Black J. From Louis XIV to Napoleon The Fate of a Great Power

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FROM LOUIS XIV TO NAPOLEON

there reached the Padouca, possibly the Comanche, in modern central Kansas, in 1724, and

found them willing to trade, but the initiative could not be sustained from distant Louisiana,

a colony then in difficulties, and in 1728 Fort d’Orléans was abandoned. Eleven years later,

a group of nine from New France led by Pierre Mallet crossed Kansas en route from the

Missouri to Santa Fé. They opened up a precarious trade route, but that was unwelcome to

the Spanish authorities.

In the West Indies the French sought to maintain their position, particularly on St Lucia

and St Vincent.

151

British settlers were expelled from St Lucia by the Governor of Martinique

in January 1723.

152

Far from being a passive responder to British initiatives, the stance of

government and its agents led to complaints on the part of Britain, especially over St Lucia,

as in 1730. Also in 1730, French warships seized British ships loading timber at the island of

St Croix, in order to underline their claim to the island.

The French were dependent on native co-operation in North America. They traded

extensively while their settlements relied on local allies, such as the Choctaws near Louisiana.

Agreements and alliances, in turn, drew the French into local rivalries, for example supporting

the Potawatomi against the Fox tribe of modern Illinois–Mississippi. A series of French–

native attacks were launched against the Fox in 1712, 1715, 1716, 1728, 1730, 1731 and

1734. Governor Charles Beauharnais sought to exterminate the Fox. A heavy defeat was

inflicted in 1730 and by 1738 the tribe, once 10,000 strong, numbered only a few hundred.

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In Louisiana, French territorial expansion was an issue. Fort Toulouse, founded on the

Alabama River system in 1717 was designed to limit British expansion from the Carolinas,

and the alliance with Britain did not prevent concern about British intentions towards

Louisiana, specifically approaches to the native population and the provision of arms. The

French competed to win native allies.

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Similarly, the French and Spaniards competed

among the Alabama and the Creek in the late 1710s. Further west, on the Mississippi,

upstream from New Orleans, the Natchez initially accepted French trade and expansion and

the French were able to establish a fortified trading base at Fort Rosalie (Natchez) in 1716.

Nevertheless, in November 1729, a French land fraud led to a Natchez attack in which Fort

Rosalie was destroyed and over 200 settlers killed. The Natchez did not receive the support

of other tribes and in 1731 were crushed by the French and the Choctaws in a campaign of

systematic extermination. The cost hit the colony’s proprietor, the Company of the Indies,

leading the Crown to resume control of Louisiana in 1731. The rising showed the weakness

of the colony as it had been necessary to call in troops from France.

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Fort Rosalie had been

the centre of the tobacco industry, and its destruction greatly harmed attempts to develop

economic links with France and the French West Indies. In the 1730s Maurepas supported

the development of cotton production in the colony and also sought a revival in tobacco

production in order to lessen imports from British North America.

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The war with the Natchez led to a spread of French commitments. Having been driven

REGENCY, BOURBON AND FLEURY, 1715–43

back by the Natchez in an attempt to reach the Arkansas country in 1731, the French

established a garrison at Arkansas Post in 1732 in order to keep an eye on the Chickasaws.

The remnants of the Natchez had taken refuge with the Chickasaws, rivals of the Choctaw

who traded with the British. Their independence concerned the French who in 1736 launched

attacks from New France and Louisiana. Both were ambushed and defeated. A large number

of French captives were burnt to death. In 1739 a larger force was concentrated, again from

both New France and Louisiana. Intimidated, the Chickasaw agreed a truce, but they remained

aligned with the British, and in 1749 drove the French from their position at Arkansas

Post.

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The end result was both to place a very heavy financial burden on the government

of Louisiana, and to show that the French could use the Ohio valley to move forces from

New France to the Mississippi. They followed the route surveyed in 1729 by Chaussegros

de Léry, chief engineer of New France.

Such campaigns were far from the concerns of most French policymakers. They were

possible because France was not using all her resources in waging war in Europe in this

period and, more specifically, as a result of at least acceptable relations with the other

European naval powers, especially Britain. In 1735, when war was feared with Britain, the

possibility of attacks on Québec and Louisiana was considered.

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Conflict did not break

out. This was to change in mid-century.

CHAPTER FOUR

The diplomatic revolution, its background and

consequences, 1743–1774

French foreign policy in mid-century is generally discussed with reference to the ‘Diplomatic

Revolution’, the diplomatic reversals that produced an alignment of Austria and France in

1756. This was indeed important, both then and to the course of French policy up to the

outbreak of the French Revolutionary Wars in 1792. However, France’s wider position was,

if anything, more important. In the 1750s she lost the struggle for position as the leading

European power in North America and India. This loss was to be challenged, most obviously

with French intervention in the War of American Independence in 1778–83, when, in support

of local powers, the French came close to overthrowing the British; but they never succeeded

in destroying the lead seized by the British in the 1750s. Rather than treating the latter

development as a separate issue to that of French foreign policy, this chapter seeks to

discuss both, and to assess the relationship between European and global strategies.

The War of the Austrian Succession II, 1744–8

The broadening out of the conflict in 1744 did not immediately fulfil French expectations.

The invasion attempt on Britain was defeated by bad weather, but it was a valuable testimony

to the revival in French naval strength and the British had been pushed onto the defensive.

The French also made important advances when they invaded the Austrian Netherlands in

1744. In May and June, Menin, Ypres and Furnes fell rapidly. The following year, ‘Bonnie

Prince Charlie’, Charles Edward Stuart, the elder son of the Jacobite Pretender, was

transported with French help to the west coast of Scotland. The ensuing Jacobite rising, the

’45, greatly assisted the French in the Low Countries. British and British-subsidized troops

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION, 1743–74

had to be transported from the Austrian Netherlands to resist the Jacobites, and their failure

to defeat the outnumbered prince in late 1745 ensured that they could not be sent back to the

continent in time to fight the French at the beginning of the 1746 campaign.

As with the earlier death of the Emperor Charles VI in 1740, a major opportunity

appeared to beckon. The prospect of a favourable result in a War of the British Succession

led Louis XV to sign the Treaty of Fontainebleau with the Pretender on 24 October 1745. By

it, Louis recognized him as King of Scotland, and promised to send military assistance and to

recognize him as King of England as soon as this could be shown to be the wish of the nation.

An expeditionary force, under the Duke of Richelieu, was prepared at Dunkirk, but delays

in its preparation, poor weather, British control of the Channel, and news of the Jacobite

retreat from Derby on 6 December 1745 led to its cancellation. Charles Edward was routed

at Culloden on 27 April 1746.

This ended the best French chance to knock out one of their leading opponents until the

Napoleonic invasion of Austria in 1805. Such opportunities were rare in ancien régime

warfare, not because goals were limited, but because of the combination of the constraints of

distance, and the nature of symmetrical warfare (fighting opponents with similar military

systems). France herself benefited from this situation. Even when hard pressed, as in 1675,

1708 and 1792, her centres of power were not taken and no French government fell as a result

of invasion until 1814, followed by 1815, 1870 and 1940.

In the 1740s the French had better success in the Low Countries than in Britain. British

hopes that the Austrian Netherlands could serve as the base for an invasion of France were

wrecked in 1745 when Marshal Saxe won the battle of Fontenoy (11 May) and captured

much of the Austrian Netherlands. He was crowned with laurels at the Paris Opéra on 18

March 1746. Brussels, Antwerp, Mons, Charleroi and Namur fell in 1746. Saxe defeated his

opponents at Roucoux (11 October 1746) and Lawfeldt (2 July 1747). The danger that the

United Provinces would be overrun – in 1748 Saxe easily took Maastricht – helped to lead

the British to negotiate for peace seriously.

Negotiations had been conducted for much of the war, but most of the powers had fought

on, hopeful of success, fearful of the consequences of abandoning their allies, and distrustful

of their enemies. In 1745 Charles VII’s death broke the impasse in Germany. The Union of

Frankfurt, a league of Charles VII, Louis XV, Frederick II, William of Hesse and the Elector

Palatine, created in June 1744 and designed to secure Charles’s interests,

had not shaken

Austrian power. The French captured Freiburg, but did not co-operate with Frederick II in

overrunning Bohemia. That December, Argenson, the foreign minister, had slapped down

Chavigny’s schemes for major French commitments and emphasized the need for peace.

French strategy became that of forcing Austria to peace.

However, Bavaria was overrun by

the Austrians in April, and Maximilian Joseph, the new Elector of Bavaria, abandoned

France and allied with Austria by the Treaty of Fussen of 22 April 1745.

Determined to exclude the house of Lorraine,

France supported Augustus III of Saxony

FROM LOUIS XIV TO NAPOLEON

for the vacant Imperial throne, but, on 14 September 1745, Maria Theresa’s husband was

elected as Emperor Francis I. As Amelot had predicted in June 1743, an Austro-Bavarian

settlement led to more Austrian military pressure in Italy, where the Franco-Spanish army

was defeated at Piacenza on 6 June 1746. This weakened the Bourbons’ negotiating position.

In 1745 Argenson had made secret approaches to Sardinia, leading to a preliminary treaty of

26 December 1745 and an armistice on 17 February 1746; but on 4 March 1746, dissatisfied

with French moves, Charles Emmanuel repudiated both. The French had pressed the Spaniards

unsuccessfully to accept his demands in north Italy.

The French also approached Austria

via Saxony in late 1745. They demanded a northern Italian state for Don Philip, as well as

gains for France in the Austrian Netherlands. The negotiations collapsed over the French

terms for Don Philip.

Their failure, and the Austro-Prussian settlement in December 1745,

further increased pressure on the French and their allies in Italy, as Argenson had feared.

Saxe’s successes in the Low Countries were not speedily translated into a political

settlement, although the French made a number of peace initiatives during the war. An

approach to Britain in the spring of 1745 was unsuccessful,

as was another in May 1746 in

which the French proposed the neutrality of the Austrian Netherlands, the cession of Tuscany

to Don Philip and the return of captured areas. Argenson rapidly followed up this approach

to Britain with another to the Dutch, and in July with a proposal to Frederick II that he try

to mediate. Puysieulx was sent to Breda to negotiate peace in a conference that began in

October 1746, Argenson hoping that month that Saxe’s successes would lead to that end.

However, Puysieulx complained that the opposing powers were not pacific and that success

in Italy had strengthened their alliance.

This was important as French success in peace

negotiations had depended on dividing their opponents. The conference was suspended the

following spring while both sides awaited the fate of the summer’s campaign. The failure of

the negotiations helped lead to Argenson’s fall on 10 January 1747. He was replaced by

Puysieulx.

By late 1747 both Britain and France wanted peace. Despite the capture of Louisbourg in

Canada from the French in 1745, the failure of the French expedition sent to regain it and to

recapture Acadia in 1746,

and naval victories in 1747 (the two battles off Cape Finisterre),

the British government was fearful of the consequences of French gains in the Low Countries.

The French had invaded the United Provinces in April 1747, storming the major fortress of

Bergen-op-Zoom on 16 September.

France, her foreign trade harmed by the British navy,

her economy hit by a poor

harvest,

and her finances by the costly war,

was in a parlous state. It had not been easy

to adapt to what was a different war, one that had to be fought at sea and in the colonies as

well as on land. Government expenditure rose to 300 million livres in 1742 and 350 million

in 1744, a sum that exceeded those of Austria and Britain combined. Austro-Sardinian forces

with British naval support invaded Provence in November 1746, advancing on Toulon, as

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION, 1743–74

they had done in 1707; but they were pushed back the following January. Spain, from July

1746 under its new ruler, Ferdinand VI, no longer supported French schemes, despite

promises to the contrary.

The Spaniards negotiated independently with the British in

1747. The French alliance system had thus collapsed whereas their opponents’ alliance

remained coherent, although not free from serious tensions.

The French were also concerned at the prospect of British-subsidized Russian intervention

on the Rhine.

French hopes that Russia could be kept busy by Turkish and Persian

commitments and that the Turks could be encouraged to attack Austria

proved abortive

and the French government became increasingly conscious of Russian strength in Eastern

Europe.

As a consequence, the French negotiated a defensive alliance with Sweden in 1747

and supported the negotiation of another between Sweden and Prussia in 1746.

A triple

alliance of France, Sweden and Prussia was concluded at Stockholm on 29 May 1747. The

Russians themselves were concerned about French attempts to organize opposition in Poland,

the Baltic and Turkey.

As at Utrecht in 1713, it was France and Britain that were responsible for both peace and

its terms. The French had delivered terms to the British in August 1747 and negotiations

continued under the pressure of French success in the Low Countries. The preliminaries of

the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle were signed on 30 April and the definitive treaty on 18

October 1748. Aside from relatively minor territorial changes in Italy, including the

establishment of Don Philip in Parma, the Pragmatic Sanction was renewed for the remaining

Habsburg territories. France regained Louisbourg, and the British East India Company Madras,

lost to a French force in September 1746. The disputed Canadian border was referred to

commissioners. The French had to agree to recognize the Protestant succession in Britain

and to expel Bonnie Prince Charlie. Having refused not to appear in public, the prince was

arrested at the Paris Opéra.

France made no territorial gains. In August 1745 the French had demanded Furnes and

Ypres in a secret peace approach to the Austrians, and Nieuport and Tournai were added a

month later, but in 1748, despite reports that France would gain Tournai and Ypres

,23

they

agreed to restore the whole of the Austrian Netherlands. Suggestions that France should lose

Alsace, Lorraine, Franche Comté, the Three Bishoprics, Roussillon and French Flanders

were fanciful.

Like all compromise peaces, that of Aix-la-Chapelle was heavily criticized. In France,

there was condemnation of an inglorious peace that had failed to bring any gains.

The Earl

of Sandwich, one of the British plenipotentiaries, was convinced that his French counterparts

sought peace but that the French army had a different view.

Peace without conquests was

necessary in order to persuade Austria and Britain to terms, and the notion of gaining a slice

of the Austrian Netherlands no longer seemed of such value, a source of power and prestige,

as had been the case 70 years earlier. Possibly, however, this was a mistake. The notion that

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100

the French Revolution could have been averted had victory been obtained in the Seven Years’

War or in the Dutch Crisis of 1787, could be extended to the War of the Austrian Succession,

for in 1745–8 France enjoyed a military position and a run of successes that was not to be

matched or bettered until 1795–7.

She was in a position to make territorial demands, but, however desirable these might

have been for domestic reasons, they would have had less happy international consequences,

not least by helping to keep alive the hostile wartime opposing coalition. Having failed to

recast Europe by partitioning the Habsburg inheritance or installing a client regime in Britain,

the French had to work with a less welcoming European system and this was best exploited

by not presenting French policy as dominated by territorial aggrandizement. The recent

conflict had taught a generation of politicians the danger of leaping into the unknown, of

exchanging diplomacy for war. Indeed, in a significant departure from recent policy, Louis

Philoxen Brulart, Marquis of Puysieulx, foreign minister 1747–51, sought better relations

with Britain and hoped that Anglo-French co-operation would ease tensions, whether in the

Baltic

or North America, or more generally in Europe.

He wished both to defend his allies’

interests and to maintain peace, a balance that was difficult to strike.

The British envoy

argued that Puysieulx was easier to deal with than Maurepas and wrote that his role in

negotiating the peace left him determined to maintain it.

The aftermath: 1748–55

This approach was rebuffed by the British in favour of retaining and strengthening relations

with Austria, and, after the War of the Austrian Succession, France found herself in a weaker

diplomatic situation than she had been after the War of the Polish Succession. It was largely

in a misleading hindsight that, in 1773, the Duke of Broglie was able to claim that France had

gained in 1748 a brilliant and solid diplomatic position, not least by balancing Prussia and

Austria and leaving France able to hold the balance.

In fact, although unwilling to accept

British priorities, Austria was closer to Britain than to France, and, indeed, in 1748 Puysieulx

was uncertain whether Austria would accept what was, like Utrecht, in effect a Anglo-

French settlement.

The absence of senior French diplomats in Austria, Britain and Russia at the start of 1749

handicapped French policymaking, and France had totally failed to secure Bavarian interests

in the recent conflict. In July 1748 Puysieulx could only press on the Bavarians the need to

adapt to circumstances.

He was angered, however, by their approach to Austria.

Despite

French interest in 1750 in maintaining her alliance with Spain, and in co-operating with her

to keep the peace in Italy,

in 1752 Austria, Sardinia and Spain settled their Italian differences

without France.

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION, 1743–74

101

The French government regarded its principal ally, Frederick the Great, as an unreliable

maverick and pointed out that he had twice made peace without consulting France.

Having

failed to overthrow Austria and Russia in 1741–2 and Britain in 1744–6, the French were left

allied to Prussia, a weak, vulnerable and unreliable power, but could not for several years

abandon the choice of 1741 and work, instead, at better relations with Austria.

Frederick, in his turn, was very caustic about what he saw as a craven French failure to

resist Anglo-Austrian plans in the Empire and the western Mediterranean.

He was envious

of France’s greater strength and frustrated by her policies. Frederick wanted France to be

assertive to others and pliable to him. In 1752 he expressed concern over reports of cuts in

the French army. Frederick sought to stir French fears, while the French, though promising

help if he was attacked, encouraged him to caution and compromise.

The two clashed in

1751–2 over policy in Sweden.

Despite France’s far from dominant position, she was faced by considerable suspicion, a

legacy both of her role in causing war in 1733 and 1741 and of more general concern about her

intentions. Puysieulx’s successor, François-Dominique de Barbarie, Marquis de Saint-Contest,

complained in December 1753 that ambitious views were being falsely ascribed to France by

powers that indeed were making plans against her. The previous year, he had noted that the

Austrians were making no attempt to bring France into any agreement to maintain the peace

of Europe.

In practice, French diplomatic plans were reactive, seeking, in particular, to thwart British

initiatives in the Empire and the United Provinces, and to retain French influence elsewhere.

In the event of another war with Britain it was important that the Low Countries should be

as vulnerable as they had been in 1745–8. The support of Prussia would make them more so,

by limiting Austrian assistance. Noailles told the Prussian envoy in January 1750 that

Prussia and Sardinia had to be the curb on Austria and that France would be the principal

support of the system.

The following month, Puysieulx told the British and Austrian

envoys that France would come to the assistance of Sweden if she was attacked by Russia,

and persuaded Frederick to adopt the same line. In the event of war, Puysieulx planned that

the French should overrun the Austrian Netherlands: the best way to intimidate Russia’s

major ally. He also, however, tried to restrain his allies from taking excessive alarm.

Nevertheless, while seeking to avoid giving automatic credence to fears about Austrian,

British and Russian intentions, Puysieulx argued that Russian moves and British support for

the Imperial succession scheme gave cause for concern. He was also aware that the Franco-

Prussian alliance served to motivate hostile moves by other powers.

In April 1750, Puysieulx sought to create a quadruple alliance with Denmark, Sweden and

Prussia, and a league of German princes led by Frederick and subsidized by France. His

conviction that a conflict in any part of Europe would rapidly become a general war led him

to emphasize the value of a wide-ranging alliance system.

In the winter of 1750–51 France

signed treaties with Württemberg and the Palatinate, and agreed to pay the subsidies promised

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102

by subsidy treaties that Frederick had signed with Brunswick–Wolfenbüttel, Mecklenburg,

Bayreuth and Gotha. Puysieulx estimated that the treaties would cost France ten million

livres.

French diplomacy also ranged more widely. Differences between Denmark and Sweden

were settled in 1749 and alliances signed with both in January 1754. There were hopes of

alliances between Sweden and Turkey, and Prussia and Turkey, and the anti-Saxon party in

Poland was encouraged. These steps were designed to prevent Sweden from becoming as

dependent on Russia as Poland was,

and to limit Russia, both as a goal in its own right and

because that would counteract the close relations between Britain and Russia. Neither

Puysieulx nor Saint-Contest sought to use diplomacy to advance any conception of a French-

dominated Europe. In December 1753 Saint-Contest cited relations with the Swiss Cantons

as an example of the essential passivity of French policy and as an example for the Dutch.

Domestic problems, particularly a crisis in relations with the Parlement of Paris, played

a major role in French politics, and there was a degree of loss of confidence that is surprising

in light of the victories of 1745–8. Always ready to adopt a critical view of his allies,

Frederick thought Saint-Contest timid.

He was, however, informed by his envoy about

French domestic and financial problems and saw them as affecting French policy.

French

caution helped to restrain Frederick. The Palatine diplomat Wrede noted the belief that

France was not in a shape to resist Austrian schemes in the Empire, but Palatine pressure led

to French diplomatic support for the satisfaction of her claims as part of any agreement to

elect Maria Theresa’s eldest son, Joseph, as King of the Romans, heir to the empire,

a plan

being actively pushed by the British in order to stabilize the Habsburg position in the

Empire. The French also pressed the need for unanimity in any imperial election. In January

1753 Saint-Contest emphasized the need for co-operation with Prussia in order to thwart

Austria, and suggested the revival of the 1741 system of alliance with Prussia and the

Wittelsbachs.

French envoys were instructed to co-operate with their Prussian

counterparts.

However, the international situation was very different to that of 1741, with Britain,

Russia, Sardinia and Spain now closer to Austria, while in France there was little enthusiasm

for war. Saint-Contest was also well aware of the limitations of employing diplomatic

leverage to settle international disputes,

difficulties that helped to block the British-backed

Imperial election scheme. He sought to avoid an alarmist approach and had a perceptive

grasp of realities. Thus Frederick was told that the British were unlikely to subsidize any

Austro-Russian attack on Prussia,

no attempt was made to limit the authority of the

House of Orange in the United Provinces,

and, in October 1753, Saint-Contest responded

cautiously to reports from his envoy at The Hague that Britain and Austria would employ

force to ensure the election of the King of the Romans. The following January, he was

similarly dubious about the possibility of Austro-Russian action.

THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION, 1743–74

103

The French economy benefited from the return of peace. This was especially true of

overseas trade. Insurance rates fell and trade resumed as British commerce raiding stopped.

In 1749 large quantities of sugar and coffee from the French West Indies reached the great

entrepôt of Hamburg,

where French trade had been hit very badly during the war and

forced to rely on neutral shipping.

They continued strong into the 1750s.

French exports

of luxury goods and wine also resumed. They were harmed by tariffs, although these could

also be helpful, as with the replacement of Hungarian by French wine in Silesia as a

consequence of Prussian moves against Austrian exports.

Trade with Canada and India

recovered from wartime disruption.

Austro-French relations

The alliance between Austria and France negotiated in 1756 was less novel than might

appear. There had been approaches for good relations over the previous 41 years, largely on

the part of France. Aside from Louis XIV’s initiative at the close of his reign, and co-

operation early in that of Louis XV – not least at the expense of Philip V

– Fleury and

Sinzendorf, the Austrian Chancellor, developed a good working relationship at the Congress

of Soissons in 1728. This, however, led to nothing because the Austrian ministry preferred

Prince Eugene’s policy of alliance within the Empire and with Russia and Spain.

Fleury and the Austrians co-operated from late 1735 until early 1741, and there had been

a number of attempts, for example in December 1745, to settle the War of the Austrian

Succession on the basis of an Austro-French understanding. From 1745 the Saxons had

sought to create a Franco-Austrian alliance directed against Prussia. Dynastically linked to

France by the marriage of the Dauphin to Augustus III’s daughter, Maria Josepha, in February

1747, the Saxons sought to turn Louis XV against his Prussian ally, a policy that was to

succeed eventually in 1756. Frederick II was worried about the possibility of an Austro-

French alliance in September 1747.

There was also speculation about a marriage between

Augustus III’s second son and a daughter of Louis XV in order to improve the chances of the

son being elected next ruler of Poland. Saxon talk of the need for a Catholic alliance helped to

lead to Austro-French discussions in 1748, but Maria Theresa responded to French advances

by making the unacceptable suggestion that Louis abandon Frederick.

The Franco-Prussian alliance was an insuperable barrier to an Austro-French understanding

in 1748 and was to hinder efforts to improve relations made by Count Kaunitz when

Austrian envoy in Paris in 1750–53.

On 21 October 1750, in his first audience with her,

Hautefort was told by Maria Theresa that while she was not thinking of retaking Silesia for

the present, she could not answer for the future.

He was told in 1752 that Prussian

intrigues were having an excessive impact on French policy.

However, by 1753–4 the

alliance was in a weaker state.

The varied discussions and negotiations in the decades prior