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INDIA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
state capital, Ahmedabad, more than 100,000 Muslims fl ed their homes
for refugee camps.
Reports suggested that police did little to stop the violence, much
of which was not spontaneous but planned and carried out under the
direction of local Hindu nationalist groups. The BJP had controlled the
Gujarat state government since 1998. It had “saffronized” (appointed
Sangh Parivar supporters to) district and regional boards and removed
an earlier prohibition against civil servants joining the RSS. The
state’s chief minister at the time was the BJP leader Narendra Modi.
Newspaper reports after the riots suggested the state had systematically
kept its Muslim police offi cers out of the fi eld and that 27 senior offi -
cers who had taken action against the rioting had been punished with
transfers. Before the Gujarat riots political observers had predicted that
the BJP’s ineffective running of the state would cost them the govern-
ment, but in the December 2002 state elections, after campaigning
form civil law code, arguing that a separate Muslim code amounts to
preferential treatment.
Communal violence is probably the single greatest concern of Indian
Muslims today, particularly in northern India. Before 1947, communal
riots were “reciprocal,” equally harming Hindus and Muslims. Since 1947,
however, riots have become more one-sided, with “the victims mainly
Muslims, whether in the numbers of people killed, wounded or arrested.”
Starting in the late 1980s and continuing to the present, Hindu national-
ist campaigns have precipitated communal violence on a scale not seen
since partition. Rioting across northern India occurred in 1990–92, in
Bombay in 1993, and in Gujarat in 2002. In the same period armed con-
fl ict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, as well as Muslim terrorist
attacks within India itself, only compounded communal tensions.
As India’s largest and most visible religious minority, it seems likely that
Indian Muslims will remain the target of Hindu nationalist rhetoric and
agitation for the foreseeable future. The defeat of the BJP government in
2004 and 2009, however, and the rise of low-caste political movements
in the late 20th and early 21st centuries may offer poor rural and urban
Indian Muslims an alternative path to political infl uence—one that may be
used without compromising their religious identities.
Source: quotation from Khalidi, Omar. Indian Muslims since Independence (New
Delhi: Vikas, 1995), p. 17.
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