Hicks M. The War of the Roses: 1455-1485 (Essential Histories)

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Conclusion and consequences 89

and Henry VII launched against France still

combined archers and men-at-arms recruited

in companies of irregular size by indentures,

with individual captains, in the old way. Not

that archers were valueless - that they were

still appreciated on the continent is shown by

Breton and Burgundian requests for them

when threatened by the French. It was

probably only on the Scottish border that

castles were maintained and rebuilt,

Gloucester's work at Carlisle allowing for

defensive ordnance, but genuinely modern

fortifications, such as the string of self-

contained castles along the south coast from

Deal to St Mawr had to wait until the reign of

Henry VIII.

The English were most conscious of the

potential of gunpowder, employing cannon

both to attack and defend the Tower in 1460,

the City in 1471 and in battle at Northampton

(1460), Barnet and Tewkesbury (1471).

Warwick had his own cannon and his own

gunner from the early 1460s and Gloucester in

the early 1480s; Edward IV enhanced his

ordnance train for his invasion of France in

1475. The defensive tactics of the Hundred

Years' War, in which the French were

encouraged to attack mixed formations of

archers and men-at-arms, were adapted in the

Wars of the Roses by the addition of cannon,

without emulating the successes of the English

at Agincourt or the French at Chatillon.

Cannon encouraged static defensive thinking,

to which Warwick was especially inclined,

proved unusable in the wet conditions at

Northampton (1460), and could not be readily

adapted to threats from different directions in

1461 or to unfavourable ground in 1471.

Presumably it was the lighter and more mobile

cannon that were used alongside bowmen at

the start of battles. At Tewkesbury such

barrages forced the losing sides to attack from

pre-prepared positions and abandon the

advantages of defence. Indeed virtually all the

battles of the Wars of the Roses were won by

the side attacking, not by the defenders, even

when the latter had chosen the ground and

entrenched themselves. Whether equivalent

results could have been achieved against the

best continental armies, however, is unlikely;

small contingents of continental professionals

carried disproportionate weight both at

Bosworth and Stoke. If Edward IV and

Warwick were able to carry the experience of

1459-61 to 1469-71, the king repeating his

successes and the earl his failures, there seems

to have been little if any development

between them or continuity between these

conflicts and those of the 1480s. The Wars of

the Roses were a military backwater irrelevant

to the mainstream of military advance.

The Wars demonstrated England's weakness

against foreign attack for although the sea and

contrary winds were useful shields, the

Channel was easily and quickly crossed with

little preparation and expense. Naval defences

were of limited value, and no invaders were

ever intercepted, so it was possible to land

almost anywhere, without resort to ports or

regard to coastal castles, most of which were in

decay, ungarrisoned and unmunitioned. Once

ashore, invading armies could march freely

wherever they chose, unimpeded by

fortifications or walled towns and with little

account for physical barriers such as rivers and

hills, and often with domestic support. The

forces that could be raised against foreign

invaders were unlikely to be equal in numbers

or equipment, and governments could be

toppled militarily with extraordinary ease. The

Wars of the Roses revealed how weak England

was to external and internal threats.

The first strategic lesson therefore, which

the Tudors took to heart, was that invasions

must be prevented at all costs. Whilst the

navy, fortifications, the militia and

armaments could be and were to be

improved, the key was prevention by

appropriate diplomatic means - fortunately

England's principal enemies up till 1588

always focused their military attention

elsewhere. Secondly, internal and external

foes must be divided, in particular by

denying exiles refuge abroad and ideally by

securing their extradition; this was nothing

new and was practised by both Henry VI in

1459-60 and Edward IV thereafter, but

Henry VII made it work. Thirdly, English

military commanders at Calais, in Ireland,

and on the northern marches must be

90 Essential Histories • The Wars of the Roses 1455-1487

prevented from turning royal resources

against the government. And fourthly,

domestic dissent must be prevented from

escalating, by a mixture of conciliation,

deterrent and propaganda, so that

Englishmen learnt to regard resistance and

rebellion as wrong. Of the four, the last three

objectives were actually achieved.

Politically the Wars of the Roses were civil

disagreements within England rather than

international conflicts between states. Whilst

England can be perceived as one of the venues

in the struggle between France and Burgundy,

few Europeans participated and the wars had

no decisive effect on the main contest.

Admittedly the Burgundians helped the

Yorkist war effort in a small way in 1461;

Frenchmen and Scots made major

contributions to the unsuccessful Lancastrian

resistance of the 1460s; the French in 1470,

Burgundians in 1471 and French again in

1485 helped overthrow English governments;

and the French in 1483 and the Burgundians

in 1487 backed invasions that failed. Such

activities need to be measured against their

strategic objectives. From a continental angle,

the intentions were twofold. Firstly, to prevent

English intervention on the other side by

fomenting instability at home. This objective

was repeatedly achieved, even the smallest

raids serving this purpose, like those of Jasper

Tudor in Wales in the 1460s and Oxford in

1472-74. Secondly, they were designed to

secure English intervention against the rival

state. This objective involved replacing the

existing government with one more

sympathetic and securing the latter's armed

intervention on the continent. It was achieved

most obviously in 1471, when Warwick

launched an assault on Burgundy as agreed

the previous summer with King Louis XI;

unfortunately his participation was terminated

by the resultant Burgundian support for

Edward IV that ended the Readeption. Twice

Edward IV had planned invasions of France, in

the 1460s and early 1470s; only the latter

happened and was prematurely curtailed. So

was the Etaples campaign of 1492 of Henry

VII, who indeed campaigned against the

French, who had made him king. The English

completely failed to prevent both Louis XI's

war against Burgundy after Charles the Bold's

death in 1477 that resulted in the French

conquest of Artois and Picardy and Charles

VIII's acquisition by marriage of Brittany, even

though these annexations placed the whole of

the Channel coastline facing England in

French hands. Diplomacy, especially the

treaties of Picquigny (1475) and Etaples (1492),

was more effective in neutralising the English

than military intervention. In his latter years

Henry VII preferred (and was able at last to

afford) to subsidise foreign allies rather than to

fight himself.

The Wars of the Roses had no permanent

impact on England's foreign relations

abroad. Defeat in the Hundred Years' War

signalled the changing standing between

France and England, France resuming its

place as the leading European power - its

proper place, when measured in terms of

resources - and England reverting to the

second rank, where it remained for two

centuries until the 1650s. Successive English

monarchs, from Edward IV and the first two

Tudors to the first two Stuarts, carried little

weight when intervening on the continent

and achieved scarcely anything when they

did; they were genuinely marginal and their

invasions could safely be ignored.

The Wars of the Roses also had no

significant impact on the distribution of power

within England, nor were the opposite parties

constant or consistent. Except at certain

points, it is not possible to discern clear

geographical zones or social classes associated

with either side, each attracting cross-sections

of supporters from all the social orders that

varied with the different regimes. Richard

Duke of York may have triumphed in 1460

because of popular support, just as Henry VI

did in 1470, but the commons did not prevail

over the aristocracy or any other social class.

The north that backed Queen Margaret in

1460-61 and continued resistance in the

1460s did not include the Richmondshire

levies of the Nevilles of Middleham and

subsequently Richard Duke of Gloucester.

Most of the major families that suffered

forfeiture were in due course restored. Henry

Conclusion and consequences 91

VII did not stand for any clear political creed

except hostility to Richard III and it is not

clear what his opponents stood for; nor did he

seek to destroy the great nohility. If he failed

to replace the greatest families that had died

out or suffered forfeiture, which may indeed

have changed the balance of landholding and

power both nationally and in the longer term

in several regions, this was more because his

younger sons failed to found any lasting noble

house. What an overmighty subject Henry

Duke of York might have been had he not

acceded as King Henry VIII!

Each of the Wars ended with a clearcut

victory that destroyed both the leadership of

the losing side and deprived the survivors of

the resources to continue. By these criteria, the

battles of Towton in 1461, Barnet and

Tewkesbury in 1471, and even Bosworth in

1485 looked decisive. Recalcitrant Lancastrians

in the North, Harlech and Jersey in 1461-68,

the Earl of Oxford at St Osyth's (Essex) and

Mount St Michael (Corn.) in 1472-74, and

erstwhile Ricardians in lurness and

Richmondshire, were persisting irrationally

with forlorn causes. Inevitably their resistance

was stubbed out and many of them were slain.

The ruling regimes that surmounted such

obstacles looked progressively more secure, so

that peace looked permanent and almost all

parties operated as though it was. Battles were

decisive, however, only for as long as the

defeated party secured no new accretion of

strength, English or foreign, or for as long as

the victorious regime maintained its unity. The

Yorkist victors of 1461 and 1471 both divided

against themselves a decade later and each

then attracted foreign backing that enabled

the former victors to be displaced. Outside

support was forthcoming for dynastic rivals to

Henry VII; what they never secured, however,

was substantial adherence within England,

especially amongst the great nobility.

What made it so easy to displace kings,

dynasties and governments during the Wars

of the Roses was the financial and military

weakness of the Crown, the full

participation of the commons in violent

politics, and the intervention of foreign

powers. These made insurrection almost

respectable, whilst dynastic differences made

the choice of king, to whom overriding

allegiances were due, ultimately almost a

matter of opinion. Henry VII benefited from

the end of the Great Slump, which restored

the financial and military initiative to the

Crown at the same time as the greatest

noble houses were in abeyance. Economic

well-being may also have removed the

political discontent of the commons, who

were no longer responsive to reforming

platforms. Perhaps the reforming

propaganda was misdirected - there was still

plenty of mileage in complaints against

unjust taxation, which brought out tens of

thousands of Yorkshiremen in 1489 and

Cornishmen in 1497, but which was never

transmuted into a national movement. After

1494 the focus of the rival great powers was

Italy and neither France nor Burgundy, the

Dowager-Duchess Margaret apart, embroiled

themselves in English politics. A final, more

intangible factor is that insurrection and

treason ceased to be respectable. Perhaps

deterred by the penalties and much reduced

chances of success, the nobility stopped

resorting to force. At some point the

concepts of order and non-resistance, so

important in restraining insubordination

and insurrection from the mid-sixteenth

century on, prevailed over individuals' sense

of grievance.

It used to be argued that the Wars of the

Roses had a finite end, the battle of Bosworth

in 1485, and that later conspiracies were

different. That is what the Tudors and their

propagandists wanted their contemporaries

and hence us to think, but it is not tenable

today. Actually the conspiracies petered out.

Plots became progressively less dangerous,

attracted diminishing support and were more

effectively countered, until new divisions,

arising from the Reformation, supplanted

them on the national and international

agenda. If Richard de la Pole died at Pavia in

1525, the White Rose of York had ceased to

pose a genuine threat a decade or more before.

Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary I and Elizabeth I

had to contend with other kinds of

insurrections and rivals.

Further reading 93

Harvey, I.M.W., Jack Cade's Rebellion of 1450

(Oxford, 1991)

Hicks, M.A., False, Fleeting, Perjur'd Clarence:

George Duke of Clarence 1449-1478, revised

edition (Bangor, 1992)

, Bastard Feudalism (Harlow, 1995)

, Warwick the Kingmaker (Oxford, 1998)

, 'Propaganda and the Battle of St

Albans, 1455', in Nottingham Medieval

Studies, 44 (2000)

, 'Bastard Feudalism, Overmighty

Subjects, and Idols of the Multitude during

the Wars of the Roses', in History, 85 (2001)

Hodges, G., Ludford Bridge and Mortimer's

Cross, revised edition (Almeley, 2001)

Holland, P. 'The Lincolnshire Rebellion of

March 1470', in English Historical Review,

103 (1988)

Jack, R.I., 'A Quincentenary: The Battle of

Northampton, July 10

, 1460', in

Northamptonshire Past and Present, iii (1)

(1960)

Jones, M.K., Bosworth 1485: The Psychology of

a Battle (Stroud, 2002)

, 'A Kingdom for a Cause', in BBC

History Magazine, 3(9) (2002)

Pollard, A.J., The Wars of the Roses, second

edition (Basingstoke, 2001)

(ed.), The Wars of the Roses

(Basingstoke, 1995)

, 'Lord Fitzhugh's Rising in 1470', in

Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research,

S3 (1979)

Richmond, C.R, 'English Naval Power in the

Fifteenth Century', in History, S3 (1967)

, 'Fauconberg's Kentish Rising of May

1471', in English Historical Review, 85 (1970)

Rosenthal, J.T., 'Other Victims: Peeresses as War

Widows 1450-1500', in History, 72 (1987)

Ross, C.D., The Wars of the Roses (London,

1976)

Visser-Fuchs, L., 'Nicholas Harpsfield, Clerk

of the Signet, Author and Murderer', in

The Ricardian, 125 (1994)

Index

Figures in bold refer to illustrations

Accord 8, 9, 28, 36, 82

Angers, Treaty of 9

Angus, Earl of 38

armies 83

composition 17-18, 20-23, 50-52, 67, 68-69

weapons 52-53, 69, 70, 88-89

The Arrival of Edward IV (Harpsfield) 61-65, 70

attainder see treason

Audley, Lord 9, 25, 35

badges, heraldic 17, 18, 53, 76

ballads 17

Bamburgh, battle of 52, 87

Barnet, battle of 7, 9, 17, 21, 29, 33, 35, 45, 52, 53,

57,

61,

62, 87, 89

Beauchamp, Anne see Warwick, Anne Beauchamp,

Countess of

Beauchamp, Richard, Earl of 77

Beaufort, Margaret see Richmond and Derby,

Lady Margaret Beaufort, Countess of

Beauforts 13, 23, 48, 65, 73

Bisham Priory 71

Blore Heath, battle of 9, 18, 25, 33, 35

Bosworth, battle of 7, 9, 16, 17, 20, 23, 33, 34-35,

48, 49, 84-85, 89

Breze, Pierre de 20, 38

Buckingham, Henry, Duke of 8, 18, 36, 67, 88

Buckingham's Rebellion 7, 8, 9, 46-48, 56-57, 72

Burgh, Sir Thomas 41

Burgundy 28, 32, 90

Butler, Eleanor, Lady 79

Cade, Jack 10, 12

Calais garrison 18, 19, 20, 23, 27, 28, 52, 68

campaigns

1459 31,35-36

1460-61 34, 36-37

1461-64 39

1461-68 37-40

1469 40-41, 42

1470 41-44, 43, 47, 52

1471 44-46, 51, 52

1483 46-48, 54

1485 48-49,55

1487 49-50

casualties 53-55, 57, 70, 87, 88

Chandee, Philibert de 49

Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy 32, 44, 61, 64, 90

Clarence, George, Duke of 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 40-42,

44, 45, 49, 58, 62, 68, 79, 82

Clarence, Isabel Neville, Duchess of 40-41, 78

Clarence, Lionel, Duke of 12, 28

coups d'etat 9, 12, 29, 30, 35, 40, 46

Courtenays 23

Dacre, Randall, Lord 57

Dartford, coup d'etat 9, 12, 35

de la Pole, Edmund 86

Devon, Earl of 40, 41, 45, 87

Dorset, Marquis of 47

Dudley, Oliver, Lord 25, 35, 73

Edgecote, battle of 9, 29, 33, 35, 41, 52, 53, 87

Edward III 12, 13, 26, 28

Edward IV (formerly Earl of March; Duke of York)

6, 7, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 18, 20,

21,

23, 27, 28, 29, 30,

33, 36, 37-38, 40, 43-45, 46, 52, 56, 57, 58, 68, 70,

72, 74,

81,

82, 84, 86, 87, 89, 90

arrest 9, 40, 41

burial 60

Readeption 44

see also The Arrival of Edward IV (Harpsfield)

Edward V 7, 8, 9, 29, 46-47, 48, 78, 84

Edward VI see Simnel, Lambert

Edward, Prince, Duke of Lancaster 9, 14, 28, 36, 88

Elizabeth (Woodville), queen to Edward IV 78, 79

Empingham, battle of 9, 33, 35, 41, 53, 87

Etaples, Treaty of 90

executions 29, 39, 41, 45, 46, 48, 55-56, 67, 78, 79,

81,

82, 87, 88

Exeter, Anne, Duchess 78

Exeter, Henry, Duke of 36, 44, 45, 72

Fastolf, Sir John 20

Fauconberg, Bastard of 16, 20, 45, 52, 62-64, 70, 82

financing the wars 68

FitzHugh, Lord 43

Fortescue, Sir John 28,45-46

France 7, 28, 32, 37-38, 84, 89, 90

Gaunt, John of see Lancaster, John of Gaunt, Duke of

Gloucester, Richard, Duke oi see Richard III

(formerly Duke of Gloucester)

Grey, Elizabeth, Lady 79

Grey, Lord 36

Grey, Richard 29

Grey, Sir Ralph 69, 88

Hampden, Anne, Lady 79

Harlech Castle 40, 41

Harpsfield, Nicholas 61-65

Harrington, William, Lord 78

Hastings, Edward, Lord 81, 88

Hastings, Katherine, Lady 78

Hastings, Mary 81

Hastings, William, Lord 29, 45, 78

Hedgeley Moor, battle of 9, 38

Henry IV 9, 12, 82

Henry V 84

Henry VI 7, 8, 10, 11, 11-12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20,

24-25, 24-25, 27, 28, 30, 35-37, 57, 59, 61, 65, 68,

82, 84, 89, 90

arrest 45

burial 60

Readeption 7, 9, 42, 86

Henry VII (Henry Tudor) 7, 8, 9, 14, 20, 47, 48, 49,

50, 57, 67, 68, 72, 73, 7S, 78, 79, 84, 86, 87, 89,

90-91

rivals 60

Henry VIII 8, 60

Herbert, William, Lord see Pembroke, William Herbert,

Earl of

Herberts 28

Hexham, battle of 9, 38, 55, 87

Hopton, Elizabeth 78

Howard, Lord 69

Hundred Years' War 7, 10, 14, 20, 28, 52, 68, 88

Hungerford, Eleanor, lady 79

Hungerford, Frideswide 73, 81

Hungerford, Margaret, l.ady 80-81

Hungerford, Walter 81

Hungerfords 80

Huntingdon, Earl of 49

inheritance 57-58, 73, 78-81

injuries 52, 54, 87

Index 95

Lampleugh, Gawen 70

Lancaster, Edward, Duke of see Edward,

Prince, Duke of Lancaster

Lancaster, John of Gaunt, Duke of 12, 28

Lancasters 13, 26, 48, 65

Lincoln, John de la Pole, Earl of 9, 49, 50

Lincolnshire Rebellion 9, 29

London 70, 74-75

Bridge 16

Tower of 16, 36, 52, 66-67, 70, 89

St Paul's Cathedral 56, 74-75

Losecote Field (battle of Empingham) 9, 41, 87

Louis XI 28, 32, 42, 61, 63, 90

Loveday 9, 24, 56

Lucy, Margaret, l.ady 79

Ludford, battle 9, 18, 27, 33, 36, 55

Mackerel, Sir Ralph 70

March, Edmund Mortimer, Earl of 12

March, Edward, Earl of see Edward IV

(formerly Earl of March, Duke of York)

Margaret, Dowager-Duchess of Burgundy 32, 49

Margaret of Angou, Queen 8, 9, 14, 15, 23, 27, 28,

36-37, 42, 45, 70, 72, 78, 90

Margaret of York 64

Memoire (Harpsfield) 61

Moleyn, Robert, Lord 79

Moleyns, Eleanor, Lady 79, 81

Montagu, John, Lord 38, 44, 45

Mortimer, Sir John 12

Mortimers 12, 13, 26

Mortimer's Cross, battle of 9, 23, 37, 38

Morton, Cardinal 46

Neville, Anne 9, 78, 79

Neville, Archbishop 29, 41

Neville, Cecily 78

Neville, Eleanor 78

Neville, Isabel see Clarence, Isabel Neville, Duchess of

Neville, Katherine 73, 78

Neville, Richard (the elder), Earl of Salisbury 12 see also

Warwick, Richard Neville (the younger), the Kingmaker,

Earl of

Neville, Sir Thomas 57

Nevilles 13, 23, 40, 65, 90

nobility, exiled 71-73

Norfolk, Duke of 33, 37

Norfolk, Elizabeth, Duchess of 81

Norfolk, Margaret, Dowager-Duchess of 78

Northampton, battle of 9, 28, 30, 33, 35, 89

Northumberland, Earls of see Percies, Earls of

Northumberland

Northumberland, Eleanor (the elder), Countess of 78

Northumberland, Eleanor (the younger), Countess of 78

Ogard, Sir Andrew 20

Oldhall, Sir William 20

Ormond, John Butler, Earl of 72

Oxford, Elizabeth Howard, Dowager-Countessof 79-80

Oxford, John, Earl of 14, 21, 44, 45, 49, 50, 79, 87, 90

Oxford, Margaret, Countess of 79

'Parliament of Devils' 27

Pembroke, Jasper Tudor, Earl of 8, 14, 21, 23, 29, 36,

40, 45, 47, 49, 72, 90

Pembroke, William Herbert, Earl of 40, 41, 87

Percies, Earls of Northumberland 13, 20, 21, 23, 38, 49,

57, 73

Percy, Sir Ralph 69

Picquigny expedition 21

Picqulgny, Treaty of 90

piracy 14, 20, 66-67

Plumpton, Sir William 56, 67

politics 18-19, 32, 76-77, 90-91

propaganda 48, 57, 73-75, 85, 91

Redesdale, Robin of 9, 23, 29, 40

Richard II 9, 12

Richard III (formerly Duke of Gloucester) 7, 8, 9, 14, 15,

19, 20, 21, 23, 29, 33, 45, 46, 47, 48-49, 58, 67, 74-75,

77, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86, 87, 91

burial 57

rivals 48

Richmond and Derby, Lady Margaret Beaufort,

Countess of 48, 78, 85

Richmond, Yorkshire 19, 20, 21, 23, 43, 90

Rivers, Lord 27, 29, 36, 37, 41, 88

Rous, John 69

Salisbury, Alice, Countess of 78

Salisbury, Richard, Earl of 9, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26-27, 35,

36, 57, 73, 87

Sandwich 9, 36

Scotland 32, 37-38, 90

Scrope, Lords 49

Shakespeare, William 8, 12, 48, 84

Simnel, Lambert 9, 21, 49-50

Somerset, Edmund, Duke of 11, 12, 21, 35

Somerset, Henry, Duke of 27, 36, 45

Southampton Plot 12

St Albans 37

first battle of 9, 12, 13, 14, 23, 33, 35, 52, 53, 55-56, 57

second battle of 9, 28, 33, 35, 52, 53, 55, 87

St John, Lord 45

St Leger, Sir Thomas 48

Stafford knot 18

Staffords 48

Stanley, Sir William 33, 49, 78

Stanley, Thomas, Lord 48, 78

Stanleys 16, 23, 49

Stoke, battle of 7, 9, 14, 18, 21, 33, 49, 53, 89

Stony Stratford, coup d'etat 29

Strange, Lord 49

Suffolk, William, Duke of 10

Surrey, Elizabeth, Countess of 79

Swart, Martin 20-21, 49, 50

taxation 68

Tewkesbury 34

Abbey 69

battle of 7, 9, 21, 29, 33, 45, 52, 53, 55, 61, 69, 87, 89

Towton, battle of 7, 9, 17, 28, 33, 35, 37, 55, 57, 87

treason 56-57, 67-68, 70-71, 73, 75, 77, 78-79, 87-88

Trollope, Sir Andrew 35, 36

Tudor, Henry see Henry VII (Henry Tudor)

Tudor, Jasper see Pembroke, Jasper Tudor, Earl of

Tudors 26, 91

Vaughans 48

Vernon, Henry 18, 77

victory celebrations 74, 86

Wakefield, battle of 9, 28, 33, 35, 36, 55, 87

Warbeck, Perkin 7, 9, 19, 86

Warwick, Anne Beauchamp, Countess of 78, 79

Warwick, Richard Neville (the younger), the Kingmaker,

Earl of 7, 8, 9, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 27, 28-29,

32, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 40-42, 44, 45, 52, 56, S7-60, 62,

70, 75, 77, 82, 84, 88, 89, 90

piracy 14, 20, 66-67

Welles, Leo, Lord 41, 57

Welles, Sir Robert 41

Wenlock, John, Ix>rd 45, 79

Willoughby, Marjorie, Lady 79

Wiltshire, Eleanor, Countess of 79

Worcester, John, Earl of 56, 78, 87

Wydevilles 8, 14, 28, 29, 47

York, Cecily, Duchess of 78

York, Edward, Duke of see Edward IV (formerly

Earl of March; Duke of York)

York, Elizabeth of 84

York, Richard, Duke of 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12-13, 15, 19, 21,

23, 24, 27, 28, 35, 36, 49, 73, 82, 90

badge of 17

Second Protectorate 35

Third Protectorate 28, 36

Yorks 13, 26, 48, 60, 65, 73

The Wars of the Roses featured

sixteen invasions, four successful;

six times kings lost their thrones.

This book explores why those

invasions occurred and kept

occurring. Destruction and

devastation were minimal, barely

affecting the daily routine

of the civilian population, yet the

Wars were lethal for their noble

leaders and, as first hand accounts

reveal, blighted the lives of their

women and children. That the

Wars ended so abruptly was not

so much because Henry VII won

at Bosworth and ruled effectively,

the author concludes, but rather

because a feel-good factor

removed popular discontent and

continental rivals turned elsewhere.

front and back cover image^ Henry VI and Edward IV at the battle of Nrthampton.

(The British Library)

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