were severely circumscribed by American power. Idiosyncratic Italian politics might be;
anti-Western they could never become, or even seem to become.
Nonetheless, a certain continuity can be traced between the foreign policy of Italy, the
middle-ranking European Republic and Italy, the Liberal and then Fascist aspirant Great
Power. Dino Grandi, who had served as Fascist Foreign Minister, had once emphasized
Italy’s intention of being the peso determinante or ‘determining weight’ in the Great
Power balance. This idea that Italy should do its best not to be committed too heavily or
too naively to one side or the other in any dispute frequently reappeared in postwar policy
making. Thus, the creation of the European Common Market, solemnized in the Treaty of
Rome of 1957, owed something to the belief of De Gasperi and other Christian
Democrats (see DC) that both their political Catholicism and ‘Europe’ offered a third
way between the rigours of American capitalism and those of Soviet ‘socialism’.
Similarly, in the Middle East, the traditions of Italy, of Christian Democracy and of
Catholicism, suggested an openness to the Arab world and thus a less than total
endorsement of Israel, the USA’s essential ally in the region. In the 1950s Enrico Mattei,
in his negotiation of oil contracts, and in the 1970s and 1980s Giulio Andreotti in his
multifarious commercial and political dealings, would similarly seek a certain
independence for Italy in a bipolar world.
An aversion to bipolarity was also evident in Italy’s relations with the communist
bloc. The presence within Italy of a powerful Communist Party undoubtedly assisted
Italy’s successful trade and investment policy in the USSR and in other parts of Eastern
Europe. It was recognized that in any eventual conflict Italy would side with the West but
until that final moment was reached, contacts in the East could remain and Italy pursued
policies there that were less hostile than demanded by ardent enthusiasts of the Cold War.
Occasional voices were heard protesting that this lack of status and of a public
exercise of power was demeaning to the Italian nation. The signature of the peace treaty
of Paris in 1947 was accompanied by nationalist complaint from such diverse sources as
the liberal philosopher, Benedetto Croce, who talked carelessly of the ‘Paris diktat’ and
the leadership of the Communist Party. Until 1954, the Trieste issue inflamed irredentist
and patriotic sentiments, and few in the political world granted that Yugoslavia had a
case there. The return of Trieste within the national borders did, however, end irredentism
as a serious factor in political life, though Italian diplomatists have continued to fight off
suggestions that the Brenner border with the Germanic world, agreed in 1919 and
confirmed in 1945, is not a just one.
In more recent times intellectuals, generally but not always conservative in their
ideological preference, have complained that the worst sin of the Republic is its loss of
national sense. It is true that opinion polls have regularly demonstrated that Italians are
anxious to define themselves as Europeans and that they trust the institutions of the
European Union more than they do those of the Italian nation state. At the same time,
this flaunted ‘good Europeanness’ is somewhat counter-balanced by the fact that
European legislation is regularly ignored by Italian governments at the same time as
European subsidies are digested.
Another unresolved issue in foreign relations is what might be called Italy’s missing
‘world policy’. Emigration dispersed Italians all over the world, but governments in
Rome have preferred to focus on Europe rather than becoming closely involved with, for
example, South American affairs. In this, as in other aspects of international dealing,
Encyclopedia of contemporary italian culture 342