The Cambridge History of China. Vol. 06. Alien Regimes and Border States, 907-1368
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THE REIGN OF T'lEN-TSO AND COLLAPSE OF LIAO 141
was to prove a fatal miscalculation and a decision that would lead to the end
of the dynasty.
The Jurchen were a Tungusic people whose fragmented tribes inhabited a
broad belt of eastern Manchuria stretching northward from the northern
border of Kory6 in the Yalu Valley through eastern Kirin and Heilungkiang
and the maritime province of the Soviet Union north of Vladivostok. (Their
earlier history is outlined in Chapter 3.) They had been in close contact with
the Khitan ever since A-pao-chi's rise to power and particularly since the
submission of Po-hai. They were powerful enough in the tenth century for
the Sung to have thought of them as a potential ally against the Liao, and
they had periodically caused serious trouble to both the Liao and the Kory6.
By the end of the eleventh century they had long been divided by the Liao
rulers into three broad groups. First were the "civilized" Jurchen
(shu
Nu-
chih),
descendants of the tribes captured by the Khitan in the tenth century
who had been settled in the Liao Valley and were fully assimilated. Farther
north in eastern Kirin Province lived the "obedient" Jurchen
{shun
Nu-chih),
who were considered a subordinate nation and had close and regular contact
with the court. But by far the largest and most significant group were the
"wild" Jurchen
(sheng
Nu-chih),
who inhabited the middle and lower valley of
the Sungari and the eastern mountains of Heilungkiang. They were nomi-
nally vassals of the Liao court, but subject to no real control. Each of these
groups was divided into many tribes and clan groups living in small farming
settlements but also pursuing a livelihood hunting, trapping, and herding
animals.
During the eleventh century one of the clans of the "wild" Jurchen, the
Wan-yen, gradually established dominance over their neighbors and welded
the Jurchen tribes into a powerful nation. The Liao court recognized the
Wan-yen as leaders of the Jurchen and conferred on their chieftains the
hereditary title of military governor of the Jurchen
(Nu-chih chieh-tu
shih).
A-ku-ta was a prominent leader of the Wan-yen, though not yet, in 1112,
their overall chieftain.
In the early years of T'ien-tso's reign, relations between the Jurchen and
the Liao had become increasingly strained. The Jurchen bitterly resented the
way in which the Liao local officials at Ning-chiang, the main border trading
post, constantly cheated them. They complained of the arrogance of the Liao
envoys who abused their womenfolk and beat their village elders when
traveling through Jurchen territories. And they resented their traditional
obligation to provide the Liao emperors with the special gyrfalcons called
hai
tung
ch'ing,
which bred in the coastal regions, and to obtain them, the
Jurchen had often to fight their way across the territories of their neighbors,
the Five Nations tribes.
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142 THE
LIAO
In 1113 A-ku-ta was elected ruler of the Jurchen by the tribal leaders,
succeeding his elder brother Wu-ya-shu (r. 1103-13), and was given the
customary Chinese title of military governor by the Liao court. A-ku-ta
immediately began to harass the Liao, raising a grievance that had rankled for
years:
the question of A-shu, a Jurchen chieftain who had opposed the Wan-
yen hegemony and taken refuge in Liao territory. A-ku-ta repeatedly and in
vain demanded his return and began to build fortifications on the frontier. In
the late autumn of 1114, A-ku-ta's demands having once again been refused
by the Liao court, he attacked Ning-chiang Prefecture, the main frontier
trading station and the place where the Liao emperors had customarily re-
ceived the Jurchen leaders.
At first T'ien-tso was not seriously alarmed and left the local forces to deal
with the invaders, though he reinforced them with some Po-hai detachments
sent from the vicinity of the Eastern Capital. This modest force was utterly
defeated: The Liao had completely underestimated the strength and ferocity
of the Jurchen. In the tenth month of 1114, T'ien-tso mobilized a force of
select Khitan and Hsi troops under the command of Hsiao Ssu-hsien, the
younger brother of his northern chancellor Hsiao Feng-hsien, but this force,
too,
was surprised and defeated on the Sungari River, with very heavy losses.
Hsiao Ssu-hsien, in spite of his incompetence, escaped punishment, which
helped demoralize the Khitan generals. By the end of
the
year, several border
prefectures near Ning-chiang had surrendered to the Jurchen, and some of
the neighboring tribes had also joined them.
T'ien-tso then turned to diplomacy and sent envoys to open peace negotia-
tions with A-ku-ta at the beginning of 1115. But late in the first month A-
ku-ta had declared himself emperor of a new Chin dynasty. He rejected the
letters from the Liao court because they addressed him by name, not by his
new title, and he continued to demand the return of A-shu and also the
withdrawal of the Liao garrison from Huang-lung fu, the major administra-
tive center in the region.
Sporadic border fighting continued throughout 1115, with the Jurchen
usually gaining the upper hand. Meanwhile, both sides prepared for a new
round of warfare.
Early in the autumn of 1115 T'ien-tso assembled a massive army under his
own command, west of the Sungari. In the ninth month, before he could
bring this force into action, A-ku-ta had already conquered Huang-lung fu,
the easternmost major military outpost of the Liao. Then, when T'ien-tso
finally crossed the Sungari River
into
Jurchen territory in the winter of 1115,
his punitive campaign was undermined by a conspiracy to dethrone him and
install his uncle, Prince Ch'un (1063-1122; Khitan name Nieh-li; posthu-
mously canonized as Hsiian-tsung), as emperor.
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THE REIGN OF T'lEN-TSO AND COLLAPSE OF LIAO 143
The
rebellion
of
Yeh-lii
Chang-nu and
the
Po-hai
uprising
The conspirators were led by Yeh-lii Chang-nu, vice-commander of the van-
guard,
a
member
of
the royal clan who was dissatisfied with T'ien-tso's
leadership.
He
associated himself with Prince Ch'un's wife
and son and
persuaded other officers to join the conspiracy. The rebels deserted the expedi-
tionary force and proceeded
to
the Supreme Capital, sending messengers
to
Prince Ch'un, who was then viceroy of the Southern Capital, informing him
of their plan. The prince hesitated, however, knowing that many prominent
and powerful members of the nobility still backed the emperor. When mes-
sengers arrived from T'ien-tso advising him
to
take precautions against the
rebels, the prince thus decided
to
remain loyal.
He
beheaded Chang-nu's
emissaries and sent their heads to the imperial headquarters.
The rebellion
did not end
immediately, however. The rebels marched
through
the
Khitan countryside, pillaging and rallying supporters
to
their
ranks.
But they failed to take the Supreme Capital and were
finally
destroyed
by
a
small force
of
loyal Jurchen when they attacked
the
imperial winter
camp
at
the Mu-yeh Mountain. More than two hundred guilty nobles were
executed, and their wives and children were condemned
to
slavery. Yeh-lii
Chang-nu was caught trying to escape to the Jurchen disguised as a messen-
ger and was later executed by being cut in half at the waist. His quarters were
sent out
to
be displayed
at
the other capitals,
to
discourage other potential
traitors.
Though Prince Ch'un had remained neutral and was
not
charged with
disloyalty
to his
nephew
and
sovereign,
the
rebellion was
not
merely
an
attempt
by a
group
of
Khitan nobles
to
rescue
the
tottering empire from
destruction under T'ien-tso's incompetent leadership. With the exception of
Yeh-lii Chang-nu, because the leading figures
in
the rebellion were closely
related
to
Prince Ch'un through birth
or
marriage,
the
uprising may
be
assumed to have resulted from yet another power struggle within the ruling
clan.
It
was not the first time that T'ien-tso and Ch'un were rivals
for
the
throne. Forty years earlier, after Yeh-lii I-hsin
had had
T'ien-tso's father
murdered,
he
had unsuccessfully sponsored Prince Ch'un
as the
new heir
apparent. When I-hsin fell from power, Prince Ch'un had also lost favor and
had been banished from court. Though Chang-nu's rebellion failed,
it
never-
theless strengthened the prince's position. To ensure his loyalty, T'ien-tso
gave him the grand title
of
Prince
of
Ch'in and Chin and appointed him
commander
in
chief of the Liao armies, entrusting to him command of the
defense operations against the Jurchen.
The effects of Chang-nu's rebellion and the previous defeats
in
1115 were
felt immediately. Fighting spread into the adjacent Po-hai region, where
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
144
THE
disaffection had always been widespread and where a minor rebellion had
occurred in the previous year. At the beginning of 1116 there was a major
uprising at the Eastern Capital. The hated Khitan viceroy was murdered,
and a Po-hai officer named Kao Yung-ch'ang declared himself emperor of the
new state of Ta Yiian
214
and requested aid from A-ku-ta against Liao puni-
tive forces. The Jurchen relief force easily repulsed the Liao troops but then
turned on the Po-hai rebels and, in the fifth month, killed Kao Yung-
ch'ang. As a result, the whole region east of the Liao River, more than fifty
prefectures, fell into Jurchen hands. This changed the entire strategic situa-
tion in the Jurchen's favor. The war was no longer confined to a distant and
relatively unimportant frontier district, but now threatened the heart of the
Liao empire. Great numbers of Po-hai and Khitan fled to settle in Kory6 (see
Map 8).
Expecting the Jurchen to advance west, T'ien-tso ordered his uncle Prince
Ch'un to recruit a new army of select troops from the southern and western
circuits and from the refugees from the Po-hai region. The twenty thousand
men he recruited for his avenging army
(yiian chtin)
inflicted more damage on
the civilian population than on the enemy, however, and morale collapsed
everywhere. Rebellion broke out in the southern region among the Chinese
population.
21
' When the Jurchen attacked Ch'un-chou on the Sungari River
in early 1117, the northeastern army therefore melted away without offering
even token resistance. At the end of the year, the Jurchen crossed the Liao
River, routed Prince Ch'un's new army in battle, and conquered several
prefectures west of the river. A-ku-ta adopted a new regnal title and pro-
claimed himself emperor of
his
new Chin dynasty.
A
bortive peace
negotiations, 1118—1120
At this critical point, both sides abruptly ceased hostilities, and at the
beginning of 1118 T'ien-tso initiated peace negotiations. Embassies were
exchanged for two years. But the demands of the Jurchen were extremely
harsh: A-ku-ta was not yet ready to destroy the Liao state, but he demanded
to be invested by the Liao court as the emperor of Great Chin. Following the
precedent of the Shan-yuan treaty, he further demanded to be addressed by
the Liao emperor as elder brother, to have numerous Liao princes and prin-
cesses sent as hostages to the Chin court, to be paid an annual subsidy of silk
and silver, and to be formally ceded the three circuits of the Supreme Capital,
the Central Capital, and Hsing-chung fu. This would have left Liao in
214 According to Chong In-ji,
KoryS
sa, 14, p. 204. His title is given as emperor of great Po-hai in
CTKC, 10, p. 108.
215 LS, 28, p. 335.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
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Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
146 THE LIAO
control of only the Southern and Western Capital circuits and deprived of
their tribal homelands. Later in 1118 A-ku-ta softened these demands some-
what, but the Liao court still balked at his terms in spite of the desperate
situation in which they found themselves. Their remaining territories suf-
fered a terrible famine in 1118, and there were more local rebellions and a
constant trickle of defections to the Chin. Meanwhile, in the far west the
Tsu-pu had rebelled again.
A-ku-ta also faced his own internal problems. His initial victories came
with unexpected ease, but his campaigns must have stretched the Jurchens'
resources to the limit. Moreover, controlling the newly conquered territory
proved far from easy. At the beginning of 1119 a rebellion against the Chin
occupation erupted in the Eastern Capital. This had to be suppressed, and
order restored. At the end of 1118 the Liao court agreed to invest A-ku-ta as
king of Tung-hai, but A-ku-ta objected both to the title and to the language
of the document of investiture as being humiliating, and so he angrily
rejected the offer in the summer of 1119. He finally grew impatient and
broke off negotiations in the third month of 1120. The hostilities resumed.
Renewed fighting, 1120
A-ku-ta's first target was the Supreme Capital, which he attacked and cap-
tured in the fifth month. By doing so he showed his determination to deliver
the coup de grace to the stricken dynasty. Situated in the Liao heartland, the
traditional grazing grounds of the Khitan, the Supreme Capital had long
since lost its political and administrative importance, but it remained the
dynasty's religious and ritual center. The holiest places for the Khitan, such
as the holy Mu-yeh Mountain, lay in its vicinity. The Jurchen invaders looted
and destroyed the buildings at the imperial tombs and other vital religious
sites.
Having achieved his main objective, A-ku-ta now temporarily suspended
his offensive because of the summer heat and distance from his home base,
but the Liao'did not take advantage of this respite to organize its defenses. In
the autumn of that year T'ien-tso went hunting as usual. The demoralized
court was also once more shaken by internal dissension. Some of the most
powerful men in the Liao state were tired of T'ien-tso's self-indulgence,
dependence on favorites and sycophants, arbitrary justice and endless levies of
manpower, and requisitions of money and goods. Above all, they resented his
favorite Hsiao Feng-hsien's ability to prevent the emperor's hearing their
own proposals or even from learning how truly desperate the situation was.
In the spring of 1121 Lady Wen, the second wife of T'ien-tso and mother of
the prince of Chin, conspired with her brother-in-law, General Yeh-lii Yii-tu,
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THE REIGN OF T'lEN-TSO AND COLLAPSE OF LIAO 147
to depose the emperor and install her own son in his stead. The plot was
uncovered by the emperor's favorite Hsiao Feng-hsien, who was the brother
of
a
rival consort, Lady Yuan, and hoped to ensure the succession for one of
her sons. Lady Wen was forced to commit suicide, and some of the other
conspirators were executed. Her son, the prince of Chin, in whom everyone
had high hopes, was exonerated. Yeh-lii Yii-tu, the principal conspirator,
escaped with his family and followers and in the fifth month defected to the
Jurchen, who were of course delighted to receive him. He was allowed to
remain in command of his troops, and in the winter of 1121—2 led a Jurchen
army in an attack on the Central Capital. It and the surrounding territory fell
to the Jurchen in the first month of 1122.
At that time T'ien-tso was in or near the Southern Capital. Leaving Prince
Ch'un in command of the Southern Capital circuit, he deserted his court and
embarked on a prolonged flight from the advancing Jurchen, first heading
northwest through the Chii-yung Pass into the Western Capital circuit.
Hsiao Feng-hsien, still determined to ensure the succession for his nephew,
now persuaded the emperor that Yeh-lii Yii-tu and his Jurchen allies were
determined to destroy him and to enthrone the prince of Chin. The emperor
thereupon ordered the unfortunate prince to commit suicide. Shortly after-
ward T'ien-tso finally tired of Hsiao Feng-hsien's manipulation and forced
him to commit suicide.
For the next three years T'ien-tso managed to stay always one step ahead of
his pursuers. Four months after leaving the Southern Capital he had retreated
to the inaccessible Yin-shan Range north of the bend in the Yellow River
along the Liao—Hsia border, where he tried to recruit fresh troops from the
local tribes. Hot on his heels, the Jurchen took the Western Capital in the
third month of 1122 but were unable to establish firm control over all the
western circuit. Furthermore, the Tanguts, fearing an invasion of their own
borders, came to the support of the Liao emperor and sent troops to block the
Jurchens' westward advance. A-ku-ta now arrived from Manchuria and soon
defeated a combined Khitan-Tangut force near the Hsia border. To remove
potential allies of T'ien-tso, to secure their own position, and to prevent
further contacts with the Tanguts, the Jurchen uprooted many of the western
tribes and resettled them east of the Hsing-an Range. T'ien-tso still re-
mained in hiding in the Yin-shan, and A-ku-ta turned back east to take the
Liao Southern Capital.
After T'ien-tso abandoned them and fled west, severing all communica-
tion with the court, the high officials of the Southern Capital, led by the Hsi
king and Yeh-lii Ta-shih, had in the third month of 1122 proclaimed Prince
Ch'un their new emperor, citing as justification the precedent of T'ang Su-
tsung's seizure of the throne during An Lu-shan's rebellion, when Hsiian-
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
148 THE
LIAO
tsung fled to Szechwan. T'ien-tso was demoted to the rank of a prince (it is
for this reason that he was never granted a temple name).
2
'
6
The Liao empire
was now split: Tien-tso's authority, such as it was, was confined to the
remote tribal areas of the far west. The territory controlled by Prince Ch'un
was limited to the sedentary southern regions, and the Liao empire he ruled
was reduced to a minor Chinese frontier state, its officials mostly Chinese,
and the army, once almost entirely composed of Khitan tribesmen, now a
motley mixture of Chinese troops and refugees from the east, under Khitan
or Hsi commanders. To reinforce these none-too-dependable troops, Com-
mander in Chief Yeh-lii Ta-shih attempted to recruit a new tribal army from
Khitan and Hsi refugees. These recruits, however, were in such poor shape
that they were nicknamed the "emaciated army"
(shou chiin)
and became more
of a burden on the people of the southern circuit than an influx of new
strength.
Sung involvement
Sung participation in these events had begun some years before. The Sung
court was forewarned of the Jurchen threat to Liao by a defector as early as
1112.
In 1117, sensing the imminent collapse of the Khitan state, it had
established diplomatic contacts with the Jurchen under the pretense of
trading for horses, hoping to form an alliance against Liao and divide up its
territories.
217
This was a shortsighted and potentially dangerous move. Not
only was the court violating a solemn agreement with a powerful neighbor-
ing state for no really serious purpose, and thus forfeiting the trust of its
other neighbors; it also was risking overturning the balance of power along
the northern frontier that had kept the Sung secure for more than a century.
The Sung court imagined that it saw the opportunity to regain the Sixteen
Prefectures lost to the Khitan in 937. From the start this was an illusion:
A-ku-ta proved willing to return to the Sung only Yen (the Southern
Capital) and its six dependent prefectures.
The Sung, moreover, were unable to intervene immediately, as they were
heavily engaged elsewhere. After 1107 an uneasy peace had been restored
with the Hsi Hsia. But in 1114 diplomatic relations between the two states
had again collapsed: The Hsi Hsia invaded Sung territory and besieged Ting-
yuan. In 1115 the Sung counterattacked with a huge army and, after causing
216 LS, 29, pp.
343-4;
30, p. 352.
217 Dagmar Thiele, Der
Abschluss eints
Vertrages:
Diplomat it zwiscbtn
Sung
und Chin Dynastic, 1/17-1123,
Miinchener Ostasiatische Studien no. 6 (Wiesbaden, 1970), is the most detailed study in a Western
language on the negotiations between the Sung and the Chin. See also the cleat account in Tao Jing-
shen, Two
Sons
of Heaven: Studies in
Sung—Liao
relations, pp. 87—97.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
FINAL DISASTER 149
widespread destruction,
met
with
a
shattering defeat.
The war
dragged
on
until
1119, and
huge numbers
of
Sung troops were committed
to the
front
with
Hsi
Hsia.
In 1119 the
combatants finally concluded
a
peace,
and the
Sung court could think seriously about attacking
the
Khitan.
2
'
8
But in
1120—1
its
attention was again somewhat distracted
by the
rebellion of Fang
La
in
Chekiang.
219
As long
as
the Jurchen attacks were directed against
the
tribal
and
Po-hai
areas
of
the
Liao empire, Sung interests had
not
been directly threatened.
But
in 1122 when A-ku-ta began
to
campaign against the western capital
and its
circuit, which included several
of
the Sixteen Prefectures that
lay
along their
own borders,
the
Sung suddenly became alarmed. Because
of
their military
troubles
on the
border
of
Hsi Hsia
and in the
south,
the
Sung
had
still
not
yet attacked Liao
in
support
of the
Jurchen campaigns,
as
they
had
under-
taken
to
do.
Now
Liao looked like easy prey,
and the
Sung regime
in K'ai-
feng hoped that
the
remaining officials
and the
population
of the
Southern
Capital circuit would readily submit
to a
Sung invasion force.
A
large army
was hastily mobilized
by the
Sung
in the
late spring
of
1122.
An
attempt
to
persuade
the
Liao court
to
surrender failed,
and
fighting erupted
in
early
summer.
A
small force
of
Khitan
and Hsi led by
Hsiao
Kan and
Yeh-lii
Ta-
shih, however, warded
off
the Sung invasion without much trouble.
FINAL DISASTER
Only three months after becoming emperor, Prince Ch'un died.
He had no
heir
and
bequeathed
the
throne
to the
prince
of
Ch'un,
who
was T'ien-tso's
son
by
Lady Yuan.
The
prince
of
Ch'in, however,
was in
hiding with
his
father
in the
west. Prince Ch'un's wife
was
therefore appointed empress
dowager and regent,
220
but
she was powerless to stem the rapid disintegration
of the dynasty.
In
desperation, most
of
the Liao's Chinese subjects were
now
looking
for
any way
to
save their own lives,
and
collaboration with
the
Sung
appeared
the
most attractive alternative. Li Ch'u-wen, who had helped install
Prince Ch'un
as
emperor, secretly advocated surrender
to the
Sung.
But the
empress dowager forced
him to
commit suicide
and
executed
his son for
treason. Then
in
late autumn
of
1122 Kuo Yao-shih, one of her chief generals,
and
Kao
Feng,
the
commander
of the
vital border prefecture
of
I-chou,
defected with their troops
to
Sung. Following Kuo Yao-shih's advice, Sung
218
See
Evgenii
I.
Kychanov,
"Les
guerres entre
les
Song
du
Nord
et le
Hsi-Hsia,"
in
fctudes Song
in
mmonam ttierme Balazs,
ed.
Franchise Aubin,
ist
series,
no. 2
(Paris, 1971),
pp.
102—18.
219
See Kao
Yu-kung, "Source materials
on the
Fang
La
rebellion," Harvard Journal of Asiatic
Studies,
26
(1966),
pp.
211
—40.
220
LS, 29, p. 394.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
150 THE
LIAO
generals again tried to take the Southern Capital. Kuo led his troops into the
city, but his Sung allies failed to halt the arrival of
a
loyal Khitan relief force
under Hsiao Kan, which almost wiped out the invaders.
The failure of
the
Sung offensive against the Southern Capital gave A-ku-ta
the opportunity to intervene and take the region
himself.
The Liao empress
dowager tried repeatedly but unsuccessfully to persuade him to recognize the
prince of Ch'in as his vassal king. But A-ku-ta refused, secure in the knowl-
edge that the remainder of the Liao territories was his for the taking. In
midwinter of 1122 he broke through the Chii-yung pass and occupied the
Southern Capital without meeting any resistance. The Liao empress dowager,
high Khitan and Hsi officials, and many of the non-Chinese population had
fled the capital by another route immediately before the arrival of the Chin
army and were traveling north into Hsi territory.
221
There they split up into
two groups. The Hsi and Po-hai troops followed Hsiao Kan into the Hsi
homeland, where at the beginning of 1123 he set up a short-lived Ta Hsi
dynasty that lasted until his death at the hands of
his
own troops
five
months
later.
222
Yeh-lii Ta-shih, meanwhile, led the empress and the Khitan troops
west to join T'ien-tso. When they finally met the emperor at T'ien-te (north
of modern Urat South Banner, Inner Mongolia) near the Hsia border, Ch'un's
unfortunate widow was executed for disloyalty, but Ta-shih, even though he
upbraided T'ien-tso for having deserted his court and capital, was spared.
T'ien-tso could not afford to execute so able a general, especially one with
seven thousand experienced soldiers under his command.
Early in the summer of
112 3
Yeh-lii Ta-shih was captured in battle by the
Jurchen, who forced him to lead a raid on T'ien-tso's camp, in which they
captured almost the entire imperial family and entourage.
22
' Only one son,
the prince of Liang, managed to escape with his father into the nearby Yin-
shan Mountains. When T'ien-tso decided to accept a Tangut invitation to
seek refuge in Hsia, the prince and his retinue objected and left the imperial
camp,
setting out for the Wu-ku and Ti-lieh tribes in the northern Gobi.
There the prince of Liang was briefly established as the "emperor" of yet
another short-lived dynasty. The Tangut ruler, Li Ch'ien-shun, had mean-
while changed his mind about giving asylum to the imperial Liao refugee.
While T'ien-tso was encamped north of the Ordos waiting for a Tangut
escort, the Jurchen sent a message to the Tangut court warning of the grave
consequences that would ensue if Ch'ien-shun were to give him refuge. To
soften the threat, the Jurchen also offered Hsia a strip of territory along the
Yellow River. In a last futile attempt to win Tangut support, T'ien-tso
221 LS, 29, p. 345.
222 LS, 29, pp. 345-7.
223 LS, 29, p. 346.
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