Burt A. The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth From the American Revolution
Подождите немного. Документ загружается.
Dominion Nationalism
635
though
the
exercise of
this
prerogative
was
sanctioned
by
the
British
North America
Act and
was continued
by
governors
in other
parts
of
the
empire
enjoying responsible government.
The
British
North
America
Act
also
recognized
the
discretionary right
of
the
governor
general
to
reserve
bills
for
the home
government
to decide
whether
they
should receive the
royal
assent or
not;
and
his instructions
re-
quired
him
to reserve all
bills
touching
certain
specified
subjects
such
as
divorce,
legal
tender,
differential
duties,
the
discipline
of
British
forces,
the
rights
of
nonresidents,
and
British
shipping.
But
the
only
reserved
bill
from which the
Colonial Office
withheld
the
royal
assent
was
one that
was
passed
in
1867,
and
Ottawa
persuaded
London
to
abandon
mandatory
reservation when
new instructions
were
issued
in 1878.
On
the
eve
of his
retirement
in 1872
the second
governor
general
inadvertently
assented to
a
bill
that
he
should
have
reserved
because
it
imposed discriminatory
duties.
This embarrassed
the colonial
secretary,
who was then
resisting pressure
from the Australian
colonies
for
the
right
to
enact
such
duties.
He
yielded
to
their demand
1
rather
than risk Canadian
displeasure
by disallowing
the
Canadian
act,
though
he
disallowed
another Canadian act of
1 872. But
the latter was
a
partisan
measure
of doubtful
legality
which
the
new
governor
general
had declined
to veto or reserve lest
he
expose
himself
to the
charge
of
interfering
in
the
game
of
Canadian
politics.
This
charge
was leveled
at the
imperial
government
when the news reached Canada
that the
act was disallowed. There
is no other
example
of
imperial
disallowance
of
legislation
passed
by
the dominion.
The
royal
prerogative
of
mercy,
exercised
in
Britain
solely
on
the
advice of
the
cabinet,
was not so controlled
in
Canada. There the
governor
general
had
to
consult the cabinet and
then make his
own
independent
decision. To this too
the
Canadian
government
objected,
with the result
that the new instructions of 1878 limited
the
guberna-
torial
discretion
to
cases
involving
imperial
interests,
which in
practice
meant
that
thenceforth
the
control was
entirely
in the
hands
of the
Canadian
cabinet.
At
the
first
Colonial Conference
in
1887,
a New
Zealand
proposal
to
extend the Canadian
system
to the
other
colonies
failed
to
carry, having
attracted little
support
except
from the
Canadian
delegation.
In
the
conferring
of
titles
and lesser
honors,
the
role of the
governor
general
is obscure
for
the
simple
reason that he
did not
bestow
them.
1
In
the Australian Customs
Duties
Act of
1873.
636
CHAPTER
THIRTY-TWO:
That
royal
function
had
not been
delegated
and was
performed
on
the
advice
of
the
British
cabinet. But
the
governor
general
on
his
own
authority
made
recommendations
to
the colonial
secretary,
and
these
recommendations were
generally though
not
invariably
followed.
In
the
seventies the
Canadian
prime
minister
claimed
die
right
to
be
consulted
beforehand,
and
the
governor general
supported
his
conten-
tion.
The
argument
was
that
Canada
with a
population
of
four
million
was
not
an
ordinary
colony,
that
English
officials
were not
sufficiently
familiar with
the
Canadian
scene to make
fair
awards,
that the
Canadian
people
held their
prime
minister more
or less
responsible
for
the
granting
of
honors
to
Canadians,
and that
an unsuitable
choice
might
damage
his
political position.
The
colonial
secretary rejected
the
claim. He
professed
a
fear that honors
would
become
prizes
at the
dis-
posal
of
the
party
in
power,
a condition not unknown
in
England;
he
suggested
that
the
size
of
the Canadian
population
had
no
bearing
on
the
point;
and
he
implied
that the
concession could not
be made
to
Canada because then
it
would be claimed
by
the Australian
colonies.
Nevertheless,
the
Colonial
Office
paid
more
attention to the
desires
of
the
Canadian
prime
minister.
In
1902
Laurier
proposed
that
titles
should be
granted
to Canadians
only
on the
advice
of the
Canadian
government,
and Chamberlain
agreed
in
so far as
they
were
to
be
rewards
for
Canadian services. For
imperial
services
rendered
by
Canadians,
he
said,
the
governor
general
should
nominate the
recipi-
ents
after
submitting
their
names to the
Canadian
government.
The
governor
general
being
the
representative
of the
British
govern-
ment
as
well as of
the
Crown,
the Canadian
government
early
felt the
need to
balance the
political
function of
this
imperial
official
by
establishing
in
London a Canadian
official of
ministerial
rank,
which
none of
the
historic colonial
agents
had
ever
possessed.
Accordingly,
in
1879,
the
dominion
parliament
created the office
of
Canadian
high
commissioner,
but not
without
some demur on the
part
of
Downing
Street. The
opening
of
this
independent
channel
of
official
communica-
tion
with
the
British
government
more than two
decades
before
the
next dominion
was
formed,
and
could follow
suit,
may
help
to
explain
why
Canada
was
not the
pioneer
in
one
particular
of the
evolution
of
the
gubernatorial
office the
selection of the
man
to
fill it.
Until
1888
it
was taken
for
granted
that the
colonial
secretary
should
pick
governors
without
consulting
the
governments
over
which
they
were to
preside.
Then
Queensland
raised
die
issue
of
these
govern-
ments'
right
to have
some
say
in
the
choice,
and
the
colonial
secretary
Dominion
Nationalism
637
issued
a
circular
dispatch
to
the
self-governing
colonies
requesting
their
opinions
on
whether
they
should
be
consulted beforehand.
Most
of
the
Australian
colonies
declared for
it,
but
Canada
did not.
The
Canadian
government
preferred
the
existing
procedure
because
the
proposed
change
might betray
the
governor
general
into
favoring
one
party
over
the
other
and
might
eventually
lead
even
to his
election.
The
Colonial
Office
concluded
the
correspondence
on the
question
by
formally up-
holding
the
principle
that
governors
owed their
appointments
to the
Crown
alone
as
a
guarantee
of
political
impartiality
in the
performance
of
their
duties;
but it
thenceforth
informally
consulted the Australian
colonies
that had
objected
to the
old
system,
and the
new
practice
gradually
became
more
general.
Another
significant
step
in
the
development
of
dominion status came
as a
result of
friction
between
the Ottawa
cabinet
and
the
commander
in
chief
of
the
militia
forces
in
the dominion.
Following
the with-
drawal
of the
British
troops
in
1871,
the
governor
general
persuaded
the
Canadian
government
to
get
a
major
general
from Britain
to
occupy
this
post.
He
and his
successors,
of
similar
background,
filled it
accept-
ably
until
shortly
before the
Boer
War,
when the
incumbent of
the
day
thought
it
his
duty
to
teach
the
Canadian
people
their
military
duty
to
the
empire.
Laurier
had him
removed
in
1900.
His
second
successor
was even
more
dictatorial.
Thereupon,
in
1904,
he
too was
dismissed
and the
dominion
parliament
passed
a
new
Militia
Act
providing
for
the
appointment
of a
Canadian
commander
in
chief
and
finally
dispos-
ing
of
the
idea,
which
had
recently
been
mooted,
that the
imperial
government
had
the
right
to call
out and
use
the
Canadian
militia.
Dominion
participation
in
the conduct
of
foreign
affairs
began,
as
we have
seen,
in
1871;
and it is
worthy
of note that
the
appointment
of
a
Canadian
as one
of
the five
British
commissioners
who
negotiated
the
Treaty
of
Washington
was
conceded
by
London without
any request
for
it from
Ottawa.
But North
American
circumstances
dictated
it;
and if
the British
government
was
beforehand in
proposing
this
radical
innovation
in
diplomatic practice,
Macdonald and his
cabinet
were not
behindhand
in
insisting
that
until the
dominion
parliament
ratified
the
treaty
it
would
not bind
Canada.
Three
years
later,
when
the British
ambassador
was the
sleeping
partner
of
the Canadian who
negotiated
an
abortive
reciprocity
treaty
with the
United
States,
the
propriety
of
this
procedure
was
accepted
without
question
in
the
mother
country
and
the
dominion.
The
prece-
dent
thus
established
in
1874,
which
was
the
direct
result of the
close
638
CHAPTER
THIRTY-TWO:
juxtaposition
of
Canada
and
the
United
States,
governed
the
subse-
quent
Canadian
negotiation
of
commercial
treaties
with
European
countries,
of
which
there
were
several
in
the
remaining
years
of
the
century.
Technically
the Crown
was
acting
on
the
advice
of
the British
government,
which,
having
no
interest
in
these
particular
transactions
other
than to
satisfy
Canada,
adopted
as
its
own
the
advice
of
the
Canadian
government.
The
diplomatic
unity
of
the
empire
was
pre-
served
in
theory.
But
how
far
was
it
still
a
fact?
That
Canada
had
the
power
to
make
treaties
with
foreign
countries
was
asserted
in
a
public
address
that
the
governor
general,
the
Marquis
of
Lome
the
son-in-law
of
Queen
Victoria
delivered
in
1883.
Apparently
he
was
assuming
that
the
imperial
government's
adoption
of
the dominion
government's
advice
had
already
withered
to
a
mere
formality
like
the
royal
assent
to
parliamentary
legislation.
His
words
tickled
Canadian
pride,
which
aspired
to
the
possession
of
this
power;
and
they
nettled
the Colonial
Office,
which saw
in
them
a
false
doctrine
that
would
disrupt
the
empire.
The
permanent
undersecretary
con-
demned
Lome's
statement
as
"a considerable
mistake
.
. . and
a
gratui-
tous
one,"
but
he
could
not
make
up
his
mind
on
what to
do about it.
He
was
inclined
to overlook
it
in view
of
the
fact
that Lome
was
completing
a
very
successful
term of
office
in Canada.
What made the
undersecretary
hesitate
was
the
possibility
that
official
silence
would
be
interpreted
as official
sanction.
The
secretary
of state
decided to
run
this risk
rather
than
face another.
"Lord
L. has
certainly
made
a
mis-
take,"
he
remarked,
"but
I
am afraid
that
we shall
only
make
matters
worse
if
we call
attention
to
it."
So
the issue
was
allowed to
sleep
until
it
was
awakened
by
developments during
the First World
War.
Meanwhile Canada
negotiated
and
Britain
signed
a
treaty
with the
United
States
that
provided
for
the
joint regulation
of certain Cana-
dian-American
problems
without
even
the formal
participation
of
the
British
government.
This
Boundary
Waters
Treaty
of
1909
laid down
a new code
of
international law
to
govern
the waters
through
which
the
international
boundary
ran for more than half
of
its four thousand
miles.
To administer
this
code,
it
set
up
a
permanent
body
that
is
really
an
international
court,
the
Joint
International
Commission,
composed
of
six
members,
three Canadian
and three
American;
in
addition,
the
treaty
empowered
the
Commission to
investigate any "question
or mat-
ter of
difference"
submitted
by
the
two
neighboring governments
"in-
volving
the
rights,
obligations
or interests of
either in
relation to
the
other or
to the
inhabitants
of
the
other,
along
the
common frontier."
Dominion
Nationalism
639
The
Commission
has
contributed
to
good
relations between
the
two
close
neighbors
much
more than
the
public
in
either of
them
has
realized.
But
here
the
significant
point
to note is an
anticipation
of
future
constitutional
development,
for
the
treaty stipulated
that
the
Canadian
members
of the
Commission were to
be
appointed
by
the
king
on
the
advice of
the
Canadian
government.
Australian
nationalism
was a
plant
of
different
growth
from Cana-
dian
nationalism.
It was
simpler,
more
natural,
less
forced,
and
not
subject
to
violent
reverses,
largely
because Australia was
peopled
almost
wholly
from
the
British
Isles
whereas
Canada
was
peopled
also from
France
and
the
United
States.
Demographic diversity
in
Canada
re-
quired
an
exercise
of will
to form a
nation
in
order to
give
life
and
strength
to the
newly
created
dominion,
and
from
time to
time
the
French-English
schism
disrupted
national
unity.
These
experiences
had
no
parallel
in
Australia. There
the
people
gradually
discovered
that
they
were a
nation,
and then
they
set
up
a
federal
government
to meet
its
needs.
For
generations
the
people
of
Australia had been
British,
and
they
were
proud
of
it.
Indeed,
there is
much truth
in
their later boast that
they
were
more
British
than
the
population
of
the
mother
country.
They
were
not a
loose
cross
section of
that
society
which
contained a
larger
percentage
of
foreigners,
was
marked
by
class
divisions,
and was
split
by
ancient
national
distinctions
between
England,
Wales,
Scotland,
and
Ireland. The
Australians
were
a
pretty
solid
segment
of the
work-
ing
class
in
the
old
land,
and
in
their new
country
they
soon became
fused into one
racial stock.
They
were
more
homogeneous
than
the
inhabitants of the
British Isles
or of
any
other
British
country
except
New
Zealand. Therefore it
is not
surprising
that
they
were
a
nation
before
they
knew
it.
The national
consciousness
of
Australians
was
rooted in
iheir
class
origin.
Though
intensely
British
in
spirit,
they
heartily
disliked
many
features
of
the
society
that
they
had
left
behind,
and
they
were
deter-
mined to
improve
upon
it
when
they
settled
down
after
the
hurly-burly
of
the
gold
rush. This determination
and what
it
achieved
gave
them
a
sense of
being
differentiated
from,
and
superior
to,
the
people
in
the
homeland.
Here it will
be
recalled
that
they
were
strongly
imbued
with
Chartism,
which
had
vainly
demanded the
democratization
of
the
state
not
as an end in
itself but
as
a
means of
attaining
social
justice;
that
accordingly
they
wrested
political power
from
the
squatter
aristoc-
racy
and
established
a
real
political
democracy;
that with
this
instru-
640
CHAPTER
THIRTY-TWO:
ment
they
first strove
to
build
a
rural
egalitarian
society
such as
existed
in North
America;
that
they
failed
in
this
because
physical
nature
was
against
them;
and
that
they
then
succeeded
in
building
an urban social
democracy.
Their
growing
pride
in this
growing
accomplishment
was a
fundamental
factor
in their
increasing
awareness
of
being
a nation.
This
national
pride
was
much
enhanced
by
two
other
factors that
were
not
present
in Canada.
The
Australians
had
a whole continent to
themselves,
and
they
were
separated
by
half
a world
from
the
land
whence
they
had
come
and
from
all
other
countries
of
western civiliza-
tion
except
the
much
smaller
New
Zealand.
Canadian
pride
had to be
content
with
half
a
continent,
the
much
less
populous
half;
and
Cana-
dians
gave
much
less
thought
than
Australians
to
the
contrast,
though
it was
equally
striking,
between
their
society
and
that of
Britain.
They
gave
less
thought
to
it for
the
simple
reason
that
their own
society,
in
addition
to
being
more
molded
by
natural
conditions,
was
over-
shadowed
by
a
very
much
larger
society
of
the same
type
in the
United
States.
Moreover,
Canadians
were
much less
interested
than Aus-
tralians
in
experimenting
with
governmental
action to
shape
their
social
structure
because,
as
we have
seen,
the
bounteous
North Ameri-
can
environment
made
immigrants
from
Britain
shed
their
Chartism
right
away.
The
self-glorification
that is
inherent
in
nationalism could
not
be
so
pronounced
in
Canada
as in
Australia.
Thanks
also to
the
exclusive
possession
of
the
continent
and
to
its
geographical
remoteness
from
the
rest of
the western
world,
the
growth
of
Australian
nationalism
was
well
started
and
was
developing
its
own
imperialist
ambitions
before
it
received
any
stimulus
from
a
foreign
power.
Then
the
New
Guinea
episode
produced
an
angry
nationalist
reaction
against
the
mother
country
for
allowing
German
imperialism
to
thwart
what
was
really
Australian
imperialism.
Hosts of Australians
shared
the dream
of
the
Queensland
premier
who ordered
the
abortive
annexation
of
New
Guinea
"a
united
Australia
ruling
the
south seas."
And
from
London's
repudiation
of
his
bold
action
may
be traced the
rise
of
an
Australian
desire
to become
an
independent
British
power.
This
ideal
played
a
not
inconsiderable
part
in the
achievement of
Australian
federation,
which
quickened
the
development
of Australian
nationalism.
Meanwhile
participation
in
the Boer
War,
which
pulled
Canada
apart,
was
in Australia
a unanimous
expression
of enthusiasm
for the
imperial
cause.
But
this,
though
reflecting
the
immaturity
of
Aus-
tralian
nationalism,
had
the
effect of
strengthening
rather
than
weak-
Dominion
Nationalism
641
ening
it,
for
Australians
were
justly proud
of what
they
did
in South
Africa.
If
Australians were
uncritical
of British
policy
in the
Boer
War,
they
made
up
for
it
shortly
afterward,
when
they openly
and
bit-
terly
denounced the
mother
country
for
perverting
the
victory
by
introducing
Chinese
coolies into
the South
African
mines.
Here
we
touch
upon
the
most
deep-seated
and
explosive
element
in Australian
nationalism.
The
anti-Asiatic
feeling
of Australians
was
a veritable
phobia
which
had
been
growing
ever since white
diggers
clashed
with Chinese
on
the
gold
fields
in
the
late
fifties. The
subsequent
rise
of
the
popular
demand
for
laws
that
would
shut Chinese out of
the
country
was
perhaps
the
first
stirring
of
Australian
national
consciousness,
and
as the
drive
for
the
exclusion
of Asiatics
gathered
momentum
it stood out
as
the main
force behind
the
development
of
Australian nationalism.
It
was
not
until
Australians
were
exasperated
by
the
inadequacy
of
state
legisla-
tion
against
the admission of
Asiatics
that
they
were
finally
converted
to
federation
as
the
only way
to
get
a
law
that
would
forever
guarantee
a
White Australia.
This,
significantly
enough,
was
the
first
thing they
demanded
and
procured
from
their first
parliament.
Everything
that
they
held
most
dear,
from their
advanced
social
democracy
to
their
racial
integrity,
impelled
them to
insist on
a
White
Australia;
for
they
were
obsessed
by
the fear that sooner
or later
they
might
be over-
whelmed
in
their more than
half
empty
continent
by
swarms
of
Orientals.
Some
outsiders
may
think this fear
excessive,
and
even
morbid;
some
may
criticize
the
Australian
people
for
playing dog
in the
manger
on a
gigantic
scale;
some
may
charge
them
with
fanatical race
prejudice
and
arrogance.
Indeed,
among
Australians
themselves the issue
roused
such
passion
that
they
commonly
indulged
in all
manner
of
ignorant
statements,
extravagant language,
and
wild
arguments
to
push
the
cause of
absolute
exclusion.
Many
of
them,
in the heat
of
discussion,
took
generous
liberties
with God's
will and
the
laws
of science.
But
the more
responsible
leaders had
the
intelligence,
the
honesty,
and
the
courage
to
keep
their
argument
down
on
the solid
ground
of
practical
necessity
the
nation's
self-preservation.
Alfred
Deakin,
who
was
soon
to be
prime
minister,
did it
finely
on the
morrow of
federation,
when
Japanese
infiltration had become
a
serious
worry.
"I
contend,"
he
said,
"that
the
Japanese
need
to
be
excluded
because of
their
high
abilities.
I
quite agree
. .
.
that the
Japanese
are
the
most
dangerous
because
they
most
nearly
approach
us,
and would
therefore
642
CHAPTER
THIRTY-TWO:
be the most
formidable
competitors."
But
more
important
than this
consideration
was another.
"The
unity
of
Australia
is
nothing,
if it
does not
imply
a
united
race."
"A
united
race
means
not
only
that its
members
can
intermarry
and
associate
without
degradation
on either
side,
but
implies
...
a
people
possessing
the
same
general
cast
of
character,
tone
of
thought,
the same
constitutional
training
and tradi-
tions." He and
his fellows
were
no
less
determined
than
the rank
and
file to
plug
all
the
holes left
by
state
legislation;
and
in
this
the
instinct
of the
masses
was
as sound
as that
of
their
leaders,
who
would
purge
the
land
and
keep
it
pure
of
the
exploitation
of
colored
people
by
whites
and all the
many
demoralizing
influences
of
such
exploitation.
It
might
be
supposed
that this
dominant
phase
of
Australian
nation-
alism
would
impose
a
heavy
strain on
imperial
relations.
It made
soft-
headed
humanitarians
in
Britain
cry
for
their
government's
interven-
tion
to check
the Australian
enactment
of
racial
discrimination.
It
embarrassed
Britain
in more
than
her
dealings
with
China,
for
it
wounded
the
pride
of
India,
and
it
inspired
Australia
to
speak
sharply
to the mother
country
on
the
subject
of Chinese
coolies
in
South
Africa.
But the South
African incident
soon blew
over,
and on
no occasion
did
the
British
government
oppose
the White
Australia
policy.
The
only
criticism
that official
London
offered
was
a
suggestion
that
the
policy
could
be
implemented
just
as
effectively
by legislation
that did
not bar
Asiatics
on
the
ground
of
race. Chamberlain
advanced
this at
the
Colonial
Conference
of
1897. He recommended
the device
that
Natal
had
adopted
an
educational
test to avoid
giving
unnecessary
offense
to
the
people
of
Asia. With
good
grace
the
first
federal
government
followed
suit in
drafting
the bill on
which Australian
hearts
were
set.
Some
crackpots
damned the measure as
"hypocritical"
and
"dishonest,"
but
the
responsible
leaders
would allow
only
one
change
in
the
pro-
posed
test
As
originally
framed it would have
offended
European
nations
by
requiring
a
reading knowledge
of
English,
and
this was
amended
by
the
substitution of
any prescribed
European
language,
which
evoked
a
Japanese protest.
Japan's objections
were
not removed
until
after
the
conclusion of the
Anglo-Japanese
alliance,
when an
amendment
of 1905
dropped
the
requirement
of
a
European
language
and
called for
a test
in
"any
prescribed
language."
This
refinement
of
the
law,
which
made
it
literally
innocent
of
any
offense to
any
race,
left
the law as effective as
ever,
for
those
who
administered it
always
picked
from
the
world's
babel
of
tongues
a
language
that
the
unwanted
applicant
for admission
could not
read.
Dominion
Nationalism
643
Australian
nationalism
expressed
itself
also
in
military
policy.
Fol-
lowing
Canadian
precedent,
the federal
government
in
1901
got
a
British
general
to
organize
and command
the
military
forces
of the
country,
and
the
officer selected
was
none
other
than
the
one
who
had
been
removed from
Canada in the
previous
year.
Apparently
his
North
American
experience
had made him more
discreet,
but
he
was
the
same
efficient
soldier and
again
he encountered
baffling
obstruction.
By
an
interesting
coincidence,
Australia took
substantially
the
same
action
as
Canada
to assert
its
government's
control
over
its
own
military
policy
and administration.
But the Australian
policy
was
not to
be
that
of
Canada,
for
the
two
countries
were
very
differently
situated.
The
senior
dominion
could
see no
possibility
of
a
hostile invasion
except
by
the
colossus
next
door
and little
sense
in
preparing
to
meet
that,
whereas the
other
dominion
had
several
potential
enemies
to
fear
and
could
hope,
with
reasonable
precautions,
to
repel
the
landing
of
any
force
that
might
slip
through
the
British naval screen.
Therefore
the
Australians,
unlike
the Cana-
dians,
were
seriously
interested
in
the
development
of
their
military
strength.
After
looking
around for
a
suitable
democratic
model,
they
copied
the
Swiss
system
of
compulsory
military
training
in
peacetime,
which
gave
them
a
national citizens'
army
four
years
before
the
out-
break
of
the First World
War.
Naval defense
likewise
meant
much
more
to
seagirt
Australia
than
to Canada
with its
long
and
indefensible
land
frontier;
and
this
differ-
ence
of
conscious
interest
was accentuated
by
the
imperial
govern-
ment's
reluctance
to
further
Australian
imperial
ambitions,
which
could
have
no
counterpart
in Canada.
The motive
behind
Australian
contributions
to
the
Royal
Navy
\vas
more national
than
imperial
to
make
sure
that
a British
squadron
would
remain
in
Australian
waters
and
twenty years
after
these
payments
began,
the
newly
formed
Com-
monwealth
of
Australia
served
notice
that
it would
substitute
a
navy
of
its
own,
thereby
giving
a more
distinct
expression
to
the
national
motive.
Australia
was
thus
much
better
prepared
than
Canada
to
face
the
dreadnought
scare
of
two
years
later,
and
the
younger
dominion
then
plunged
ahead
with
the construction
of
a
national
navy
while
the
elder
dominion
floundered
and
did
nothing.
In
this
respect
Aus-
tralian
nationalism
was
then
demonstrably
more
mature than Canadian
nationalism.
New
Zealand
was
much
less
nationalist,
so
much so
that it
looked
with
pained
disapproval
upon
the
nationalism
of the other
dominions.
644 CHAPTER
THIRTY-TWO:
Though
it
developed
its
own
individuality,
and
was
quite
conscious
of
this,
New
Zealand
was the
one
British
dominion
that
was
anxious
to see
a
constitutional
reintegration
of
the
empire.
New
Zealand
pulled
away
from
federation
with Australia
in
the
belief that
the
only
proper
federa-
tion was
with the mother
country,
and
in later
years
it
viewed
with
sad
regret
the transformation
of
the
empire
into
the
commonwealth.
The
elevation of
the
daughter
nations,
including
itself,
to
a
position
of
constitutional
parity
with
the
parent
state
might
cause the
other
daughters
to
rejoice,
but
not this
one,
for
in
the words
of
an
outstanding
New
Zealand
scholar,
it
had
a real
mother
complex.
2
The
contrast
is
striking, particularly
with
Australia,
and
may
seem
surprising.
New Zealand
was even more British
than
Australia
in
the
composition
of its
population,
and was no less
proud
of it.
New
Zea-
land
was
an
even more remote British
and white
outpost.
It
too
developed
an advanced
social
democracy,
of which
it
could
boast,
and
it
likewise
legislated
against
colored
immigration.
It
too
blamed
Britain
for
allowing
other
powers
to
establish
themselves in
the
South
Seas,
and it
adopted
universal
military
training
at
the
same
time
as
its
neighbor.
Moreover,
it
attained
political
unity
long
before
Australia
and had its
own
peculiar
traditions of
conflict
with
the
Colonial
Office,
such conflict
having
marked the
whole
Wakefield
period
and
darkened
the
period
of the
Maori
wars.
One
might
expect
that
all
these
condi-
tions
would create a
national
consciousness
comparable
to
that
of
Australia.
Why
were
New
Zealanders
so
lacking
in
national
maturity,
or,
to
put
the
question
in
another
way,
why
did
they
not
catch
the
current
fever
of
nationalism?
A
clew
may
be
found in
the
character
of
New
Zealand
society,
which
was
quite
distinct from
that
of
Australia.
It
was
more akin
to
that
of
the
mother
country,
more,
indeed,
than
any
other
in
the
world.
"More
English
than
England"
is
a
phrase
that
many
observers
have
applied
to
New
Zealand.
This
use
of
the
adjective
"English"
is
of
course
the
careless
and
common
one
which
irritates
Scots
anywhere
and not
least
in
New
Zealand,
where
they
form
an
important
25
per
cent
of
the
population.
Passing by
this
innocent
inaccuracy,
and
accepting
the
meaning
of
the
phrase
as
it
was
intended,
we
should
note
that
it
sums
up
a
deep-rooted
tradition.
The
founders
of
New
Zealand
sought
to
transplant
a
representative
section
of
British
society,
not
just
a
working
class
segment
of
it;
they
selected
the
colonists
2
J.
B.
Condliffe,
New
Zealand
in
the
Making
(Chicago,
1930),
p.
431.