Telo M. European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era
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The policy itself is articulated through a series of Action Plans. These consist of
bilateral agreements between the Union and individual states in which a programme
of action, over three-to-five years, is laid out to achieve the overall objective. The
state concerned, in negotiation with the Commission, determines the content of the
Action Plan, thus establishing what it would consider a reasonable programme,
whilst the Union monitors progress through a process of benchmarking and provides
political, administrative and financial support. From 2007, the old Barcelona
MEDA (Mésures d’Ajustement) financing programme which provided funding for
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, together with the old programmes for funding
political and economic change in the East, such as the TACIS programme, will
have been absorbed into a new financial instrument designed specifically for the
European Neighbourhood Policy.
35
It seems impossible to consider such a policy,
based specifically on bilateral relations across the Mediterranean, as being in
any sense ‘open regionalism’, even if it does apply to a series of geographically
contiguous states.
What, then, happens to the Barcelona Process? It seems clear that the new
European Neighbourhood Policy runs directly counter to the underlying principles
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for it promotes bilateral relations between
neighbour-states and the European Union, rather than the horizontal integration
which was the ultimate purpose of the Barcelona Process. The Commission is
determined to reject such a conclusion and, in the regulations laying down the final
policy,
36
published in October 2006, it states that (paragraph 13) ‘For Mediterranean
partners, assistance and cooperation should take place within the framework of
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership…’ It argues that, in effect, the European
Neighbourhood Policy will enable states to enter the European Economic Area
(paragraph 18) and thus, supposedly, will enjoy all the benefits offered under the
Barcelona Declaration’s ‘zone of shared peace, prosperity and stability’ proposed
in 1995.
The problem is twofold; firstly all the measures to be adopted under the new
European Neighbour and Partnership Instrument in reality emphasize the bilateral
relationship between neighbour-states and the Union and undermine the South-
South relationships which were the key to the Barcelona Process, and secondly,
neighbourhood states have no compulsion for reform. Instead they set the reform
agenda by negotiation with the Commission and suffer no inconvenience if they
do not achieve the objectives they have set for themselves. It is true, of course, that
there are rewards for states that do achieve their targets but no price is paid if they
do not. Thus, clearly, if a foreign government feels that its priorities require that the
priority accorded to the Neighbourhood Policy should be downgraded, it suffers no
disadvantage in consequence.
In essence, therefore, unlike the Barcelona Process, the old principle of
horizontal integration has disappeared and the new policy is resolutely bilateral
in its conception, rejecting the multilateralism inherent in the Barcelona Process
as a complicating factor which led in part to the failure of the Euro-Mediterranean
Partnership. It thus entrenches the ‘hub-and-spoke’ concept which the Barcelona
Process considered to be a temporary stage, to be overcome by horizontal integration
in the political, security and social spheres, once economic integration had been
achieved in the South. In security terms, it seeks to build what Attina regards as
EU and the Mediterranean: Open Regionalism or Peripheral Dependence?
269
an amalgamated security community, as defined by Karl Deutsch
37
. As William
Wallace has said, ‘Western Europe faces the uncomfortable choice of importing
insecurity from its neighbours, or of exporting to them security – which necessarily
involves prosperity and stability’.
38
The policy is thus overtly Eurocentric, avoiding any of the linguistic moderation
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, even if its underlying purpose is little
different. In effect, its spirit and outcomes seem likely to be far closer to the ‘closed
regionalism’ concept, in that it wishes to bind neighbouring states into permanent
relationships governed by an agreed body of law, as in the European Union itself,
but without any executive counterpart. Indeed, it is also imperial, for the satellite
‘neighbours’ will be, in effect, satrapies of the European core in which, in the end
governance, security mechanisms, economic relationships and cultural paradigms
will be imposable if the full benefits of partnership are to be realised. Once states
have accepted the European embrace – the acquis communautaire – there will be
no going back!
6 Conclusion
In a sense, the policy wheel has come full circle, although the European Commission
insists that the global and holistic features of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
will not be over-ridden by European Neighbourhood Policy when the two are
amalgamated after 2007. Whether this is true or not will depend on the degree to
which the political-security and cultural-social baskets of the Barcelona Process are
sustained under the new, combined policy. In economic terms, however, the hub-and-
spoke arrangement of independent bilateral agreements with the European Union
will dissipate hopes of integration of the economies in the South Mediterranean
into a single market to partner the European Single Market, through initiatives
such as the Agadir Agreement and the moribund Maghrib Arab Union (UMA). Yet
that, of course, was one of the major justifications for the Barcelona Process; that it
would generate economic integration in the South that would provide a sustainable
economic region that could ensure endogamous economic growth.
Yet, if the pessimistic conclusions voiced above are not to be realized, the real
question is whether or not the new initiatives can achieve the aspirations of the
Barcelona Declaration, of creating a zone of shared peace, stability and prosperity,
and thus of providing Europe with the security it needs from uncontrollable
immigration from the South Mediterranean and from the spill-over effects of
regional violence as a result of economic and political failure there. In part, of
course, this depends on the ability of Western policy to defuse, not exacerbate,
regional problems and tensions. In part it depends, too, on the development of
stable, participatory government there as well. Both, in turn, depend on resolving
the two great crises in the region – the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq and the
continuing crisis in the Palestinian territories – and that, too, is a European and
American responsibility. And, increasingly, both are becoming tributary to the
securitised obsessions inherent in the ‘war on terror’.
European Union and New Regionalism
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However, even if both issues – and even the ‘war of terror’ – were addressed by
appropriate policies, in which the European Union, because of its lack of effective,
integrated military force, could only play a subsidiary role, this will still not resolve
the underlying economic crisis. Here, even given the indulgence inherent in the
European Neighbourhood Policy which does not prescribe economic restructuring
as the Barcelona Process, in parallel to the Washington Consensus, did, success
seems unlikely. In large part this is because of the dimensions of the economic
challenges that exist and because of the theoretical and ideological implications
of the responses proposed. The European experience, even that of the Accession
countries, does not necessarily apply in the South Mediterranean and attempts to
force the region into the European mould will almost certainly fail. The danger will
then be that frustration in the region will produce violence and extremism so that
policies intended to dissipate security threats may well create them instead!
EU and the Mediterranean: Open Regionalism or Peripheral Dependence?
271
Appendix
The tables below provide economic data referred to in the chapter.
Table I EU trade with Mediterranean countries*
(€ million)
EU-world trade EU-Mediterranean country trade
Date Imports Exports Imports % Eu Total Exports % EU Total
2001 983,443 892,720 68,201 6.93 73,407 8.22
2002 941,885 900,424 67,638 7.18 76.781 8.53
2003 940,347 878,483 67,926 7.22 78,107 8.89
2004 1,031,999 964,652 75,364 7.30 91,625 9.50
2005 1,176,055 1,061,836 88,171 7.50 101,671 9.58
Source: EUROSTAT (Comtext; Regime 4)
Note: * Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey
Table II Mediterranean country* trade with the EU
(€ million)
Med-world Trade Mediterranean Country-eu Trade
Date Imports Exports Imports % Med Total Exports % Med Total
2001 150,658 118,074 70,296 46.66 58,482 49.53
2002 163,631 122,211 76,495 46.75 60,369 49.40
2003 164,238 122,262 79,736 48.55 61,569 50.36
2004 207,812 155,287 92,288 44.41 76,157 49.04
2005 238,836 172,373 109,443 45.82 81.071 47.03
Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics
Note: * Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey
Table III EU Foreign Direct Investment
(€ billion)
EU outward FDI
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004
Maghrib 0.78 0.83 1.77 1.38
Mashriq 0.60 2.00 1.15 0.11
Israel -0.33 0.20 0.12 0.23
Turkey 2.98 0.80 1.11 1.54
MED countries 1.05 3.04 3.05 1.72
World 286.35 133.90 135.42 99.95
Source: Chronos; EC Relex: External Trade: EuroMed Fact Sheet 10.03.2006
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/cfm/doclib_section.cfm?sec=152&lev=2&order=date
Note: Maghrib: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia Mashriq: Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria
MED: Maghrib and Mashriq including Israel but excluding Turkey
European Union and New Regionalism
272
Table IV European Union meda support
€ million
MEDA-1
(1995-1999)
MEDA-2
(2000-2004)
MEDA 1 & 2
(1995-2004)
Bilateral funding
Algeria 164.0 232.8 396.8
Palestine 111.0 350,3 461.3
Egypt 686.0 353.5 1,039.5
Jordan 254.0 204.4 458.4
Lebanon 182.0 73.7 255.7
Morocco 660.0 677.1 1,337.1
Syria 101.0 135.7 236.7
Tunisia 428.0 328.6 756.6
Total bilateral 2,586.0 2,356.1 4,942.1
Regional funding 471.0 739.8 1,210.9
Total funding 3,057.0 3,095.9 6,152.9
Source: Europe Aid
Note: According to the MEDA budget projections, funding under MEDA I (1995-1999) was set at
€3,435 million, with an additional €4,808 million in soft loans from the European Investment Bank.
Funding under MEDA II (2000-2006) will have totalled €5,350 million, with European Investment
Bank loan funding up to 2007 of €6,700 million.
Table V Financial support under the Usmepi programme
$ million
2002 2003 2004 2005
Economic development 6 38 32 23
Political development 10 25 20 22
Educational development 8 25 22 14.4
Women’s empowerment 5 12 15.5 15
TOTALS 29 100 89.5 84.4
Source: http://mepi.state.gov/mepi
Table VI Funding under the European neighbourhood and partnership
instrument
€million
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 2007-2013
Amount 1,433 1,569 1,877 2,083 2,322 2,642 3,003 14,929
EU and the Mediterranean: Open Regionalism or Peripheral Dependence?
273
Notes
1 Open regionalism implies linkages between states that do not impinge directly upon their
sovereign activities and rights. They therefore tend to be primarily economic in nature,
even if, the explicit objectives of such regional organizations may involve common
security or diplomatic factors. Closed regionalism involves explicit common policies
in all areas and thus diminishes the sovereign powers of constituent governments (see
Thomas G. (1998), “Globalisation versus regionalisation”, in Joffé G. (ed), Perspectives
on development: the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Cass (London): 63.
2 The term was originally coined by Peregrine Worsthorne in the Daily Telegraph in 1991.
It was, however, revived in 1998 and popularized by Hervé Védrine, then French foreign
minister, in a speech to the Association France-Ameriques in Paris on Monday, February
1, 1999.
3 Viz: Buzan B. (1991), ‘New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century’,
International Affairs, 67 (3): 431–51.
4 Globalization, of course, is no new phenomenon but, in its contemporary guise, based
on deregulated global financial markets powered by information technology, together
with free trade dominated by the Triad of the United States, Europe and Japan, it alohas
some quite unique characteristics. See Barber B.R. (1995, 2001), Jihad vs. McWorld:
terrorism’s challenge to democracy, Ballantine Books (New York).
5 Fukuyama F. (1989), ‘The end of history?’ The National Interest (Summer 1989).
Democratic peace in this context involves the explicit rejection of neo-realist views of
state interest and the security paradigm.
6 Huntington S. (1993), ‘The clash of civilisations’, Foreign Affairs, 72, 3 (Summer
1993). Here conflict is innate in the very existence of different civilizations and in their
political contacts with each other.
7 Fukuyama F. (2006), ‘Afterword’, The end of history and the last man, (second edition),
The Free Press (New York).
8 Roberts A. (1991), ‘A new age in International Relations?’, International Affairs, 67, 3
(July 1991).
9 Calleya S. (1997), Navigating regional dynamics in a post-Cold War world, Dartmouth
(Aldershot): 15.
10 Ibid: 35–36.
11 Thomas, op. cit. 1998: 59–74.
l2 British Petroleum,
BP statistical review of world energy 2006, London (available only
in electronic form at www.bp.com)
13 There is now an extensive literature on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the correct
title for the Barcelona Process. Two short introductions to it and to its main activities
over the past ten years are provided by the European Commission and the Euro-
Mediterranean Human Rights Network. See: http://europa.eu.int/comm./external_
relations/euromed; www.euromedrights.net/english/barcelona-process/main/html.
14 Aubarell G. and Aragall X. (2005), Immigration and the Euro-Mediterranean Area: keys
to policy and trends, EuroMeSCo Paper No. 47 IEEI (Lisbon): 8–9.
15 Jandl M. (2004), ‘The estimation of illegal migration in Europe’, Studi Emigrazione/
Migration Studies, XLI, 153 (March 2004): 150.
16 UNCTAD (2005), World Investment Report 2005, Table 1 (FDI flows by region and
selected countries ) 1993–2004: pp. 10–11.
17 Strategic lines of communication, as defined by the Pentagon, carry 99 per cent of global
maritime trade by volume. Four of the nine critical chokepoints for global trade exist in
the Mediterranean system – the Bosporus and the Dardanelles for access to the Black
European Union and New Regionalism
274
Sea, the Bab al-Mandab and the Suez Canal which control access to the Red Sea, and
the Straits of Gibraltar which controls access to the Atlantic. To these could be added the
Straits of Hormuz which control access to the Persian Gulf and 70 per cent of the world’s
oil reserves. The Mediterranean itself, of course, is a major pathway for the transfer
of oil to both Europe and the United States. A chokepoint is defined as a waterway
narrow enough to be closed by simple military action involving artillery, air or naval
power. These issues are studied in detail in Nincic D. J. (2002), ‘Sea lane security and
US maritime trade: chokepoints as scarce resources’, in Tancredi S. J. (2002) (ed.),
Globalization and maritime power, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National
Defense University (Washington DC).
18 See endnote (7).
19 http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/15920.htm.
20 The detailed commitments are given in the appendix and can be compared with funding
levels under the MEDA programmes for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also given
in the appendix.
21 Personal communication.
22 See endnote (5).
23 For example, Weber C. (1995),
Simulating sovereignty: intervention, the state and
symbolic exchange, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge).
24 A useful and sympathetic review of the speech and its subsequent implications is
provided by Bentley T. (2003), “Countdown to war: Tony Blair, issue by issue”, Le
Monde Diplomatique (English version)(February 2003).
25 Cooper R. (1998), The post-modern state, Demos (London); Cooper R. (2003), The
breaking of nations: order and chaos in the 21st century, Atlantic Books (London).
26 See Halper S. and Clarke J. (2003), America alone: the neo-conservatives and the global
order, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge): 76–81, 254–57.
27 Kagan R. (2003), Paradise and power: America and Europe in the New World Order,
Atlantic Books (London).
28 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, White House, September 17,
2002.
29 See Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy:
Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373 final, Brussels 12.05.2004.
30 Smith K. (2005), ‘The outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy’, International
Affairs, 81, 4 (2005): 760.
31 See Kelley J. (2006), ‘New wine in old wineskins: policy adaptation in the European
Neighbourhood Policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 1 (2006).
32 Aliboni R. (2005), ‘The geopolitical implications of the European Neighbourhood
Policy’,
European Foreign Affairs Review, 10.
33 The body of European regulation that goes to make up the shared legal system of the
European Union and makes access to the Single European Market possible, as well
as, in the case of members, access to the Union’s policy-making and administrative
activities. The implications of this could be very costly! See Tocci N. (2005), ‘Does the
ENP respond to the EU’s post-Enlargement challenges?’, The International Spectator,
XL, 1 (2005): 30.
34 These were laid down at the Copenhagen summit in June 1993 as the basis upon which
Enlargement could proceed as they determined the conditions Accession state would
have to fulfil to actually join the Union. They are:
political: stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights
and respect for minorities;
•
EU and the Mediterranean: Open Regionalism or Peripheral Dependence?
275
economic: a functioning market economy;
incorporation of the Community acquis: adherence to the various political, economic
and monetary aims of the European Union (http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/glossary/
accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm).
35 The figures for the new financial instrument, known as the European Neighbourhood
and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), in constant 2004 prices, are taken from Smith op.cit.
and appear in the Statistical Appendix above. They can be compared with the budget
for the East and the Mediterranean in 2004 (€ 1,420 million with € 953 million for the
Mediterranean) but the figures are not fully comparable.
36 Official Journal of the European Union (09.11.2006), Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying down
general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument,
Brussels.
37 Attina F. (2004), ‘European Neighbourhood Policy and the building of security around
Europe’, in Attina F. and Rossi R. (eds)(2004), European Neighbourhood Policy:
political, economic and social aspects, Jean Monnet Centre, University of Catania
(Catania); 16-17. Deutsch’s concept of an amalgamated security community is one in
which the community considers war as an obsolete instrument of conflict resolution.
Deutsch K et al (1957), Political community in the North Atlantic area, Princeton
University Press (Princeton).
38 Quoted in Balfour R. and Rotta A. (2005), ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy and its
tools’, The International Spectator, XL, 1 (2005); 9.
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Chapter 14
Europe: Trading Power,
American Hunting Dog,
or the World’s Scandinavia?
Göran Therborn
On the world maps of the Peters Projection, Europe appears as a small far northern
periphery of peninsulae and islands, out on the Western fringe of the huge Asian
land mass, separated by the narrow Mediterranean waterway from the big central
continent of Africa, and by the wide Atlantic Ocean from the impressive semi-
continent of North America. In other words, Europe here looks very much like
the Nordic countries on a standard European map, with the qualification that
Scandinavia normally looks larger on the maps of Europe. A Scandinavian scenario,
I am going to argue, is in the long run one of the most attractive futures left to an
irreversibly ex-imperial continent.
The future standing of Europe in the world will depend on four complex
variables, the relative weight, the relative specificity, and the relative unity of
Europe, and finally, least predictable of all, the handling of these variables by
the political leaders. As this decade has shown already, European assets may be
squandered by reckless politicians.
1 Still heavyweight, but ...
Western Europe has long since abdicated from claims to rule the world, although the
Dutch, the French and the Portuguese had to be ousted from their colonies by force.
The bungled Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 was the last attempt
to play world power. The recent War of the Yugoslav Succession demonstrated
Europe´s weakness even as a regional power. A long way has been travelled from
Berlin 1878 to Dayton, Ohio 1995. In so far as the Soviet Union was a European
power, its collapse entails a further weakening of Europe on the global theatre of
power.
Commemorations are correspondingly scaled down with lowered aspirations.
The start of Western Europe’s outward expansion was remembered in the last World
Exhibitions of the twentieth century, in Sevilla in 1992 and in Lisbon in 1998, in
ecologically conscious theme parks for tourists, without any of the imperial glory
and nation state braggadoccio of the pre-Second World War exhibitions, nor with
the futurism of the Brussels 1958 Exhibition. The arrival of European modernity