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fluence over the media may lead to a backlash. The public is already
leery about big business influence. In answer to the Roper Center ques
-
tion “How much of the time do you think news reporting on television,
newspapers and radio is improperly influenced by big business,” 49%
said “often” and an additional 38% said “sometimes.” (Only 10% said
“rarely” and 2% said “never.”) One of the experts presented in the Moyers
program thought that the relationship between big money and free
speech would be the top issue of the 21st century.
129
Such attitudes could lead to future congressional action. A little over
20 years ago, two congressmen sought legislative action against busi
-
ness on grounds their communications threatened to deprive citizens of
full and accurate information about social and political issues. In 1978,
Representative Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N.Y.) and Senator James
Aborezk (D-S.D.) proposed an investigation into corporate advertising
practices, charging big business was brainwashing the American public.
The Association of National Advertisers took this charge so seriously it
responded by conducting a major study of corporate communications
on public issues. Its findings contradicted the charge.
130
This historical
attention by legislators to the perceived dangers of excessive business
control over the media should serve as a warning of possible future
legislative action.
In contrast to business, interest groups, except for large ones like the
Natural Resources Defense Council and AARP, receive little media cover-
age. AARP’s position on an issue like Medicare drug benefits are reported
upon but receive considerably less attention compared to the Pharma-
ceutical Research & Manufacturers of America and its key members. The
media generally ignore labor union views on issues beyond strikes and
specifics like minimum wages.
The government is a major news source and enjoys more coverage
than business. However, it does not own media outlets, as is true in sev-
eral European countries (e.g., Italy as described earlier). The press in the
United States enjoys the protection of the First Amendment free speech
rights. Broadcasters must conform to the ownership restrictions im
-
posed by the FCC but these may be further loosened. Content is not reg
-
ulated except for decency standards, as illustrated by the Janet Jackson
exposure. The Fairness Doctrine that required broadcasters to air oppos
-
ing views was rescinded in 1987 by the FCC. Furthermore, the govern
-
ment’s use of advertising has been highly limited and its use of other
payments to the media and reporters has not been a significant problem.
A recent exception was the payment of $240,000 by the U.S. Depart
-
ment of Education to conservative columnist Armstrong Williams to
promote the administration’s “No Child Left Behind” law. The Govern
-
ment Accountability Office criticized the administration for an illegal
“covert propaganda” campaign and congressional Democrats leapt on
the Williams incident as an abuse of White House power.
131
In some
other countries, such as Brazil, government advertising expenditures
are huge and the resulting media dependency on the government can be
372 I CHAPTER 13
construed as indirect government control.
132
A free press must guard
against influence based on government financial support.
Business Constraint Needed. Since the muckraking period in the
late 19th century, corporations have complained about media bias
against them and hired public relations people, most of whom were
ex-journalists, to balance media treatment of them. As the chapters in
Part III indicated, the tools of proactive media relations, along with get
-
ting greater control over the media through broadcast appearances,
have enabled business to seize the initiative. Furthermore, by buying
media space in the form of advocacy advertising, business could use the
pages and broadcast time of the media to promote its agenda and views.
Advances have also been made in making the media more accountable
and, in extreme cases, to intimidate the media by suing objectionable
newspapers and broadcasters. As a final tool, business is increasingly
able to bypass the mass media and reach target audiences directly
through direct mail and a variety of private media, especially the
Internet.
Although tamed, and sometimes manipulated by business, the mass
media can act independently when it suits their own corporate interests.
Hence they remain a potential menace to the general corporate commu-
nity. As PR Watch comments, the media have become so ratings-con-
scious and sensationalistic they are literally “out of control” and willing
to run stories with popular appeal, even when they present big business
interests in an unfavorable light.
133
This happens especially when crises
occur, as Exxon, Dow-Corning, Prudential, and Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance can attest. Furthermore, business is not a monolithic entity. When
media conglomerates find it in their business self-interest to disclose
questionable corporate behavior—namely, those of nonmedia corpora-
tions—they often do so. The media still have a penchant for sensational-
izing scandals and seeking entertainment value at the expense of
business. There is no unbreakable bond between media corporations
and nonmedia corporations, except when they are one and the same.
For this reason, the greatest potential danger of corporate dominance
of the media is the outright ownership of the news media by nonmedia
companies. GE and Disney have crossed that line, leading to accusations
of interference with editorial judgments. As an example given in the
Moyers program “Free Speech for Sale,” NBC’s Saturday Night Live once
presented a cartoon sketch about the wide corporate interests of big me
-
dia owners, including GE, and mentioned the increasing partnerships
between companies that ostensibly are competitors. The latter mention,
however, was missing in a repeat of the NBC program.
134
The increasing
concentration of ownership of newspapers and broadcasting stations
and their emphasis on profits over public service makes the media more
vulnerable to public criticism.
Part II presented and explained the strategies that corporations can
use to gain fair treatment by the media. Many of the same strategies are
ASCENDANCY OF CORPORATE POWER I 373
also used to win people over to their viewpoints. Richard Vigueri, co-au
-
thor of America’s Right Turn: How Conservatives Use New and Alternative
Media to Take Power, boasts “we won” and sees nothing wrong when his
political view dominates the news media. He believes, “journalism is all
opinion” anyway, disagreeing with objective journalists who believe
that too many views masquerade as news. The liberal media had their
day and now the conservative media will have theirs. But concentration
of opinions is a serious threat to democracy and, potentially to business
and other interest groups. When a big media chain like Sinclair can de
-
termine that its viewers will be exposed to one particular political view,
those who agree with that viewpoint can feel victorious. But they have
to consider that at some future time an antithetical viewpoint may be
presented. Rather than play the win-lose game, all groups in society
must have confidence that the public will be exposed to a wide spectrum
of views, with none predominating.
Media concentration aggravates the danger of dominance by one
group in society. Those in control can exercise too much power, espe
-
cially when the FCC is lax in demanding that broadcasters observe the
public interest in exchange for their license to broadcast. Journalists are
under increasing pressure to conform to the wishes of their managers.
When these wishes reflect commercial interest and promote a particular
point of view, this pressure undermines the concept of a free press that
serves as society’s watchdog. Journalists cannot march lockstep with
whatever political view dominates at a particular time. They have be-
come careless in checking out facts and asking tough questions at press
conferences, as The New York Times acknowledged when it admitted that
it let the Pentagon dominate its view about the Iraq war.
CONCLUSIONS
Corporations have had to enter politics and build up their power to
achieve a balance with government and opposing interest groups. How
-
ever, by continuing to seek and exercise more power, some leading corpo
-
rations engaged in unethical and illegal actions that fomented public
opposition. As a result, public attitudes toward corporate America have
worsened, causing a new round of government regulation. The Business
-
Week/Harris survey reinforces the need for business to change its beliefs
and behavior. A BusinessWeek editorial, recognizing the “triumph of the
market over the state,” warns that there is an uneasiness with the power
-
ful institution of the corporation. Its advice to corporate America is three
-
fold: Get out of politics by embracing the McCain-Feingold campaign
finance reform legislation; take responsibility for overseas factories; and
spread the wealth.
135
Depending on public satisfaction with corporate re
-
form and such other factors as economic recovery, corporations can ei
-
ther continue to become more powerful or face growing opposition from
government, interest groups, and the media.
374 I CHAPTER 13
ENDNOTES
1. Scott R. Bowman, The Modern Corporation and American Political Thought
(University Park, Penna.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p.
276.
2. David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes (New York: Basic Books, 1989), p. 237.
3. “Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism,” Publishers
Weekly, January 26, 1998, Vol. 245, No. 4, p. 82.
4. Sharon Beder, Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism (White
River Junction, Vt.: Green Books & Chelsea Green Publishing Company,
1997), p. 15.
5. John J. Fialka and Jeanne Cummings, “Energy Documents Show Different
Levels of Access,” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2002, p. A4.
6. Robert S. Greenberger, “Court to Rule on Energy Task Force,” Wall Street Jour
-
nal, December 16, 2003, p. A2. “Cheney Energy Panel Wins Court Ruling,”
Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2005, p. A4.
7. See book review by Christopher Farrell, “A Nation Shaped in the Image of Big
Business,” BusinessWeek, April 30, 2001, p. 20.
8. Robert Weissman, “Insurrection: Taking on Corporate Power,” a book review.
Multinational Monitor, Vol. 25, January–February 2004, pp. 40–41.
9. “Special K: Why the Bush Administration Is Worse Than DiLulio Said,” The
New Republic, December 30, 2002, p. 16.
10. Anthony Mason (anchor), “Corporate Wrongdoing Can Have Widespread
Effect,” Sunday Morning show, July 7, 2002, CBS News Transcript.
11. “Funny Numbers,” USA Today, October 21, 2002, p. 3B.
12. “Corporate America’s Woes, Continued,” Economist, November 30, 2002, p. 59.
13. Richard S. Dunham, et al., “The Fallout for Bush and Congress,”
BusinessWeek, January 28, 2002, p. 43.
14. Carla Marinucci, “Group Tallies Enron’s Contributions, Lobbying,” San
Francisco Chronicle, January 30, 2002, p. A10.
15. Albert R. Hunt, “Enron’s One Good Return: Political Investments,” Wall
Street Journal, January 31, 2002, p. A19.
16. Rebecca Smith and Alexei Barrionuevo, “Dynergy Ex-Trader Is Indicted on
Criminal-Fraud Charges,” Wall Street Journal, January 28, 2003, p. A6.
17. Anita Raghavan, Kathryn Kranhold, and Alexei Barrionuevo, “Full Speed
Ahead: How Enron Bosses Created a Culture of Pushing Limits,” Wall Street
Journal, August 26, 2002, p. A1.
18. Brad Foss, “The Year of the Corporate Scandal,” Toronto Star, December 26,
2002, p. J02.
19. Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy (New York: Broadway Books, 2002), p.
153.
20. Editorial: “Enron Justice,” Wall Street Journal, January 15, 2004, p. A14.
21. Gerald F. Seib and John Harwood, “Rising Anxiety: What Could Bring
1930s-Style Reform of U.S. Business?” Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2002,
pp. A1, A8.
22. Accession No. 0331489, Question No. 014, June 1999. Roper Center at Uni
-
versity of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online.
23. John Harwood, “Americans Distrust Institutions in Poll,” Wall Street Jour
-
nal, June 13, 2002, p. A4.
24. Seib and Harwood, op. cit., p. 8.
25. Roper Center at University of Connecticut, Public Opinion Online, Accession
No. 0335858, Question No. 010, November 1997.
ASCENDANCY OF CORPORATE POWER I 375
26. Seib and Harwood, op. cit., p. A1.
27. Tom Hamburger and Jeanne Cummings, “Business Ties Now Bind Bush,”
Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2002, p. A4.
28. Seib and Harwood, op. cit.
29. Ibid., pp. 145, 149.
30. John A. Byrne, “Restoring Trust in Corporate America,” BusinessWeek, June
24, 2002, p. 32.
31. “CEOs in Handcuffs,” Wall Street Journal, July 26, 2002, p. A10.
32. Deborah Solomon, “SEC Considers Stronger Sanctions,” Wall Street Journal,
June 16, 2003, p. A2.
33. Ibid., p. 149.
34. Ibid., p. 148.
35. Ibid. The Gallup survey was conducted between June 24 and June 27.
36. Seib and Harwood, op. cit.
37. Richard W. Stevenson and Janet Elder, “Poll Finds Concerns That Bush Is
Overly Influenced by Business,” New York Times, July 18, 2002, p. A1.
38. Robert B. Reich, “Commentary; Perspective on Business; Democracy and
Megacorporations May Be Mutually Exclusive.” Los Angeles Times, May 13,
1998, p. B-9.
39. Bowman, op. cit., p. 255.
40. Paul M. Sherer, “The Lesson From Chrysler, Citicorp and Mobil: No Compa-
nies Nowadays Are Too Big to Merge,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 1999,
p. R8.
41. Martin Peers, Nick Wingfield, and Laura Landro, “Media Blitz: AOL, Time
Warner Leap Borders to Plan a Mammoth Merger,” Wall Street Journal, Jan-
uary 11, 2000, p. A1.
42. Kirk Victor and Michael Posner, “Merger Mania: Federal Regulators and
Lawmakers Are Struggling to Stay on Top of the Surge in Mergers,” National
Journal, Vol. 32, July 15, 2000, pp. 2280–2289.
43. Vernon A. Mund, Government and Business (New York: Harper & Brothers,
1950), p. 553.
44. David Wessel and John Harwood, “Selling Entire Stock!: Capitalism Is Giddy
With Triumph; Is It Possible to Overdo It?” Wall Street Journal, May 14,
1998, p. A10.
45. Ibid.
46. Rob Wells, “IRS to Begin Outsourcing Debt Collection,” Wall Street Journal,
November 24, 2004, p. D1.
47. “Private Security Firms in Iraq: Dangerous Work,” Economist, April 10,
2004, pp. 22–23.
48. Spencer E. Ante and Stan Crock, “The Other U.S. Military,” BusinessWeek,
May 31, 2004, pp. 76–78.
49. Economist, op. cit.
50. Greg Jaffe, David S. Cloud, and Gary Fields, “Iraq Contractors Pose Prob
-
lem,” Wall Street Journal, May 4, 2004, p. A4.
51. Amy Schatz, “Effort to Speed Airport Security Is Going Private,” Wall Street
Journal, January 12, 2005, pp. D1, D3.
52. Vogel, op. cit., p. 12.
53. Beder, op. cit., p. 120.
54. Ibid.
55. Amy Keller, “After Victory, Reformers Start to Face Hard Times,” Roll Call,
January 27, 2003, Section: Welcome Congress.
56. Beder, op. cit., p. 144.
376 I CHAPTER 13
57. See John J. Gialka, “Global Warming Treaty Is Sparking Differing Views
From 2 Business Groups,” Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1998, p. A8.
58. Greg Hitt, “Mercury Issue Takes Wing,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 2004, p. A4.
59. Jim Carlton, “Bush Administration Proposes Wider Overhaul of Forest
Plan,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2002, p. A6.
60. John Carey, “How Green Is the White House?” BusinessWeek, November 3,
2003, pp. 96–98.
61. John Carey, “Special Report: Global Warming,” BusinessWeek, August 16,
2004, p. 62.
62. Tobias Huerter, “GE: Green and European,” Technology Review, Vol. 107, Sep
-
tember 2004, p. 24.
63. Jim Carlton, “U.S. Firms Are Getting ‘Greener’ But They Fail to Codify Prac
-
tices,” Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2002, p. B2.
64. Jeffrey Ball, “Rocky Road: After Long Detente, GM, Green Group Are at Odds
Again,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2002, p. A1.
65. John Carey, “Global Warming,” BusinessWeek, August 16, 2004, pp. 60–69.
66. See a diagram of “The Power Structuring of American Institutions in 1950”
in Delbert C. Miller and William H. Form, Industrial Sociology (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 854.
67. Aaron Bernstein, “Can This Man Save Labor?,” BusinessWeek, September 13,
2004, p. 84.
68. Stated in a Wall Street Journal editorial, “State of the Unions,” January 23,
2004, p. A14.
69. Paul F. Clark, John T. Delaney, and Ann C. Frost, “Private-Sector Collective
Bargaining: Is This the End or a New Beginning?” Collective Bargaining in the
Private Sector, Industrial Relations Research Association Series (Champaign,
IL: Industrial Relations Research Association, 2002), pp. 2–5.
70. Joann Muller and David Welch, “Can the UAW Stay in the Game?”
BusinessWeek, June 10, 2002, p. 78.
71. Bruce E. Kaufman and David Lewin, “Is the NLRA Still Relevant to Today’s
Economy and Workplace?,” in Paula B. Voos, ed., Labor Law Journal: Pro-
ceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting, Vol. 2 (Industrial Relations Research As-
sociation, 1998), p. 1124.
72. Thomas A. Kochan, “Building a New Social Contract at Work: A Call to Ac-
tion,” Perspectives on Work, Vol. 4, No.1, p. 3.
73. Peter Hoier, “The Obsolesence of Organized Labor?” Perspectives on Work, Vol.
5, No. 1, p. 9.
74. Robert L. Rose, “New AFL-CIO President Seeks to Revitalize Old Federation,
Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1996, p. B1.
75. Glenn Burkins, “AFL-CIO Plans First Restructuring in 44 Years,” Wall Street
Journal, October 6, 1999, p. A2.
76. Robert L. Rose, “Love of Labor: Training the Newest Generation of AFL-CIO
Organizers,” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 1995, p. B1.
77. Aaron Bernstein, “Labor’s New Organization Man,” BusinessWeek, April 7,
2003, p. 86.
78. Ibid., p. 82.
79. Paul Glader and Kris Maher, “Two Large Unions in Industrial Sector to
Merge,” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2005, p. A4.
80. Ibid., p. 80.
81. Jarol B. Manheim, The Death of a Thousand Cuts: Corporate Campaigns and the
Attack on the Corporation (Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,
2001), pp. 37–38.
ASCENDANCY OF CORPORATE POWER I 377
82. David Welch, “A Breakthrough for Labor,” BusinessWeek, August 2, 2004, pp.
76–86.
83. Manheim, op. cit., p. 224.
84. Amy Borrus and Paul Dwyer, “Governance: Getting the Boss to Behave,”
BusinessWeek, July 15, 2002, p. 110.
85. Ibid.
86. Steven Greenhouse, “Labor’s Labors Not Lost,” New York Times, May 12,
1996, p. E4.
87. Aaron Bernstein and Richard S. Dunham, “He’s Got Washington Listening to
Labor Again,” BusinessWeek, November 4, 1996, p. 89.
88. Bernstein, “Can This Man Save Labor?,” op. cit., p. 83.
89. Manheim, op. cit., pp. 34–36.
90. Paula Dwyer, “Big Labor: So Out It’s ‘Off the Radar Screen,’” BusinessWeek,
March 26, 2001, p. 55.
91. Kathy Chen, “Bush Halts Union-Friendly Rules; Carpenters Sever AFL-CIO
Link,” Wall Street Journal, April 2, 2001, p. A24.
92. Tom Feran, “Big Business Raises the Price of Free Speech; PBS Looks at Effects
of Consolidating Media Ownership,” The Plain Dealer, June 8, 1999, p. 1E.
93. Charlotte Ryan, Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Organiz-
ing (Boston, Mass.: South End Press, 1991), p. 14. A stronger view is voiced
by Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky in what they call the “propaganda
model”; it “ focuses on this inequality of wealth and power and its multi-
level effects on mass-media interests and choices. It traces the routes by
which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, margin-
alize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to
get their message across to the public.” See their Manufacturing Consent: The
Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon, 1988), p. 2.
94. Sylvia Poggoli, “Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi Celebrates 10th An-
niversary in Politics as Critics Decry His Control of the Media,” National
Public Radio, January 27, 2004.
95. Tony Barber, “Berlusconi Under Attack for Media Power,” Financial Times,
April 23, 2004, Edition 2, p. 8.
96. “Reporters Without Borders—ITALY—Silvio Berlusconi Saves One of His TV
Channels by Decree in Flagrant Example of Conflict of Interest,” Canada
NewsWire, January 30, 2004.
97. Poggoli, op. cit.
98. Eric Boehlert, “Sinclair’s Disgrace,” Salon.com, October 14, 2004, feature.
99. Joe Flint, “Sinclair Draws Partisan Scrutiny With Plans for Kerry Broadcast,”
Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2004, p. B13.
100. Boehlert, op. cit.
101. Bill Carter et al., “Risks Seen for TV Chain Showing Film About Kerry,” New
York Times, October 18, 2004, p. C-1.
102. Bill Carter, “Broadcaster’s Stock Picks up After Change on Kerry Film,” New
York Times, October 21, 2004, p. A-27; Joe Flint, “Political Shows Prove
Costly to Sinclair CEO,” Wall Street Journal, October 22, 2004, p. B1.
103. Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy (New York: Broadway Books, 2002),
p. 248.
104. Patricia Aufderheide, Communications Policy and the Public Interest (New
York: Guilford, 1999), p. 62.
105. Ibid., Tom Feran, “Media Access Examined [by] Bill Moyers Special,” Colum
-
bus Dispatch, June 8, 1999, p. 7F. The number will be reduced to five if
Viacom succeeds in acquiring CBS.
378 I CHAPTER 13
106. “Face Value: Beyond Janet Jackson’s Breast,” Economist, January 22, 2005,
p. 64.
107. Robert W. McChesney, The Problem of the Media: U.S. Communication Politics
in the 21st Century (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004), pp. 276–277.
He refers to Catherine Yang, “The News Biz: Is Bigger Better?” BusinessWeek,
March 3, 2003, p. 97.
108. Ibid.
109. David Lieberman, “TV’s New Look: All Business, All the Time,” USA Today,
January 14, 2000, pp. 1A, 2A.
110. Will Harper, “Rethinking the Media Monopoly,” East Bay Express (Califor
-
nia), July 7, 2004, in news and features section.
111. William Safire, “The Great Media Gulp,” New York Times, May 22, 2003, p.
A-33.
112. Editorial: “Media: The Dangers of Concentration,” BusinessWeek, July 8,
2002, p. 118.
113. Carl Boggs, The End of Politics: Corporate Power and the Decline of the Public
Sphere (New York: Guilford, 2000), p. 9.
114. “Relaxing Rules Raises Concerns About Diverse Media Voices,” USA Today,
January 16, 2003, p. 1B.
115. As summarized in Yochi J. Dreazen and Joe Flint, “FCC Eases Media-Own-
ership Caps, Clearing Way for New Mergers,” Wall Street Journal, June 3,
2002, p. A1.
116. “Beware Media Consolidation,” BusinessWeek, May 26, 2003, p. 126.
117. William Safire, “Merged Media Giants Have Us at Their Mercy,” The Inter-
national Herald Tribune, January 22, 2003, p. 9.
118. Neil Hickey, “Power Shift: As the FCC Prepares to Alter the Media Map, Battle
Lines Are Drawn,” Columbia Journalism Review, March/April 2003, p. 26.
119. Yochi J. Dreazen and Joe Flint, “Court Rejects Curbs on Media Ownership,”
Wall Street Journal, February 20, 2002, p. A3.
120. Hickey, op. cit.
121. Bauman states that positive corporation images can also be conveyed effec-
tively on television through product endorsements. “Smiling faces, high
production values, and a corporate logo can also shape attitudes, especially
those of a new generation.” p. 150 Also: Bauman: “Corporate individual-
ism continues to be the most important ideological weapon in the arsenal
of corporate power. Through modern methods of advertising—especially
television commercials—the corporate persona regularly advises, enter
-
tains, and indoctrinates a captive audience.” Bauman contends that “The
selling of corporate America takes many forms in which commercial and
political advertising often become indistinguishable.” This is witnessed
when “the sales pitch fades into the background in what appears to be pub
-
lic-service announcements or self-congratulatory ‘commercials’ lauding
corporate good deeds and praising the American way.… Public responsibil
-
ity becomes increasingly important as corporate power transforms social
relationships. To succeed in the long term, corporate leaders must take into
account social and political realities.” See Bauman, op. cit., pp. 182–183.
122. Ibid., p. 33.
123. This criticism is similar to discussions about advertising as an unfair
method of competition. Vernon A. Mund states that this occurs when ad
-
vertising is false and when used excessively. He states, “The very fact of be
-
ing able to employ large-scale advertising gives an advantage to a few
producers which is not equally available to smaller but perhaps just as effi
-
ASCENDANCY OF CORPORATE POWER I 379
cient firms.” See his Government and Business (New York: Harper & Broth
-
ers, 1950), p. 305.
124. Roland Marchand, Creating the Corporate Soul: The Rise of Public Relations
and Corporate Imagery in American Big Business (Berkeley, Calif.: University
of California Press, 1998).
125. Ibid., p. 204.
126. Ibid., p. 161.
127. See book review by Susan G. Davis, “Corporate Affairs; Big Business Uses
PR as a Tool and a Club,” The San Diego Union-Tribune, January 31, 1999, p.
Books-1.
128. Marchand, op. cit., p. 357.
129. Ibid.
130. Press release dated October 27, 1978, from ANA, “Public Issues & Corpo
-
rate Constituents: Highlight of A.N.A.–Business Week Survey on Busi
-
ness’s Understanding of Public Issues.”
131. Christopher Cooper and Brian Steinberg, “Bush Draws Fire Over Fee Paid to
Columnist to Promote Policy,” Wall Street Journal, January 10, 2005, p.
B3.
132. Melvin L. Sharpe and Roberto P. Simoes, “Public Relations Performance in
South and Central America,” in Hugh M. Culbertson and Ni Chen, editors,
International Public Relations: A Comparative Analysis (Mahwah, N.J.: Law-
rence Erlbaum Associates, 1996), p. 287.
133. “They’re Rich, They’re Powerful and They’re Running Scared,” PR Watch,
Vol. 4, First Quarter 1997, pp. 1–3.
134. Feran, op. cit.
135. “Editorials: New Economy, New Social Contract,” BusinessWeek, September
11, 2000, p. 182.
380 I CHAPTER 13
Chapter 14
Constructing a Competitive
Political Marketplace
Corporations can mitigate fears of excessive corporate power, if not out-
right dominance, by accepting the model of a political marketplace and
constructing ways to implement it. Its fundamental requirement is the
maintenance of competition among society’s myriad of interests. Just
as the economic marketplace requires vigorous competition to work
properly and protect the public interest, so does the political market-
place.
1
When competition exists everybody can pursue their economic
interests and express their personal viewpoints because, as Adam Smith
stated, the “invisible hand” of the marketplace allows people to work for
their own self-interest and still produce a desirable social outcome.
2
In
the economic marketplace, the existence of competition with many
buyers and sellers prevents the domination by any one of them because
the price is set by the market. Similarly, in the political marketplace
competition among a diversity of interest groups enables people to pro
-
mote their position on issues and compete in influencing public policy.
Competition in the economic marketplace is protected by “rules of the
game” established by business and supplemented by laws that seek to
preserve a competitive structure. The most important laws are the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 and the Clayton Act of 1914. Just as the
Sherman Act forbade the combination of economic entities that would
restrain commerce, the rules of the political marketplace would prevent
the excessive building up of power blocs. These understandings about
the requirements of competition are required in both marketplaces to
avoid, in the words of the Sherman Act, a “ruthless, savage war to the
death, waged without rules of fairness or reasonableness, and legiti
-
mate as long as it promotes the interest of the person practicing it.”
3
Just
as the Clayton Act curbed the use of unfair methods of competition, the
381