, the future khan Selamet Giray, would later refer to his oath, taken in
front of Prince Vyšnevec’kyj and Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, in his instrument of peace
issued in December 1609; see Document 44.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 105
the Giray family members and standing in hierarchy immediately aer
the qalga, changed permanently the structure of Crimean politics.
Although King Stephan continued to send gis to the Crimea dur-
ing his conict with Muscovy, he was not satised with the khan’s
instrument brought in 1579.
315
In 1581, a new embassy was sent to
the Crimea, headed by a Lithuanian scribe, Andrzej Chorążyc. e
envoy was provided with a ready formula of an “amended” instru-
ment expected from the khan. Mehmed II Giray detained Chorążyc
almost a year and sent him back along with a Crimean great envoy
in November 1582. e khan declared that he issued a new instru-
ment, written word for word in accordance with the royal formula, but
simultaneously warned that his engagement would be void if the king
did not compensate the Tatars for the losses suered by them from the
Cossacks. e warning caused an angry reaction of King Stephan who
reproached the khan that the contents of his message contradicted his
outwardly peaceful declarations.
316
Repeated Ottoman invitations to join distant Persian campaigns
caused Mehmed II Giray’s growing irritation. Firstly, he did not want
315
In a letter to King Stephan, delivered on 5 January 1583 in Cracow, Mehmed II
Giray recalled that his earlier sealed instrument of agreement (Pol. dokończenie pod
pieczęcią), sent through his envoy, Kazan Agha, “had not pleased His Royal Majesty”
(i Wasza Królewska Miłość tego dokończenia nie polubieł); see Bibl. Kórn., ms. 280,
fol. 15b–17a; for another version, see Bibl. Czart., ms. 90 (Teki Naruszewicza), pp.
13–14 (its copyist misread nie polubiwszy as na polu bywszy, sic). e khan did not
refer to the date of Kazan Agha’s embassy, but it was apparently identical with the
mission of 1579.
316
On the embassy of Andrzej Chorążyc (alias Andrej Xoružyč; the family later
adopted the surname Obryński), see Dopierała, Stosunki dyplomatyczne Polski z Turcją,
pp. 123–125. e name of the Crimean great envoy who accompanied Chorążyc on
his way back to Poland is recorded in Polish sources as Kulozdem murza Bulha-
kowicz, Kulozdembi (i.e., Kulozdem bej) Bulganowicz, or Kubdembej Bulganowicz
(spelled in the Polish orthography, with the Slavic form of the envoy’s patronymic).
In his letter to the king, Mehmed II Giray announced that he sent an instrument of
peace (dokończenie) written word for word (słowo w słowo) aer the royal formula
and sealed with his golden seal (pod pieczęcią swą złotą, pieczęć swą przyłożywszy
posłałem); see Bibl. Kórn., ms. 280, fol. 15b–17a; Bibl. Czart., ms. 90 (Teki Narusze-
wicza), pp. 13–14; Bibl. Czart., ms. 89 (Teki Naruszewicza), pp. 285–287 (another ver-
sion dated 5 November 1582). Yet, from a preserved royal answer it appears that the
Crimean great envoy only announced the imminent arrival of the khan’s instrument
(przez niego rozkazałeś do nas, iże posłałeś nam dokończenie) but the king still did
not receive it as he insisted that the khan should conrm it with an oath (listeś swój
jako nam dajesz znać napisacieś kazał, przysięgą byś potwierdzieł); see Bibl. Kórn., ms.
280, fol. 35a–39a. Mehmed II Giray’s “ordinary” letters, brought to Cracow in Janu-
ary 1582, are preserved in several copies, but his instrument of peace is not extant.
Moreover, it is not certain whether it ever reached Poland.
106 part one—chapter two
to ght someone else’s wars while leaving behind his unruly subjects
and family members. Secondly, his nickname “Fat” (Semiz) alluded to
his growing incapacity to mount a horse. In 1583, he openly quarelled
with the Ottoman commander on the Persian front, Osman Pasha.
e latter received an order from Istanbul to depose the khan and
was simultaneously approached by Alp Giray, who had been dream-
ing of his brother’s removal. In 1584, a war broke out in the Crimea.
Mehmed II Giray besieged Osman Pasha in Caa, but his troops were
repulsed by the means of the fortress artillery and the guns of the
Ottoman eet.
317
Sensing defeat, the khan tried to escape but was killed
by Alp Giray. Contrary to the latter’s expectations, the Porte desig-
nated as the new khan another brother, Islam Giray, who had spent
numerous years in the Ottoman Empire as the guarantor of “proper
behavior” of their father (i.e., Devlet Giray).
e new khan introduced the custom of preceding the khan’s name
with the sultan’s name in the invocation pronounced during the Mus-
lim Friday prayer (khutbe), which became a visible sign of decline of
the Crimean sovereinty.
318
Islam II Giray’s position was further weak-
ened by the fact that three sons of Mehmed II Giray: Sa‘adet, Murad,
and Safa, found refuge in Muscovy. Sa‘adet Giray even temporarily
captured the Crimean throne, but was defeated. Fearing that the exiles
might be used against him, Islam II Giray resigned from any agressive
designs against the northern neighbor, even though Russia seemed
weakened aer the death of Ivan IV (1584).
In Poland-Lithuania, internal developements in the Crimea were
carefully watched. During the campaigns of 1579–1581, the engage-
ment of Tatar troops in Transcaucasia deprived King Stephan of a
potential ally against Muscovy, but the Tatars remained at least neu-
317
e internal struggle within the Giray family and the deposal of Mehmed II
Giray is narrated in the Ottoman chronicle devoted to the deeds of Osman Pasha;
for a recent facsimile edition, comprising miniatures depicting Alp Giray (p. 420)
and the defeat of the Tatar besiegers in front of the walls of Caa (p. 425), see Âsafî
Dal Mehmed Çelebi, Şecâ‘atnâme. Özdemiroğlu Osman Paşa’nın Şark Seferleri (1578–
1585). Edited by A. Özcan (Istanbul, 2006). On this conict and the subsequent
events, see also Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, “La Mos-
covie, l’Empire ottoman et la crise successorale de 1577–1588 dans le khanat de Cri-
mée. La tradition nomade contre le modèle des monarchies sédentaires,” Cahiers du
Monde Russe et Soviétique 14 (1973): 453–487, and Aleksandr Vinogradov, “Russko-
krymskie otnošenija v 1570–1590-x gg. v kontekste dinastičeskogo krizisa Gireev,” in:
Srednevekovye tjurko-tatarskie gosudarstva, vypusk 2 (Kazan, 2010): 274–299.
318
Smirnov, Krymskoe xanstvo, p. 443.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 107
tral.
319
Aer the turmoil in the Khanate, Broniowski was sent again to
the Crimea and returned in May 1585 along with a Tatar envoy, Ali
Mirza, who brought an instrument of peace issued by the new khan.
320
Yet, the document’s contents irritated the king since—like earlier
Mehmed II Giray—apart from demanding to send him ordinary gis,
the khan conditioned his goodwill on the expulsion of the Cossacks
from the Dnieper and compensation of all damages inicted by them
to his subjects. Eventually, the instrument was returned to the Tatar
envoy with a request that it should be taken back to the khan in order
to be amended.
321
e prominence of the Cossack issue in the Polish-Crimean cor-
respondence of that period is not accidental. King Stephan is justly
credited as the ruler who developed this semi-regular formation and
used the Cossacks in his campaigns against Muscovy. Historians still
disagree whether his plans of an anti-Ottoman crusade, pronounced in
the nal years of his reign, were genuine or rather served him to gain
legitimacy in the eyes of the pope and the Habsburgs, who still regarded
him as an Ottoman creature. What matters here is that aer the peace
with Muscovy in 1582, Poland-Lithuania did not enter any new war.
e Cossacks, unemployed and deprived of salaries and spoils, learned
to make their living by raiding the neighboring Crimean, Ottoman,
and Moldavian lands. It did not augur well to the future of Polish
319
A useful diversion was provided by Tatar raids of Muscovy in 1580 and 1581; cf.
Podhorodecki, Chanat krymski i jego stosunki z Polską, p. 188. Yet, these raids were of
a smaller scale and motivated by economic rather than political reasons.
320
In his letter to Marcin Kromer, the bishop of Warmia (Ermland), dated 1 June
1585, the king referred to a Tatar envoy (orator) who had brought a foedus in scriptis
from Islam Giray; the document was apparently in Turkish, because the king referred
to its being translated ex arabico in latinum; Bibl. Czart., ms. 91 (Teki Naruszewicza),
pp. 497–498. A year later, in his letter to Qalga Alp Giray, dated 8 April 1586, King
Stephan recalled that Ali Mirza (referred to as Alli murza) had brought him the khan’s
oath-letter (lyst prysjažnyj); see Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 594 (1585–1600). Edited
by A. Baliulis (Vilnius, 2006), p. 20.
321
See Bibl. Kórn., ms. 281, fol. 235a-235b; Dopierała, familiar with this letter,
addressed to Andrzej Opaliński and reporting the events at the royal court, did not
understand the phrase dlatego to przymierze król odsyła (“therefore the king sends
back this instrument of agreement”) and erroneously assumed that the king had sent
back the Tatar envoy along with his own, royal instrument of peace; cf. idem, Sto-
sunki dyplomatyczne Polski z Turcją, p. 140. In fact, the king had only sent back the
khan’s instrument with a request that it should be corrected. Today, neither the origi-
nal instrument of Islam II Giray, nor its amended version (if it was issued at all) is
extant.
108 part one—chapter two
relations with southern neighbors, although these relations remained
mostly peaceful until King Stephan’s death in 1586.
322
e following Polish election revived the hostility between the pro-
Habsburg and anti-Habsburg factions and evolved into a civil war.
Archduke Maximilian of Habsburg competed for the throne with
Sigismund Vasa, the son of King John III of Sweden and Queen Cath-
erine, the sister of Sigismund Augustus, the last Jagiellonian king.
In December 1587, the Swedish prince was crowned in Cracow as
Sigismund III, but the conict lasted till January 1588, when Maxi-
milian was defeated and imprisoned by Jan Zamoyski, the powerful
chancellor, hetman, and Sigismund’s chief supporter.
323
e interregnum, lasting over one year, certainly did not serve well
to appease the conicts along the southern border. Irritated by the
unstable situation in Poland, the Porte authorized a Tatar raid and
provided the khan with Ottoman janissaries. Islam II Giray departed
from Perekop in January 1588, but had to wait another month until
the Dnieper froze and enabled the passage of troops. Having arrived
at Akkerman, the khan waited for Ottoman reinforcements and unex-
pectedly died in early April. In his stead, his brother Ghazi Giray was
appointed the new khan and sent from Istanbul to the Crimea, but the
campaign against Poland was cancelled.
324
In the shade of the Ottoman-Habsburg confrontation: the reign
of Ghazi II Giray (1588–1608)
Ghazi Giray, the son of Devlet Giray, had participated in Ottoman-
Safavid campaigns and, taken prisoner in 1581, spent four years in
Iranian captivity. Aer a successful escape, he arrived at Istanbul and
322
In 1585 and 1586, the king twice prepared embassies that were to deliver gis to
the khan; yet, in both cases the envoys were recalled upon fresh news of a Tatar raid;
see Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 594 (1585–1600), pp. 20 and 52.
323
Zamoyski was to say that he would rather call Turks for help than let a German
[i.e., Maximilian Habsburg] into Poland; see Władysław Konopczyński, Dzieje Polski
nowożytnej (Warsaw, 1986), vol. 1, p. 176 [rst published in 1936].
324
See the raport of a Russian envoy, who arrived in the Crimea in February
1588 and witnessed the change on the khan’s throne: “Statejnyj spisok moskovsk-
ago poslannika v Krym Ivana Sudakova v 1587–1588 godu.” Edited by F. Laškov, in:
Izvestija Tavričeskoj učenoj arxivnoj kommissii, no. 14 (Simferopol, 1891): 43–80, esp.
pp. 67–69. On the dating of Islam II Giray’s death, see also Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-
tatarskie, p. 48.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 109
gained the favor of Sultan Murad III. Having ascended the throne,
the new khan simultaneously oered peace to Moscow and Cracow,
invoking his inuence at the Ottoman court, but in return demanded
to send him overdue gis. When a Russian envoy protested, nding
the Crimean nancial demands exorbitant, Ghazi II Giray retorted
that if not for his dissuasion, Murad III would have led a new expe-
dition against Astrakhan.
325
Almost at the same time, Ghazi II Giray
made an analogous oer to Cracow while his chancery prepared the
extensive list of Crimean dignitaries entitled to receive royal presents
(tiyiş) in addition to the annual gis due to the khan.
326
Although Sigismund III Vasa initially enjoyed the Ottoman support
as an anti-Habsburg candidate, his delay in sending a great embassy
to Istanbul soon led to a political crisis. In 1589, the Porte encouraged
Ghazi II Giray, who still waited in vain for the royal gis and was
furious because of a recent Cossack raid of Közlev, to pillage Polish
southeastern provinces.
327
In the following year, a full-scale Ottoman
invasion of Poland was expected, but the crisis was appeased.
328
In
1591, Murad III conrmed the peace with Sigismund III by a new
‘ahdname, while Marcin Broniowski was again sent to the Crimea
along with the royal gis. In the spring of 1592, Broniowski returned to
Poland, accompanied by the khan’s great envoy, Qasım, and provided
with two solemn documents. e rst one, referred to alternatively as
a yarlıq or an ‘ahdname, was addressed to the general audience: the
royal councilors and subjects. Recalling the ancient friendship, Ghazi II
Giray deplored that aer the death of Sigismund Augustus, during
the interregnum and in the times of Stephan Báthory, the Dnieper
Cossacks had been unleashed, protected, and even encouraged to raid
Muslim lands. eir raids provoked in revenge Tatar raids of Poland,
and hence the peace was mutually broken. Having acquitted that he
received the gis, recently brought by Broniowski from the new king,
325
“Statejnyj spisok moskovskago poslannika v Krym Ivana Sudakova,” pp. 79–80.
326
For the list (deer), dated 1 Shaban 996 A.H. (26 June 1588), see AGAD, AKW,
Dz. tat., k. 65, t. 124, no. 700; it enumerates the khan himself along with his mother
and four wifes, the khan’s younger brother and qalga Feth Giray, the nureddin Safa
Giray (Mehmed II Giray’s son, who had returned from exile in Muscovy), further—
male and female—Giray family members, and a few dozen of courtiers and retainers.
327
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, p. 59.
328
e reconciliation was reached with the help of the English diplomacy, inter-
ested in focusing the Ottoman energy against Spain, as well as the Jewish merchants,
involved in the Polish-Ottoman trade; see Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic
Relations, p. 125.
110 part one—chapter two
the khan expressed his hope that from then on, the gis and presents
for himself, his brother and qalga Feth Giray, as well as other Crimean
dignitaries, listed in a separate register (deer), would be sent on time,
and the Cossacks would be expelled from the Dnieper. In return, he
oered security from Tatar raids, the freedom of trade, the right to
buy salt in his domains, and the Crimean military assistance against
Muscovy in return for an extra monetary allowance. e envoys of
both sides were not to be detained longer than two months.
329
e second document, also referred to as yarlıq, was addressed to
Sigismund III and of similar contents. Like in his earlier negotiations
with Muscovy, Ghazi II Giray ascribed to himself the merit of dis-
suading Murad III from invading Poland. e khan quoted his letter
to the Porte, in which he blamed Stephan Báthory for unleashing the
Cossacks, since “the Hungarian kings had been old enemies of His
Excellency, [. . .] the illustrious padishah,” but defended the new king,
Sigismund III, from the sultan’s wrath. e khan also stressed that,
persuaded by Sigismund’s nancial promises, he rejected lavish oers
from Moscow, ordered a Russian envoy arrested, invaded Muscovy
in the previous year (i.e., 1591), and prepared a new campaign in the
upcoming summer.
330
e role of Cracow and Stockholm in instigating the aforemen-
tioned Tatar raids of Muscovy was not negligible. King John III of
Sweden, the father of Sigismund III, counted on a Tatar diversion in
his approaching war against Muscovy. In 1589, a Crimean embassy
traveled through Poland to Sweden, and in 1590 the Swedish-
Muscovian war began. In the summer of 1591, Ghazi II Giray reached
the suburbs of Moscow at the head of his troops, but the Russian capital
was successfully defended by Boris Godunov (the future tsar). In 1592,
another Tatar raid, headed by Qalga Feth Giray, devastated the region
of Tula. Nevertheless, in the years 1593–1594 a Crimean-Muscovian
reconciliation was reached and conrmed by solemn documents,
exchanged between Khan Ghazi II Giray and Tsar Fedor Ivanovič.
331
329
See Document 34.
330
See Document 35.
331
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 50 and 59; Carl Max Kortepeter, Otto-
man Imperialism during the Reformation. Europe and the Caucasus (New York and
London, 1972), pp. 110–112; Podhorodecki, Chanat krymski i jego stosunki z Polską,
pp. 121–122; Vinogradov, “Rod Suleša vo vnešnej politike Krymskogo xanstva vtoroj
poloviny XVI v.,” p. 64; Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov,
pp. 29–34.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 111
A major factor that contributed towards the Crimean-Muscovian
peace and made it durable for another 15 years, was the Tatar engage-
ment in the long Habsburg-Ottoman war (1593–1606). Aer the
khan was summoned to assist the Ottoman troops, in 1594 the Tatars
marched through Poland, heading for Transylvania and Hungary.
332
At the outset of the war, the Ottomans were challenged by the pro-
Habsburg stand of the rulers of Wallachia and Transylvania, Michael
the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) and Sigismund Báthory, who also exerted
pressure on Moldavia. To counter this challenge, the Porte resolved to
convert Moldavia into a regular Ottoman province, but this move pro-
voked a Polish response. Although Poland-Lithuania remained neutral
in the Habsburg-Ottoman conict, the devastations made by the Tatars
during their unathorized march in 1594 were deeply resented. More-
over, the turning of Moldavia into an Ottoman province infringed
Polish interests and made a direct Polish-Ottoman confrontation
imminent. In 1595, a Polish army headed by Jan Zamoyski, the Polish
hetman and chancellor, entered Moldavia with the aim to install on its
throne a pro-Polish candidate, Ieremia Movilă. From another direc-
tion, Moldavia was entered by an Ottoman-Crimean army headed by
Khan Ghazi II Giray, Qalga Feth Giray, and Ahmed Bey, the Otto-
man governor (sancakbeyi) of Bender and would-be governor-general
(beylerbeyi) of Moldavia. In October 1595, when a military confronta-
tion seemed unavoidable, a compromise was reached at Ţuţora (Pol.
Cecora) on the Prut river. Movilă was conrmed on the Moldavian
throne, but his status of an Ottoman vassal was to remain unalterable.
e Porte apparently tried to ease its relations with Poland in view of
its pending confrontation with the Habsburgs.
333
332
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, pp. 60–61; Bronisław Kocowski, Wyprawa
Tatarów na Węgry przez Polskę w 1594 r. (Lublin, 1948); on the Crimean participation
in the long Habsburg-Ottoman war, cf. Mária Ivanics, A Krími Kánság a tizenöt éves
háborúban (1593–1606) (Budapest, 1994).
333
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 126–127 and 298–302
(Documents 25–26). e instrument of peace, dated 12/22 October 1595 (the rst date
according to the Old Style) and composed in two versions: a broken Serbian and a
Polish one, was corroborated from the Muslim side by Ghazi Giray, Feth Giray, and
Ahmed Bey. e fact that the khan and the qalga corroborated the instrument on
behalf of the Ottoman sultan convinced the present author to regard it as a Polish-
Ottoman, and not Polish-Crimean treaty (on this issue, see also Part II). e pacica-
tion at Ţuţora has been studied by Kortepeter, who explains the conciliatory policy
of Ghazi II Giray towards Poland by earlier Ottoman refusal to secure the Moldavian
throne for the khan’s brother. At rst, the Porte openly ignored the khan’s wish by
appointing Djafer Pasha, the former governor of Shirvan, to the governorship of Mol-
112 part one—chapter two
e reconcilement of 1595 was conrmed by a formal ‘ahdname,
issued by the new Ottoman sultan, Mehmed III,
334
in November
1597. Due to some Polish reservations in regard to its contents, an
“amended” version was issued in August 1598. is second version
provided that “if an imperial [i.e., Ottoman] campaign is ordered in
any direction, while the Tatar khan with the Tatar army must set out
and head [in this direction], they should not enter Poland but they
should pass through another suitable territory, and they should not
annoy Poland.” Moreover, in the hope to gain Sigismund’s support
against Vienna, the Porte tempted the Polish king with the prospect
of conquering Kassa, Huszt, and Munkács—three northern Hungarian
fortresses held by the Habsburgs.
335
In parallel with the Polish-Ottoman rapprochement, negotia-
tions also took place between Cracow and Baghchasaray. Already in
November 1595, straight from the military camp at Ţuţora, a Crimean
envoy, Djan Ahmed Chelebi, arrived at Cracow in order to collect the
promised gis. While the delivery of gis was postponed until the
return of the Polish embassy from Istanbul, in 1596 Ghazi II Giray
was deposed in favor of his brother and qalga, Feth Giray, who gained
the Porte’s favor due to his deeds in the Hungarian campaign. Early
in 1597, Ghazi II Giray regained the throne and executed his brother,
promptly sending again Djan Ahmed to Poland in order to resume the
davia in May 1595. He was soon replaced by another candidate, Ibrahim Bey, the
former sandjakbey of Vize. Finally, in order to appease the khan, the Porte resolved
to appoint Ahmed Bey, the sandjakbey of Bender, who was a son of the khan’s sister.
Nonetheless, the Girays’ dream to exert direct control over Moldavia remained unful-
lled. Unable to secure their exclusive rule over Moldavia, they apparently preferred a
joint Ottoman-Crimean or even Ottoman-Crimean-Polish protectorate to an exclusive
Ottoman suzerainty; cf. Kortepeter, Ottoman Imperialism, pp. 142–146. e informa-
tion regarding the relation between Ghazi II Giray and Ahmed Bey (referred to as
sororis lius chani) origins from a contemporary chronicle by Reinhold Heidenstein;
see idem, Vitae Joannis Zamoyscii, in: Collectanea vitam resque gestas Joannis Zamoy-
scii magni cancellarii et summi ducis Reipublicae Polonae. Edited by A. Działyński
(Poznań, 1861), p. 121. On the successive appointments of Djafer Pasha and Ibrahim
Bey to the governorship of Moldavia, see Mihai Maxim, “Voyvodalık ou beğlerbeğilik?
La politique ottomane envers les principautés roumaines (novembre 1594—février
1596) à la lumière des nouveaux documents turcs,” in: idem, Romano-Ottomanica.
Essays and Documents from the Turkish Archives (Istanbul, 2001): 163–172, esp. pp.
168–172.
334
Murad III died in January 1595; his death was ominous for his protégé, Ghazi
Giray, who was to suer a temporary deposition the following year.
335
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 127 and 303–323 (for
the two new clauses, see pp. 321 and 323). Today Košice is located in Slovakia, and
Xust and Mukačeve in Ukrainian Transcarpathia.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 113
negotiations. e Tatar envoy was detained over one year but nally,
on 21 April 1598, Sigismund III issued an instrument of peace, to be
sent to the khan through a royal envoy, Nikodem Kossakowski.
336
e royal document referred to the preliminary agreement reached
at Ţuţora between Ghazi II Giray and Jan Zamoyski, and contained
clauses regarding: mutual friendship, military alliance against Mus-
covy and other common enemies, remission of past transgressions,
freedom of trade, and conrmation of Ieremia Movilă on the Mol-
davian throne. e royal customary gis were to be transported each
year to Akkerman. A highly contradictory clause asserted the Polish
right to the access to the Black Sea and simultaneously required that
Tatar troops should not pass through Poland while heading for mili-
tary campaigns against other states. Having in mind that Tatar aux-
iliaries regularly participated in Ottoman campaigns in Hungary, it
was obvious that they could not omit the Polish territory if it really
extended to the Black Sea! Nevertheless, this clause was to reappear in
the Polish-Crimean treaties until 1624. In fact, Poland-Lithuania had
tacitly resigned from the access to the Black Sea already by 1542, but
it was ocially conrmed only by the Polish-Ottoman demarcation
of 1633.
337
Although the royal instrument invoked the tradition of friendship
dating back to the times of Mengli Giray and Sigismund I, in a sepa-
rate instruction Kossakowski was specically ordered not to accept the
customary clause contained in the ancient treaties, by which the khans
“granted” Kiev and other lands to Lithuania, because the Tatars “could
not donate a thing that had never belonged to them.”
338
e envoy
336
In fact, the envoy was provided with two versions of the royal instrument. In the
second one, the king unwillingly conceded to the khan’s previous request and engaged
to restrain the Cossacks, but Kossakowski was instructed not to display it unless in
the utmost necessity. e royal chancery hoped that the khan would accept the rst
version, in which the Cossack issue was not mentioned. Today only the text of the rst
version, which was actually used by Kossakowski, is extant. On the Polish-Crimean
diplomatic relations in the years 1595–1599, see Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie,
pp. 66–90; idem, “Poselstwo na Krym Nikodema Kossakowskiego. Przyczynek do sto-
sunków polsko-tatarskich w ostatnich latach XVI wieku,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 108
(2001), no. 2, pp. 25–42.
337
See Document 36. On the Black Sea issue, cf. Kołodziejczyk, “Inner Lake or
Frontier? e Ottoman Black Sea in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” pp.
129–130.
338
Skorupa, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie, p. 79. On this issue, cf. notes 143–144 in
Part II.