Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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24 part one—chapter one
Historians still disagree on Mengli’s real intentions in 1480. Was his
desire to keep peace with Casimir genuine, frustrated only by the king’s
indecisiveness? Or was the khan just buying time, trying to soen the
Lithuanian stand during the decisive confrontation between Muscovy
and the Great Horde?
When Hlyns’kyj was on his way back from the Crimea, Khan
Ahmed had already been waiting three months for Lithuanian rein-
forcements, in order to begin a planned joint invasion of Muscovy.
e reinforcements never arrived and the khan, having encountered a
strong Muscovian army across the Ugra river, returned home without
an actual ghting. e “Ugra stando ” of 1480 was to arise in the
Russian national mythology to the symbolic end of the “Tatar yoke,”
especially as Ahmed perished soon aerwards in an engagement with
dissatised Nogays.
72
Whatever the actual importance of these events
was, Mengli Giray’s luring Casimir into peace negotiations, interrupted
by the Crimean raid in September, certainly did not help the king to
organize assistance for his distant ally.
Following Ahmed’s death in January 1481, Temir, a powerful Nogay
leader, whose role in the Great Horde was similar to that of Eminek’s
in the Crimea, asked Mengli Giray for protection over the late khan’s
sons. e protection was surprisingly granted, but soon aer the rela-
tions between the two hordes deteriorated anew and later in the same
year a large raid of the Great Horde devastated the Crimea. Having
suered humiliation and defeat, Mengli Giray could no longer ignore
monits from Moscow, reminding him of his treaty obligations against
Vilnius, and besides he apparently wanted to make up for the losses
suered by the Crimean economy.
In September 1482, a large Crimean army conquered, burned and
looted Kiev, taking numerous captives, including the palatine Ivan
Xodkevyč (Pol. Chodkiewicz) along with his family. Although no
invasion of comparable size occurred aer that date, the Lithuanian-
Crimean relations became openly hostile and embassies were rare.
In the following decade, Mengli Giray was again busy combating the
khans of the Great Horde: Murtaza, Seyyid Ahmed (not to be confused
Metrika. Otdel pervyj. Čast’ pervaja: Knigi zapisej. Tom pervyj. Edited by I. Lappo
(St. Petersburg, 1910), cols. 333–334; and (in Latin script) by Pułaski.
72
For a recent reevaluation of these events, see Khodarkovsky, Russia’s Steppe
Frontier, pp. 77–82.
genghisid legacy: shaping eastern europe (1240–1523) 25
with Tokhtamısh’s grandson, long dead by that time), and Sheikh
Ahmed, commonly referred to in his correspondence as “the children
of Ahmed” (axmatovy dety). Also Ivan III temporarily turned his
attention to the north and east, capturing Tver (1485) and making rst
eorts to subjugate Kazan. Casimir faced an imminent danger from
the south, when in 1484 the Ottoman sultan Bayezid II invaded Mol-
davia, which was a Polish tributary, and annexed two Black Sea ports,
Kilia and Moncastro (known to the Slavs as Bil’horod/Białogród and
to the Turks as Akkerman). All this contributed towards less intensive
diplomatic and military contacts between Vilnius and Qırq Yer. Some-
what surprisingly, in the years 1487–1491 Lithuania faced three raids
of the Great Horde, its supposed-to-be ally, apparently undertaken for
economic reasons.
In 1491, the nomads of the Great Horde, who in the preceding
years had grazed their herds on the lower Dnieper, retreated to the
Volga, relieving their pressure from both the Lithuanian and Crimean
borderlands. In the spring of 1492, Mengli Giray notied Ivan III of
his construction of a new fort on the lower Dnieper, on the “royal
land” below the river crossing named Tavan’ (na korolevoj zemli niže
Tavani), declaring his readiness to march against Kiev by harvest
time, providing that he received Muscovian reinforcements. e khan
expressed his hope that, God permitting, the two allies would soon
take Vilnius and Cracow.
73
Writing his letter, Mengli Giray was unaware of Casimir’s death
on 7 June 1492 that was to trigger a full-scale Muscovian invasion
of Lithuania. e Lithuanian-Muscovian war of 1492–1494 resulted
in the Muscovian annexation of the lands on the upper Oka (apart
from Mcensk and Ljubutsk), once “granted” to Lithuania in Mengli’s
yarlıq.
74
e death of Casimir also terminated the Polish-Lithuanian union
as the thrones of Poland and Lithuania were divided among his sons,
73
Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 1, pp. 148–153. For a convincing local-
ization of the new fort at the mouth of the Tjahynka, a right tributary of the Dnieper,
see Vladimir Syroečkovskij, “Puti i uslovija snošenij Moskvy s Krymom na rubeže
XVI veka,” Izvestija Akademii Nauk SSSR, VII serija: Otdelenie obščestvennyx nauk 3
(1932): 193–237, esp. pp. 218–221.
74
On these lands and the shiing loyalties of their autonomous princes, see Mixail
Krom, Mež Rus’ju i Litvoj: Zapadnorusskie zemli v sisteme russko-litovskix otnošenij
konca XV—pervoj treti XVI v. (Moscow, 1995).
26 part one—chapter one
respectively John Albert and Alexander.
75
Admittedly, the two brothers
cooperated in their foreign policy and mutually consulted important
decisions.
76
Curiously enough, Mengli Giray, still unaware of Casimir’s
death, notied the Lithuanian court of his construction plans on the
lower Dnieper, not disclosing his designs of a large scale Crimean-
Muscovian invasion. His letter was answered on 27 June 1492 already
by Grand Duke Alexander, who notied the khan of his father’s
death and expressed his amazement that Mengli wished to violate his
own yarlıq, in which he had granted the disputed lands to Lithuania.
Referring to the new Tatar fort on the Dnieper as Tjahyn, Alexander
stressed that if Mengli Giray behaved in a peaceful manner, he could
receive it as a ef.
77
In 1493 Lithuanian troops, commanded by two Tatar “renegades:”
Prince Bohdan Hlyns’kyj and Özdemir, Mengli’s youngest brother
remaining in Lithuanian service, destroyed Tjahyn. e infuriated
khan sent his troops to raid the Lithuanian Ukraine.
78
In 1494, the
Crimeans reached Volhynia and defeated the Lithuanian-Polish troops
at Vyšnivec’, while Mengli Giray began the construction of a new
Dnieper fort that later became known as Djankerman or Djankermen
(lit. “New Town”) to the Tatars and as Očakov to the Slavs (today Ukr.
Očakiv).
79
A peace between Vilnius and Moscow, concluded in 1494
and cemented by Alexander’s marriage with Ivan’s daughter, did not
75
e union was reestablished in 1501 when Alexander was elected the king
of Poland aer John Albert’s death. For the rst time such a break of the Polish-
Lithuanian union occurred in 1440, when the Lithuanian lords put Casimir on the
throne of the Grand Duchy without consulting his older brother, Vladislaus III, who
had been the king of Poland since the death of Vladislaus II (Jogaila) in 1434. e
death of Vladislaus III (also the king of Hungary) in the battle of Varna (1444) enabled
the election of Casimir to the Polish throne and the reestablishment of the union in
1447.
76
In the same period Casimir’s oldest son, Vladislaus, was the king of Bohemia
(1471–1516) and Hungary (1490–1516). Yet, notwithstanding a lip service paid by
the three brothers to the idea of an anti-Ottoman crusade, the Jagiellonian foreign
policy never attained the level of homogeneity that was later attributed to the House
of Habsburg.
77
Lietuvos Metrika (1427–1506). Knyga Nr. 5. Užrašymų knyga 5. Edited by E. Ban-
ionis (Vilnius, 1993), pp. 55–56; the letter was earlier published by Pułaski.
78
e modern term Ukraine, referring to a European state, originally referred to
the borderlands of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, especially its southern borderland
inhabited by a mixed Ruthenian-Tatar population.
79
e new fort was situated in the Dnieper and Boh estuary, in a better defensible
site; see Vladimir Syroečkovskij, “Puti i uslovija snošenij Moskvy s Krymom na rubeže
XVI veka,” pp. 220–221.
genghisid legacy: shaping eastern europe (1240–1523) 27
prevent Tatars from further raids of Lithuania, although in 1496 both
sides returned to negotiations and Alexander urged Mengli Giray to
send him an oath letter (lyst prysjažnyj).
80
In 1497, in a much delayed reaction to the Ottoman conquest of
Kilia and Akkerman, King John Albert led the Polish troops to Mol-
davia. e ocial aim of his expedition was an anti-Ottoman cru-
sade that was to result in the reconquest of the Black Sea ports. Less
openly, the Jagiellonians also planned to remove Stephan the Great,
whose policy was too independent for their taste, from the Moldavian
throne and replace him with their younger brother, Sigismund (the
future king of Poland). Sensing the danger, Stephan sided with the
Ottomans and the Polish king suered a humiliating defeat from his
former vassal.
ough Lithuania did not participate in the Polish-Ottoman war,
Alexander gathered his troops in southern provinces. A planned Lith-
uanian attack against Mengli Giray, coordinated with a Polish advance
in Moldavia and an invasion of the Great Horde from the east, did
not materialize, but a Lithuanian commander, Kostjantyn Ostroz’kyj
(Pol. Konstanty Ostrogski), defeated Crimean troops in a battle near
Braclav, where Mengli’s son and the future khan, Mehmed Giray, was
wounded and temporarily captured.
81
A formidable Ottoman-Crimean revenge occurred in 1498, when
the Muslim troops reached as far as Sanok in present-day Poland. A
Turkish undated map, preserved in the Topkapı Palace and depicting
a planned attack of Ottoman galleys against Kiev, origins probably
from that period.
82
In 1499 Polish-Ottoman negotiations began, result-
ing in a truce that was converted into a lasting peace by 1503.
83
Simul-
taneously, a peace was proposed by Mengli Giray to Alexander on the
condition that the latter would pay him a tribute.
84
e oer would
almost certainly have been rejected, if Muscovy had not resumed its
80
Lietuvos Metrika (1427–1506). Knyga Nr. 5, p. 111; the letter was earlier pub-
lished by Pułaski.
81
For the chronology of military engagements in the years 1493–1497, see
Kolankowski, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, pp. 417–422 and 429–436.
82
Abrahamowicz, “Stara turecka mapa Ukrainy z planem wysadzenia dnieprzańskich
porohów i ataku oty tureckiej na Kijów,” Studia Historyczne 44 (2001): 3–23, esp. p. 20.
83
Cf. Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th
Century). An Annotated Edition of ‘Ahdnames and Other Documents (Leiden, 2000),
pp. 111–113.
84
Kolankowski, Dzieje Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, p. 441.
28 part one—chapter one
attack on Lithuania in 1500. In dire circumstances, Alexander empow-
ered his envoy Dmytryj Putjatyč, the palatine of Kiev, to secretly oer
Mengli Giray a tribute from the provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, and Pod-
olia, calculating three grossi (Ruth. den’hy) yearly per a subject’s head,
and in addition a tribute from the recently lost province of Putyvl’,
if the khan assisted Alexander to reconquer it from the Muscovites.
85
However, on the eve of Putjatyč’s departure, his mission was cancelled
and an oensive alliance was concluded instead with Sheikh Ahmed,
the khan of the Great Horde.
86
In 1501, Sheikh Ahmed along with his troops and people entered
eastern Lithuanian provinces, pushing out the Muscovian troops from
their recent conquests: the regions of Ryl’sk, Novhorod-Sivers’kyj, and
Starodub.
87
e khan urged Alexander to join the oensive, but the lat-
ter was busy securing the Polish throne aer the death of his brother,
John Albert. Sheikh Ahmed’s initial success turned into a disaster due
to both natural and human reasons: the extremely harsh winter of
1501/1502 and Mengli Giray’s order to burn the steppe.
88
Facing star-
vation, most of Ahmed’s subjects, including his own wife, defected to
the Crimea and submitted to Mengli. In June 1502, Mengli defeated
the remnants of the Great Horde on the Sula river, forcing Ahmed
to take refuge on the Volga.
89
In the following winter also Tevkel, the
son of Temir, the powerful Nogay leader and a leading gure in the
Great Horde, entered Mengli’s service. Tevkel’s descendants would
later form a powerful Crimean clan of the Manghıts (also referred to
as Mansurs). Late in the year 1503, Sheikh Ahmed returned to the
Black Sea steppe in vain hope of regaining the loyalty of his people, but
he was chased out by the Crimean troops. Having arrived at Kiev, he
85
See the instruction dated 27 November 1500, in Lietuvos Metrika (1427–1506).
Knyga Nr. 5, pp. 154–156; it was earlier published by Pułaski.
86
See Egidijus Banionis, Lietuvos Didžiosios Kunigaikštystės pasiuntinybių tarnyba
XV–XVI amžiais (Vilnius, 1998), p. 100.
87
See the letter of Sheikh Ahmed to Alexander, in Lietuvos Metrika (1427–1506).
Knyga Nr. 5, p. 170; it was earlier published by Pułaski.
88
See Mengli’s letter to Ivan III, reporting his order to set re in the steppe in order
to prohibit wintering to Ahmed’s people (i jaz velel požary puskati, čtoby im negde
zimovati), in Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij, vol. 1, pp. 377.
89
Leslie Collins convincingly demonstrated that the historical tales of Mengli’s cap-
ture of the Horde’s capital of Saray on the Volga resulted from a misunderstanding.
Mengli would not have time in 1502 to lead an expedition to the Volga and the whole
drama was resolved solely on the Dnieper and Sula rivers. When relating “the cap-
ture of the Horde” by Mengli Giray, Russian chroniclers referred to Sheikh Ahmed’s
mobile military camp (ordu) and not his town on the Volga (cf. n. 90 below).
genghisid legacy: shaping eastern europe (1240–1523) 29
would then spend over two decades in Lithuanian custody, regarded as
the warranty of good behavior from the side of the Crimean khans.
90
e catastrophe of Sheikh Ahmed certainly did not help Lithuania
in its war against Muscovy. In 1503, a truce was concluded between
Alexander and Ivan III, sanctioning the Muscovian annexation of the
last Lithuanian strongholds on the Oka (Mcensk and Ljubutsk) and
vast tracts on the Sejm and Desna rivers, with such important centers
as Putyvl’, Ryl’sk, Kursk, Černihiv, Novhorod-Sivers’kyj, Starodub,
and Brjansk, all of them once listed in the yarlıqs of Hadji Giray and
Mengli Giray.
Mengli Giray proved Ivan’s valuable ally by both destroying (or
rather absorbing) the Great Horde and weakening Lithuania through
constant raids. Yet, not unexpectedly, their common success bore
seeds of a future conict. Both Ivan III and Mengli Giray had political
plans regarding Kazan. rough a political marriage with Nur Sultan,
the widow of the Kazan khan, Ibrahim (d. 1479), Mengli had become
the stepfather of two competitors for the Kazan throne: Muhammed
Emin and Abdullatif. As long as Sheikh Ahmed was dangerous,
Mengli coordinated his policy with Ivan III and had to swallow the
latter’s interventions in Kazan’s internal aairs, such as the one in
1502, resulting in the removal and arrest of Abdullatif and his replac-
ing with Muhammed Emin.
91
Yet, having chased out Sheikh Ahmed
and secured loyalty of many of his subjects, Mengli gained strength
and prestige that validated his aspirations to the heritage of the Golden
Horde. e change of his Weltanschauung was best demonstrated by
his repeated demands of a tribute from Moscow, rising in frequency
since the beginning of the 16th century. e reorientation of Mengli’s
foreign policy was inuenced by a fresh newcomer, Tevkel, once the
advisor of Sheikh Ahmed and also Nur Sultan’s brother, who remem-
bered well his lost pasturelands on the Volga.
92
Apart from the Volga, Ivan III and Mengli Giray soon found
another area of contest in result of the Muscovian expansion towards
the Dnieper. e Crimeans did not resign from raiding the former
90
For a reconstruction of events, see Collins, “On the Alleged ‘Destruction’ of
the Great Horde in 1502,” pp. 369, 381–382, and 388–397. On the imprisonment of
Sheikh Ahmed in Lithuania, see also Document 9, notes 27 and 30.
91
Xudjakov, Očerki po istorii Kazanskogo xanstva, pp. 58–59; on Nur Sultan, see
also Mixail Berežkov, “Nur-saltan, carica Krymskaja,” in: Izvestija Tavričeskoj učenoj
arxivnoj kommissii, vol. 27 (Simferopol, 1897): 1–19.
92
Cf. Xoroškevič, Rus’ i Krym, pp. 163–164.
30 part one—chapter one
Lithuanian territories aer they had been annexed to Muscovy, caus-
ing understandable protests of their ally. Along with the straining
of Crimean-Muscovian relations, yet another factor contributed to
Mengli’s rapprochement with Vilnius: although Sheikh Ahmed had
been defeated, he was still dangerous as long as he was alive and kept
in Lithuanian custody.
e years 1503–1506 were characterized by continuous Tatar raids
against Lithuania, but also intensication of diplomatic contacts. In
1505 a Lithuanian envoy, Jakub Ivašencovyč,
93
was sent to the Crimea
with a proposal to renew the peace. In reply, Mengli sent a courier
named Batush, notifying Alexander that he had already sworn to keep
friendship in the presence of Ivašencovyč. An oath had also been taken
by Mengli’s brother Yaghmurcha, the khan’s second son Ahmed, the
Shirin qaraçı Devletek,
94
the Barın qaraçı Devlet Bakhtı, and other
beys. In return for his declaration, the khan, who was surprisingly well
informed of Sheikh Ahmed’s whereabouts, required that his old enemy
be arrested in the presence of Batush and imprisoned in Kaunas. While
Ivašencovyč was detained in the Crimea until the return of Batush, the
khan asked Alexander to prepare a new great embassy, to be headed
by the palatine of Trakai “as was the ancient custom,” or another per-
son of high rank, so that the great envoy should arrive at the khan’s
court and swear an oath in the king’s name.
95
Alexander accepted the
proposal, let Batush witness the imprisonment of Sheikh Ahmed, and
sent him back along with a royal courier, Petr Fursovyč.
Even the raid of Mengli’s two younger sons, Feth Giray and Burnash
Giray, who were defeated by Myxajlo Hlyns’kyj at Kleck (in Belarus)
on 5 August 1506, did not frustrate the negotiations.
96
Sending his new
embassy, Mengli assured the king that the raid had been unauthorized
93
On his career, see Document 8, n. 39.
94
e former envoy to Moscow, see above.
95
Lietuvos Metrika (1427–1506). Knyga Nr. 5, pp. 231–232; the letter was earlier
published by Pułaski (where the name of Devlet Bakhtı is omitted). Referring to the
palatine of Trakai, Mengli Giray had in mind Bohdan Sakovyč, who had collected
Mengli’s rst yarlıq (see Document 4, n. 31) and whom the khan mentioned by name
and function in another letter from 1506; see Lietuvos Metrika. Knyga Nr. 8, p. 59. In
fact, Sakovyč was nominated the palatine of Trakai ten years aer he had completed
his mission.
96
On the campaign of 1506, see Stanisław Herbst, “Kleck 1506,” in: idem, Potrzeba
historii czyli o polskim stylu życia. Wybór pism (Warsaw, 1978), vol. 2: 214–230 [the
article was rst published in 1934].
genghisid legacy: shaping eastern europe (1240–1523) 31
and its rout well deserved. Judging by the fact that the khan already
knew the result of the raid, but did not know about Alexander’s death
on 19 August, we may assume that his embassy le the Crimea in
late August 1506. It was headed by Mengli’s trusted courtier, Tevkel
(Tjuvikel) Ulan (not to be confused with the Manghıt leader), com-
posed of numerous envoys sent by the Giray family members and clan
leaders, and joined by Jakub Ivašencovyč, nally allowed to return
home. In his letter to the king, Mengli expressed his gratitude for the
imprisonment of Sheikh Ahmed and reiterated his peaceful inten-
tions, which were to be conrmed with solemn oaths, sworn by the
Crimean envoys in front of the king and his councilors. e khan
again asked the king to send a great embassy, which would complete
the whole somewhat prolonged procedure. e royal envoys would
swear an oath by the king’s soul in front of Mengli Giray and wit-
ness an oath taken by the khan and his retinue. In conclusion, Mengli
criticized Muscovian duplicity and proposed to form a triple alliance
between Alexander, Mengli Giray, and Muhammed Emin, the khan of
Kazan, who had recently waged war against his former protectors and
successfully withheld a siege by the Muscovian troops. Muhammed
Emin’s envoy also participated in the Crimean embassy, carrying his
lord’s letter invoking the past friendship between Vytautas and Ulug
Muhammed.
97
Initially sent to Alexander but learning of his death, the Crimean
embassy did not return; instead it was received by his brother and
successor, Sigismund. By the end of the year 1506, Tevkel Ulan swore
a solemn oath in the presence of Sigismund and his councilors,
assembled in Mielnik. e oath was pronounced on behalf of Mengli
Giray, referred to as the khan of the two hordes, the Trans-Volgine
(Zavolskoe, i.e., the Great Horde) and of Perekop (Perekopskoe, i.e., the
Crimean Horde). It stipulated that neither the khan nor his subjects
should commit any harm to Sigismund’s domains, either the Polish
Crown or the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and promised Mengli’s assis-
tance against Sigismund’s enemies, particularly the Muscovian ruler.
97
For the letters of Mengli Giray and Muhammed Emin, see Lietuvos Metrika.
Knyga Nr. 8, pp. 50–51 and 56–57; these letters were published earlier (in Latin script)
by Pułaski. On Tevkel Ulan’s biography, see Document 7, n. 2. On the war between
Muscovy and Kazan in the years 1505–1506, see Xudjakov, Očerki po istorii Kazans-
kogo xanstva, pp. 60–67.
32 part one—chapter one
Tevkel also engaged that the oath would be conrmed by the khan
personally in the presence of royal envoys, who were to be dispatched
to the Crimea.
98
Having witnessed the Crimean oath, Sigismund reciprocally swore
his own oath along with his Polish and Lithuanian councilors, and
immediately dispatched a courier named Soroka, who was further to
proceed to Kazan. e promised great Lithuanian embassy le shortly
aerwards, headed by Jurij Zenovevyč, the future governor of Smo-
lensk, and—again—Jakub Ivašencovyč.
99
e envoys returned in the
late summer of 1507, accompanied by a Crimean embassy, headed
by Mamısh Ulan, who carried two important documents issued by
Mengli Giray. e rst one, drawn on 2 July 1507, was a typical yarlıq,
similar in form and contents to the former yarlıqs of Hadji Giray and
Mengli Giray.
100
Invoking the old friendship between Hadji Giray and
Vytautas, the khan “granted” anew to Lithuania numerous lands along
with their inhabitants, grouped into units referred to by the Mongolian-
Turkish term tümen. e yarlıq ennumerates all the lands that were
listed in the former documents, with a single, apparently accidental
omission of Novhorod-Sivers’kyj.
101
Moreover, it lists a few additional
settlements.
102
Following the arguments of Myxajlo Hruševs’kyj, Fedir
Petrun’ rightly concluded that the contents of this yarlıq reected geo-
graphical realities from the last years of Vytautas’ life (1428–1430).
103
Yet, given the political context in 1507, the anachronism was at least
partly deliberate. Arguably, Mengli Giray had no intention of stirring
98
e text of the oath has been recorded and is preserved; see Document 7. On
the reception of the Crimean embassy in Mielnik, see “Litovskija upominki tatarskim
ordam. Skarbovaja kniga Metriki Litovskoj 1502–1509 gg.” Edited by M. Dovnar-
Zapol’skij, in: Izvestija Tavričeskoj učenoj arxivnoj kommissii, vol. 28 (Simferopol,
1898): 1–81, esp. pp. 52–53.
99
Pułaski, Stosunki Polski z Tatarszczyzną, pp. 109–111, 296–300; Lietuvos Metrika.
Knyga Nr. 8, pp. 54–56 and 58–59. Pułaski refers to Zenovevyč as the “palatine” of
Smolensk; yet, he became the governor (namestnik) of Smolensk only in 1507, appar-
ently in reward for his embassy; see Document 8, n. 38.
100
See Document 8.
101
Also an unidentied locality named Čynamir was omitted; yet, perhaps it was
identical with the estate of Donec that was rst listed in 1507.
102
Čornyj Horod on the lower Dniester, Zvynyhorod to the southwest of Čerkasy,
Xoten’ to the southeast of Putyvl’, Myloljub in the tümen of Jagoldaj, Donec on the
Donec river.
103
Fedir Petrun’, “Xans’ki jarlyky na ukrajins’ki zemli (do pytannja pro tatars’ku
Ukrajinu),” Sxidnyj Svit (1993), no. 2: 133–143 [rst published in 1928], esp. pp.
134–135.
genghisid legacy: shaping eastern europe (1240–1523) 33
a Polish-Lithuanian conict by “granting” western Podolia along with
the castle of Kamjanec’ (incorporated to the Polish Crown in 1430) to
Lithuania. But by “granting” of eastern territories that had either been
lost to Ivan III in the years 1494 and 1503, or had never belonged to
Lithuania, like Pskov, Velikij Novogrod, and Perejaslavl’ Rjazan’skij,
the khan cemented and encouraged the military cooperation with
Sigismund in the approaching war against Muscovy.
e second document by Mengli Giray, referred to as “oath-letter”
(Ruth. prysjažnyj lyst), was dated 14 July 1507. It was issued on behalf
of the khan, but also on behalf of his younger brother Yaghmurcha,
his ve sons: Mehmed, Ahmed, Mahmud, Feth, and Burnash, his
nephew Yapancha, and a number of Crimean notables: Muslim cler-
gymen, service beys,
104
the leaders of the four aristocratic clans of the
Manghıts, Sedjevüts, Shirins, and Barıns, other commanders, courtiers
and the khan’s servants, both mentioned and not mentioned by name,
who had all conrmed its contents by their oaths. e ceremony of
oath taking, referred to in the document, was central in the peacemak-
ing procedure and reected the hierarchical order of both societies
concerned. While the Lithuanian envoys took their oath on behalf of
King Sigismund and the Lithuanian lords, beginning with the bishop
of Vilnius, the khan and all those present reciprocated by swearing to
keep the peace on their part.
e document reconrmed the yarlıqs of Tokhtamısh and Hadji
Giray that had granted Ruthenian lands to Lithuania, without speci-
fying the lands concerned (that was already done in the yarlıq). e
khan also promised to send a Tatar army commanded by his brother
or son with the task of assisting Sigismund to ght his enemies. In
return, Mengli Giray expected Lithuanian assistance in his own cam-
paigns. In a separate clause, the khan demanded that the king execute
Halek Sultan, the nephew of Sheikh Ahmed, and the latter’s other
prominent retinue members, who had found refuge in Lithuania. Less
104
e term “service begs” (i.e., beys), coined by Syroečkovskij (in Russian: služilye
or služebnye knjaz’ja), was adopted into English by Manz. It refers to the courtiers of
either noble or humble origin, who owed their status to their service and devotion to
the khan and not to their place in the clan hierarchy. Unlike the members of the aris-
tocratic clans, namely the Shirins and Manghıts, the service beys did not intermarry
with the Giray dynasty; cf. Syroečkovskij, “Muxammed-Geraj i ego vassaly,” Učenye
zapiski Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta im. M. V. Lomonosova, vyp. 61
(1940): Istorija (vol. 2): 3–71, esp. p. 35; and Manz, “e clans of the Crimean Khan-
ate,” pp. 291–293.