and by the far greater numbers of people employed in municipal, provincial and national
government. Nor is the regional sub-division systematically mapped over dialectal or
linguistic areas, except in the peripheral cases of Valle d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto Adige and,
to some extent, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia. Venice has certainly shaped the historical identity
of the Veneto, as the comparatively progressive Grand Duchy did that of Tuscany before
unification, but Italy’s regions cannot all be said to be the product of sedimented
historical realities dating back to the pre-unification period. For example, the old
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies was centralized in Naples and embraced Sicily and the
mainland Mezzogiorno (South). Nor are these regions all territories powerfully rooted in
the imaginations of their inhabitants. The pattern of geographical loyalties varies widely
between the administrative regions: any ‘Campanian’ identity is dwarfed by that of
Naples. Indeed, local identities tend to be centred on the city, town or village, producing
historical rivalries—such as those between Modena and Bologna, or Pisa and Livorno—
far stronger than regional sentiments.
‘Regionalism’, a term which historically has tended to be employed to abuse
‘unpatriotic’ enemies rather than for social scientific purposes, also sometimes refers to
the whole issue of subnational geographical identities inasmuch as they are deemed to
impede the spread of an Italian identity and undermine the legitimacy of the national
state. The fact that the regions were set up so late in Italy’s history is indicative of the
strong sense of the new state’s fragility which influenced the ‘unitarian’ perspective of its
national ruling classes up to and including Fascism. But it may also be taken to betray the
surprising lack of centrifugal regional movements ‘from below’ in Italian history even
after the war: the Lega Nord is in this respect an anomalous product of recent years.
Local interests have traditionally preferred to preserve margins for autonomy within the
existing machinery of government. Politicians become mediators managing complicated
exchanges of resources, favours and votes between the local and the national levels.
Italy displays other ‘regional divides’ which, while they are not recognized
administratively, describe the country’s social contours and historical transformations at
least as well as the twenty regions listed above. The villages and towns of rural
Lombardy and the Veneto were, until recently, the heartland of a ‘white’ (i.e. Catholic)
subculture. The central ‘red’ belt of Tuscany and Emilia-Romagna, particularly the latter,
was the domain of a rooted Communist subculture. There is the northwestern ‘industrial
triangle’ of Milan, Turin and Genoa, and now the Third Italy characterized by
specialized, family-run light industries in the centre and northeast. There is, of course, the
North—South divide (see also Southern Question), although one must be careful not to
forget the great diversity internal to each of these areas. The South has never been a
banner for a political movement, although in the postwar period the state devoted huge
resources to a special Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Southern Development Fund) in an
effort to alleviate the region’s ‘backwardness’. Stereotypical constructions of the South as
a metaphor for corruption and parasitism have been a constant in Italian history. The
North had no institutional or political meaning until the early 1990s and the emergence of
fanciful Lega Nord plans for a ‘Republic of the North’ or ‘Padania’. Italian political
opinion remains divided over the degree of decentralization the country needs, and over
the most appropriate level at which regional government should operate.
See also: minority languages; regional government
Encyclopedia of contemporary italian culture 714