Peden G.S. Arms, Economics and British Strategy From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs

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Co-operation with the army was left to short-range reconnaissance

machines and RAF bomber crews were not trained to intervene directly

on the battleﬁeld.

The long distances involved in imperial defence encouraged the

development of ﬂying boats for reconnaissance, and arguably the RAF

was a leader in this ﬁeld. However, co-operation with the navy was not

high on the Air Staff’s list of priorities, and it did not develop an anti-

submarine doctrine or effective aircraft for what became Coastal

Command. Some degree of co-operation with the navy was necessary

regarding the equipment of the Fleet Air Arm, at least until its transfer

from Air Ministry to Admiralty control in 1937, but this co-operation

did not extend to agreement on how best air power could be app lied to

naval warfare. The bomber versu s the battleship controversy, the classic

inter-service dispute, is dealt with below in connection with naval

armaments. It may be noted here that the RAF’s case would have been

more convincing if it had provided some of its long-range bomber crews

with the specialised training required to attack warships, but this role

was left to small numbers of specialised torpedo bombers, either carrier-

or shore-based.

British warplanes did not always fulﬁl their potenti al or the Air Staff’s

hopes, but problems tended to arise from a mismatch of strategic or

tactical doctrine with technical possibilities rather than with short-

comings in aircraft design. The traditional view that the inter-war British

aircraft industry was backward has been contested by Edgerton, who has

pointed to its military focus and the support it received from govern-

ment. The Air Ministry was easily the largest research and development

institution in the country and there were great advances in aerodynamic

theory as a result of work in the universities and at the government’s

Royal Aircraft Establishment.

The fact that biplanes, on the eve of

rearmament, had a superﬁcial resemblance to First World War aircraft

does not justify Barnett’s description of the products of the inter-war

British aircraft industry as ‘backward in design and construction’,

employing wood and fabric when America and Germany had already

moved into the era of all-metal aircraft.

In fact the Bristol aircraft

company produced an all-metal, monoplane ﬁghter, the Type 133, with

retractable undercarriage in 1934, a year ahead of the prototype of the

Messerschmitt Bf 109.

The RAF chose the Gladiator biplane in 1934

Sir John Slessor, Central Blue (London: Cassell, 1956), pp. 166, 183, 204–8.

Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane, pp. 18–37.

Barnett, Collapse of British Power, pp. 213, 418.

Peter Lewis, The British Fighter since 1912 (London: Putnam, 1979), p. 232; William

Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich (London: MacDonald and Jane’s, 1970), p. 526.

Retrenchment and rearmament 115

because it could be in service sooner than the Bristol machine. Reten-

tion of the biplane format, with its greater manoeuvrability, if lower

speed, was not exceptional: the Italian and Soviet air forces both had

biplane ﬁghters until 1942, and even the Luftwaffe had one of its thirteen

day ﬁghter wings still equipped with biplanes in September 1939.

British aircraft designers made use of metal from an early date, the

change from wood to metal airframe having begun with the Armstrong

Whitworth Siskin ﬁghter, which entered service in 1924, and fabric-

covered metal frames were standard for German as well as British

ﬁghters in the early 1930s.

In any case, the move from wood to metal

did not necessarily represent progress: the bias of American aircraft

designers in favour of metal precluded promising projects involving

wood, such as the de Havilland Mosquito of the Second World War,

which drew upon that ﬁrm’s experience of using wood in the 1930s.

British aero-engine ﬁrms, particularly Rolls-Royce and Bristol, were so

far from being backward in 1935 that the prototypes of the Mes-

serschmitt Bf 109 ﬁghter and the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber were

ﬁtted with Rolls-Royce engines in that year because German ﬁrms had

lagged behind their British counterparts.

One notable aspect of the revolution in aircraft design in the mid-

1930s was a sharp increase in the prices of all types. Table 3.1 is based

on estimates made by the Air Ministry in 1937 and although the ﬁgures

are expressed in current prices they are reasonably comparable, since

retail prices were generally lower in 1937 than in 1924.

As light

bombers like the Hart and Hind were replaced by larger machines like

the Battle and Blenheim in 1937, the unit cost rose by about three times.

The larger medium bombers of 1939, the Hampden and Wellington,

were expected to be more expensive than earlier heavy bombers. Nor

was a slackening in the increase in costs in sight. The four-engined

bombers like the Halifax that the Air Staff wished to order in 1939 were

estimated to cost 40 per cent more than the current twin-engined

heavy bomber, the Whitley. In contrast, unit costs of both aircraft and

John Killen, The Luftwaffe: A History (London: Frederick Muller, 1967), p. 95.

A. J. Robertson, ‘The British aircraft industry and the state in the interwar period: a

comment’, Economic History Review, 28 (1975), 648–57.

Eric Schatzberg, Wings of Wood, Wings of Metal: Culture and Technical Choice in

American Airplane Materials, 1914–1945 (Princeton University Press, 1999).

Green, Warplanes of the Third Reich, pp. 42–4, 168–9, 428, 526.

The nearest thing available to a retail price index in the inter-war period, the Ministry of

Labour’s working-class cost of living index, is not a good price deﬂator as it was based

on Edwardian consumption patterns. More signiﬁcant regarding relative prices of

aircraft is the fact that average money wages – the major input – were stable from 1924

and were no higher in 1936 than in 1929.

Arms, economics and British strategy116

warships had been relatively stable between the mid-1920s and the

mid-1930s: for example, a biplane ﬁghter cost 3.7 per cent le ss in 1934

than in 1924, and a class of cruisers of about 7,000 tons completed

between 1933 and 1935 cost 8.8 per cent less on average than a class of

7,500-ton cruisers completed in 1926.

Naval weapons

In 1919 the Naval Staff argued that aircraft were in their infancy and

that the battleship could not be dispensed with for the foreseeable

future: ‘the country whose fast capital ships and their complementary

units are not containe d or held by similar enemy ships can, with these

vessels, sweep the enemy ships and sea-borne trade off the sea’.

Table 3.1. Costs of aircraft, 1924–39 (£ at current prices)

Fighters

1924 Siskin 4,050

1930 Bulldog 4,200

1934 Fury 3,900

1937 Gladiator 5,300

1939 Spitﬁre 8,000

1939 Deﬁant 10,500

Light bombers

1924 DH 9A 3,300

1930 Hart 4,050

1937 Hind 4,150

Medium bombers

1937 Battle 11,250

1937 Blenheim 13,500

1939 Hampden 20,000

1939 Wellington 18,500

Heavy bombers

1924 Virginia 13,300

1934 Heyford 13,750

1937 Whitley 30,000

1939 Halifax 42,000

Sources: ‘Defence expenditure in future years: summary of forecasts submitted

by the defence departments’, 22 Oct. 1937, CAB 24/272, TNA.

Data for cruisers from Jane’s Fighting Ships 1936 (London: Sampson Low, Marston &

Co, 1936), pp. 51–2.

‘Some notes by Naval Staff for First Lord’s speech on the naval estimates: the retention

of capital ships’, 24 Nov. 1919, Admiralty records, series 116, ﬁle 1677 (ADM 116/

1677), TNA.

Retrenchment and rearmament 117

Complementary units included aircraft carriers. Naval historians have

tended to assume that the Admiralty was irrationally attached to bat-

tleships and allow ed Britain to fall behind in na val aviation. Edgerton,

however, has pointed out that in 1935 Britain had six carriers compared

with four each for the United States and Japan, and would have had

more than either of these powers at the beginning of the Paciﬁc War in

1941 had it not been for wartime losses.

The lead over European

powers was much greater: in 1939 France had only one ﬂush-decked

carrier, which was too slow for a ﬂeet action, and the German and

Italian navies had none in service. The Admiralty’s commitment to

naval aviation was indicated by the fact that as many aircraft carriers

(ﬁve) were launched between 1937 and 1940 as battleships. Opposition

to building carriers came not from conservative admirals but from the

Air Ministry, which claimed that land-based aircraft woul d be better

value for money. This interdepartmental dispute gave the Treasury the

opportunity to delay the laying down of the ﬁrst of the new carriers, the

Ark Royal , until 1934, when the First Lord, Sir Bolton Eyers-Monsell,

was provoked by the Air Ministry’s claim to remark that ‘six-inch guns

ashore would cost only a fraction of the cost of a ship mounting guns of

the same calibre – but we cannot on that account do without the ship’.

The Treasury conceded that the Admiralty had got the better of the

argument.

The inter-war bomber versus the battleship debate in Whitehall was

largely, although not entirely, an interdepartmental dispute over

resources at a time when the Treasury was trying to reduce the annual

estimates. In Novem ber 1920 the Admiralty estimated that the con-

struction of four new capital ships would cost £37,500,000.

In the

event, these 48,000-ton monsters were cancelled under the Washington

naval treaty and replaced by two 35,000-ton battleships. Even these

‘Nelson’-class vessels cost £7.5 million each, at a time when the naval

estimates were being reduced from £80.8 million in 1922/3 to £52.6

million in 1924/5. The Air Ministry’s estimates in 1922/3 amounted to

only £9.4 million. The Admiralty’s request to proceed with new capita l

ships in 1920 prompted an enquiry by a CID sub-committee on Naval

Shipbuilding, chaired by Bonar Law. Most of the witnesses agreed that

the development of aircraft had not yet reached a stage where the bat-

tleship was obsolete. Bonar Law attached particular importance to

Trenchard’s evidence that aircraft were still ineffective against a capital

Edgerton, Warfare State, pp. 30–2.

Eyers-Monsell to Sir Philip Sassoon (Air Ministry), and notes by Bridges, 4 Oct. and 11

Oct. 1934, T 161/624/S.36130/34, TNA.

‘Naval policy and construction’, CP 2176, 22 Nov. 1920, CAB 24/124, TNA.

Arms, economics and British strategy118

ship, although the CAS clearly believed that the air threat would grow.

Naval advocates of torpedo bombers and carriers argued that research

into these weapons would be a better investment than construction of

battleships. Such views were stoutly opposed by Chatﬁeld, then assis-

tant chief of the Naval Staff, who argued that ships with armoured decks

designed to withstand plunging 16-inch shells from other capital ships,

and ‘bulges’ to absorb torpedoes ﬁred from submarines, would resist

any bombs carried by aircraft.

The enquiry did not accept the radical

case against the battleship, but trials were carried on from 1921 into the

effectiveness of armour against bombs, and ‘bulges’ against near misses

by bombs or aerial torpedoes, and into the accuracy of bombing (using a

radio-controlled, but slow-moving old battleship) and of anti-aircraft

guns (using slow, unmanned target aircraft), without producing an

interdepartmental consensus. The debate only acquired urgency in

1936, when the moratorium on capital ship construction, agreed at

Washington and extended in 1930 at the ﬁrst London naval conference,

was about to end.

In March 1936 a CID sub-committee was appointed to consider the

vulnerability of capital ships to air attack, in the light of experiments

since 1921, with Inskip in the chair, and Chatﬁeld, now ﬁrst sea lord,

and Ellington, the CAS, as his expert advisers. Chatﬁeld’s view, as in

1921, was that no warship was unsinkable but there was no reason why

capital ships could not be designed to withs tand air attack. Ellington

thought there was a tendency in the sub-committee’s discussions for the

capital ship of the future to be pitted against the aircraft of today,

whereas the air threat would increase very rapidly. On the question of

relative price, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry agreed that forty-three

twin-engined medium bombers could be built and maintained for the

cost of one capital ship over a given period (aircraft would have had to

be replaced more frequently). Inskip did not accept, however, that such

aircraft could be substituted for battleships. Given the need to protect

Britain’s world-wide trade and empire, there was a need for ships equal

in ﬁghting power to the enemy that could operate in the oceans far

beyond the range of land-based aircraft. He felt that Brit ain had more to

lose by making a wrong decision in this matter than other naval powers,

yet none of them proposed to dispense with battleships. He accepted

that it was extremely difﬁcult to conduct tests in peace that would be

sufﬁciently realistic to be conclusive, but urged that the Admiralty and

Geoffrey Till, ‘Airpower and the battleship in the 1920s’, in Bryan Ranft (ed.),

Technical Change and British Naval Policy 1860–1939 (London: Hodder and Stoughton,

1977), pp. 108–22, at pp. 111–13.

Retrenchment and rearmament 119

Air Ministry should collaborate in further trials aimed at obtaining

information that would enable capit al ships to be designed so as to

secure the maximum immunity from air attack.

Given uncertainty whether all other naval powers would observe the

35,000-ton limit ﬁrst set at Washington in 1922, and renewed by

Britain, Franc e and the United States at the second Londo n naval

conference in 1936, there was doubt whether the new capital ships due

to be laid down in January 1937 would be equal in ﬁghting power to a

potential enemy. The signatories of the second London naval treaty

agreed on 14-inch calibre as the maximum size of gun, but the Japanese

refused to state their intentions and the Americans then opted for a

16-inch gun. However, the British had already designed mountings for

14-inch guns and, as the construction of gun mountings determined

how soon a capital ship could be completed, Chatﬁeld decided to go

ahead with 14-inch guns for the ‘King George V’ class. Speed of con-

struction seemed to be of the essence, given that all except three of the

Royal Navy’s capital ships were at least twenty years old, and the fact

that France, Germany and Italy were already building new ones. The

completion of the ‘King George V’ class was, howe ver, delayed by

Chatﬁeld’s insistence on extra armour, which necessitated the redesign

of one of the turrets to take two rather than four guns, to save weight.

The consequence was that Britain’s new capital ships had smaller calibre

guns than those constructed by the Italians, Germans or Japanese, but

this was probably inevitable, given that the British observed the 35,000-

ton limit and the Germans and Japanese did not.

Cruisers were considered by the Naval Staff to be the major threat to

British trade, and also the means by which a guerre de course could be

conducted against Japan. The Germans sprang a surprise in the early

1930s when they began to replace their pre-dreadnoughts with so-called

pocket battleships. These armoured ships were nominally within the

10,000-ton limit set by the Treaty of Versailles, but in reality displaced

20 per cent more. They were designed as commerce raiders, with suf-

ﬁcient speed to evade all capital ships, except battle-cruisers, but with

more powerful guns (11-inch) than any allowed to cruisers under the

Washington treaty (maximum 8-inch). However, the Admiralty gave

greater priority to the Japanese menace. When asked in the DRC in

‘Sub-Committee on the Vulnerability of Capital Ships to Air Attack, report’, CID paper

1258-B, 30 July 1936, and minutes of evidence, CAB 16/147, TNA. An abridged

version of the report was published as Cmd 5301 (PP 1936–7, xii. 73–90).

Chatﬁeld to Churchill, 10 Mar. 1942, Chatﬁeld Papers, CHT/4/3, National Maritime

Museum, Greenwich; G. A. H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement between the

Wars: A Reappraisal of Rearmament (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 173.

Arms, economics and British strategy120

January 1934 by Hankey and Fisher about the pocket battleships,

Chatﬁeld replied that the French (who had laid down the ﬁrst of two

battle-cruisers in 1932) could look after them. He added that Britain’s

three battle-cruisers could do so too, but ultimately the Royal Navy

might not possess any ships of that type as the design of their replace-

ments would depend upon what the Japanese replaced their battle-

cruisers with.

No attempt was made to build larger cruisers to cope

with the pocket battleships. Indeed, the Admiralty proposed at the

second London naval conference to reduce the maximum size of cruisers,

from the 10,000 tons allowed under the Washington treaty to 8,000

tons, to make it possible to build at less cost the number believed to be

required to protect Brit ish trade.

The need for economy also inﬂuenced Admiralty thinking on anti-

submarine warfare. On being app ointed ﬁrst sea lord, Chatﬁeld made a

start to building a reserve of anti-submarine vessels, equipment and

trained personnel to form a nucleus for the anti-submarine force that

would be required in war. However, in a period of severe ﬁnancial

restraint his only change in the Admiralty’s sketch estimates for 1933

was to raise the number of anti-submarine escorts to be laid down from

one to two.

When Fisher asked in the DRC in January 1934 whether

the navy had enough destroyers for anti-submarine work, Chatﬁeld said

that the number could be increased by refraining from scrapping old

vessels, if the Ge rmans started building submarines again. He also

declined to take up Fisher’s suggestion that the Admiralty should put in

a claim for all the Asdic (Sonar) sets required in war, instead of asking

for 200 and waiting for others to be manufactured subsequently.

Germany had already taken secret steps to re-create a submarine force

and the Admiralty was no t entirely surprised to learn that U-boats were

already under construction when Hitler denounced the arms limitation

clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in March 1935. Even so, the

Admiralty continued to give a higher priority to major warships than to

anti-submarine vessels, on the grounds that the latter could be produced

quickly in an emergency. By 1934 the Admiralty had designed an anti-

submarine trawler capable of rapid construction and in October 1938 it

was decided to build a new type of ship that would be cheaper

than conventional destroyers, but faster than existing designs of escort

DRC minutes, 23 Jan. 1934, CAB 16/109, TNA.

Stephen Roskill, Naval Policy between the Wars, 2 vols. (London: Collins, 1968–76),

vol. II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930–1939, p. 317.

Chatﬁeld’s comments on ‘Naval policy and the sketch estimates for 1933’, 30 Aug.

1932, CHT/3/1, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich.

DRC minutes, 18 Jan. and 23 Jan. 1934, CAB 16/109, TNA.

Retrenchment and rearmament 121

vessels.

The Royal Navy was ahead of the US Navy in ﬁtting Asdic to all

destroyers from 1932 as well as to older ones earmarked for escort duties.

The development of the Royal Navy’s own submarines was restricted

by the need for economy, although insofar as economy led to standar-

disation of design it was not without beneﬁt. There had been ﬁve dif-

ferent kinds of submarine in service in 1918: patrol, ﬂeet, minelayer,

monitor and anti-submarine. The last two types were quickly dis-

continued and, although examples of the other types were still in service

in 1939, only the patrol type was under continuing development.

Increasing concentration on patrol submarines capable of laying mines

as well as reconnaissance and anti-warship patrols was the best use of

scarce resources.

On balance, it is clear that the Royal Navy did not cease to be a

technical leader in the inter-war period. Geoffrey Till has argued that

the British were less perceptive than the Japanese or the Americans

in their understanding of what naval aviation could achieve, but, as he

says, the difference was only one of degree.

In other respects the Royal

Navy was clearly ahead. The developm ent of Asdic had been kept secret

even from Allied navies in the First World War and Britain still had a

strong lead in 1939.

The Royal Navy was also participating in the

development of radar from 1935, and the ﬁrst sets were installed in a

cruiser in 1938. Britain was thus well placed to exploit electronic

technology, which came to dominate naval warfare in the Second World

War, both as regards tracking an enemy (as with the shadowing of the

battleship Bismarck in 1941) and ﬁghting at night.

Army weapons

Britain continued to lead the world in the development of tanks during

the 1920s. The Vickers Medium Mark I, deliveries of which began in

1923, was the ﬁrst British tank in service to have a revolving turret. The

Mark III of 1928 was well ahead of its time, having the ﬁrepower of a

heavy tank but the speed of a medium one. However, because of its high

First Sea Lord, Sir Roger Backhouse, to Inskip, 13 Oct. 1938, ADM 205/3, TNA.

David Henry, ‘British submarine policy, 1918–1939’, in Ranft (ed.), Technical Change

and British Naval Policy, pp. 80–107.

Geoffrey Till, ‘Adapting the aircraft carrier: the British, American and Japanese case

studies’, in Williamson Murray and Alan R. Millett (eds.), Military Innovation in the

Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 191–226.

George Franklin, Britain’s Anti-Submarine Capability 1919–1939 (London: Frank Cass,

2003).

Alan Beyerchen, ‘From radio to radar’, in Murray and Millett, Military Innovation,

pp. 265–99, at p. 294.

Arms, economics and British strategy122

cost, only three examples were built and the type was not developed.

Instead the army concentrat ed on light tanks, initially of 4.25 tons, little

more than a quarter of the size of the Medium Mark III. Armed only

with machine guns, they were of no use in tank-to-tank combat, but they

could be built cheaply and issued for training. An identical policy was

followed by the German army when it adopted the Panzerkampfwagen 1,

with similar characteristics to the British Light Tank Mark VI, in 1934.

Reliance upon light tanks was not a sign of technical backwardness.

Indeed, British tanks were widely exported or produced under licence

abroad in the inter-war period; for example, Italy based its standard light

tank down to 1941 on a British model of 1929.

Whereas the United States abolished its tank corps at the end of the

First World War, the Royal Tank Corps (RTC), as it became in 1923,

survived and engaged in a good deal of experiment. Indeed, until the

early 1930s the British army was widely regarded as the world leader in

developing doctrine for tank warfare. This reputation was not entirely

deserved. For example, Fuller, who was the best-known British radical

military thinker of the 1920s, successfully converted the RTC to the

doctrine of ﬁring on the move in tank-to-tank combat. The Germans

adopted the opposite tactic of ﬁring when stationary, which made for

much greater accuracy. From 1927 the British army conducted

experiments to discover how tanks could best be combined with

armoured cars, motorised machine guns and artillery, and aircraft, but

the conclusion drawn was that tanks were best employed in independent

brigades, rather than in units combining different arms, in contrast to

what the Germans were to do with their panzer divisions.

By late 1933

the British army had an armoured briga de as part of its establishment,

but the composition of the brigade had yet to be decided, pending

experiments with new medium tanks, especially as regards their resis-

tance to anti-tank guns. The cavalry division was still mounted on horses

and would remain so, in the words of the DRC report in February 1934,

‘until a vehicle is designed capable of replacing the horse, and no such

vehicle is in sight’.

The vulnerability of horsed cavalry to modern

ﬁrepower was recognised, but tanks were as yet characterised by short

range and limited mechanical reliability, and armoured cars lacked

cross-country capability. Nevertheless, in October 1934 the CIGS,

Montgomery-Massingberd, decided that one of the army’s two horsed

cavalry brigades should be given tanks, and combined as a mechanised

Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks, pp. 197–204, 215–29, 246–8.

‘Defence Requirements Sub-Committee, report’, DRC 14, 28 Feb. 1934, CAB 24/247,

TNA.

Retrenchment and rearmament 123

cavalry brigade with the army’s sole existing tank brigade to form a

‘mobile’ (armoured) division.

In the absence of any satisfactory

alternative, the mechanised cavalry were equipped with light tanks.

Conversion of other horsed cavalry regiments followed and, contrary to

what many military historians have assumed, the limiting factor was the

availability of armoured ﬁghting vehicles rather than sentimental

attachment to horses.

Teething troubles and indecision about the best balance between

armour and speed led to hesitation in adopting a successor to the

obsolescent medium tanks dating from the 1920s. Design work was

delayed by the death of Sir John Carden, Britain’s leading tank

designer, in an aeroplane crash in 1935. The limited resources of

Vickers-Armstrong, Britain’s only producer of tanks after it took over

the Carden-Loyd ﬁrm in 1928, were furth er stretched when the War

Ofﬁce decided in 1936 on a re-equipment programme based on no

fewer than four categories of tank. These were to be: a light tank for the

cavalry; a larger ‘cruiser’ tank, armed with a 2-pounder shell-ﬁring gun,

but fast enough for the light tank role in the Tank Brigade; a similarly

armed, but more heavily armoured medium tank for the ‘hitting’ role in

the Tank Brigade; and a heavily armoured, slow assault tank to operate

with the infantry. The Cruiser Mark I was not ready for production until

August 1937, and was considered to be too vulnerable to anti-tank guns;

the more heavily armoured Mark II was not ready for production until

July 1938. Neither the Mark I nor the Mark II was suitable for mass

production by non-specialist ﬁrms and both were regarded as stop-gaps.

The Cru iser Mark III was developed by the Morris Car Company, using

the suspension of the American Christie tank, but suffered from many

teething problems and did not enter production until December 1938.

The medium tank remained a research project. The Infantry Tank Mark

I was not ready for production until April 1937 and, being armed only

with a single machine gun, was not design ed for tank-to-tank ﬁghting.

This drawback was overcome with the Mark II, which had a 2-pounder

gun, but the pilot model did not appear until April 1938 and production

did not start until the following year. The British tanks of the late 1930s

were comparable in ﬁghting power to their German equivalents, but not

in mechanical reliability, reﬂecting their hurried development.

Tanks

suitable for use by armoured divisions in a campaign on the European

Minute by CIGS, 15 Oct. 1934, WO 32/2847, TNA.

David French, ‘The mechanization of the British cavalry between the world wars’, War

in History, 10 (2003), 296–320.

Postan, Hay and Scott, Design and Development, pp. 240, 309–13, 316; Harris, Men,

Tanks and Ideas, pp. 240–1; ‘Tank situation statements made to the DPR

Arms, economics and British strategy124