Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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190 chapter four
Anglo-Imperial strategic plan.
115
e gures are very vague, but we can
be reasonably certain that Charles’s own corps, led from Speyer to Metz,
amounted to 16,000 and Gonzaga’s force, which joined the Emperor at
Saint-Dizier, 27,000 (43,000). Aer the siege of Saint-Dizier, though,
these forces had dropped through desertions to 33,000.
116
With a simi-
lar number under Henry VIII, the French were facing combined forces
or more like 70,000. A spy report to Henry VIII (in fact one that was
planted by the French through a double agent, La Vigne) at the end
of May noted that Francis would be pitting 40,000 foot, 1200 light
horse and 1500 lances against the Emperor under the command of the
Dauphin and Annebault. For Picardy under the command of du Biez
‘qui est ung diable’ and Vendôme with 1000–1200 lances, 7–800 light
horse and an unknown number of infantry. e King himself would
have the Swiss, a certain number of aventuriers, 1500 lances and his
guards. ese gures agree well with the estimate by Ferdinand Lot
based on du Bellay’s brief assessment of 40,000 foot made up of 16,000
Swiss and Grisons, 6000 lansquenets, 12,000 French and Italians with-
drawn from Italy and a certain number of legionnaires. ere was talk of
80,000 men ultimately assembled at the camp of Jalons in August but
this was a huge exaggeration.
117
e planted spy report just mentioned
stressed that in Picardy ‘the countryside is well scoured, for everything
has been brought into the fortresses that could be and at the present
nothing is to be found.’
118
Du Bellay reports that, immediately aer the
victory of Ceresole, Francis recalled his crack troops from Piedmont:
6000 infantry of the old bands and 6000 Italians. In view of the King’s
need to concentrate forces in order to meet the Emperor and Henry
in a great fortied camp, Picardy was ‘very short of men’ and the duke
of Vendôme ‘poorly accompanied’ in the defence of Ardres, Boulogne,
érouanne, Montreuil and Hesdin.
119
Elsewhere, there were fears of
an English descent on Normandy in March.
120
In the early stages of
115
Monluc, Commentaires (ed. Courteault), p. 170.
116
Rozet et Lembey, L’invasion de France, pp. 22–24.
117
NA SP1/187, fos. 239v–240r (274v–275r) (L&P, XIX, i, 575.3); F. Lot, Recher-
ches sur les eectifs des armées francaises des Guerres d’Italie aux Guerres de Religion
1494–1562 (Paris, 1962), pp. 103–104.
118
Spy report, May 1544, NA SP1/187, fo. 239v(274v) (L&P, XIX, i, 573.3): ‘la cam-
panye est byen razé car on a tiré tousiours dedans les places fortes ce qui sera assez à
faire à voyre et de ceste heure ne se treuve ryens.’
119
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, p. 236, 8: ‘fort dépourveue d’hommes’ ‘mal accompagné.’
120
Correspondance de Matignon, ed. Labande, no. CXLVI.
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
191
the campaign, du Biez, as Vendôme’s deputy, was responsible for the
strengthening of the garrisons. Reports coming in during May indi-
cated a build up of Spanish troops around Gravelines, Saint-Omer
and Aire and the marching of the Italians into Luxemburg. Du Biez
countered with reinforcements at Hesdin and érouanne.
121
Further
south, Vendôme, from La Fère as his headquarters, undertook the
reinforcement of Landrecies with 800 horse and some infantry before
withdrawing to Guise.
122
He heard that forces were concentrating in
Hainault and called Jean de Créquy to join him with his company.
123
But with Buren at Valenciennes it was dicult to take appropriate
measures, especially as an English army was assembling at Calais.
124
French uncertainty about English objectives is clear in intelligence
reports that:
20,000 English have landed at Calais, 500 making a thousand, brought
by the duke of Norfolk and that the King of England is to arrive shortly
with another 20,000; that ovens are mounted on carts that they are to
take with them. eir intention is to aim for Ardres to attack it and if
that is not possible to move on the Boulogne and Montreuil.
e German troops at Valenciennes were likely to enter French
territory through Bray and Corbie in order to join in an attack on
Montreuil. In July the situation became more ominous when Heilly
(governor of Hesdin) reported the imminent junction of the forces
under Buren and du Roeulx with the English.
125
On the 12th, Heilly’s
agent sent further word:
121
Du Biez to Heilly, 1 May 1544; Villebon to du Biez, 16 May 1544, Potter, Du
Biez, nos. 196, 197.
122
Bailli of Avesnes to M. de Bermerain, 30 May 1544 (AGR, Audience, liasse 20);
Aerschot to Mary of Hungary, 3 June 1544, AGR, Audience, liasse 21.
123
Vendôme to Heilly, 22 May 1544, BM Amiens, MS 1150, no. 25; Bouchet to
Heilly, 15 May 1544, SAP Ch. Heilly 57, no. 47.
124
Du Biez to Heilly, 9, 10 June 1544, Potter, Du Biez, no. 198, 199.
125
‘Nouvelles des ennemys rapportees à Monseigneur de Heilly,’ 15 June 1544, SAP
Ch. Heilly, 59, II, no. 46: ‘Qu’il est descendu vingt mil Angloys à Calays, les vc faisant
le mil, que le duc de Norfocq a amenez, et que le Roy d’Angleterre doit descendre de
brief avec autres xxm Angloys; et qu’on faict faire des fours sur chariotz qu’ilz mey-
nent avecques eulx. Leur deliberacion est dresser leur chemyn à Ardre pour l’essayer et
s’ilz n’y peuvent riens eulx dresser à Boullogne et Montreul.’; news letter, 1 July 1544,
ibid., no. 47; Heilly to Vendôme, 1 July 1544, SAP, Ch. De Heilly, 57, no. 2.
192 chapter four
He says that they are determined to attack Montreuil with a great fury
and if they unable to take it will withdraw to their country without mov-
ing further on. He fears that 800 English are camped before Boulogne.
126
At Ardres, where the Constable’s brother La Rochepot was in command
with his company and an augmented garrison, the men were restive
for lack of pay and he had to make this up himself. Nevertheless, he
seems to have solved the problem and Ardres was judged too strong
to attack.
127
At the start of the campaign it looked as though the French in the
north would be able to eld 10–12,000 foot (Normans, Picards and
Beauvoisiens); they also expected 8000 Italians and 300 Germans.
e Dauphin was imminently expected on the northern frontier to
take command against the English while the Duke of Orléans faced
the Emperor in Champagne.
128
Early in July, it was reported that the
Dauphin would advance into Picardy with 30,000 men to block the
English advance.
129
e companies of the Dauphin and Vendôme were
expected at Doullens on 10 July and then at Abbeville at the end of
the month. It is clear, though, that the Dauphin was having trouble
raising men: du Roeulx reported on 1 August that ‘the Dauphin does
what he can to assemble men; but according to news I have received
today, he will nd few infantry and still less money to pay them, while
the King of France lies ill at Saint-Denis.’
130
e Dauphin did indeed
advance as far as Amiens with his own suite, taking order for supplying
Vendôme with such money and troops as were available.
131
But money
was delayed (causing looting) and news of the Emperor’s advance was
so alarming that he was recalled to join the King’s camp forming near
126
News letter, 12 July 1544, SAP Ch. Heilly, 59, II, no. 48: ‘Dict qu’ilz sont deli-
berez d’assaillir Montreul d’une grant furie et s’ilz ne le scavent emporter se retireront
en leur pays sans passer plus oultre. Et craint que les Angles, qui sont a huit cens, se
campent devant Boulogne.’
127
La Rochepot to Vendôme, 25 July1544, HHSA, P.A. 55, fos. 445–446.
128
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 9, 23 June 1544 AGR, Audience [liasse 21]
Paillard, p. 312.
129
Rozet et Lembey, p. 256, Ferruno to Ercole II of Ferrara, 5 July 1544.
130
Letters of du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 23, 28 June, 10, 11, 15, 31 July,
1 August (AGR, Audience, [liasses 22–23]) Paillard, L’invasion allemande, p. 313:
‘Le Daulphin fait ce qu’il peut pour assembler gens; mais, aux nouvelles que j’ay eu
aujourd’huy, trouvera bien peu de gens de pied et encores moins d’argent pour les
payer, et que le roy de France est malade à Saint Denys.’
131
Vendôme to Dauphin, 31 July 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 23.
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
193
Château-ierry. ere were, then, to be no extra troops for Vendôme
in breaking the sieges except the 2000 brought by the Dauphin.
132
is, in eect, determined the course of the defence against Henry. By
10 August it was being reported that the Dauphin had even taken
his cavalry towards Champagne, perhaps in the knowledge that the
English would be conning themselves to local action near Calais. is
le Vendôme with no more than 2000 horse.
133
us, other than the
garrison troops, Vendôme had only small cavalry forces at his dis-
posal. Norfolk reported in mid-June that the French had ‘sparkeled all
their companies into their fortresses, thinkyng surely that we woll laye
siege to Boloyn, Arde or Monstrell.’
134
When the English main battle landed at Calais at the beginning of
July, du Biez was le in the front line to face them. Early in June, he
was putting on a brave face when an English trumpeter arrived, ‘won-
drefully galyardly trimmed, mustering his men,’ 100 hommes d’armes
with a ne complement of horses and 1500 foot.
135
When it became
clear that a powerful force was advancing on Montreuil under Norfolk’s
command and had been joined by Buren’s forces, he took part of the
Boulogne garrison and set up his command at Montreuil, leaving his
son-in-law, Vervins, at Boulogne (the origin of the latter legal attack
against him was the erroneous claim that Vervins and his fellow com-
manders were inexperienced).
136
Du Bellay gives fairly precise details of
the garrisons le: at Montreuil under du Biez himself, two companies
of hommes d’armes, half of his own and the Constable’s (150 lances,
or 375 men), 4 ensigns of French infantry under Genlis (presumably
legionnaires) or 1200 men, 1000 Italian infantry under count Berenger
and another 1000 under Francisque de Chiaramont. is gives a total
of around nearly 4000 men. At Boulogne, the complement was weaker
according to du Bellay. Vervins had half of du Biez’s company and
132
Norfolk to Council, 2 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 9; Council to Norfolk, 15 Aug.
1544, ibid., no. 89.
133
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 10 August 1544, Paillard, L’invasion, p. 317
(AGR, Seigneurs, II, 427); Council with King to Norfolk and Russell, 15 Aug. 1544,
L&P, XIX, ii, 89.
134
Norfolk to Council, 15 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 140(156) (L&P, XIX, i, 709).
135
Norfolk to Council, 9 June 1544, NA SP1/188, fo. 80(90)r (L&P, XIX, i, 654).
136
D. Potter, ‘A treason trial in sixteenth-century France: the fall of marshal du Biez,
1549–1551’ English Historical Review, 105 (1990), 595–623; Du Bellay, Mémoires IV,
pp. 238–239; Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 9 July 1544, Brussels AGR, Audience, ‘le
seigneur du Biez leur a respondu ce que ung homme de bien doibt respondre.’
194 chapter four
for infantry Lignon with 500 and two other bandes of foot (numbers
unspecied) under d’Aix and Philippe Corse. Of these, only Corse was
described as experienced, the others as ‘peu expérimente’ or ‘jeune
homme.’
137
How reliable are these gures? At his later trial, du Biez
produced detailed evidence on his dispositions. He was accused of
knowing in advance about the English plan and, indeed, he admitted
that, a year before the siege, he sent warnings to the King that the
English would attack Boulogne. However, on receiving a royal com-
mission he claimed to have taken careful steps to provision the places
under his command.
138
is chimes with the earlier estimate of his
opponent, du Roeulx, that he was ‘the commander on this frontier most
to be feared.’
139
e garrison he le at Boulogne comprised 4 bands of
300 under Lignon, Colinet, Pocques and d’Aix, a band of 200 Italians
under Philippo Corso, half of his own company (52 hommes d’armes
and 100 archers), plus the ordinary garrison of 100 mortespaies and
plenty of pioneers. e total would thus be something around 1650
men, very close to the English trumpeter’s estimate. Ardres was pow-
erfully garrisoned with 1000 foot and 50 hommes d’armes under La
Rochepot, provisioned for four months.
140
Vendôme, moving between Hesdin and érouanne, oversaw measures
to break the blockade where possible and reported to the Dauphin:
I have dedided to leave this town [Doullens] tomorrow to go with the
captains of the companies here sleep at Hesdin. From there I shall go to
érouanne to try whether it will be possible to do something to help
Montreuil.
141
137
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 238–239. An extensive compilation of miscelleous
material on the siege was made by A. Marmin in Le siege de Boulogne en 1544 . . . avec
des notes historiques par M. Alexandre Marmin (Boulogne, 1825). is seriously exag-
gerates the numbers of the besieging army.
138
Trial, 23 Aug. 1549, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 304–305: ‘Et par confession plus au long
confesse qu’il en fut adverty des environ ung an auparavant et le t entendre au feu
Roy, le suppliant pourveoir aux aaires lequel luy envoyoit commission pour munir
la ville et suyvant icelle t mener de St Vallery à Boulongne cent cinquante muydz
de bled et voyant que ce n’estoit assez t ung ravage et arrester grande quantité de
vins estrangers, tellement que quand il partit dud. Boulongne pour aller à Monstreul
y laissa vivres pour nourrir unze mois deux mil quattre cens bouches. Laissa xlij ou
xliij caques de pouldres au pris de ijc lt. pour cacque, grande quantité de salpestres et
de charbon avec deux molins pour en faire.’
139
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 19 May 1542, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 3: ‘le
capitaine sur ceste frontiere le plus à craindre.’
140
Norfolk, 9 June, L&P, XIX, i, 654.
141
Vendôme to Dauphin, 31 July [1544], BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 23: ‘J’ay deliberé partir
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
195
Supply lines from Saint-Omer were, as has been seen, a major weak-
ness of the English position at Montreuil. His resources were limited,
though he promised as stout a defence at Boulogne and Montreuil as
at Saint-Dizier. At any rate, an attempt by Saint-André late in July to
get into Boulogne by sea was foiled by the English occupation of the
haven and the land around the town.
142
Vendôme’s attempt to attack the supply convoys for the English
troops at Montreuil early in August was only partially successful but
the resistance of the garrison there was erce enough.
143
e English
mounted a battery of 18 cannons on 2–3 August and followed it up
with seven assaults, but the bulwark in front of the Abbeville gate stood
up well and the defenders were able to report 5 or 6000 casualties in
the assaults (400–500 of them defenders).
144
On 12 August, Vendôme,
at the Dauphin’s command, at least managed to get 200 pioneers into
Montreuil, with powder and saltpetre, one more measure of English
incompetence. He also started making plans to cut the sea routes by
which the besiegers at Boulogne were being supplied but could do
little about the land routes.
145
On 13 August, the English at Montreuil
began a new battery of the Abbeville (marché) gate and Vendôme’s
spies suspected mining in that area of the walls. Intelligence about
Montreuil was pessimistic and reports of constant skirmishing with
the few French companies of hommes d’armes not reassuring.
146
A
demain de ceste ville [Doullens] pour m’en aller coucher à Hesdin avecques les cap-
pitaines de compaignyes quy sont icy et delà m’en aller à erouanne pour essayer s’il
sera possible faire chose qui puisse favoriser Monstroeul.’
142
Vendôme to Orléans, 31 July [1544] ibid., fo. 24.
143
Norfolk to Council, 2 and 4 Aug. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 9, 27.
144
News sent out to Heilly, 4 Aug. 1544, SAP, Ch. Heilly, 59, II, no. 59: ‘que depuis
le samedy deuxiesme jour d’aoust jusques au dimenche sept heures du matin noz
ennemys donnarent cinquante vollees de canon chacun vollee de xxviij canons et
depuis lesd. sept heures jusques à dix dud. jour donnarent sept assaultz dont le pre-
mier dura environ une heure où il fut tué de quatre à cinq mil homes dont on extime
en y avoir environ quatre cens de la ville.’
145
Vendôme to Francis I, 12 Aug. 1544; to Dauphin, same date, BnF, fr. 20521,
fos. 26–27, 25.
146
Vendôme to Francis I, 14 Aug. [1544],: BnF, fr. 20521, fos. 73–74. Intelligence
reports stressed the optimism of the English at Montreuil: ‘Advertissment’ of 10 Aug.
1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 72: a returning French prisoner had reported: ‘avoir oy aulc-
huns gentilz hommes du camp de Monstroeul dire que leur cas alloit bien et qu’il
avoient iiij milles cloies et six milles grosses bouvrees prestes et la ville fort crouste,
pour battre incontinent que le conte de Bures aures prins Boullongne. Ung aultre
prisonnier de Cressy dict que jeudi de la nuict ont mis plusieurs pieces d’artilleries sus
ung hault mont de terre pour battre dedens la ville.’
196 chapter four
the start of September, a message was sent through the lines from
Montreuil that there were only enough supplies to last 6 weeks, rather
than 2 months. Francis I was highly indignant, telling the messenger
that, if so, he might be forced to make a disadvantageous treaty with
the Emperor to rescue Montreuil. Du Biez claimed at his trial to have
got out the message that, by economies which had made his garri-
son discontented, he could make supplies last for two or even three
months. At this, Francis was relieved.
147
ere had in fact been res
in the munition stores and a young 16-year-old English soldier was
captured with a fuse and matches in his possession. Blamed for not
executing him, the marshal declared that an Italian captain had sued
for his life and saying that he was young and handsome.(‘dist que led.
Anglois estoit beau et jeune.’)
148
Of course, Boulogne was increasingly the main danger point; rel-
atively weak in its garrison and confronted by Henry VIII’s main
forces. A French spy report indicated that ‘they are suering greatly at
Boulogne.’ On the 12 August, Vendôme reported an imminent assault,
in view of ‘their great bombardment.’ However, little news was getting
out of the town because spies were unable to get through the much
tighter English lines, a problem compounded by Boulogne’s remote-
ness and relative isolation from the rest of Picardy.
149
e contrast
with the relative ease by which du Biez was able to get messages out
of Montreuil is striking, though at least one of these was intercepted
and later testimony at his trial suggests a certain element of cloak and
147
Trial, 9 Sept. 1549, Potter, Du Biez, pp. 307–308: ‘Surce led. mareschal confesse
que le feu Roy fut mal content de ce qui luy avoit mandé qu’il n’avoit vivres que pour
deux mois et se esbahissoit commant il y avoit mis si mauvais ordre et que s’il estoit
contrainct le secourir dedans led. temps fauldroit qu’il st ung traicté avec l’empereur
à son grand desadvantaige. Dont adverty, led. mareschal . . . envoya led. Caron devers
luy pour luy donner entendre que . . . ce neantmoins il en avoit pour aller jusques au
troisiesme au moyen du bon ordre que luy et le sr de la Guyche avoit mis aux vivres,
dont les soldards n’estoient contans et non obstant que bonne partie desd. vivres eus-
sent esté perduz par le feu qui sy y mist par deux fois. Dist que led. feu Roy en eut
grand contentement comme il luy escrivit par led. Caron.’
148
Ibid., p. 308.
149
‘Advertissment’ of 10 Aug. 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 72: ‘ilz ont fort à sourir à
Boulongne.’ . . . ‘la grande batterie qu’ilz font.’ e most detailed and evocative French
source for the internal conditions at Boulogne is to be found in the long verse chron-
icle kept by the priest Antoine Morin, published by François Morand as ‘Chroniques
du siège de Boulogne, en 1544, ou Journal de ce siège, en vers, composé par A. Morin,’
Revue des Sociétés Savantes, ser. 4, vol. II (1866), 60–67, 129–145, 244–261. is makes
abundantly clear the sense of isolation and abandonment felt by the population:
‘Souuerain Roy de Franche, nous laisra tu mourir?’ (p. 253).
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
197
dagger.
150
It should not be supposed, though, that Vendôme was pre-
pared to write Boulogne o and we know of one successful venture
mounted by him from érouanne to cut the English supply routes
from Saint-Omer which reveals the limited numbers of troops he had
at his disposal (perhaps 1500–2000 horse). He had word that a supply
train was moving from Saint-Omer to resupply the camp at Montreuil
protected by 800 cavalry, 1200 lansquenets and four culverins. e forces
he had were his own gendarmerie company (100 lances, 350 horse)
and those of Villebon, Estrées, Esguilly, 50 lances of the Dauphin’s
company and 50 under Sénarpont (perhaps in total 1000 horse). He
had 200 more lances (Créquy and Heilly) in reserve but, according
to du Bellay, did not need them to break up the supply train and take
800 prisoners to érouanne. More than that, he was unable to do and
nor were the several attempts of the young sr. de Saint-André to get
into the town by sea successful.
151
The Fall of Boulogne and French Attempts at Recapture
e course of events was being dictated in Champagne. e Emperor
had become dangerously bogged down aer his rapid advance and
marched past the French camp at Jalons on the other side of the river,
not even laying siege to Châlons. Peace discussions were well under
way by 16 September when he reached Château-ierry. For form’s
sake, the Emperor had asked Henry for his terms should a peace be
possible, but the English King was unenthusiastic, putting forward pre-
posterous terms not even translated into French.
152
But with the arrival
150
Du Biez to Vendôme, 31 Aug. 1544 copy sent to Emperor, Potter, Du Biez,
no. 202; testimony of Nicolas Caron, 9 Sept. 1549, Potter, Du Biez, p. 207: ‘Et quant
led. Caron et son guyde partirent dud. Monstreul furent toutte la nuyct dedans les
maretz et le lendemain se retirerent aux bois où ilz furent attendans la nuyct et à la
nuyct allerent à Abbeville devers monsr de Vendosme, qui le despescha et dela au
lendemain led. Caron vint à Reims où il trouva Saint Germain et de Reims luy et led.
sr de Saint Germain allèrent à Iternay où le Roy estoit et le trouva led. Caron en sa
garde robe où luy t sa messaige dont led. Sr fut bien aisé et luy commanda venir en
ceste ville de Paris où led. sr vint et y despecha led. Caron et luy bailla lettres de credit
pour advertir led. mareschal de la paix faicte avec l’empereur et que luy envoyroit le
roy qui est à present pour le secourir. Dist oultre que le feu Roy luy bailla L écus et
promesse d’une place des gardes.’
151
Du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 261–263, 275–276.
152
3 Sept. 1544: copy sent to Wotton: St.P., X, p. 52; original sent to Emperor (in
English): HHSA, England, Varia, 3, konv. 3, fos. 69–70 (L&P, ii, 180.2 and 3).
198 chapter four
of cardinal du Bellay, Pierre Remon and Claude de L’Aubespine in the
English camp on 10 September, it might have seemed that a general
peace was in the ong. Francis was prepared to oer a return to the
status quo ante, to pay reasonable arrears of the pension and resume
the yearly payments. If Henry were to raise the sieges, Francis would
oer noble hostages for the carrying out of his commitments. He even
oered to come to terms with Henry separately if he could not do
a deal with the Emperor. Elis Gruydd passed through Hardelot at
this time and reports these talks, with the rumour that the French
had oered Ardres, but also dryly comments Henry would not listen.
153
Henry was still dismissive of peace oers. Even the Constable’s brother
La Rochepot, in command at Ardres, sent out for a safe conduct to
make some oer. Henry was having none of it, though La Rochepot’s
trumpeter told du Roeulx in condence that the Constable’s party
were deeply discontented.
154
Negotiations were derailed, and with dire long-term consequences,
by the capitulation of Boulogne and by the rapid conclusion of the
Franco-Imperial treaty. e broad terms oered by the French would
have represented a real coup if the Emperor had been le out. e
treaty of Crépy, a return to the status quo of 1542 (with a secret reli-
gious clause) was not signed until 20th at Crépy-en-Laonnois but it
had been likely for some time and the Emperor had sent to Henry
VIII at Boulogne for his consent. Henry, though he himself had been
entertaining French peace oers, was outraged as he saw himself as on
the verge of taking the town.
155
He seems to have made the mistake
in discussions with the bishop of Arras of giving the impression that
he would approve of Charles ‘making as good an end for himself as
he could.’ What Henry insisted later that he had said was that Charles
would do least ill ‘if he embraced the overture for Milan.’ e Imperial
envoys, who were anxious to be gone from the camp, found him pen-
sive and by no means his usual boastful self. At all events, Granvelle
153
Norfolk insisted that du Bellay was [vain]‘glorious’ and wondered how to deal
with him (L&P, XIX, ii, 176). How he had formed this view remains a mystery, though
he may have been baed by the subtlety of the man. For the French instructions,
Scheurer, Correspondance de Jean du Bellay, III, pp. 263–266. Gruydd, ed. Davies,
‘Enterprises of Paris and Boulogne,’ p. 36.
154
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 11 Sept. 1544, AGR, Audience, 119, fo. 37: ‘le
connestable et tous ses parens, serviteurs et amis estoient pis traictez que jamais.’
155
Du Roeulx to Mary of Hungary, 1 Aug. 1544, Brussels, AGR Audience, 99,
showing Habsburg awareness of Henry’s dealings with the French.
‘
fighting over the bear
’
s skin
’
199
draed a full justication for Charles’ abandonment of his ally which
was convincing enough for the Emperor.
156
Announcing the treaty to Vendôme, who, by then, was back at La
Fère, Francis I declared that;
Considering that the English might make some diculty over the condi-
tions of peace and that in this case I am determined to succour my towns
of Boulogne and Montreuil, I inform you that I write presently to my
son the Dauphin to march straight to Montreuil with my army . . . for my
army is easily sucient to dislodge the English and give them a drub-
bing.
157
e switch of French forces came too late for Boulogne, however.
Vervins, despairing of help and with his defences ruined, sent his
lieutenants Saint-Blimont and Aix out to the English camp on the
morning of 13th. Vervins’ trial, however one-sided, makes it clear that
a range of the town’s civil leadership did not wish to surrender and
oered to continue ghting.
158
Vervins must have known, though, that
the next assault would leave no room for quarter according to the
laws of war. He agreed terms which allowed all those who wished to
156
Courrières and Chapuys to Charles V, 26 Sept. 1544, L&P, XIX, ii, 304; Council
to Wotton, Leedes, 2 Oct. 1544, ibid., no. 346. Granvelle’s justication for the Treaty
of Crépy: C. Weiss (ed.), Papiers d’état du cardinal de Granvelle, 9 vols (1841–1852),
III, p. 26 (L&P, XIX, ii, 250): ‘And as to saying that the King of England may be dis-
pleased, and pretend that you have thereby contravened the treaty; the retreat, also,
could not, by the treaty, be made without his consent. It is a maxim to regard the
reality of treaties in conjunction with what is possible, and not to run risks for the
sake of groundless scruples. Taking the principal treaty and that aerwards passed
between the King of England and Don Ferrante, it is clear that from the commence-
ment England has not fullled them, for he promised to enter France by 20 June and
did not do so until 15 July; and, instead of marching in the common enterprise he has
halted with his whole army (although he informed your Majesty that, at the least, by
10 July, he would march 30,000 men into France to co-operate with your army, and
retain the rest to besiege some place in his frontiers), leaving you alone in the principal
enterprise. As to the practice of the peace, it is clear that the King of England entered
it rst; and you may remember what the Queen of Hungary wrote of her fear that he
might do us a bad turn.’
157
Francis I to Vendôme, 17 Sept. 1544, BnF, fr. 20521, fo. 75: ‘D’autant que
l’Angloys pourroit faire quelque diculté sur les condiscions de lad. paix et que en
ce cas je me delibere secourir mes villes de Boullogne et Monstreul, je vous advise
que j’escriptz presentement à mon lz le Daulphin marcher droict aud. Monstreul
avecques mon armee . . . car mon armee est assez susante pour faire desloger lesd.
Angloys et bien leur rompre la teste.’
158
e safe-conduct is dated 7 p.m. on 12 Sept. and was to be activated within
2 hours. L&P, XIX, ii, 219 but the diary of the siege, ibid., no. 424 states that the
French came out at 9 a.m. on 13th.