32 Essential Histories • The Wars of the Roses 1455-1487 
in changing both king and dynasty. The 
Scots occupied Berwick from 1461 to 1483 
and crossed the northern frontier 
repeatedly in 1461-63 and in 1480-82. 
Lesser raids occurred almost annually in 
the 1460s and in 1472-74. There were 
series of northern rebellions in 1469-71 
and in 1486-92. Never before or since has 
the kingdom of England seemed more of 
an island, exposed to attack anywhere 
along 2,000 miles of coast and land frontier 
and nowhere more than a day from enemy 
bases overseas or from Scotland. Hard 
though they tried, no regime was able to 
control the sea, although Warwick came 
closest in 1459-61, and there were no 
successful interceptions of seaborne 
attackers throughout the period. Once 
ashore, admittedly, small expeditions were 
at risk, but they quickly outgrew the forces 
available locally. No government could 
guard effectively against landings that 
could occur anywhere, in Kent or Devon in 
1470, in Norfolk and Yorkshire in 1471, in 
Essex and Cornwall in 1472-74, or at 
Milford in Hampshire or Milford in 
Pembrokeshire in 1485. Nor could they 
afford to keep their defences alert for 
prolonged periods. Often enough, 
moreover, such landings were part of multi-
pronged attacks that diverted attention, so 
where did the real threat lie? 
One difference between the Wars of the 
Roses and the periods before and after was 
the willingness of foreign powers to dabble 
in English affairs and in English politics. 
Their actions were self-interested, arising 
principally from the rivalry of the great 
north European powers of France (and its 
Scottish ally) and Burgundy. The Wars of 
the Roses were part of the struggle between 
France and Burgundy that was fought on 
English soil. Merely providing the shipping 
enabled Louis XI, Charles the Bold and 
Margaret of Burgundy to exploit pre-
existing political divisions within England. 
A handful of Burgundian handgunners 
in 1461 and a few thousand French (1485) 
and German professionals (1487) exerted 
disproportionate force against amateur 
armies that fell short of continental 
standards of equipment, training, and 
numbers. Relatively small diplomatic, 
financial and military investments paid 
foreign powers big dividends, at the very 
least preventing effective English 
intervention in Europe. 
The campaigns themselves were very 
short. Aggressors sought first to outgrow 
local resistance and to recruit locally, and 
secondly to force a battle with the ruling 
regime's field army before all those owing 
allegiance could join the king. Having 
failed to prevent a landing, the 
establishment also sought to crush its rivals 
before they were too strong. Both sides 
always hastened to settle the issue in battle, 
so that neither faced the major logistical 
problems of accommodating and supplying 
armies for months and years in the face of 
the enemy in the field. Outside the years 
1461-64, when the Lancastrians 
maintained their toehold in 
Northumberland, there was little 
garrisoning or blockading of castles or 
towns. Multi-pronged attacks were as much 
about distracting defensive efforts as 
bringing together all the aggressor's 
resources; only four times was such a 
combination attempted - in 1455, when it 
was successful, in 1459, when it took too 
long, and in 1469 and 1470, when the 
decisive battle happened first. Inevitably, 
therefore, opposing sides joined in battle 
before their fullest strength was achieved. 
Each preferred known risks to what might 
have been, hence there were no semi-
permanent frontiers between rival spheres 
of influence, no gains or losses in one 
another's territory and no stalemates 
between rival front lines. Several times 
efforts were made to settle quarrels by 
negotiation - in 1455, 1459, 1460, 1470 
and 1471 - always by securing the same 
concessions as were sought by force, but 
agreement was never achieved. It was 
unusual for either side to refuse battle, 
although the Scots did at Alnwick in 1463 
and Warwick did at Coventry in 1471, and 
rarer still for such policies to succeed. Four