Cornwall M. The Undermining of Austria-Hungary: The Battle for Hearts and Minds

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274 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

political and academic connections and came to head the `propaganda and

political' section of the FAst, responsible for producing FA propaganda. Another

key individual was Roderich Gooû, a Hungarian citizen and former employee in

the State Archives who would take charge of the FAst's `historical-constitu-

tional' section, dealing especially with FA content and keeping Waldsta

tten

aware of Hungarian sensitivities. As a whole the FAst was to be directly subject

to Arz (with Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau as the liaison), had the Operations

and Intelligence sections of the AOK at its disposal, and would cooperate

closely with the KPQ to finance and print its propaganda material.

By the

end of April more flesh had been put on the FA bones. On 26 April all

army commands were issued with guidelines about `patriotic instruction and

defence against enemy propaganda'.

These specified that the FAst in Vienna

would be the coordinating centre, producing propaganda material and training

education officers; in turn, each army command should appoint an education

chief (Unterrichtsreferent) and each division an education officer (Unterrichtsoffi-

zier),

so that a hierarchical network would be created. The FA education, while

paying attention to protecting the troops from damaging influences through

vigilance and censorship, was also to be distinctly positive in outlook. Con-

ducted with

the active support of all officers, it was to lay particular emphasis

upon Staatsgedanken or ideas which would stimulate loyalty to the Empire. The

soldiers were to be reminded of the `freedom and equality' which all citizens of

the Empire supposedly enjoyed, and of the advantages of living in a large state

ruled by the Habsburg dynasty. These rather vague concepts were meant as a

substitute for dealing with the whole subject of nationalist politics in the

Monarchy. Arz himself had observed that `only love of the dynasty and mutual

respect for all nationalities' was necessary or desirable in the armed forces, a

notion which might have been applicable before 1914 but was highly ques-

tionable in

the `civilian army' of 1918.

Indeed, at the FA inaugural meeting the idea of excluding politics from

patriotic instruction had been challenged. It had been clear that the Minister

of War, Sto

ger-Steiner,

wanted Bolshevism tackled head-on, and Colonel Reich

too, in his exposition on national individuality, more than implied that FA

education could not be divorced from national politics. A compromise was

reached, largely it seems by default through lack of discussion, that the dangers

of socialism or national irredentism might be taught to the troops, but this

should never develop into a fully politicized discussion on the domestic politics

of the Monarchy. This was perhaps necessary and understandable since the

Habsburg authorities had, for example, no clear ideas or solutions for the Czech

or South Slav questions which would be acceptable for public consumption. But

it meant that the FAst position was weakened from the outset since it had to

ignore the widespread evidence of domestic agitation, a topic which enemy

propaganda was quite prepared to discuss and exploit. Not surprisingly, some of

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 275

the FA lecturers in Vienna were to find it very difficult to deal with the issues of

Italian or Romanian irredentism without also touching on the Monarchy's

nationality problems.

The FA tried to fill this serious omission with guidelines

which simply encouraged a soldier's sense of duty, discipline and order: that

desertion was a disgrace with serious consequences, that indiscipline and lazi-

ness had

produced the great defeats of the Russian and Italian armies in 1917,

that Austria-Hungary must not be allowed to fall into chaos like Russia. The

tone had to be optimistic, showing that it was not just a duty but also worth-

while to

hold out for victory since the Monarchy was morally superior (Britain

was the real cause of the war, Italy was the traitor) and could look forward with

confidence to a favourable outcome before the United States affected the

balance of forces. Here were general sentiments of a kind which Austria was

already propagating against Italy in early 1918. But they would increasingly

have a hollow ring both in the Italian and Austrian trenches, not least because

the real and increasingly obvious character of the Habsburg organism had to

remain a taboo subject in Austrian propaganda.

By the

time of Austria-Hungary's ill-fated Piave offensive of June 1918, two FA

training courses had been held in Vienna and about 150 Unterrichtsoffiziere had

passed through them. While the first course was primarily for (34) officers from

the fronts and occupied territories, 80 per cent of the 118 officers on the second

course stemmed from units in the hinterland where FA was to be organized in

each military district in the same way as in the war zone. The numerous lectures

held every morning during the fortnight of each course reflected the themes

suggested in the AOK guidelines. Thus Karl Werkmann, head of the imperial

press office, discussed `the dynasty and the war' with the purpose, as he assured

Waldsta

tten, of `destroying the rather widely-held belief that members of the

imperial house do not participate in the duties and suffering of this war to the

same degree as other citizens of the Monarchy'.

Then there were lectures on

the real nature of the war and the need to stand firm: `Austria-Hungary's

strength in the World War' (by Glaise-Horstenau), `The World War up to

now' (by Petrovic

), `Why are we fighting?', `How to personally see it through'

(by the later Hungarian right-radical Prime Minister Gyula Go

s). Enemy

mbo

propaganda

was presented in context: by the Austrian historian, Hans U

bers-

berger, on

`The Russian revolution'; by Max Weber on `Socialism'; and by others

on `The organization of enemy propaganda in the hinterland', `The military

significance of enemy propaganda' and `Italian and Romanian irredenta' (the

latter by Roderich Gooû). Turning to optimistic plans for the future, notable

academics were brought in to lecture on `Care for war invalids' (Rudolf Peerz)

and `Industrial and social reconstruction after the war' (Friedrich Hertz). Others

gave instruction on the nature of the press, on film propaganda, or even on `war

and the woman' (Margarete Roller). Many of these lectures were eventually

issued as brochures for the benefit of FA personnel, and they were regularly

276 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

supplemented by the KPQ with new themes ranging from the `The war aims

of England' (47 colour slides) to `The holy egoism of the Italians' or even `The

significance of fertilizer in modern agriculture' (26 slides).

It was with these aids at their fingertips, and from July with a regular infor-

mation `package'

from the FAst known as the VaterlaÈndische Bildungsarbeit, that

the education chiefs and officers proceeded to their work in the armed forces

(including the navy). Having passed through the first information course in

mid-May, for example, Captain Ljubomir Jemric

returned to Belgrade and held

his own education course there in late June for officers and padres of military

units in occupied Serbia. His lectures mirrored precisely what he had been

taught in Vienna, but occasionally added local `colour' such as tips on how to

explain the recent mutiny at Kragujevac where 44 soldiers had been sentenced

to death.

In the same way, the Unterrichtsreferent for Krako

w military district,

having attended the second information course in early June, established a

series of courses and lectures in western Galicia. Special attention was paid to

the presence of homecomers in the region, and also to railway stations as

`danger spots' since it was there that those on leave arrived from the Italian

Front bearing enemy propaganda leaflets.

On the Italian Front itself the same trickling-down of FA activity began slowly

to occur in June. On the Upper Piave, for instance, Captain Franz Zeidner, the

diligent Unterrichtsreferent for the II corps, began to send detailed reports to the

FAst. After returning from Vienna, he had held a three-day course for selected

education officers who had then started to teach at divisional level and had

been well-received despite the very mixed composition of the units. `The men

want to be educated', he gushed, `and in this way we will anticipate the enemy!'

Calling for the FAst to send out more material, especially light and witty

leaflets, he observed that patriotic instruction clearly had a willing audience,

but could not be left to the padres who tended to be `indolent' or `Bolshevik',

inclined to condemn all of the belligerents equally.

Similarly optimistic was the Unterrichtsoffizier of the predominantly Croat

42HID, situated on the Asiago plateau. Lt Juraj S

njak

was a former history

teacher, who after instruction from his corps `education chief' began FA work in

the division on 1 June, precisely at a time when a string of officer desertions to

the enemy were under investigation. On 12 June he discussed with his selected

regimental counterparts the guidelines for their work which included, besides

the usual themes, an explanation of Italy's alleged friendliness towards the

South Slavs, the nature of Italy's aspirations to Croatian territory, and hence

the `reality' behind the claims of enemy manifestos. The Austrian military, Con-

rad's Intelligence section, for example, had recommended many months before

that the Italians' true face should be exposed for Slav troops, to show that they

had not actually renounced their designs on Croat and Slovene territory; now

such arguments were to be put directly to the soldiers.

According to

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 277

njak, both men and officers immediately showed a keen interest in the

new patriotic instruction: `The men were very receptive to the plain-speaking

explanation and grasped the complete futility of enemy propaganda, especially

as regards the Yugoslav question.' Although, as we will see, recent desertions

suggested the exact opposite, S

njak stated confidently that `enemy propaganda

has had absolutely no success among field units of the division'. He painted for

the FAst a surprisingly rosy picture of the troops on the eve of the June offens-

ive, of

men eager to fight against their hereditary enemy. If all treasonable

agitation in the hinterland could be suppressed and the Monarchy's political

problems quickly solved, he opined, all harmful influences would indeed be

removed from the army!

Despite such wild optimism the FAst leaders themselves were aware from

the start that there were fundamental obstacles to their work. Not least was

the very small budget they were allotted. When in April Waldsta

tten asked

the AOK for unlimited credit and a monthly allowance for the FAst of 2000

Kronen, his request was refused on the grounds that the work had to be

funded out of the KPQ budget and consequently `the utmost thrift' was

necessary. As a result the FAst was unable to match the scope of its remit. It

could not meet the increasing demands for propaganda literature, for example,

from Sarkotic

in Bosnia when he requested 18 500 copies of reading material

for soldiers travelling on the railways (a response in itself to the FAst urging

all military commands to spread patriotic literature in trains and stations).

Nor could it even pay for the full subsistence of those who attended the

courses in Vienna, leaving a sour taste indeed in the mouths of participants.

By July, Waldsta

tten was complaining to the AOK that FA incorporation in

the KPQ budget was an unsatisfactory arrangement; he began to approach

the military ministries directly for a credit advance for propaganda pur-

poses.

A second

practical problem, which affected all military fields by 1918, was

that of manpower and the lack of suitable personnel for the FA network. It was

not just a case of too few translators for Heimat (the KPQ , for example, had no

translators for the Slovak or Romanian languages!).

It also manifested itself in

a dearth of suitable instructors. Some of those who attended the second infor-

mation course

in Vienna were felt by the FAst to be too old or far too young.

Baden might specify that `only men experienced in war, inspired with ideal

energy and capable of expressing their views in eloquent language, were suited

to educate and convey really effective propaganda into the ranks'. But in

practice it was impossible to match this criterion. Indeed, the situation was

exacerbated when the AOK added that due to a lack of officers, only those who

were incapable of active service (like Waldsta

tten himself) should be employed

as Unterrichtsoffiziere. The inevitable tendency was either to choose individuals

from the lower officer ranks who lacked sufficient experience, or (against AOK

278 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

orders) to appoint individuals who were already occupied with a military

command but were expected to take on additional FA duties.

Such a case was Major Richard Gablenz, a battalion commander in the 48ID

on Monte Pertica in the Italian mountains. On 1 July he wrote a private letter to

Waldsta

tten, complaining about the double burden of work. He also summed

up well the views of many when he set out the impossible environment in

which patriotic instruction was supposed to operate:

It is

high time to begin this work if it's generally going to have any success.

For the bow has been drawn very tightly. Every glance in the newspapers

informs officers and NCOs about the political confusion [of the hinterland].

Press reports and newspapers talk of the ever growing Czecho-Slovak armies.

I myself am based with my battalion on Monte Pertica, where we've been

officially notified to expect that men of the Czecho-Slovak brigade will

dress in Austrian uniforms and attack our positions ± doing this when half

of our regiment is itself Czech. I won't go into the miserable state of our

position except to supply some buzz words: 8



centigrade, heat and light

forbidden, no water, ice-cold food, no caves, no shelter etc. ± repeated

desertions, countless Italian propaganda leaflets, but no press reports of

our own.

In a

few sentences Gablenz described the formidable uphill task which faced

the FA network. It was only being created after a full four years of warfare. And

it immediately came face to face with two major internal enemies which had to

be removed if patriotic instruction was to have any impact. First was the

Monarchy's food crisis, which consistently undermined the spirit of soldiers

already enduring severe conditions in the war zone. Second was the radicaliza-

tion of

domestic politics in the hinterland, which for the FAst seemed to be

most dangerously expressed in the circulation of wild ideas through the radical

nationalist press. Both threats helped to give Padua's manifestos their real bite,

both were to prove insurmountable, nibbling away at the morale which com-

manders were

trying to sustain. The military as usual were inclined to blame

the hinterland for these evils, from which the `ordinary soldier' in the war zone

could not be protected, and over which they themselves had far less influence

than earlier in the war.

Of the

two, it was hunger which was the most dangerous threat to army

morale in the last year of war, `a valuable ally for enemy propaganda'.

General

Ottokar Landwehr, who had been appointed by the Emperor in February 1917

to coordinate the Monarchy's food supplies, was trying valiantly to juggle a

range of options, but none of them were really secure. This is clear from a brief

survey of the food crisis. As far as the armed forces were concerned, they could

expect to acquire all grain surpluses from occupied Serbia and Poland, as well as

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 279

a percentage of the Romanian harvest (although this had to be regularly rene-

gotiated with

Germany). But the bulk of army supplies still had to come from

domestic sources: from Hungary. In the last months of 1917 the crisis had

deepened. Due to a disastrous summer harvest in Hungary, compounded by

hoarding of grain in the countryside, the supply of flour waggons to the troops

was slowing down. Count Hadik, the obstinate Hungarian food minister, might

assure the Empire's Common Ministerial Council that it was a priority to feed

the army, but his promise to Landwehr that Hungary would supply 200 wag-

gons of

flour per day to the armed forces could not be matched in practice.

the turn of the year the AOK was concluding that the armed forces were `living

from hand to mouth': they needed 219 flour waggons daily to supply them

with adequate rations but only an average of 112 waggons was available.

Therefore, in the spring Landwehr put his faith in two new initiatives. Firstly,

he persuaded the Hungarian leadership to implement requisitioning in the

countryside, a move which seemed more promising as Hadik had been replaced

by the energetic and empire-orientated Prince Ludwig Windischgra

tz. In Feb-

ruary, field

units in Hungary and Croatia proceeded into the country, notwith-

standing the

AOK's anxieties about placing troops in such close contact with

civilians. In April the action was stepped up, but a month later Windischgra

was still unable to give Landwehr a very positive picture.

Secondly, Landwehr

looked with the whole of the Monarchy expectantly to the East where the peace

with Ukraine in February was championed as a Brotfriede, a `Bread Peace' which

would surely solve the whole of the Monarchy's grain crisis. In fact, although

under the peace terms the Ukrainians agreed to supply Austria-Hungary with a

million tons of grain, and Habsburg troops advanced into the region ostensibly

to bring `peace and security' to its population, the chaotic situation in the East

prevented the import of more than 46 000 tons before the end of the war.

The

average grain imports for March were only seven waggons a day, for April only

15 (and the army needed 219 daily). If the Ukrainian native population was

reluctant to surrender or sell its produce to the Austrian and German occupiers,

it was also the case that the food which the troops collected there was barely

able to cover their own requirements.

There was even talk of the Monarchy

having to export flour to Ukraine to feed the occupying forces.

The celebrated

Brotfriede produced neither the bread, nor the complete cessation of hostilities

in the East which had been expected and which was propagated so vigorously

in FA propaganda. For Landwehr, struggling to tide over the army and the

Austrian half of the Empire for another month, drastic measures were unavoid-

able and

could only be taken at the expense of an unresponsive German ally. In

late April he made the bold move of confiscating over 2000 waggons of

Romanian grain which were bound for Berlin.

But the pay-off from this was

more serious. On 18 May, the Monarchy felt obliged to conclude a new eco-

nomic agreement

with Germany, according to which it would receive regular

280 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

supplies of grain from Ukraine on condition that full economic control there

was placed in German hands. It was just one more indication of how far

Austria-Hungary's survival could be determined in Berlin. The Habsburg auth-

orities from

mid-1918 were repeatedly having to travel northwards to petition

their ally, all the more so as, despite Germany's promises, material aid from

Ukraine and elsewhere always continued to fall far short of what was agreed on

paper. By the middle of June, grain waggons from the East had dried up

completely.

This persistent pattern of erratic supply was mirrored on the Italian Front

throughout the period of Italy's propaganda onslaught. The Austrian comman-

ders in

1918 would obsessively note the divergence between theory and reality

in food supplies from the hinterland. Not that all had seemed hopeless in late

1917. After Caporetto, with the conquest of the fertile Venetian plains, it had

(as Landwehr hoped) been possible for two months to feed the Austrian troops

under Archduke Eugen exclusively from Venetian produce. But already by the

turn of the year the narrow strip of land between the mountains and the sea was

being milked dry. As Archduke Eugen wrote to General Sarkotic

Economically the

situation here is less pleasing. The food situation is at

the moment worse than critical since, from the start of the offensive, I have

fed the three armies under my command exclusively from the occupied

territory. Supplies from the hinterland are irregular and scarce. Almost no

tobacco, which the troops find hard to bear, but they do still get every day

half a litre of wine [the full ration] which is plentifully available in this

region. Bread is bad and only half the ration.

In subsequent months Austrian troops on the plains would continue to

benefit from some local vegetable and meat provisions, as well as having the

chance to requisition in neighbouring Trieste and Istria.

For flour supplies,

however, their position was to differ little from troops in the mountains in that

they relied exclusively on what Landwehr could conjure up at home and

abroad. Given the crisis in the hinterland, the AOK began to order a reduction

in the bread ration. But in January 1918, the Isonzo army command (KISA) was

unable to distribute even half of this reduced ration, since flour supplies that

month were only sufficient to cover eight days, not 31. It was not long before

KISA troops in reserve were living exclusively on potatoes, having given up

their bread rations to those in the front line.

As for the latter, a unit like the

10ID, located next to the sea, was quickly reduced to a chronic state in its new

position. Inadequate shelter (a major issue for troops on the plains) was com-

pounded by

damp conditions: the fact that the men were often wet-through,

standing in water and lacking any change of clothing so that cases of illness

abounded. As the weather improved this would change; water pumps would

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 281

also be an asset in the Piave delta. But as bronchial catarrh diminished, cases of

malaria would soar, and still nothing would be able to relieve the pangs of

hunger.

On 17 February, FM Boroevic

duly telegraphed Arz to warn that the food crisis

in his armies (the Isonzo and 6th armies) was beginning to undermine discip-

line at

the front.

A week later he spoke out more bluntly:

Even if

in the end the occupied Italian territory is bled dry by totally

disregarding the needs of the civilian population and completely neglecting

cultivation, any improvement in army supplies would only be secured for a

few days . . . If [after this] supplies from the hinterland remain the same,

there will be a rapid decline in the physical powers of the fighting troops

and a dwindling of their morale, already much lowered in the past few weeks

due to insufficient food. As a result one will have to say that the innumerable

sacrifices of life and property have been in the end in vain.

Boroevic

had no patience with what he considered plain incompetence by the

Monarchy's political authorities:

The troops

are no longer moved by incessant empty phrases, that the

hinterland is starving or that one must hold out, especially as it is known

that in the Monarchy there are still extensive regions with unexhausted food

supplies, and because the men are sure that the provisions for German

troops are far better. The troops will endure no more experiments, they

must be adequately supplied to be able to live and fight. I therefore beg

again most urgently for vigorous measures to overcome the present food

crisis as quickly as possible.

These words were naturally heeded by the AOK, but when the High Command

was not powerless it usually felt obliged to give priority in supplies to the even

worse predicament of troops in the mountains. The upshot was that in May,

just a few weeks before the crucial June offensive, Boroevic

's armies could not

be given increased rations in preparation for the attack. Boroevic

himself

warned Baden that he could not take the responsibility for beginning an

offensive with undernourished men; he vainly petitioned his superiors to post-

pone the

attack until they were strong enough.

In the mountains the story had been similar but worse. There, as is shown

below in a case study of one Croat division, the food crisis was exacerbated by

complicated supply lines through treacherous terrain. When in January Conrad

von Ho

tzendorf

had ordered his armies to reduce the daily bread ration for

front-line troops from 700 to 500 grams, Krobatin of the 10AK had already felt

bound to go further, reducing the ration to 350 grams because of severe flour

282 The Undermining of Austria-Hungary

arrears (only increased, in theory, in late March).

The result was clear in a

number of censored letters from the trenches which Krobatin forwarded to

Baden, questioning as he did so how far his officers would really be able to

offset the effect of enemy propaganda if the ranks were so weakened by hunger.

In one of the letters, a Polish corporal described his daily diet as follows:

Early in

the morning half a litre of coffee which is pure water, only browner

and warmer. At midday a piece of meat as big as an egg and half a litre of

pure water with about three leaves of boiled cabbage which would be very

good if one could only get more of it. Apart from this nothing. In the

evening half a litre of coffee and a piece of bread, as big as we used to give

to the beggars; it would be tolerable if it wasn't made of maize. This piece of

bread has to suffice for the whole day . . . This is no life, it is torture. In these

mountains your feet go numb, you move in the darkness, you collapse, rest,

then get up and go ever onward. The cabbage which you give the cow to eat I

would like to eat up with my eyes. No one will be able to recognize me any

more, since my hands, feet and face have become skinny and weak.

For the 11AK, which was in the spring still engaged in some fighting, Count

Scheuchenstuel similarly warned his superiors of the consequences:

Because of

the inferior quality of meat, the small fat ration of six grams and

the lack of vegetables which can only be substituted by flour, the present

measure of 500 grams is already the minimum which a man should get

under the existing fighting and climatic conditions in order just to sur-

vive .

. . Any reduction of the bread ration seems to me very risky because

bread is the most indispensable foodstuff and our men cannot be fully com-

pensated with

meat.

Although Baden

proceeded to order a rise in the meat ration to offset the

bread reduction, the measure which was set was usually academic anyway.

Like Boroevic

, Conrad proceeded to blame the hinterland, judging that the

situation could `only be saved if the central authorities quickly seize the oppor-

tunity to

overpower all those groups who appear to have made questions of

provision a political issue'.

He was presumably referring to the Hungarians

but, as we have seen, not even vigorous requisitioning in the Hungarian coun-

tryside was

a solution. Shortly before the Monarchy's June offensive, the 11AK

considered that its food situation had never been so bad. Like the commanders

on the plains, it warned that `under such circumstances, to prepare for the

approaching offensive is completely out of the question'.

The divisions

might not be starving, but they were always undernourished, and the final

raising of the bread ration on 8 June, a week before the attack, was as usual a

Austria-Hungary on the Defensive 283

theoretical rather than feasible order. Conditions in the 18ID, a division sta-

tioned on

the Asiago plateau, exemplify how a persistent food and material

crisis was then compounded by problems of transport and terrain. Writing only

two days before the offensive, Brigadier Julius Vidale

noted that food and

munitions had to be brought to the front line at night by a road under constant

enemy fire; because of a dearth of horses, the men themselves had to act as

carriers of supplies and so were considerably weakened. Vidale

, like so many of

his fellow divisional commanders, concluded at this time that the spirit of his

troops (chiefly German, Magyar and Slovene) remained excellent; but he cau-

tioned his

superiors to consider what effect divisional conditions might have

on the success of the imminent offensive.

In the words of the Austrian official

history, it was `with completely undernourished troops that the Austro-Hun-

garian army embarked upon its fatal battle'.

The FAst had been aware from the beginning that the food situation had to

be tackled. One of Waldsta

tten's first moves upon his appointment had been to

write to Arz reminding him that during the `temporary' food crisis it was

important to calm the men and ensure that the officers' mess had exactly the

same rations.

A month later, in his introductory lecture to the first FA infor-

mation course,

Waldsta

tten ± evidently now better informed ± readily acknow-

ledged that

FA would be hampered because of food shortages: `A man with an

empty stomach', he observed, `is less receptive to the most attractive language.'

However, he remained hopeful: `If everyone knows what is at stake, then they

will be more easily and more decisively prepared to see it through, even in the

hinterland.'

The implication was that propaganda emanating from the FAst

and its network would be able to seize any initiative from enemy propaganda.

After all, in contrast to the latter, which presumably faced basic obstacles of

distribution and reception, FA work could be regular, methodical and under-

taken in

immediate proximity to its audience.

The reality

unfortunately was that the war zone was never a vacuum in which

the FAst and the Padua Commission could duel with their ideas on equal terms.

Poisonous ideas were also reaching the troops from the hinterland, or were

infecting those soldiers who managed to secure leave and then witnessed the

national agitation and social misery in their homeland. It was almost imposs-

ible to

keep the armies on the Italian Front in quarantine from such reality, all

the more so as the troops' links to their families and home environment always

provided them with a sense of security and well-being, an essential prop to

good morale. But building such a quarantine was exactly what the AOK

attempted to do. Since in the second half of the war the military no longer

possessed the power to directly intervene and suppress radical politics in the

hinterland, the alternative was to try to obstruct the means of communication

of radical ideas, enforcing censorship so that patriotic instruction would be able

to operate more easily.