Cambridge University Press, 2004. 414 p.
An important and timely contribution to inteational relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors offer a new approach to deterrence Perfect Deterrence Theory which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome newexamination of the subject.
Theoretical underpinnings.
Classical deterrence theory.
Classical deterrence theory: assumptions and implications.
Structural deterrence theory.
Decision-theoretic deterrence theory.
Empirical anomalies.
Logical problems.
Coda.
Rationality and deterrence.
On rationality.
Procedural rationality.
Instrumental rationality.
Some implications of the assumption of instrumental rationality.
Resolving the paradox I: deterministic threats.
Resolving the paradox II: the threat-that-leaves-something-to-chance.
Resolving the paradox III: the metagame solution.
Coda.
Credibility and deterrence.
On credibility.
Resolving the paradox IV: mutually credible threats.
On capability.
Deterrence and uncertainty.
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with complete information.
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with one-sided incomplete information.
Coda.
Direct deterrence.
Uncertainty and mutual deterrence.
Capability, credibility, and mutual deterrence.
Credibility, uncertainty, and mutual deterrence.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game.
Class 1 equilibria.
Class 2A and 2B Attack Equilibria.
Class 3 Bluff Equilibrium.
Coda.
Unilateral deterrence.
Game form.
Unilateral deterrence under complete information.
Unilateral deterrence under incomplete information.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Unilateral Deterrence Game.
Deterrence equilibria.
Other equilibria.
The Unilateral Deterrence Game and power transition theory.
Coda.
Extended deterrence.
Modeling extended deterrence.
Preliminaries.
The Asymmetric Escalation Game.
Extended deterrence and the dynamics of escalation.
The Asymmetric Escalation Game under complete information.
Stability±instability paradox.
Escalation dominance.
Subgame-perfect equilibria.
Coda.
Modeling Massive Retaliation.
Modeling all-or-nothing deployments.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Massive Retaliation.
Challenger-Soft Deterrence Equilibrium.
No-Response Equilibrium.
No-Limited-Response Equilibria.
Coda.
Modeling Flexible Response.
Modeling Flexible Response: assumptions.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Flexible Response.
Escalatory Deterrence Equilibria.
All-or-Nothing Equilibria.
Flexible Response Equilibria.
Multiple equilibria.
Discussion.
Coda.
Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence.
Theory and evidence.
Assumptions.
Behavioral possibilities.
Deterrence and conflict spirals.
Traditional deterrence.
Non-traditional deterrence.
Confict spirals.
Discussion.
Coda implications.
Perfect Deterrence Theory.
Capability: a necessary condition.
Deterrence and the status quo.
Credibility and deterrence.
Deterrence breakdowns, limited conficts, and escalation spirals.
Nuclear weapons and deterrence.
Coda.
Appendices.
Deterrence models.
Useful de®nitions.
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game.
Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game.
Unilateral Deterrence Game.
Asymmetric Escalation Game: ``Massive Retaliation'' version.
Asymmetric Escalation Game: ``Flexible Response'' version.
Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version.
An important and timely contribution to inteational relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors offer a new approach to deterrence Perfect Deterrence Theory which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capability, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome newexamination of the subject.
Theoretical underpinnings.
Classical deterrence theory.
Classical deterrence theory: assumptions and implications.
Structural deterrence theory.
Decision-theoretic deterrence theory.
Empirical anomalies.
Logical problems.
Coda.
Rationality and deterrence.
On rationality.
Procedural rationality.
Instrumental rationality.
Some implications of the assumption of instrumental rationality.
Resolving the paradox I: deterministic threats.
Resolving the paradox II: the threat-that-leaves-something-to-chance.
Resolving the paradox III: the metagame solution.
Coda.
Credibility and deterrence.
On credibility.
Resolving the paradox IV: mutually credible threats.
On capability.
Deterrence and uncertainty.
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with complete information.
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game with one-sided incomplete information.
Coda.
Direct deterrence.
Uncertainty and mutual deterrence.
Capability, credibility, and mutual deterrence.
Credibility, uncertainty, and mutual deterrence.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game.
Class 1 equilibria.
Class 2A and 2B Attack Equilibria.
Class 3 Bluff Equilibrium.
Coda.
Unilateral deterrence.
Game form.
Unilateral deterrence under complete information.
Unilateral deterrence under incomplete information.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the Unilateral Deterrence Game.
Deterrence equilibria.
Other equilibria.
The Unilateral Deterrence Game and power transition theory.
Coda.
Extended deterrence.
Modeling extended deterrence.
Preliminaries.
The Asymmetric Escalation Game.
Extended deterrence and the dynamics of escalation.
The Asymmetric Escalation Game under complete information.
Stability±instability paradox.
Escalation dominance.
Subgame-perfect equilibria.
Coda.
Modeling Massive Retaliation.
Modeling all-or-nothing deployments.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Massive Retaliation.
Challenger-Soft Deterrence Equilibrium.
No-Response Equilibrium.
No-Limited-Response Equilibria.
Coda.
Modeling Flexible Response.
Modeling Flexible Response: assumptions.
Perfect Bayesian equilibria under Flexible Response.
Escalatory Deterrence Equilibria.
All-or-Nothing Equilibria.
Flexible Response Equilibria.
Multiple equilibria.
Discussion.
Coda.
Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence.
Theory and evidence.
Assumptions.
Behavioral possibilities.
Deterrence and conflict spirals.
Traditional deterrence.
Non-traditional deterrence.
Confict spirals.
Discussion.
Coda implications.
Perfect Deterrence Theory.
Capability: a necessary condition.
Deterrence and the status quo.
Credibility and deterrence.
Deterrence breakdowns, limited conficts, and escalation spirals.
Nuclear weapons and deterrence.
Coda.
Appendices.
Deterrence models.
Useful de®nitions.
Rudimentary Asymmetric Deterrence Game.
Generalized Mutual Deterrence Game.
Unilateral Deterrence Game.
Asymmetric Escalation Game: ``Massive Retaliation'' version.
Asymmetric Escalation Game: ``Flexible Response'' version.
Asymmetric Escalation Game: general version.