Potter David. Henry VIII and Francis I
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330 chapter seven
through Trier and past Luxemburg.
102
eir way would lie through
Aachen into the archbishopric of Liège, thus avoiding the Emperor’s
territory. e whole situation was changed, however, by the arrival, on
the day of the crossing, of letters from the English Council.
103
ese
contained the orders reversing previous policy and directing the army
towards Champagne in a diversionary expedition. e troops were
to burn, waste, and kill for a month before returning; their leaders
were requested to await payment with patience until then. e rea-
son for the English government’s change of plan is not dicult to
nd: the invasion scare of the summer of 1545 had by now passed;
the French eet was out of the Channel; and the only threat which
remained was to Boulogne. Here a diversionary expedition would be
of use. However, the stipulation that only two months’ wages and con-
duct were to be paid eectively ruined the expedition: payment had
begun on 5 September, leaving by now only just over a month to reach
France, undertake some exploit and then return.
ough Reienberg appeared to agree to this new plan, it is plain
that he had serious doubts about the feasibility of the expedition and
feared for his reputation among the men. So, from the start, things
began to go wrong with English plans. First of all, from Aachen,
Averey had to be sent post haste to Antwerp to obtain another ten or
twelve thousand crowns in order to satisfy the growing demands of the
men, though the Council, on the commissioners’ request, despatched
£44,000 to Aachen on 8 October plus 12,000 crowns
for the parfyght ending of all thinges to thintent his grace be nott by
any meane trobled with any odde rackoninges or demandes among
them . . . butt that they may be quyte rydde away wythout great reason of
any quarrel, or the which ordre His Majeste maketh none accompt of
iiij or vM over or undre.
104
e English Council was evidently under the impression that it could
get rid of the levy simply, but this was not the case. From Aachen, as
102
Fraisse to Francis I, 14 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 94–95. ere were a limited num-
ber of alternatives. In December 1542, Heideck had proposed to move from Coblenz
to Luxemburg, though things had changed since the Emperor went to war with France:
Seymour to Henry VIII, 29 Dec. 1542, St.P., IX. 254.
103
Council to the English commissioners, n.d. [Sept. 1545], NA SP1/208, fos. 12–19
(L&P, XX, ii, 403).
104
English commissioners to the Council, Rheinbach, 29 Sept. 1545, ibid.XX, ii,
474; Aachen, 1 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/208, fos. 139–142 (L&P, XX, ii, 509); Council to
commissioners, 8 Oct. 1545, BL, Add.MS 5753, fo. 151 (L&P, XX, ii, 548).
france and england compete for troops 331
the troops marched into Liège, it is clear that relations between the
commissioners and the soldiers deteriorated badly. Reienberg stuck
to his demand for four months’ wages, arguing that this is what had
been agreed and that otherwise little could be done with the expedi-
tion; he also added an extra demand for pages for the horsemen. To
this, the Council in England retorted that there was no custom for
xed agreements on length of service with landsknechts and enclosed
contracts with the French King and the Emperor to prove it.
105
To what extent was French inuence responsible for the debacle
which followed? Fraisse certainly detected the slowness with which the
troops were receiving payment and seems to have taken the opportu-
nity to entice away some of the captains.
106
ere is no evidence that
these negotiations were with Reienberg himself, rather than with his
subordinates, for he himself complained late in August that Fraisse
was corrupting his men. He later attributed the desertion of 300 horse
and 1,000 foot to French intrigue,
107
but Fraisse was working on fertile
ground. Neither Reienberg nor his followers were anxious to leave
Germany and they wrote to oer their services to the Landgrave and
the Protestant estates.
108
Fraisse reported that, even aer the binding
distribution of coin to each of the men (completed by 21 September),
desertions were occurring for two main reasons: rstly, the rumours of
Anglo-French peace talks; and secondly, the word spread by the French
that other princes, among them the kings of France and Denmark,
were in need of mercenaries. John Dymoke and Claes Taphoren, the
clerk of the musters, had reported ominously as early as August that
little was to be expected from Reienberg.
109
Mont, from Coblenz early in September, saw clearly how French
agents were urging the local princes to break up the levy. He himself
105
Council to the commissioners, 14 Oct. 1545, BL, Add.MS 5753, fo. 153 (L&P,
XX, ii, 585).
106
Fraisse to Longueval, 20 Sept. 1545, Fraisse, pp. 112–114.
107
English commissioners to Paget, 27 Aug. 1545, L&P, XXI, ii, 234; Reienberg to
his clerk Hans Ulrich, 4 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fo. 94.
108
Reienberg was quick to oer his men to the Evangelical princes once the
expedition to France had broken down. Reienberg to the Landgrave, Florennes,
27 Oct. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 752, fo. 48r–v: his instruction, ibid., fos. 49–51, same
place and date.
109
Dymoke to Paget, Hamburg, 31 Aug. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 259; Taphoren to same,
31 Aug. 1545, ibid. 255. Christophe Richer claimed to have persuaded Christian III
of Denmark to impede the passage through his states of troops being raised in Meck-
lenburg for English service (Mémoires du sieur Richer in N. Camusat, Mélanges his-
toriques, fo. 13r.
332 chapter seven
could do little about it.
110
Only during October, with the expedition
dragging its way to an ignominious halt at Florennes, did the full
extent of French activities become apparent to the English. An agent of
Longueval’s, returning from the Archbishop of Liège, was intercepted
and questioned. His papers and confessions revealed not only that
the Archbishop was favourable to the French, which might have been
assumed anyway, but also the extent of Fraisse’s intelligence. e con-
fession indicates that Fraisse had followed the army to Liège and was
extremely well-informed as to its progress, even predicting its likely
return without crossing the French frontier.
111
e march of the troops came to a halt at the abbey of Florennes on
28 October, the day aer Reienberg wrote oering his services to the
Landgrave, with the detention of Henry’s commissioners by the ‘gui-
dons’ of the infantry, who declared they would put them, Reienberg
and his ocers in irons if they were not paid. In the next few days the
commissioners became convinced that Reienberg himself was staging
the mutiny, especially since his lieutenant Wolf Slegher was ‘the chee
begynner of this muteny.’ On 30 October, 500 arquebusiers ‘of the
rascalles’ came to assault the abbey. Negotiations followed over how
much had been paid to Reienberg and whether they would have their
month’s return pay ‘according to their bestellinge.’ Insisting on what
they had already paid out, the commissioners were then ignominiously
led on foot ‘in the fowlest waie they culde devise . . . whedir we were car-
iede more like theves then comyssaries’ to the camp, where they had
to enter the ‘ring,’ the famous circle of the lansquenets, formed when
disputes arose. With Reienberg and Slegher orchestrating events on
horseback, they ‘causide to be oride us a drome to [sit] on, whiche we
reuside and as it is tolde us the same is amonge them taken in deri-
sion.’ Having been forced to listen to the demands of the ‘commons,’
and protesting that Reienberg had already been paid, they eventu-
ally agreed to disburse some more money. Chamberlain, especially,
was threatened with hanging since he had insisted on making full
account of money already paid out and had thus made an enemy of
110
Mont to Paget, 5 Sept. 1545; Bucler and Mont to Henry VIII, 15 Sept. 1545,
L&P, ii, 310, 381.
111
‘Memoire de ce que l’homme de Monsieur de Fresse a apporté,’ NA SP1/209,
fos. 100–101 (L&P, XX, ii, 636/2). See also Chamberlain to Paget, 28 Oct., sending him
the cipher of the Frenchman ‘who was servant to the Frenche Kinges man that laie at
Conuence for to have distorbed our armie, as it now makethe me suspecte he did’
NA SP1/209, fos. 151–152. e cipher is enclosed, fos. 152–153.
france and england compete for troops 333
Reienberg. ey were then led on to Givey and Chimay until released
on the intervention of an Imperial agent in return for a promise of
safe-conduct for Reienberg to go to the Emperor’s court. In all they
had disbursed several thousand crowns more than they thought was
due to the Germans by the time they managed to get back to Antwerp
by 22 November.
112
e Council in England denounced ‘the lewd and ontrue proced-
inges of Reyfenberg and others.’ Henry promised his agents would not
be out of pocket ‘and therefor prayeth you to pluck your hartes unto
yow and play the men for the tyme.’ A trusted man was sent to the
Emperor’s court to obtain the commissioners’ release, and Reienberg
was to be told that Henry ‘doth know more of ther dooble dealinges
and secrett practizes then they think.’ e King’s ambassadors in the
Low Countries, one of whom was Gardiner, sent comforting letters,
and it is a measure of the reaction that even Gardiner, normally so
hostile to France, was now prepared to admit that peace with her was
necessary in order to ‘escape the thrawldom’ of the German captains
and in view of ‘our wantes at hom.’ Paget himself issued Reienberg
with an extraordinary letter, surely reecting Henry’s coruscating
anger, denouncing his ‘desloyal et mauvais service’ and threatening in
eect to ‘put out a contract’ on him:
If you do not do as instructed you can be sure, and His Majesty has also
told me to write thus, that wherever you might nd yourself, anywhere
in Christendom you will forfeit your life, even if His Majesty has to pay
50,000 crowns for it.
113
e commissioners were given leave by the Council to retire on 28
November, leaving Chamberlain in Antwerp to attempt to recover the
money lost. Ironically, when, in 1549, Fane was swept up in the political
troubles that brought Somerset down, it was put to him (preposterously)
112
Fane and Averey to the Council, 28 Oct. 1545, ibid., fos. 156–160 (L&P, XX,
ii, 680); 1 Nov., NA SP1/209, fos. 209–212 (L&P, XX, ii, 710); 10 Nov., NA SP1/210,
fos. 67–70, esp. 68v (L&P, XX, ii, 766); commissioners to Council, 22 Nov. 1545, NA
SP1/211, fos. 25–26 (L&P, XX, ii, 847).
113
Paget and Petre to the commissioners, 2 Nov. 1545, BL, Add. MS 5753, fo. 155;
Gardiner, irlby and Carne to same, 3 and 5 Nov. 1545, ibid., fos. 156, 158; Gardiner
to Paget, 7 Nov. 1545, in Muller (ed.), e Letters of Gardiner, p. 180; Paget to Rei-
enberg, 2 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 215 (L&P, XX, ii, 716): ‘si vous ne faictes ce
que dessus soyez bien asseuré et aussi Sa Majesté m’a commandé vous escripre, que
en quelque part que soyez en toute la Chrestienté il vous coustera la vie, encore que
Sa Majesté en paye pour ce cinquante mille escuz.’
334 chapter seven
‘that he should robb King Henry when he went for the Almaynes
to be brought to Bulleyne.’ At the same time, it was hinted that
Dr Bruno of Metz, one of the Protestant mediators between England
and France, had been ‘the menes the army went not forward.’
114
While it was certainly the case that the Protestant diplomats did
not want to see the Anglo-French war encouraged, there is no real
evidence that they, rather than the Landgrave, were in a position to act
in this way. Naturally, Fane and Chamberlain concluded that the col-
lapse of the expedition had been intended from the start. In the course
of the mutiny they reported that they thought Reienberg had always
intended to stay close to the Rhine, in order to ‘breake upe for to go
to serve his master the Landsgrave’ if needed, and that he had never
intended to enter France. His ‘brentmaister’ had told them that, when
he had discussed levying protection money in France, Reienberg had
said this was not the moment as they might both nd themselves in
French service.
115
It seems, too, that the Landgrave’s Hofmarschall, von
Baumbach, was requested by the English government to ask his master
to provide an explanation for Reienberg’s betrayal and the rumour
that the Landgrave had actually encouraged the mutiny.
116
ere is no
direct evidence of collusion between Fraisse and Reienberg, though
it is possible that, when the latter became convinced that the English
were trying to get away with spending as little as possible, he began to
make approaches to the French. Reienberg was a complete opportun-
ist: English suspicions of this were rife late in 1545 and conrmed in
the following year, when Mont reported his conversations with French
agents. e Landgrave, for his part, tried to convince Mont early in the
following year that the asco was nothing to do with him and hinted
that grants made since by the Emperor to Reienberg revealed the
true author of the aair.
117
We know that Reienberg latter oered
114
Council to commissioners, 28 Nov. 1545, BL, Add. MS 5753, fo. 160 (L&P, XX,
ii, 883). Anonymous Chronicle, BL, Add. MS 48023, fo. 351v.
115
Fane and Chamberlain to the Council, 22 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fos. 94–99
(L&P, XX, ii, 636); the same to the same, 28 Oct. 1545, NA SP1/209, fo. 157r–v (L&P,
XX, ii, 680); commissioners, 22 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/211, fos. 25–26 (L&P, XX, ii,
847): Reienberg had turned down the idea of ‘a large ransome for brandesakking of
howses, to saye, for savinge them from brennynge’ in France.
116
Johann Sturm to Jakob Sturm, 13 Nov. 1545, Pol. Corr. III, 637; Mont and Bucler
to the Landgrave, received Cassel 24 Nov. 1545, SAM, Pol. Arch., 1801, fos. 76v–77r
(Reienberg had been saying openly that the Landgrave himself had encouraged the
mutiny). Landgrave Philip to Reienberg, 28 Nov. 1545, ibid., fos. 66–68, dra; Reien-
berg’s reply, 5 Dec. 1545, ibid., fos. 56–58, dealing with three articles of accusation.
117
Paget claimed, in talking to Sturm in November 1545, that ‘the Lansgrave . . . hath
france and england compete for troops 335
himself to France early in 1546, though his price was high. Despite
this, Francis I cautiously accepted his plan to seize English money for
troops in Germany, and thereaer he was regularly to serve France.
118
Fraisse himself went as far as Liège and then returned to France,
probably concluding that his task was complete. Ironically, he then
went straight to Ardres to take part in peace talks there with the
English. In an undated report to his master, though, he concluded
exultantly that
I have not only concluded my operation but, but in addition . . . when
there was a possibility of these troops entering your kingdom, not only
did they mutiny and break up, but they destroyed their banners, impris-
oned the King of England’s commissioners and took all their money, for
which he will be for ever mocked and despised here.
Henry, he said, would never try the same plan again.
119
e French,
however, remained wary of Reienberg’s army until its complete break-
up; they continued to fear for the safety of the frontier and Mézières
in particular, especially when the army arrived at Florennes.
120
Francis
I was at La Fère from 9 to 13 October and from there he despatched
Enghien to Guise, Martin du Bellay to Mézières and Longueval to
raise the Champagne levies. French military preparations to resist
served the King of late very il for his army of Almayns,’ and Sturm had to defend
Philip by saying that Reienberg’s knavery had been without the Landgrave’s knowl-
edge. Fane et al. to Council, Antwerp, 22 Nov. 1545, L&P, XX, ii, 847; Paget to Petre,
27 Nov. 1545, NA SP1/211, fo. 91r. See also Mont to Henry VIII, 10 Feb. 1546, L&P,
XXI, i, 191; 1 May 1546, NA SP1/217, fos. 160–163 (L&P, XXI, i, 730).
118
Francis I to Bassefontaine, Montargis, 18 Apr. 1546, orig. crs. Bayard, AE Acq. ex.,
vol. 11: ‘an de se servir de chacun selon ce qu’il se peult faire, sans entrer en despence
inutille, vous tiendrez aud. Reienberg bons et gracieulx propoz de ma part, luy disant
qu’il n’est point de besoing qu’il vienne pardevers moy, mays que s’il veult prendre les
deniers des Angloys je l’advouheray tresvolontiers de ce qu’il aura faict; et davantaige,
je recognoistray ung tel service, de sorte qu’il aura occasion de s’en contenter.’
119
Fraisse to Francis I, undated, Fraisse, pp. 8–9: ‘je suis non seulement venu à
bout de mon entreprise, mais encore . . . car quand il a esté question de faire entrer ces
bandes dedans votre royaume, non seulement elles se sont mutinés et départies, mais
ont rompu les enseignes, prins les commissaires du roi d’Angleterre prisonniers et ravi
tout l’argent, dont il sera à jamais mocqué et vilipendé par deça.’ e English reported
that he reached Liège and then returned to France: NA SP1/209, fo. 157 (L&P, XX,
ii, 680). His short account written in the following year makes it clear that, aer his
activities in the Rhineland (‘Ou, Dieu mercy, nous fusmes assez heureux’), he went on
to Ardres: Fraisse to Marie de Guise, 3 Mar. [1546], Balcarres Papers, I, 247–248.
120
Germain le Lieur, agent in Antwerp, to Mesnage, 12 Oct. 1545, copied into the
ambassador’s Diplomatic Journal, BNF, fr. 17889, fo. 128r, describing a conversation
with a Scotsman recently arrived from London: ‘Davantage m’a dict avoir parlé à deux
courriers venans d’Angleterre lesquelz luy ont dict qu’ilz alloient audevant les Alle-
mans pour les faire haster et partir pour venir à Boullogne et le reste à Mésières.’
336 chapter seven
the German troops on the north-east frontier were extensive during
October.
121
Francis warned Mesnage that he had heard
at the Germans who assembled to enter the King of England’s service
are six leagues from Binche and the rumour runs among them that they
will pass through the Emperor’s lands to join the English near Calais and
that they are keeping as far as possible from my frontier out of fear of
being obstructed in the journey.
e King aected to disbelieve this, in view of the assurances of the
Imperial envoy that the Emperor would not allow it, but asked for
warning so that, should the Emperor have changed his line, ‘I may
change the instructions I have issued for resistance.’ Mesnage still
feared the success of the English enterprise later in October, and
Grignan described himself as ‘merveilleusement desplaysant’ at the
news that the army had crossed the Imperial territory of Brabant
into Liège, despite the Emperor’s assurances. e discomture of the
English must have been obvious by the end of the month, though,
when the King wrote again of the Germans that ‘they seem to be doing
nothing if not getting ready to retreat, for they have sent away their
supplies like men with no intention to stay around long.’
122
Changing Terms of Trade: 1546
e Reienberg débâcle was most certainly not the end of Anglo-
French competition, especially as the issue of troop-raising in north
121
See Martin du Bellay, Mémoires, IV, pp. 320–321. In October 1543, commis-
sions were sent out to experienced gentlemen on the north-eastern frontier to raise
infantry ‘pour obvier et resister à l’entreprise d’aulcuns Allemans et autres gens de
noz ennemys’; royal letter of remission, Mar. 1546, AN, JJ 257B, no. 106, fo. 34r.
Picard adventurers under Belleforrière were mustered at Vervins ‘pour resister aux
entreprinses que font sur lad. place et autres circonvoisins . . . aulcuns gens de guerre
allemans soubz . . . le roy d’Angleterre’ (BnF, fr. 25793, no. 548).
122
Francis I to Mesnage, 14 Oct. 1545, Pierpont Morgan Library, RF (MA 147):
‘que les Allemans assemblez pour aller au service du Roy d’Angleterre sont à six lieues
de Baings et que le bruict qui court entre eulx est qu’ilz passeront par les pays de
l’Empereur pour aller joindre aux Angloys vers Calais et qu’ilz s’esloignent le plus
qu’ilz pourront de ma frontiere de peur d’estre empeschez en leur passaige.’ ‘. . . je puisse
changer l’ordre que j’ay donné pour y resister.’; Mesnage to Admiral d’Annebault,
26 Oct. 1545, copied into Mesnage’s Diplomatic Journal, BnF, fr. 17889, fo. 120r.
Grignan to Mesnage, 15 Oct. 1545, ibid. fos. 53–54; Francis I to Mesnage, [20 Oct.–
9 Nov. 1545], ibid., fr. 17890, fo. 52: ‘ilz facent apparence de rien faire, synon de bien
t[ost se retirer], car ilz ont desia faict descharger leurs munici[ons . . .] comme gens qui
n’ont pas deliberé d’aller longue[ment . . .].’
france and england compete for troops 337
Germany remained unsettled. e kaleidoscopic strategic picture was
changing yet again; where the Germans could aord to be uncoop-
erative in August and September 1545, the Emperor’s plans to subdue
Germany were becoming more obvious by the end of the year. is
was to be seen in the desperate eorts of the Protestants to breathe life
into their earlier oers of mediation. Another indication was the even
greater embarrassment of the princes during the rst months of 1546 at
seeing the French and English locked in dispute within the Empire.
English strategy also began to change. e diculties of bringing
men from the Rhineland and the events of the Schmalkaldic War led
the English to turn their attention much more to northern Germany,
and in particular to the area around Hamburg and Bremen, as a source
of men who could, at need, be transported directly by sea. e area
was replete with men eager for employment, though few contempo-
raries knew clearly for whom the levies made around Bremen and
Hamburg in the summer of 1545 were ultimately intended: the Duke
of Brunswick, the King of Denmark, and the kings of France and
England were all suggested as the true paymasters. ere is some rea-
son to suppose that the bands of Peter of Guelders were originally hired
by the English, though later on English sources suggest that they were
in French pay. It seems that Duke Henry of Brunswick was receiving
payments from both French and English. e French suspected in July
1545 that the Mecklenburg levies were destined for England,
123
though
a little later Schmalkaldic diplomats believed, that those in Brunswick
were inspired by the French (Brunswick was at the time an enemy of
the League). Such uncertainties were the result of secrecy and suspi-
cion. e French denial of this suggestion is instructive. In a letter to
the Council of irteen at Strasbourg, Francis I admitted to paying
the Duke of Brunswick to break up the levies raised for the English
in north Germany, but added that he had made no levies of his own.
124
is should, of course, be read in conjunction with Grignan’s rather
more honest analysis of the situation, though it does display well the
French anxiety to retain the goodwill of the Protestants.
Doubt about all these northern levies was complicated by the defeat
of the Duke of Brunswick. Henry VIII had been deceived, as usual, in
his dealings with Brunswick but the negotiations with Captain Conrad
123
Jean Petit to Mesnage, 4 July 1545, BnF, fr. 17888, fos. 318–319.
124
Francis I to the Council of Strasbourg, 8 Oct. 1545, Pol.Corr., III, no. 614.
338 chapter seven
Pfenning or Pennynck (‘Courtpenninck’), begun by John Dymoke and
Claes Taphoren in September 1545,
125
eventually ended in Pennynck’s
signature of his contract for the supply of 3000 lansdsknechts and collec-
tion of an annuity in January 1546.
126
e French seem quickly to have
got wind of these activities
127
and, of course, were just as active on their
own part, especially aer the failure of mediation talks with the English
held by the envoys of the Protestant princes late in 1545. Hacfort was
sent to north Germany to recruit troops on behalf of the French gov-
ernment.
128
e French ambassador Mesnage reported English negotia-
tions with mercenary captains there. He was under orders to tell the
Emperor that French agents in Germany were there ‘to break up the
King of England’s negotiations there and stop him from drawing men
to make war on me,’ and then to protest at news of levies of cavalry for
Henry VIII by the Emperor’s commander, Buren.
129
125
Dymoke to the English commissioners, 2 Sept. 1545, NA SP1/207, fos. 68–70
(L&P, XX, ii, 274); Council to the English commissioners, 30 Aug. 1545, with Tapho-
ren’s account-book attached, BL, Add.MS 5753, fos. 161–163.
126
Council to Paget, 29 Dec. 1545, NA SP1/212, fos. 147–148 (L&P, XX, ii, 1054).
Contract with Pennynck, 22 Jan. 1546, cf. NA SP1/213, fo. 152 (L&P, XXI, i, 112/
ii), though Henry VIII’s notication of appointment has ‘drei dusent dutsche land-
sknecht’ in ensigns of 400, ibid., fo. 151 (L&P, XXI, i, 112/i). See also the Council
to Brende and Brygantyn, Jan. 1546, NA SP1/214, fos. 1–6 (L&P, XXI, ii, 172). For
German comments on this, see Christo von Carlowitz to Maurice of Saxony, 27 Feb.
1546, in Brandenburg, Politische Korrespondenz, no. 868.
127
Mémoire of Mesnage to d’Annebault, 24 Dec. 1545, BnF, fr. 17889, fos. 98–99;
Mesnage to Francis I, 25 Dec. 1545, ibid. fos. 96–97.
128
Henrick Hacfort to [Mesnage], 6 Jan. 1545/6, BnF, fr. 6616, fo. 95: ‘par commis-
sion du Roy il s’est asseuré de quatre mil pietons et cinq cens chevaulx et qu’il entre-
tient les cappitaines à ses frayz; et depuis lad. commission à luy baillée, il n’a eu argent
ne nouvelles du Roy. . . . Il dict aussi que led. Hacfort s’est allyé d’aucuns protestants
pour plus seurement faire lad. levée et led. Hacfort ne luy a nommé lesd. protestants
mais il croict que c’est le Landgrave et l’Evesque de Meunstre.’ By February, Hacfort
had been imprisoned in Guelders for levying men without the Emperor’s licence: see
Chamberlain to Paget, 20 Feb. 1545/6 (L&P, XXI, i, 256).
129
Mesnage to Francis I, 10 Jan. 1545/6, BnF, fr. 17890, fo. 18: ‘pour rompre les
menees et praticques que y faict le roy d’Angleterre et empescher qu’il n’en tire
gens pour me faire la guerre’ ‘le personnaige qui m’a apporté la lettre de creance du
cappitaine Hacfort m’a dict qu’il venoit dud. lieu de Bresme et que pour certain il
avoit veu commission du Roy d’Angleterre à Martyn van Hard, capitaine du pays de
Frise . . . pour lever douze enseignes et a promys les passer en Angleterre et les mener
en Escosse. Aussi a veu commission dud. Roy à Cort Pannich, cappitaine demourant à
Bresme, pour lever dix huict enseignes et les mener à Callaix et Boullongne; et disoient
lesd. cappitaines et autres de la compaignie de ceulx ausquelz il avoit congnoissance
que au commencement du Caresme seroit faicte lad. levée.’ Francis I to Mesnage,
28 Feb., 8 Mar. 1546, Pierpont Morgan Lib. RF (MA 147).
france and england compete for troops 339
e new English commissioners, Brende and Brygandyn, were more
successful then the predecesors, though in more favourable circum-
stances. Instructed on 1 February 1546, they collected £3,000 from
Vaughan at Antwerp and £2,000 from Hamburg merchants on Henry’s
letters of credit, arriving at Bremen with the necessary money by
4 March.
130
Even so, they seem to have had to deal with the eorts of
French agents to disperse the troops when they were waiting for per-
mission to cross the Netherlands at Aalten on the border of Guelders
and Cleves.
131
e commissioners were pleased with the calibre of the
men: 2983 in 8 ensigns, ‘of electe personages and old lanceknightes,
armed and weaponed according as it is covenanted.’ But they claimed
that ‘betwene this and Hambrough we were put by every wher from
our muster place and therfore came hether being ground wher com-
menly the men of warre assemble for all princes.’ e abbess of Aalten
certainly did not agree and the territory was technically under the
Emperor as duke of Guelders. e Queen Regent was horried at the
idea of such an army marching across her territory at a time of famine
and was anxious not to oend France; she threatened to have them
cut to pieces and Pennynck hanged. So, much bargaining had to be
done by Edward Carne. e troops had to cross the Rhine and Maas
and were eventually able to cross the Netherlands in small groups,
mostly through Dorte in Holland and thence through Zeeland and the
coast of Flanders. Inland routes via Cleves were shut.
132
ey arrived
at Calais early in April and some were reported by the Rhinegrave as
having crossed the sea with diculty.
133
In the circumstances, it was a
130
Brende and Brygandyn to Henry VIII, 6 Mar. 1546, NA SP1/214, fos. 217–218
(L&P, XXI, i, 330). For their account, see NA E 351/13, 1 Feb.–20 July 1546, rendered
28 Aug. 1553.
131
Brende and Brygandyn to Henry VIII, 27 Mar. 1546, NA SP1/216, fos. 7–10
(L&P, XXI, i, 473).
132
Carne to Brende and Brigandyn, 31 March 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 495; Brende and
Brigandyn to Henry VIII, 3, 7 April 1546, NA SP1/216 fo. 105v (L&P, XXI, i, 531,
569); same to Carne, 3 April 1546, NA SP1/216, fo. 111r (L&P, XXI, i, 534); Mary of
Hungary to van der Del and Scepperus, 17 April 1546, L&P, XXI, i, 615.
133
Pennynck to Cobham, 7 Apr. 1546, BL, Harleian 288, fo. 71 (L&P, XXI, i, 568).
Brende and Brygandyn, 7 Apr. 1546 L&P, XXI, i, 569; Brende and Brygantyn to Paget,
14 Apr. 1546, NA SP1/217, fos. 8–9 (L&P, XXI, i, 599). Georg Reckerodt to Simon
Bing, 21 May 1546, SAM, Pol.Arch., 1839, fo. 4r. Earlier reports had led the Landgrave
to think that Pennynck’s force had been lost at sea (letter to Mont, 14 May 1546, NA
SP1/218, fo. 129 (L&P, XXI, i, 834/i). Pennynck’s eight ensigns of foot had 400 men
per ensign. Each man received one daller conduct money and each ensign received
3,054 philippus per pay. Brende and Brygantyn disbursed £. 7523 to them from
February to July: NA E 351/13.