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47 See Jessica Mathews, “The New, Private Order,” Washington Post, January 21, 1997,

p. A11.

48 See Jody Williams, “Nobel Lecture” (December 10, 1997), available online at

www.icbl.org/resources/jodynobel.html.

49 See Dana Priest, “Mine Decision Boosts Clinton-Military Relations,” Washington

Post, September 21, 1997, p. A22.

50 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer

of Antipersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, available online at

www.icbl.org/treaty/treatyenglish.html. See Monica Schurtman, “The International

Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Ottawa Landmines Treaty: Applications to the

Movement to Restrict Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers,” unpublished paper

prepared for the SSRC Workshop on Law and International Relations (February 6–7,

2002).

51 See Arms Trade Resource Center, “U.S. ‘Supplier of Choice’ for Weapons Sales”

(August 20, 2001), available online at www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms/updates/

082001.html.

52 See Small Arms Transparency and Control Regime in Africa, available online at

www.unrec.org/eng/satcra.htm.

53 See UN General Assembly, Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufac-

turing of and Trafﬁcking in Firerams, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related

Materials, 24th Special Sess. (November 13, 1997), available online at www.

iansa.org/documents/regional/reg5.htm.

54 See Small Arms and the Humanitarian Community: Developing a Strategy for

Action, Report of the Proceedings of the Nairobi Conference (November 18–20,

2001).

55 See generally, William Korey, The Promises We Keep: Human Rights, the Helsinki

Process, and American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).

56 “Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,” Pub. L. vol. 91, no. 95–213 (1997) Stat., p. 1494.

57 See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Ofﬁcials in Inter-

national Business Transactions, available online at www.oecd.org/pdf/m00007000/

M00007323.pdf.

58 See the website of Transparency International, at www.transparency.org.

59 Examples include the Lima Declaration (1997); the Durban Commitment (1999), and

the Principles to Combat Corruption in African Countries (1999). See also 10th Inter-

national Anti-Corruption Conference, at www.10iacc.org/download/workshops/

cs52a.pdf.

60 See Barbara Frey, “The Availability and Misuse of Small Arms and Light Weapons

in the Context of Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms,” unpublished paper pre-

pared for the SSRC Workshop on Law and International Relations (February 6–7,

2002).

61 See Federation of American Scientists, Arms Sales Monitoring Project, “United

States Arms Transfer Eligibility Criteria Index Page,” at http://fas.org/asmp/cam-

paigns/legislationindex.html. For website links to bills and public laws relating to

arms transfers and foreign military assistance, see Federation of American Scientists,

Arms Sales Monitoring Project, “Bills and Public Laws,” at http://fas.org/

asmp/resources/billlaws.html. See also Federation of American Scientists, Arms

Sales Monitoring Project, “Government Documents,” at www.fas.org/asmp/

resources/govtdocs.htm. The website of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,

and Labor can be found at www.state.gov/g/drl.

62 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, “No Questions Asked: The Eastern Europe

Arms Pipeline to Liberia” (2001), available online at www.hrw.org/backgrounder/

arms/liberia1115.htm.

HAROLD HONGJU KOH

63 See generally, Wendy Cukier, “Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light

Weapons: Strengthening Domestic Regulations” (March 2001), available online at

www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/btb_brf7.pdf.

64 See http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms, the website of the United Nations Con-

ference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (July

9–20, 2001).

65 See Koh, “The 1998 Frankel Lecture.” I have argued elsewhere that international law

norms can be internalized into domestic legal systems through a variety of legal,

political, and social channels. See, for example, Brief Amici Curiae of Mary Robin-

son et al., Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 1512 (2003), no. 02-102. See also the

following by Harold Hongju Koh: “The 2001 Richard Childress Memorial Lecture:

A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century,” St. Louis University Law

Journal vol. 46 (2002), p. 293; “Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights

Treaty (CEDAW),” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law vol. 34

(2003), p. 258; “Paying ‘Decent Respect’ to World Opinion on the Death Penalty,”

University of California Davis Law Review vol. 35 (2002), p. 1085.

66 The US Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the US Customs Service have

engaged in interdiction and investigative efforts along the southwestern border of the

United States, and US attorneys in that region have increased their efforts to prose-

cute arms trafﬁckers caught attempting to smuggle ﬁrearms into the United States.

67 See www.treas.gov/ofﬁces/enforcement/ofac/legal/eo/diamond_eo.pdf.

68 See William Godnick, “Tackling the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light

Weapons,” unpublished paper prepared for the SSRC Workshop on Law and Inter-

national Relations (February 6–7, 2002).

69 See Leon H. Sullivan, Moving Mountains: The Principles and Purposes of Leon Sul-

livan (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press), pp. 106–12. See also UN Secretary-General

Koﬁ Annan’s Global Compact initiative (available at www.unglobalcompact.org).

70 See US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Vol-

untary Principles on Security and Human Rights,” fact sheet (December 20, 2000),

available online at www.state.gov/www/ global/human_rights/001220_fsdrl_prin-

ciples.html. See Harold Hongju Koh (US assistant secretary of state for democracy,

human rights, and labor) et al., “Voluntary Principles on Security and Human

Rights” (December 20, 2000), available online at www.state.gov/www/policy_

remarks/2000/001220_koh_hr.html; “Contemporary Practice of the United States

Relating to International Law: Voluntary Human Rights Principles for Extractive and

Energy Companies,” American Journal of International Law vol. 95 (2001), pp. 626,

636 (ed. Sean D. Murphy); Bennett Freeman et al., “A New Approach to Corporate

Responsibility: The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights,” Hastings

International and Comparative Law Review vol. 24 (2001), p. 423.

71 OAS Inter-American Convention, Art. XII, available online at www.defenselink.mil/

acq/acic/treaties/small/oas/oasconvention.htm.

72 OAS Inter-American Convention, Art. XIII (1)(e).

73 The United States has recently contributed experts and funds to destroy small arms,

light weapons, and ammunition in Liberia, Haiti, and the former Yugoslavia, and has

agreed with 10 nations of southeastern Europe on a program to destroy illicit arms.

74 See US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “Small Arms/Light

Weapons Destruction in Albania Memorandum” (September 7, 2000), available

online at www.state.gov/www/global/arms/bureau_pm/smallarms/000907_albania.

html.

75 See Human Rights Watch, “My Gun Was As Tall As Me.”

76 See Norton-Taylor, “Small Arms Trade,” p. 15.

77 US law prohibits arms and munitions retransferral of arms exported from the United

A WORLD DROWNING IN GUNS

States by the recipient without prior US approval, and suspected diversions and trans-

shipments are investigated. The United States has also implemented sanctions and

embargoes established by the United Nations by prosecuting those who violate

embargoes. The United States has also refused to authorize commercial or govern-

ment-to-government weapons transfers to conﬂict areas not then subject to UN

embargoes such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Angola.

78 Law enforcement ofﬁcials made the ﬁrst seizure of munitions under the provisions of

the new legislation in November 1999.

79 See notes 57–58.

80 Ian Ayres and John J. Donohue III, “Shooting Down the More Guns, Less Crime

Hypothesis,” Stanford Law Review vol. 55 (2003), p. 1193; John R. Lott Jr., More

Guns, Less Crime: Understanding Crime and Gun-Control Laws (Chicago: Univer-

sity of Chicago Press, 2000).

81 William Reno, “Arms, Internal War, and the Causes of Peace,” unpublished paper

prepared for the SSRC Workshop on Law and International Relations (February 6–7,

2002); William Reno, “Small Arms, Violence, and the Course of Conﬂicts,” Chapter

3 in this volume. Reno argues that the current regulatory system, in seeking to deny

small arms to all nonstate actors, ignores the possibility that some of these groups

may be seeking to establish order in the face of predatory, dictatorial governments.

Accordingly, Reno would adjust small arms regulatory schemes to account for con-

textual differences in purposes among nonstate organizations. But Reno nowhere

explains how such distinctions among nonstate actors would be drawn, nor why lim-

iting small arms trade could not be combined with more effective international pres-

sure to remove predatory regimes.

82 Kathi Austin, “Armed Refugee Camps as a Microcosm of the Link Between Arms

Availability and Insecurity,” unpublished paper prepared for the SSRC Workshop on

Law and International Relations (February 6–7, 2002); Human Rights Watch, Liber-

ian Refugees in Guinea: Refoulement, Militarization of Camps and Other Protection

Concerns (November 2002), available online at www.hrw.org/reports/2002/guienea.

83 Harold Hongju Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” Stanford Law Review vol. 55

(2003), p. 1479.

HAROLD HONGJU KOH

Part II

TERRORISM

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM,

NONSTATE ACTORS, AND

TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL

MOBILIZATION

A perspective from International Relations

Fiona B. Adamson

International terrorism as a conceptual challenge for

international relations

The problem of international terrorism presents a conceptual challenge to the

discipline of international relations (IR), which has traditionally been concerned

with understanding conﬂict and cooperation among state actors, rather than

the role that nonstate actors play in the international security environment.

Yet international terrorism is inherently an international phenomenon that

impacts overall levels of international security and international stability, and

therefore falls squarely within the domain of what IR should be able to explain

and understand.

In this chapter I suggest a framework for thinking analytically about inter-

national terrorism from an IR perspective. In order to do so, I argue that, rather

than focusing on speciﬁc groups, particular ideologies, or even particular strat-

egies or threats of terror and violence, the most fruitful approach for IR scholars

to take is to devise a broad research agenda around the role that nonstate actors

and transnational political movements play in the international security environ-

ment. Speciﬁcally, I propose that there is a common and identiﬁable pattern of

transnational organizing and transnational strategies that nonstate political entre-

preneurs adopt when mounting a violent challenge to the political status quo.

This pattern of transnational political mobilization coexists with an international

system of states, and has been a prevalent feature of international politics for at

least the past two centuries.

Examining the international systemic-level activities of nonstate actors

necessitates a shift in IR thinking away from so-called billiard ball models of the

international system in which world politics is conceived of solely as interac-

tions among unitary state actors operating within an anarchic environment.

Instead, such a perspective suggests the utility of viewing the international

system as a single political space – a world polity in which both state and non-

state actors interact and respond to changing opportunity structures at the global

level.

By conceiving of the international system as a world polity – a space of

political contention, in addition to interstate competition – we have the starting

point for analyzing international terrorism as a political phenomenon, in addition

to analyzing it as a security threat. This, I argue, provides some analytical lever-

age for thinking about long-term systemic-level political responses to the

problem of international terrorism, as opposed to relying exclusively on military

and policing responses.

I begin by placing current concerns regarding international terrorism in their

historical context. International terrorism is not a new feature of the international

security environment, and it is useful to be reminded of this through a brief

survey of past examples of transnationally linked nonstate actors who employed

violence as a tool for achieving their political goals. Second, I discuss how

dominant theories of international relations have dealt with the question of non-

state action in world politics – and argue that both realist and liberal paradigms

have been unable to respond adequately to the challenge of international terror-

ism, largely because of their focus on states as the most signiﬁcant actors in

international relations as well as, in the case of liberalism, the inability to

account adequately for the role that violence may play in the constitution of

political order. Third, I discuss the advantages of employing a political mobil-

ization framework for analyzing international terrorism, which draws on insights

from the literatures on social movements and political mobilization. Finally, I

conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of such a

framework, emphasizing the need to promote stronger institutional channels

both within and beyond the state for nonstate actors to use to articulate political

grievances. Such institutions, including strong regional court systems, provide a

useful focus for a common research agenda that could be pursued by both inter-

national relations and international law scholars.

Nonstate actors, political violence, and international

security

The use of strategies of violence and terror by nonstate actors and transnational

political movements is not a new feature of the international security environ-

ment. For at least the past two centuries, politically motivated nonstate groups

have organized transnationally as a way of mounting a challenge to the political

status quo, and many of these groups have employed violence as a means of fur-

thering their goals. The ideology employed by such groups has varied across

time and place, but the transnational strategies employed share similarities.

Some scholars have characterized international terrorism as emerging in histor-

FIONA B. ADAMSON

ical waves, but upon closer examination it would appear that the use of political

violence by transnationally networked nonstate actors has been an almost con-

stant source of insecurity in world politics over the past two centuries – what has

changed has been largely the mobilizing ideologies employed by such groups.

For a historical perspective on the use of political violence by nonstate actors

and transnational movements, one need only think of the multitude of political

groups that mobilized transnationally during the nineteenth century, many of

which used violence as a tactic with which to pursue their political goals. Such

groups included anarchist and socialist groups in both Europe and North

America. While most anarchists and socialists were nonviolent, these global

movements also included radical and violent wings, in which members circu-

lated pamphlets that provided instructions on such skills as bomb-making and

the use of dynamite.

In addition to anarchist and socialist networks, a number of nationalist move-

ments were also organized transnationally during the late-nineteenth and early-

twentieth centuries. A prominent example includes the Irish nationalist

movement, which was active transnationally in the form of the Fenian groups

that operated in Ireland, Great Britain, the United States, Australia, and parts of

Europe.

A number of nationalist movements operated in the declining Hapsburg

and Ottoman Empires, such as the Young Ottomans (which were organized

transnationally across Europe), the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organi-

zation, Greek and Albanian nationalism movements, and the Young Bosnians.

The pattern of transnational political mobilization accompanied by violence con-

tinued throughout the twentieth century in the form of transnationally organized

anti-imperial, anticolonial, and separatist nationalist movements. The Algerian

nationalist movement and the Palestinian nationalist movement are two of the

most prominent examples. While their ideology was nationalist, their strategies

were transnational – both of these movements operated internationally and used

political violence and terrorism to pursue their goals.

In the past decades, a

wide variety of contemporary conﬂicts that have been categorized as “civil

wars” – from Kosovo to Kashmir and from Chechnya to Northern Ireland – have

involved transnationally organized nonstate actors who use strategies of viol-

ence and terror to pursue their goals.

While there are certainly important differences between previous transnation-

ally organized movements and the activities of Al-Qaida and other radicalized

groups, there are also many striking similarities in terms of both their trans-

national dimensions and their strategic uses of violence. The primary differences

are, of course, the nature of the mobilizing ideology – political Islam, as

opposed to nationalist or other secular ideologies – as well as advances in

technology. Contemporary transnational movements use the Internet to

communicate with one another rather than circulating pamphlets, and may have

access to more destructive weaponry than was available to groups operating

in the past. However, there are also many historical continuities. The use of

informal channels for fundraising, the circulation of political propaganda via

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONSTATE ACTORS

transnational social networks, and the linking of a global ideology to transna-

tionally organized underground networks are all features of Al-Qaida that

resemble earlier transnational movements that employed tactics of terrorism.

The “new threat” posed by Al-Qaida is not necessarily an objectively novel

feature of the international security environment, but is rather subjectively

experienced as new to this generation of American citizens. The magnitude of

the attacks of September 11, 2001, the fact that they occurred within the territor-

ial borders of the United States and were directed at US civilians, and the fact

that the United States is the declared target of Al-Qaida’s activities, all magnify

this subjective experience. Yet if one takes a more objective perspective on the

activities of Al-Qaida, the similarities that exist between the current wave of

“jihadist” terrorism and earlier waves of political violence by transnationally

organized nonstate actors provide important points of comparison and together

suggest a fruitful analytical lens through which to view the role played by non-

state actors and transnational movements in the international security environ-

ment – a role that has been largely ignored by mainstream international relations

theory.

International relations theory and violent nonstate actors

There has been a surprisingly limited amount of theoretically informed research

in IR on violent nonstate actors. This arguably stems from two factors. The ﬁrst

is theoretical and path-dependent, in the sense that the discipline of IR has been

driven and moved forward by debates that are structured around some widely

accepted starting propositions regarding what constitutes legitimate areas and

methods of inquiry in IR. The most obvious starting point is the assumption of

the primacy of sovereign states as the main actors in international affairs, and

the treatment of states as unitary actors.

In many respects, this has had the effect

of marginalizing questions relating to nonstate actors in the discipline. The

second signiﬁcant factor concerns the sociology of knowledge production, in

which the research agenda of IR has historically been either consciously or

unconsciously driven by US foreign policy interests; and unlike most other

states in the world, the United States has been relatively untouched by inter-

national terrorism over the past half decade.

Only a few years ago the study of

terrorism was still considered a marginal ﬁeld for scholars interested in inter-

national peace and security. As one scholar noted in 2002, “a principal interest

in terrorism virtually guarantees exclusion from most academic positions.”

Even today, most of the scholarship on terrorism tends to be empirically driven,

and there has been very little written on terrorism by IR scholars.

Despite the relative paucity of theoretically driven research on the topic,

however, it is nevertheless possible to try to use the dominant paradigms of IR

to deduce some propositions about the impact of violent nonstate actors and

transnational movements on the international security environment. Indeed,

realist and liberal theories of IR each suggest a different type of lens through

FIONA B. ADAMSON

which to formulate appropriate policy responses to international terrorism. As

such, it is useful to examine both realist and liberal perspectives on violent non-

state actors, as a prelude to introducing a political mobilization perspective.

The realist paradigm of international relations still holds a great deal of sway

over the ﬁeld of IR. Realists do not completely ignore nonstate actors. Most

realists acknowledge the existence of nonstate actors – they simply argue that

they are peripheral to understanding the international system and the inter-

national security environment compared with the interests and behavior of

states. As Kenneth Waltz argued, “transnational movements are among the

processes that go on within” the international system; they are not, however, a

crucial deﬁning feature of system structure.

This means that for most realists, nonstate actors are not endowed with any

independent agency or power in international politics. Power is treated as an

attribute that is distributed across unitary state actors who must each prioritize

their own security interests. The very structure of the system is determined by

the distribution of power, which rests in state actors.

In this view, nonstate

actors may engage in activities at the international or transnational level, but

their behavior does not affect the fundamental structure of international politics.

Realists, for example, would point out that the structure of the international

system was unipolar both before and after September 11, 2001 – the attacks on

New York and Washington, DC, did not fundamentally alter the structure of the

international security environment.

When realists do look explicitly at the activities and behavior of nonstate

actors, they tend to view them as being mere extensions of existing conﬁgura-

tions of state power and capabilities.

Nonstate actors are shaped by and

respond to the institutional structures of states, but there is little acknowledg-

ment that nonstate actors may operate independently and have goals and strat-

egies that are autonomous from any one particular state. Similarly, there is little

acknowledgment by realists that states can be shaped and restructured by the

activities of nonstate actors, as well as vice versa.

The realist paradigm suggests a particular lens through which to view the

problem of international terrorism: the logical responses to international terror-

ism, from a realist perspective, are to either refocus attention on states as the

source of security threats, treat violent nonstate actors as proxies for state inter-

ests, or view nonstate actors as being “statelike.”

Indeed, one can easily see the

marks of some of these realist assumptions on the US response to the September

11 attacks on New York and Washington, DC. Even in the early days following

the attacks there was a sense of disbelief among some in the policy community

that nonstate actors could have been acting independently in the attacks, and at

the highest level government ofﬁcials were convinced that a state sponsor had to

be somehow involved.

There was an immediate attempt to refocus attention on

states, especially “rogue states,” despite the lack of any signiﬁcant evidence of a

link between Al-Qaida and any state actor.

In addition to removing the Taliban from Afghanistan, the George W. Bush

INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONSTATE ACTORS