
182 PRICE MECHANISM AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
a list of the various processes available in the plant and their input and output
coefficients. Somewhat confused by this mass of data, the civil servants who were
supposed to operate the plant decide to call in a private industrialist to consult on
how they should plan their production. The industrialist realizes that it would be
good training for his men and a feather in his cap if he could contract to actually
operate the plant. Accordingly, once he gets the information and studies the data,
he proposes a flat fee for which he will manage the plant, turn over to the government
the required amounts of output, and use no more than the allotted quantities of the
scarce materials. The civil service men declare that all other things being equal,
they think it would be best for the government to operate the plant, but if he can
convince them that his proposal is a good one (meaning that if the government
operates the plant, it is unlikely it could do so less expensively), they will accept
his offer.
The industrialist takes the data back to his office, gets out his linear program-
ming book titled Linear Programming 1: Introduction, and uses input-output coef-
ficient data to form a matrix A and a labor cost vector c.
To determine the minimum fee for which he can afford to operate the defense
plant, the industrialist has only to solve the following linear program:
c
T
x = z (min),
Ax = b,
x ≥ 0.
(7.28)
Using the software provided, he quickly solves the problem on his PC and prints
out the results using his printer. The results are that z
∗
is the minimum cost and
x
∗
is the vector of optimal process utilization levels. His first thought is to explain
the linear programming technique to his civil service friends, show them the final
tableau, and thereby convince them that they can do no better than to accept
his offer and pay him z
∗
. But then he realizes that this plan will give away his
secret; the civil servants will have no further need for him. They will take his vector
of operating levels x
∗
to optimally operate the plant themselves. To prevent this
from happening, he must find a way to convince the government that z
∗
is minimal
without giving away his plan x
∗
.
To this end, he decides to invent a system of prices that he will offer to pay for
the materials, provided he is paid certain prices for the outputs. He wants these
prices to be such that there are no profits on any individual activity, for if there
were profits, the government would spot them and know that they could find a way
to run the plant with lower labor cost. On the other hand, given these restraints,
he wants to make as much money as possible. That is, he wants his price vector π
to satisfy
π
T
b = v (max),
A
T
π ≤ c.
(7.29)
He recognizes this problem as the dual of the one he just solved and immediately
produces the dual solution: optimal π = π
∗
, the simplex multipliers from the last
iteration of the Simplex Method used to solve the primal problem, and maximal
v = v
∗
. Fortunately, he notes with relief, v
∗
= z
∗
.