Burt A. The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth From the American Revolution
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The Climax
of
British
Imperialism
595
premiers
were
so
divided
on
both
points
that
no
agreement
on
either
was
possible.
The main
positive
achievement
of
the
Conference had to
do
with
the
negotiation
of
treaties.
Fisher
complained
that
Britain
should have
consulted
the
dominions
before she
joined
other
powers,
as
planned
by
the
Hague
Peace
Conference
of
1907,
in
drawing
up
and
promulgating
the
code
of
international
rules
governing
naval warfare known
as the
Declaration
of
London
(1909).
It
mattered little
that
Asquith
brushed
aside
the
complaint,
for the
Declaration
failed
to
get
the ratifications
necessary
to
put
it
in
force;
but
what did
matter
was
that
the discus-
sions
produced
an
agreement
for
the
future.
Thenceforth
the
domin-
ions
were to
be
consulted
in the
preparation
of
instructions
to British
delegates
to
the
Peace
Conferences,
conventions drafted
by
these con-
ferences
were to
be circulated
among
the dominions
before
signature,
and
the
same
procedure
was to
be
followed,
as far
as
possible,
in the
negotiation
of other
international
agreements.
This
reservation
was
inserted
with
the
full
consent of the members of
the Conference.
Botha
said,
"I
want
it
clear.
I
do
not
want to
handicap
the
British
Government.
I
want them
to undertake
the full
responsibility."
As-
quith
asserted
that
his
government
did
not
wish "to shovel
it
off
on
the
dominions."
Fisher
added,
"I do not
wish to
handicap
you
either.
We
want to
be associated
as
far
as
possible."
Laurier would
claim
no
right
to be
consulted
except
when
Canada
was
immediately
concerned.
Turning
to
his Australian
colleague
he
remarked,
"We
may
give
advice
if
our
advice
is
sought,"
and he added
a
thinly
veiled
warning:
"...
if
your
advice
is
sought,
or
if
you
tender
it,
I do
not think
the United
Kingdom
can
undertake
to
carry
out
that
advice
unless
you
are
pre-
pared
to
back
that
advice
with
all
your
strength."
Uncertainty
clouded
the
future constitutional
relations
between
the
autonomous
members
of
the
empire.
The old
antinomy
between
im-
perial
unity
and
colonial
autonomy,
having
been
dispelled
as
an
illusion
in
the field
of
domestic
affairs,
was
now
thrusting
itself
into
the field
of
foreign
affairs;
there
the
dominions
shrank
from
pressing
the
issue
because
they
were
not
mature
enough
to
face
it
squarely.
The
final,
and
in
many
respects
the
finest,
phase
of the
imperial
federation
movement
the
Round
Table
sprang
from
seed sown
by
the
publication,
early
in
1906,
of
an
Englishman's
brilliant
and
pene-
trating
study
of
how
the
American
Union
was
formed,
F.
S.
Oliver's
Alexander
Hamilton.
The
concluding
chapters
drew
from
the rise
of
the
United
States
cogent
lessons
on
how
the
British
Empire
should
be
596
CHAPTER
THIRTY:
united
in a
great
federation.
Almost
immediately
the
seed
developed
a
vigorous
root
in
the soil
of
Milner's
"Kindergarten,"
a
handful
of
extraor-
dinarily
able
and
public-spirited
young
graduates
of
Oxford
Univer-
sity
whom
Milner
had
enlisted
to
help
him
in
the
reconstruction of
shattered
South
Africa.
Their
work
there
being
completed
with the
Union
Act
of
1909,
which
created
the
Union
of
South
Africa whose
constitution
they
largely
drafted,
they
threw themselves
into
the
task
of
reconstructing
the
empire.
This
task
they
approached
with keener
analytical
minds
and
with
shrewder
sense
than
their
predecessors.
They
were
a devoted
brotherhood
devoid
of
personal
ambition. The
prime
mover
was
Lionel
Curtis.
His
principal
lieutenant
was
Philip
Kerr,
later
the
eleventh
Marquis
of
Lothian
and
ambassador
to the
United
States.
Far
from
seeking
to
reverse the
growth
of
colonial
autonomy,
the
common
mistake
of
previous
imperialists,
these
new
federationists
pointed
out
that
the
existing
distribution
of
governmental
powers
gave
too
little
to
the dominions
and too
much to
the United
Kingdom.
The
political
development
of the
former
could
not be
stopped
at the
point
it
had
reached
but
was destined
to
press
on
into the
very
arcana
of
sovereign
power.
As these
great
British
communities
matured,
it was
inconceivable
that
they
would
remain
content
to be
bound
by
the sole
decision
of
the mother
country
on
important
questions
of
foreign
rela-
tions
and
the vital issues of
peace
and
war.
At the same
time,
they
would
be
loath
to
sever
their British
connection,
and
yet
they
would
be
forced
to
do
it if
that
was
the
only
way
to
satisfy
their
appetite
for
sovereignty.
This Round
Table
analysis
of the
imperial
problem
looming
ahead
was
eminently
sound.
It
adumbrated
the British Commonwealth of
Nations.
But
this
solution,
or rather
dissolution,
of
the old dilemma
has
been
only
slowly
evolved
by
an
empirical process
that
defied the
prevailing
concept
of
sovereignty. According
to the
strict
logic
of
sovereignty,
there
was
only
one
solution
of the
dilemma
that had
wrecked
the
first
British
Empire,
had
later
haunted the
minds of those
who
yielded
to
the
colonial
demand for
responsible
government,
and
now
inexorably
called for
a final decision because
time
had
focused it
upon
the
supreme
issue of
government.
This
solution
the Round
Table
leaders
presented
in bold outline.
It
was
that the
mother
country
should
admit
the dominions to
share with
her the
control
of
high policy
for
the whole
empire;
and,
as
a
concomitant,
that
they
should
relieve
her
by assuming
a
corresponding
share of the
responsibility
for
defend-
The
Climax
of
British
Imperialism
597
ing
the
empire.
This
would,
of
course,
impose
an
additional
burden on
them,
but
nothing
like
what
they
would have
to bear
if
they
chose
the
alternative of
complete
independence.
To
achieve
the
federation of
the
empire,
or
rather,
as
they
soon
put
it,
to
transform
the
empire
into
a
genuine
commonwealth,
this little
knot
of
men
who
had
already
accomplished great
things
set to work
in
a
quiet
and
efficient
manner.
Instead of
trying
to
propagate
their
idea
by
launching
a
general
publicity
campaign,
with
its
attendant
disper-
sion of
energy,
they
founded in
1910 a
high-class quarterly
under the
anonymous
editorship
of
Philip
Kerr,
The Round
Table,
which was
devoted to
the
publication
of
anonymous
articles
on
the affairs of
the
empire
and its
various
parts,
"written with
firsthand
knowledge,
and
entirely
free
from
the
bias
of
local
political
issues/'
They
also
organized
in
many
strategic
centers
throughout
the
empire
small
groups
of
intel-
lectuals
who
were
independent
in their
politics
and
could
give
a
definite
lead to
public
opinion.
These
groups
of
highly
selected individuals met
privately
at
more
or
less
regular
intervals
to
wrestle with the
imperial
problem
as
outlined
above and
elaborated
by
Lionel Curtis
in
challeng-
ing
memoranda which
the
Round Table
headquarters
in
London
cir-
culated;
the
reports
of the
group
discussions were
exchanged
through
this
central
office,
thereby
stimulating
more
fruitful
discussion all
round. Thus the movement
expanded
through
the
empire
into
a
co-
operative
study
of
the
imperial
problem
in
all
its
aspects,
and
this
at
a
time when
the
obvious
approach
of world w
r
ar
invested
the
problem
with
a
more
serious
urgency.
When the final crisis
came and
the
empire
plunged
into
the
fiery
ordeal,
this
practical
demonstration
of
imperial unity
far
exceeded
anything
that had
gone
before. Faith
in
the
future of the
empire
had
never burned
so
brightly
as in
the
dark
days
that
followed. The men
of
the
Round Table
eagerly
seized
upon
the idea
that the
great
war
would act as
a
catalyst,
speeding
the
transformation of the
empire
into
their
commonwealth,
and
for
a
while
it seemed
that
perhaps they
were
right.
The war did serve as
a
catalyst,
but what
it hastened was
the
emergence
of
a
very
different
kind of
commonwealth.
The
cause of
imperial
federation
was one of
the more
important
casualties in
that
gigantic
clash of
arms.
CHAPTER
XXXI
The
Formation
of
Two
New
Great
Dominions:
Australia
and
South
Africa
THE
FEDERATION
of
the
six
self-governing
Australian
colonies
and the
union
of
the
four
self-governing
South
African
colonies
in
the
first
decade
of
the
twentieth
century
were
outstanding
events
in
the
growth
of
the
imperial
structure.
Like
the
federation
of
British
North
America
in
the
previous
generation,
these
two
new
consolidations
within
the
empire
were
formed
without
any
conscious
purpose
of
preparing
the
way
for
the
federation
of
the
empire
or
its
transformation
into
the
British
Commonwealth
of
Nations.
No
one
could
then
foresee
that
they
were
paving
the
road
to the
latter,
because
no one
had
yet
any
vision
of
what
that
might
be.
The
other
possibility
was
the
only
one
that
had
been
clearly
set
forth,
but
the colonies
in
each
group
were
simply
pulling
together
that
they might
better
serve
the
interests
they
had
in
common.
The
Australian
story
of
political
unification
is far
from
being
a mere
repetition
of
the Canadian
or
an
anticipation
of
the South
African
story.
It
is
much
simpler
because
the
Australians
were a
homogeneous
stock
and
the
whole
continent
was
theirs.
The federation
of
the Aus-
tralian
colonies
was
favored
by
the
fact
tibat
they
were almost
wholly
peopled
from
the
British
Isles,
but
it
was retarded
rather
than hastened
by
the
fact
that
they
had the
continent
to
themselves.
Long
separated
from
one
another
by great
distances
over
which
there
was no communi-
cation
except
by
a sea
journey,
each
colony
became so
engrossed
in its
own
development
that
it felt
little
concern
for the others or
for its
future
relations
with
them.
The
centrifugal
urge
split
the
old
New
South
Wales
into
four
distinct
colonies,
as
we
have
seen;
and
later
it
threatened
the
integrity
of
Queensland,
which
only
federation seems
to
have
saved
from
partition.
Two \eu-
Great
Dominions:
Australia and
South
Africa
599
Meanwhile
each
colony
levied its
own
customs
duties,
and
inter-
colonial
tariff
barriers
arose.
As
the
colonies
grew
and their trade
increased,
these
barriers
mounted,
becoming quite
formidable
after the
grant
of
responsible
government.
The effect
was
most serious
along
the
Murray
River
where
it
divided
New
South
Wales
from
Victoria
and then
pursued
its
course
into
South
Australia. It was
on
this
bound-
ary
that
expanding
settlement
effected the
first
meeting
of
two Aus-
tralian
colonies.
These
were
the
outstanding
rivals,
by
far the richest
and
most
populous,
and
their
fiscal
policies
were
poles apart.
New
South
Wales,
alone
among
the
Australian
colonies,
clung
to
the
old-
fashioned
doctrine
of
free
trade,
and Victoria
led the others in
seeking
salvation
according
to the
new
gospel
of
protection.
Because
there
was
a
constantly
swelling
volume
of trade
crossing
the
river,
and also mov-
ing
up
and
down
it,
the
collection
of
customs
in
this
region
became an
exasperating
nuisance.
Repeated
intercolonial efforts were
made to
remove
it,
but
they
foundered in
intercolonial
wrangling.
Internal
free
trade
was
impossible
without
uniform
tariffs
against
the
outside
world,
and
the
clash
of
policies
between
Sydney
and
Melbourne
barred
any
such
uniformity.
In
the
building
of
railways,
as
in
the erection
of
tariff walls
but with
more
permanent
results,
the
Australian colonies
reinforced the divi-
sions between
themselves.
Each
colony
was
so anxious to
develop
its
own
hinterland
and to make
this
tributary
to its own
principal
port
that
the
continent was
provided
with
unrelated
transportation
systems.
This
disjointed
design,
together
with
the
generally dry
nature
of
the
country,
soon
limited
construction
and
operation
to state
enterprise,
which in turn
accentuated
the
uneconomic and
separatist
character
of
the
design.
To
make
matters
worse,
the
colonies
adopted
different
gauges,
so
that when
systems
did meet
they
could
not be
joined.
More
than
half
a
century
after
federation,
Australia
still
has
not
got
a
uniform
gauge.
Another
reason
for the
long
continuance of Australian
political
dis-
unity
is that
these
colonies,
sharing
the whole continent
and
growing
up
under the
protection
of British
naval
supremacy,
were
absolutely
immune
from invasion
by
land
or sea. The
powerful
backing
that
the
close
juxtaposition
of the United States had
given
to the idea
of federa-
tion
in
British North
America
had no
parallel
in
Australia. Nor did
Australia,
being overwhelmingly
white,
have to face
anything
compar-
able to the
black
problem
that
inexorably
called for
political
unity
in
South
Africa.
600
CHAPTER
THIRTY-ONE:
What
first
made
many
Australians
think
seriously
that
they
ought
to
have a
common
government
was
the
appearance
of
foreign
shadows
on
their
horizon
during
the
eighties.
The
international
scramble
to
appro-
priate
the islands of
the southwest
Pacific,
which
then
began,
squeezed
growing
Australian
interests
in
these
islands
and
raised
the
ominous
prospect
of
foreign
powers
closing
in
on
Australia.
When
the
British
government repudiated
Queensland's
annexation
of
eastern New
Guinea and allowed
Germany
to
share
it,
Australian
blood
boiled.
The
apparent
betrayal
by
the
mother
country
shocked
Australian
nationalism
into
angry
consciousness.
A
united
Australia
might
have
won
enough
British
support
to forestall
Germany.
The
lesson
was too
obvious
to be
ignored
by
the divided
colonies.
As the
years
passed
and
both
Germany
and
France
strengthened
their
holdings
in
the
island-strewn
sea,
the
anxiety
of
Australians
over
their
exposed
position
provided
the main
impulse
to unite
their
country
under
one
government.
In the
beginning
the
aim
was
wider
an
Australasian
union of
some
kind.
New
Zealand
and
Fiji
felt
the
same
apprehensions
as
the
six
Australian
colonies
and
were
therefore
represented
in
the
intercolonial
convention
that
met
at
the
end
of
1883
to denounce
further
foreign
annexations
in
the
south
Pacific.
The
premier
of
Victoria,
who
called
the
gathering,
pressed
for
a
federation
of
all
eight
colonies,
but
his
government
was
the
only
one
to
support
it.
Thereupon
the
premier
of
Queensland
came
forward
with
a
resolution,
which
was
promptly
adopted,
for
the creation
of
an
Australasian
council
composed
of dele-
gates
from
each
member
government.
From
this
resolution
sprang
the
Federal
Council
of
Australasia,
authorized
by
imperial
legislation
in
1885,
which
sat
every
other
year
until
1899.
At first
there were
hopes
that
it
might
lead
to
federation,
but
it could lead
nowhere.
It had no
revenue,
no
executive
power,
only
a modicum
of
legislative
authority,
and
it
was never
joined
by
New South
Wales
or
New Zealand.
1
It
may
suggest
the
mouse
that the
mountain
in labor
brought
forth. But
this
is
misleading,
as
we
shall
now see.
Intercolonial
cooperation
for
greater
security
took
a
practical
turn
with
the
ad hoc
agreement
of
Queensland,
New South
Wales,
and
Victoria
to
supply
the annual
15,000
required
of
Australia as a condi-
tion for
the
British
establishment
of
a
protectorate
in New
Guinea;
and
this
precedent
was
followed
by
the
larger
commitment undertaken
in
1887,
when
New
Zealand
and
the
Australian
colonies
bound
them-
1
Representatives
of
Fiji appeared
at
only
the first
meeting.
Two
New Great
Dominions:
Australia and
South
Africa
601
selves to
pay
126,000
a
year
toward the
maintenance of a British
naval
squadron
and
to
bear
the
whole cost
of such
local fortifications
as
expert
British
opinion
would
advise.
The
consequent
report,
submitted
in
1889,
on
measures
necessary
to
place
these colonies in a
proper
state
of defense
heightened
their
anxiety
over their
military
weakness.
By
this
time,
also,
the
idea
of an
Australasian
federation was
fading
out.
Two
things
discouraged
it.
One
was the
expanse
of
ocean
twelve
hundred
miles
that
rolled
between Australia and New
Zealand.
The
other was the
difference
between the two lands
and
their
people.
New
Zealand,
however,
participated
in the
first
Australian
drive
for federa-
tion
and
the
preparation
of the
initial draft of
the
Australian
constitution.
This
drive
for
federation
was
precipitated
by
the 1889
report,
which
postulated
unified
control
as
essential
to
Australian defense. Sir
Henry
Parkes,
then
premier
of New
South Wales for
the fifth
time,
had
been
studying
the
movement
of
opinion
toward Australian
unity,
and
the
startling
effect of the
above
report
convinced him
that the
hour
had
come
for
action.
In October
of
that
year
he
delivered
a
speech
that
reverberated
throughout
the
country,
calling
for the creation
of
a
na-
tional
government.
A
few months
later,
in
1890,
a conference
repre-
senting
all the
Australian
colonies and
New
Zealand
met and
passed
a
unanimous
resolution for the
summoning
of
a national convention.
Accordingly
all
the
legislatures
elected
bipartisan
representatives
who
assembled
in
Sydney
early
in 1891 to frame
the desired constitution.
But
before
examining
their work
and its immediate
results,
we
should
note that
influences
other
than the
urgency
of
national
defense
were
already pulling
the
country
together.
Among
these other
influences
was
an old
one intercolonial
migra-
tion.
The
great
gold
rush
began
it,
and
the
collapse
of
that rush
con-
tinued
it.
The
struggle
between
squatters
and selectors
stimulated
it,
and so
did
the
opening
of
the
Queensland
interior
to
pastoral
develop-
ment.
There
was
nothing
like
this intercolonial
movement
of
people
in British
North
America
until
long
after
federation;
though
there
was
a
parallel
in South
Africa,
it
there intensified
the discord between
Boer
and
Briton.
Organized
labor
likewise
contributed
unconsciously
to
Australian
thinking
in terms
of
continental
unity.
Labor
early
tended
to
join
hands
across
colonial
boundaries
in order
to
strengthen
its
position
in
bargaining
with
employers
and
to
get
uniform
laws
touching
its own
immediate
interests.
In
1874
an
intercolonial
conference
of
miners
602
CHAPTER
THIRTY-ONE:
tied
together
their
separate
unions
in
a
national
federation,
the
Amal-
gamated
Miners'
Association.
In
1886
the
Amalgamated
Shearers'
Union
was
formed.
It
was a national
union
of
the
hitherto
unorganized
army
of
migratory
workers on
the
sheep
runs
except
in
Queensland,
which
had its
own Shearers'
Union
and
it
soon
became the
largest,
the
strongest,
and
the
most
typical
of
all
Australian unions.
From
1879,
also,
there
were
frequent
intercolonial
congresses
of
trade
unions.
Labor
thus blazed
the
trail for
governments,
which met
from
time
to
time in
intercolonial
conferences
to
deal
with
such
common
interests
as
navigation
aids,
mail
services,
cables,
alien
immigration,
and
defense. The
intercolonial
labor
congresses
were
chiefly
concerned
with
securing
uniform
legislation
on
such
things
as
the
eight-hour
day,
the
legal
status of
unions,
the
protection
of their
funds,
safety
regula-
tions
for
employees
in mines
and
factories,
and the
exclusion
of
Chinese.
In
pressing
for
this last
object,
labor
espoused
a
lively
national
inter-
est.
Chinese
immigration
had
been an
Australian
nightmare
ever
since
the
lure
of
gold
began
it
in the
early
fifties. Almost
at
once there
was
a
vigorous agitation
to
stop
it;
within a
few
years
several
colonies
enacted
severe
laws
against
it,
incidentally
embarrassing
Britain in
her
dealings
with
China.
But
there
were
already
several
thousand
Orientals in
the
country,
and
others
filtered in
because
other
Australian
colonies
adopted
milder measures
to
keep
them
out.
Western
Australia,
for
example,
was
tempted by
the
idea
of
speeding
its
slow
development
by
using
cheap
yellow
labor. There
were doubts
also
in
South
Australia;
and
Queensland,
where
there were
many
Kanakas,
showed
signs
of
wavering
on the
exclusion of
Asiatics.
Unless
all the
bars
were
put
up
and
kept
up,
Australia
might
in time
be
overrun
by
Chinese;
for
their
number was
legion,
they
were
spreading
out
like a
flood in
southeastern
Asia,
they
could thrive
wherever
white men
could
and in
places
where
white
men
could
not.
So
strong
was the
anti-Oriental
agitation
that
in
1888
the
premier
of
New
South
Wales
called
an
intercolonial
con-
ference to
discuss
what
could be
done
to
check
the
yellow
danger.
AU
that
the
conference
accomplished
was
to
reveal
more
clearly
than
ever
that,
much as
the
majority
of the
people
were
determined
to
have
a
con-
certed and
effective White
Australia
policy,
they
could
not
get
it
from six
uncoordinated
governments.
But
as
this
alarming
fact
struck
home,
it
made
Australians
realize
that
they
must
have a
national
government
for the
sake of
a
White
Australia.
Thus
racial
exposure
ranks
with
mili-
tary exposure
as
a
major
cause
of
Australian
federation.
When
the
first
Two
Xeir
Great
Dominions:
Australia and
South
Africa
603
national
parliament
met in
1901,
it
promptly
enacted a
stiff law*
against
nomvhite
immigration
and
initiated
the
repatriation
of
the
Kanakas.
The 1891
draft of
the
Australian
constitution,
which
emerged
from
the
convention
in
Sydney,
was
based
largely
on
a
comparative
study
of
the two most
apposite
examples,
those of
the United States
and
Canada
a
study
that was
greatly
facilitated
by
the recent
publication
of
Bryce's
famous
classic,
The
American Commonwealth.
Like
the
Canadians
of a
generation
before,
the
Australians
were so
convinced
of
the
superiority
of
their
British
cabinet
system,
with its
fusion
of
powers,
that
they
would not
consider
adopting
the
opposite
American
principle
for their
projected
federal
government;
and this of
course
entailed the same
provision
for the office
of
governor
general. They
also
followed Canadian
precedent
by
providing
that
the federal
government
should
pay
annual
subsidies
to the
states
in return for the
latter's
surrender
of the
right
to
collect customs duties.
Otherwise
the
Australian
plan
was on the
American
side
of
the
Canadian
balance between the British
and
American constitutions.
None of
the
delegates
in
Sydney
sought,
as
Macdonald had
done in
Quebec,
to
set
up
a
unitary
government.
All took for
granted
that it
would be
a
federal
one. Nor was there
any
copying
of the
Canadian
deviations from
strict federalism. The residual
powers
were to
remain
with the
states,
and
their
legislation
was
not to
be
subject
to
federal
veto.
The central
government
was not to
appoint
state
governors
or
judges
of state courts.
There was
to
be
equal
representation
of states
in
the
senate.
The Australians
w
r
ere more considerate of states'
rights
because
they
had
to
be.
Australian
federation was
nothing
so
impera-
tive as
the
Canadian
had been.
When
the
draft
of 1891
was
submitted
to
the several
colonies
for
their
approval,
the drive for federation became
bogged
down for some
years.
It was
then
that
New Zealand
dropped
out. In Australia
the
leading
colony
balked
and
the others hesitated.
The trouble
was the
projected
surrender
of
governmental
power
to
a
central
authority
states'
rights.
The
strongest
objections
arose in New South Wales be-
cause
it was
the
wealthiest
and most
populous
Australian
colony,
and
because
it
was the
only
one
that
had a free
trade
policy
and
a
labor
party
in
its
legislature.
Federation
would enclose
the whole
country
within
a
protective
tariff;
and the
rotund leader of
the
free
traders,
who
rejoiced
in
the
nickname
of
"Georgie
Porgy"
even
when he
later
became
Sir
George
Reid,
compared
New
South
Wales to
a teetotaler
facing
the
prospect
of
keeping
house
with
five drunkards.
The
Labor
Part)*,
which
604
CHAPTER
THIRTY-ONE:
was
divided on
the
question
of
fiscal
policy,
resented
the
intrusion
of
the
federal
issue
as
likely
to
interfere
with
the
enactment
of
social
reform.
What
pulled
the federation
movement
out of the
morass
and
started
it
going again,
this time
to a successful
conclusion,
was the
develop-
ment of a severe
economic
depression.
It
set
men
to
thinking
how
much
better off
they
would
be if
the
country
were
united
and
there
were no
internal tariff barriers
to
strangle
trade.
Federation
at
last
began
to
have
a
widespread popular
appeal.
Local
federation
leagues
were
formed
throughout
Australia,
and central
leagues
in the
capital
cities.
They
adopted
a
new
plan
of action
calculated
to
tie the
hands
of
bungling politicians
while
getting
the
fullest
cooperation
of
the
various
legislatures.
An
enabling
act
was
prepared
for them
to
pass,
and
it
was so drawn
that once it became
law
each
step
in the
process
of
constitution-making
would follow
automatically
until the
finished
product
was
presented
to
the
people,
not
the
legislatures,
for
acceptance
or
rejection.
The electorate would choose
representatives
to
a new
con-
stitutional
convention;
this would
draft
a constitution
and
adjourn
to
let
the
legislatures
examine its
handiwork
and
propose
amendments
for
consideration
by
the
convention;
it would
reassemble
and
prepare
a
final
draft,
which
would
be submitted to
a referendum
in
each
colony.
If
the
electorate
in
three or
more colonies
approved,
the home
govern-
ment
would be asked
to have
parliament
enact it.
Bowing
to
popular
pressure,
New South Wales
passed
the
Enabling
Act
at
the
end of
1895,
and
shortly
thereafter
Victoria,
South
Aus-
tralia,
and Tasmania did
the
same.
Some months later
Western
Australia fell
partly
into line
by
providing
for
the
selection of
its
repre-
sentatives
by
the
legislature
but reserved
the
right
to hold
a
referen-
dum.
After
waiting
a
while for
Queensland,
which
was
distracted
by
an internal
struggle
over whether
it
should
remain a
political entity
or
be
split up,
the
other
five colonies decided
to
go
ahead
without
their
sister.
The
constitutional
convention,
which met at
Adelaide
in March
1897,
comprised
the
leading public
men of
the
participating
colonies.
After
a
month's
deliberation,
they produced
a
document
that
was sub-
stantially
the same
as
the
draft of 1891.
Then
the
legislatures
got busy
and
turned out
a
sheaf of
suggestions,
which were
presented
to
the
convention
in
September.
After three
weeks
of
inconclusive
debate,
there
was
an
adjournment
occasioned
by
a
general
election in
Victoria.
The
convention
renewed
its
task of
revision
at
Melbourne
in
January