Kissinger Henry. White House Years

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confrontation;througheveryphaseofcoexistencetheSovietleadershave

insistedthatitdidnotimplyanylesseningoftheideologicalstruggle.Soviet‐line

Communistpartiesaroundtheworldoccasionallydifferwiththeirseniorpartner

inMoscowonquestionsofinternalCommunistpolicy—asonewouldexpectfrom

strong‐willed,power‐orientedmenwhohave reachedeminencebyaruthless

politicalcompetition.Theyalmostneverdifferoninternationalissues;eventhe

mostapparently“independent”CommunistpartiesofWesternEuropeandLatin

AmericafollowtheSovietleadinforeignpolicywithoutsignificant exceptions,

andthoseexceptionsareasoftenasnotonthesideofgreaterradicalismthan

theKremlinconsidersexpedient.



NoristheproblemsimplyamatterofCommunistparties.Radicalpoliticsin

today’sworldencompassesanetworkofsympatheticorganizationsandgroups

thatcovertheglobe,carryingoutterroristoutragesorfinancingthem,

transferringweapons,infiltratingmedia,seekingtoswaypoliticalprocesses.How

fundsaretransferredfromformalCommunistchannelstothesefront

organizationsisdifficulttotrace.OurAmbassadorinChile,forexample,reported

inSeptember1970thatoneofthereasonswhyhewasconvincedAllendewould

succeedinestablishinga totalitarianstatewasthat“ofthethreeTVchannelsin

Santiago,inastillfreesociety,oneistotallycontrolledbytheMarxist‐Leninistsof

theUniversityofChile,anotheriscontrolledbyacombinationofMarxistsand

veryleftwingChristianDemocratsoftheCatholicUniversityandthethirdisthe

State’s.”(Thestate’s,ofcourse,wouldalsobecom edominatedbyradicalsafter

Allende’saccessiontopower.)Andthroughout1970wereceivedcrediblereports

thatsubstantialcovertfundsandassistancefromCubaandotherCommunist 

sourceswerebeingfunneledtoAllende.



Inthesecircumstancesitwasneithermorallynorpoliticallyunjustifiedfor

theUnitedStatestosupportthoseint ernalpoliticalforcesseekingtomaintaina

democraticcounterweighttoradicaldominance.Onthecontrary,noresponsible

nationalleadercouldhavedoneotherwise.Therewasnothingsinisteraboutthe

desireoftheUnitedStatestomakeitpossiblefordemocraticpartiestomaintain

competingradioortelevisionoutletsornewspapers.Theseconsiderationshad

inducedtheKennedyandJohnsonadministrationstomakeavailableover$3

millionbetween1962and1964tothecampaignofAllende’sopponent,the

reformistandableEduardoFrei(thoughapparentlywithoutFrei’sknowledge);

andtheybecameparticularlyacuteinthelightofAllende’srelentlesscampaignof

harassment,intimidation,andeconomicpressuresto driveopposingmediaand

democraticpartiesoutofbusinessoncehecameintooffice. ThisIwilldiscussat

greaterlengthinthenextvolume.



Whatthereaderisentitledtoknow,however,isbrieflyhowina

democraticsocietywemaintainedsupervisionovercovertactivitiestoensure

thattheyremainedconsonantwithournationalethicandpurposes.



Whenwecameintooffice,covertoperationsweresupervisedbytheso‐

called303Committee,namedafteraJune1964PresidentialDirective(National

SecurityActionMemorandum303)thataffirmeditscomposition,functions,and

responsibilities. Suchaninteragencycoordinatingmechanismhasexistedunder

variousdesignationseversincethe1947NationalSecurityAct,whichcreatedthe

CIAandtheNSC.EarlyintheNixonAdministrationthe303Committeewas

identifiedinanewsstory.Inthosefarawaydaysofinnocencethiswasconsidered

enoughofabreachofsecuritytorequireachangeofname.NationalSecurity

DecisionMemorandum40reaffirmedthefunctionsofthecommitteeonFebruary

17,1970;itwasgivenanewlabel,namedafterthisdirective.



Atthattime,the40CommitteewascomposedoftheAttorneyGeneral,the

DeputySecretariesofStateandDefense,theDirectorofCentralIntelligence,the

ChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,andtheAssistanttothePresidentfor

NationalSecurityAffairs,whoactedaschairman.TheAssistantSecretaryofState

fortheareainwhichthecovertactivitywasproposedwouldalmostinvariablysit

in.Inotherwords,exceptfortheAttorneyGeneral,[

TheAttorneyGeneralhad

participatedinthecommitteesupervisingcovertactionsatleastsincetheKennedy

Administration;heistodayaformalmember.

]thecompositionofthe40Committee

wasidenticaltothatoftheSeniorReviewGroupandtheWSAG;itcomprisedthe

seniorofficialsresponsiblefortheday‐to‐dayconductofournationalsecurity

affairs.Itwasthegroupmostlikelytobesensitivetoalltheramificationsofour

foreignpolicy.(TheprincipaldifferencefromtheSeniorReviewGroupwasthat

staffmemberswereexcluded.)



TheagendawasgenerallyputforwardbytheCentralIntelligenceAgencyin

consultationwithmyoffice.TheCIAusuallyclearedtheagendainformallywith

theStateDepartmentandhadatendencytodeferitemsuntilithadresolve d

StateDepartmentobjections;thishappened,forexample,withChile.(Sincethe

AmbassadorinthefieldwastechnicallythesupervisoroftheCIAstationchief,the

CIAhadlearnedthatitneededStateDepartmentsupporttooperateeffectively.)

ACIAofficerfamiliarwiththeprojectunderdiscussionwouldbrieftheCom‐

mittee.AdditionalstaffwasnotpresentexceptfortheStateDepartmentexpert

ontheareaunderdiscussion.NoteswerekeptbyaCIAofficialassignedtothe

NSCforthepurpose.



Theoverwhelmingmajorityofcovertactivitieswerefirstsuggestedbythe

CIAorbyourambassadorsabroad;whileI wasinofficeonlyintherarestofcases

didtheWhiteHouseproposeagenda items.Chilewasone ofthese,andeven

therethePresidentonlygaveimpetustowhattheCommitteewasalreadydoing

onitsown.TheonlychangeImadeintheproceduresIinheritedwastorequire

thateachapprovedcovertorreconnaissanceoperationbereviewedatleastonce

ayearbythe40Committee;thiswastopreventitscontinuationbybureaucratic

inertiaaftertheneedhadpassed.



SubjecttoPresidentialblessing,oncethe40Committeeapprovedacovert

activity—usuallybyauthorizingtheexpenditureofagivenamountofmoney—the

CIAwasresponsibleforitsexecution. The40Committeedidnotsupervisethe

day‐to‐dayconductofwhatithadapproved.Itwouldordinarilybebriefedona

particularprogramonlyoncompletionorattheannualrevieworwhenmore

moneywasrequired,althoughincriticalsituationssuchasthefirstmonthafter

Allende’svictorythereweremoreregularbriefings.Infact,theprincipal

proceduralweaknessinourcovertoperationswasthatwhiletheywereinitiated

withfullforeignpolicyreviewtheywerenotthereaftercontrolledwiththesame

attentiontodetailbythehighestlevelsinourgovernment;therewasno

subgrouptomonitoroperations.The40Committeeauthorizedbutdidnot

supervise.Theoretically,theAmericanambassadorsinwhosecountries covert

activitieswerebeingconductedweresupposedtosupplythesupervision.But

theyrarelyhadthetimeortheexpertise.[

Inreadingsomeoftheinternal

communicationsoftheAgency,whichwerepublishedbytheChurchCommittee—especially

thoseafterOctober15,1970—Ihavecometobelievethatweshouldhaveinsistedonthesame

clearanceforthosecablesbytheofficeofthePresident’snationalsecurityadviserasthatto

whichkeyStateDepartmentcablesweresubjected.

]WithrespecttoChile,thekey

questionwaswhethertheadventofanAllendegovernmentinChilewasof

sufficientconcerntoournationalsecuritytojustifytheinvolvementofthe40

Committee.



<<Contents>>



****



TheChileanElectionof1970



salreadynoted,twopreviousadministrationshadconcludedthatSalvador

Allendeandtheforcesbehindhimposedasufficientthreattoourinterests

towarrantouropposinghiminthe1964election,totheextentofnearly$3

million;aslateas1968severalhundredthousanddollarswereappropriated

covertlybyourpredecessorstohelpdefeattheAllendeforcesintheChilean

congressionalelectionsscheduledforMarch1969.Ourofficialforeignassistance

toChileduringtheFreiAdministrationtotaledwellover$1billion,thelargestper

capitaprogrambyfarinLatinAmerica—partlytostrengthenthedemocratic

forcesagainstAllende.ThatanAllendego vernmentthreatenedournational

interestswasconventionalwisdomwhenNixonenteredoffice.



Strangelyenough,theNixonAdministrationwasinitiallylessactiveagainst

AllendethanitsDemocraticpredecessorshadbeen,partlybecauseofits

preoccupationwithsomanyothercrises;partlyfromawrongestimateofthe

likelyoutcomeoftheChileanelection.Themistakenestimatewasreadily

acceptedbecauseitledtothemostcomfortableconclusion;itmadeit

unnecessarytofaceuptothehardchoiceswewouldbecompelledtomakeinthe

conditionsof1970.



TheUnitedStatesgovernmenthadforyearsactivelysupportedFrei

becausehewasthemostpopularandablemaninChile.Itwasamorallysimple

decisionbecauseitenabledustobebothanti‐Communistandonthesideof

reformistandprogressiveforcessupportedbythevastmajorityofChileans.But

in1970wewerenottobesofortunate;achoicewouldhavetobemade.

PresidentFreiwasbarredbytheChileanconstitutionfromsucceedinghimself.His

ChristianDemocraticPartyhadlostgroundinthe1969congressionalelection;its

votehadbeenreducedby11percent.TheconservativeNationalPartyhadgained

correspondingly.TheChristianDemocratsweresplintering;themostleftist

membersdesertedwhenthepartyrejectedtheirdemandfora“popularunion”

withtheMarxistparties,andthepartymachinefellintothehandsofanti‐Frei

forcesmuchmorestrident,lesscommittedtothetraditionsofanopensociety

anddemocracy,lesstrulyreformist,morehostiletotheUnitedStates.



ThepolarizationofChileanpoliticallifewasevidencedwhenFrei,inspiteof

thegenerousUSaidprogram,feltobligedbyleftistpressuresinearly1969totake

twosignificantsteps.Inthefaceofradicalstudentprotests,hecanceledavisitby

GovernorNelsonRockefeller,whomNixonhadsentonatourofLatinAmericato

helpchartanewapproachtotheWesternHemisphere.Almostsimultaneously,

FreiinsistedonrenegotiatinganagreementwiththeAmericancoppercompanies

concludedbyhisowngovernmentandputintoeffectonlytwoyearsbefore,by

whichChilehadacquiredasubstantial,thoughnotineverycasecontrolling,share

oftheownershipofthecoppermines.Henowdemandedanimmediatemajority

interestandtheprogressiveacquisitionbyChileoftheremainingAmericanstock.

Yetthedesiretostrengthenwhatweandourpredecessorsconsideredthebest

hopeformoderatedemocracyinChilewassostrongthatAmbassadorKorrywas

instructedtobehelpfulinarrangingmutuallysatisfactoryterms.“Satis factory”in

thiscontextwasarelativeconcept,giventhecompanies’knowledgethatthe

alternativewouldbeoutrightexpropriation.(Withalackofpoliticalforesight

characteristicofmanymultinationalcompanies,Anacondahadpermittedits

expropriationinsurancetolapseinrelianceontheearlieragreement,inorderto

saveinsurancefees,whichundermineditsbargainingpositionfurther.)



Therewerethusplentyofstormwarningsin1969.Theincreasingleftward

trendoftheChileanChristianDemocratsandtheirshrinkingpopularbasemadeit

unlikelythatthenonrevolutionary partiescoulduniteonasinglecandidateas

theyhaddonein1964.Theprospectwasforaclosethree‐wayraceamonga

conservativecandidate,aweakChristianDemocrat,andtheradicalleftist

Allende—andafinaldecisionbytheCongress,inwhichAllende’sgroupingwas

notfarfromamajority.ButtheWhiteHousein1969waspreoccupiedwith

Vietnamanditsdomesticturmoil,Sovietrelations,WesternEurope,theOkinawa

negotiationswithJapan,andthebeginningsoftheChinainitiative.Iknewtoo

littleaboutChiletochallengetheexperts.



Noagencycalledourattentionto thegravityofthesituation.Thosethat

mighthavefavoreda moreactiveAmericanrolewerehes itanttochallengea

StateDepartmentpredispositionagainstanactivecovertrole.Chile,indeed,isa

classicexampleofhowmajoreventscanunfoldwithouttheWhiteHouse’s

knowingbecausethelineagenciescannotagreeontheirs ignificance:The

“nonaggressiontreaty”bywhichagenciesseektoavoidacontestinwhicha

decisionmightgoagainstthempreventedChilefrombeing raisedtotheWhite

Houselevelthroughout1969.Tobesure,theCIAonanumberofoccasions

pointedoutthatifaseriouseffortweretobemountedin1970,preparationsfor

ithadtobeginin1969.AndinApril1969theAgenc yhadreckonedthatthe

radicalleftstoodanevenchanceofwinningthepresidency.Butthiswasa

practicaljudgmentofwhatwouldhavetobedoneiftherewereadecisionto

repeatourinvolvementof1964;itwasnotarecommenda tionforaction. 

Moreover,anysuchrecommendationwascertaintofacetheadamantopposition

oftheLatinAmericanBureauoftheStateDepartment,whichcouldnotbring

itselftofaceChileanpoliticalrealities.In1970therewasnoviablereformist

ChristianDemocrattosupport;thepartywasdivided;itscandidatewasweakand

playingwiththera dicalleft.IfAllendewastobestopped,itwouldhavetobeby

theconservativeJorgeAlessandri.Thoughhehadimpeccabledemocratic

credentials—indeed,hehadprecededFreiinthepresidency—theLatinAmerican

Bureaudislikedhim,ostensiblyforbeingtooold,inrealitybecausehewas

consideredinsufficientlyprogressive.SomeintheLatinAmericanBureau,

confusingsocialreformwithgeopolitics,didnotconsideranAllendepresidency

dangerousenoughtoovercometheirideologicalprejudicesagainstAlessandri.



Ironically,theAmericantendencytoidentifypoliticswithtechnical

economicdevelopmenthadunintentionallycontri butedinthelastyearsofthe

JohnsonAdministrationtotheweakeningofthereformistpoliticalforceswhom

ourofficialsreallypreferredandwhowereessentialtoresisttherevolutionary

parties.In1968—twoyearsbeforethepresidentialelectionthatbroughtAllende

topower—theUnitedStatesterminatedgranteconomicaidtoChileonthe

groundthattheChileaneconomyhadbe comelargelyself‐sustaining.Thismay

havebeentechnicallycorrect,butitisaclearexampleoftheerroroftaking

essentiallypoliticaldecisionsoneconomicgrounds.ThecutoffofAmericanaid

wasunpopularinChile;itundercutthemoderateelementrepresentedbyFrei;it

wasexploitedbythemoreradicalanti‐Americanwingofthegoverningparty,

whichadvocatedaneconomicprogramsubstantiallysimilartothatoftheradical

parties,thusfurtherconfusingtheelectoralsituation.



Thetechnicalapproachtodevelopmentflourishedsidebysidewitha

doctrinaireantimilitarism.In1967UnitedStatespolicyturnedincreasingly

unfriendlytotheChileanmilitary(andthatofotherfriendlyhemisphericnations).

Thetheorywastoencourageashiftofresourcesfrommilitaryexpendituresto

socialandeconomicdevelopment,onthepremisethatthesecountr ieshadno

needforadefenseestablishment.Ceilingswereplacedonoursaleofarms;grant

militaryaidprogramswereterminated;Freiwasencouragedtosponsorvarious

demilitarizationanddisarmamentschemesforLatinAmerica.ByOctober1969

discontentintheChileanmilitaryaboutlaggingprofessionalismandinadequate

payeruptedintoanabortivecoupagainstthegovernment.InresponseFrei

institutedastateofemergency;rumorsofmilitaryunrestcontinued.TheNixon

AdministrationinheritedinChilebotharadicalizedChristianDemocraticParty

andprofoundresentmentonthepartoftheChileanmilitaryagainsttheUnited

StatesaswellasagainsttheChristianDemocrats.Thisalmostcertainlyenhanced

Allende’sabilityto“buyoff”orneutraliz e themilitaryinthefirstyearsofhis

term.



Nothingillustratesmoreclearly—eventragically—thedangerofapplying

theabstracttheoriesofourbettergradua teschoolstothedomesticcomplexities

offoreignsocietiesthanthepolicytowardChileinthe1960s.Thenotionthat

socialreformandeconomicdevelopmentautomaticallyproducedpolitical

stability—drawnfromtheexperienceofourownNewDeal—hadonlythemost

limitedrelevanceinacountrywheretworadicalpartiesweredeterminednotto

reformbuttooverthrowthesystem.Ourrefusaltofacetherealitythatwhatwas

goingonwasadeadlypoliticalstruggleandnotadebatebetweeneconomics

professorstransformedusby1970fromthedominantelementof1964intoasort

ofmotherhencluckingner vousirrelevanciesfromthesidelines. 



Tocompletetheprocessofself‐stultification,theLatinAmericanBureau

chosethismomenttoattacktheveryconceptofcovertsupportforforeign

democraticparties,whichhad forsolongbeenacentralfeatureofourChilean

effort.TheresourcesforanyefforttoblocktheSocialist‐Communistclimbto

power,sotheargumentran,couldandshouldhereafterbefoundentirelywithin

Chile.Agreatcollegetermpapercouldhavebeenwrittenonthats ubject,butto

raiseitsuddenlyin1970wastorunthekindofunacceptableriskthat

policymakersarehiredtoavoid.Sucha policywasboundtodemoralizethevery

forceswewantedtoencourage;thosewhohadbenefitedfromAmericansupport

wouldinferfromitanewindifference.Inacloseelectiontheresultantsubtle

changeinthepsychologicalbalancecouldbedecisive.



Iwasonlydimlyawareofthesetrendsin1969.Infact,the40Committee

consideredthesubjectonlyfourtimesduringtheentiretwenty‐onemonths

beforeAllende’svictoryonSeptember4.InApril1969itdecidedtodeferany

decisiononthepossibleneedforaction;inMarch1970itallocatedanegligible

sumforpropaganda insupportofdemocraticcandidatesfivemonthsbeforethe

election;inlateJune1970itallocatedasomewhatlargersumforthesame

purposes—butintotalasumstillonly15percentofwhattheUnitedStateshad

spentcovertlyin1964;andthefundsreachedChilemuchtoolate,barelyfour

weeksbeforetheelection.InAugust1970the40Committeedecidedthat

nothingfurthercouldnowbedonebeforetheelection.Inotherwords,twoofthe

fourmeetingstooknoaction.Theothersapprovedatokeneffort.[

Onthebasisof

fourmeetingsovereighteenmonths—onlytwoofwhichmadeadecision—theSenateSelect

CommitteechargeddarklythatChilehadbeen“formorethanayear…onthe40Committee’s

agenda.”

]Atfirsttheinactionwasrationalizedbecausetherewerenotyetany

candidates;hence,itwassaid,therewasnobasisonwhichtoformajudgmentor

launchastrategy.ByearlyDecember1969,however,thisexcusevanished.The

conservativesnominatedthevenerableseptuagenarianAlessandri,aformer

PresidentofChile.TheChristianDemocratsnominatedRadomiroTomic,a

representativeoftheirleftwingwhoseprogramdifferedfromAllende’slargelyon

proceduralpointsandinhissincerededicationto thedemocraticprocess.The

CommunistsjoinedinacoalitionwithAllende’sSocialistsandchoseAllendeas

thecoalitioncandidate.Ihavealreadydescribedthevirulentanti‐Americanism

andradicalismofAllende’s1970program.Nowthattherewasathree‐manrace,

theagenciescomfortedthemselveswiththefactthatthepollsshowedAlessandri

farinthelead;hencetherewasnoneedforanAmericanrole.



Untilwellinto1970Ididnotfocusonthedangerslargelybecausethe

agencieswithoperationalresponsibilitywentthroughacomplicatedthree‐

corneredminuetthatkepttheproblemfromhigh‐levelattention.Ambassador

KorrytookthepositionthatanAllendevictorywastantamounttoaCommunist

takeover;itwouldbeimprudenttoactasifanAllendegovernmentwouldbe

anythingbutanotherCastrogovernment;itmight,infact,beworse.ButState’s

LatinAmericanBureaudisagreed;itdisparagedboththelikelihoodandthe

dangerofanAllende victory.Itwantedtodonothingtohelptheconservative

Alessandri.TheCIAtendedtosidewithKorrybutnottothepointofaskingthe

WhiteHousetoresolvethedifference;itknewitcouldnoteffectivelyoperate

withoutstrongStateDepartmentsupport.Thusthenonaggressiontreatyamong

theagenciescausedmetobeunawareforfourmonthsthatinDecember1969

theEmbassyandtheCIAstationinSantiagohadjointlysubmittedaproposalfora

campaigntoheadoffAllende;orthattheupshotoftheresultingint eragency

conferencewasagreementthatastatusreportembodyingtheconflictingpoints

ofviewwastobepreparedforthe40Committee.TheDepartmentandthe

Agencydidnotexactlyexpeditetheprocess.Ittookthemanothertwomonthsto

agreeonareport;onMarch25, 1970,theymanagedtosubmittothe40

Committeeajointprogramfora “spoiling”actionagainstAllende.Itconsistedof

Americanassistanceforthepreparationofposters,leaflets,andadvertisements

opposingAllendewithoutsupportingAlessandri.Thegrandsumof$135,000was

recommended—andapproved.[

Allthesefigureshavealreadybeenpublishedby

Congressionalcommittees.]ButtheStateDepartmentcircumscribedtheexpenditure

ofthesefundsevenfurtherbyastrongcaveattotheeffectthatifanyofthe

covertactivitiestendedtoendorseAlessandri,StateDepartmentsupportwould

bewithdrawnforthwith.Theconceptofdefeatingonecandidatewithouthelping

hisprincipalopponentwasratheroriginal;itwasnotobvioushowAllendecould

bedefeatedwithoutbenefitingAlessandri.Theappropriationandthecaveat

canceledeachotherout.



InretrospectitisclearthatIshouldhavebeenmorevigilant.Asecurity

adviserserveshisPresidentbestbyneversimplyratifyingthebureaucratic

consensus;heshouldalwaysbethedevil’sadvocate,thetirelessaskerof

questions,theproberofwhatispresentedasself‐evident.ButLatinAmericawas

anareainwhichIdidnotthenhaveexpertiseofmyown.Iwaslulledbythepolls

thatpredictedanAlessandrivictoryandbytheconsensusoftheagencies—a

consensusIwouldneverhaveacceptedsoreadilyinanareawhereIhadfirsthand

knowledge.AndinthespringandsummerCambodiaclaimedmostofmy

attention.



ItwasJune27beforeChilereturnedtotheagendaofthe40Committee,

toolateforaneffectiveroleintheremainingtwomonthsoftheChilean

presidentialcampaign.AmbassadorKorry’suneasinessaboutanAllendevictory

hadmultipliedbecausewenowfacedanotherdanger:bothCIAandState

DepartmentexpertssuddenlyandunexpectedlyconcludedthatAllende’s

supportersintheChileanCongressmightprevailevenifAllendelost,unless

Alessandri’smarginofvictoryinthepopularelection—stillconfidentlyassumed—

wasmorethan5percent.Korrythereforerecommendedatwo‐phaseprogram:

anincreaseinexpenditureforspoilingactivitiesalreadyapproved,andfundsto

influencethecongressionalvote.



TheStateDepartmentopposedbothproposals;theonlyargumentithad

foundevenpartiallypersuasivewasaqueryfromKorry:“Ifhe[Allende]wereto

gainpower,whatwouldbeourresponsetothosewhoaskedwhatwedid?”

Expenditureswereapprovedforthebriefperiodremaininginthecampaignand

thesewere,asindicated,minorbythestandardsof1964.Forstudentsof

bureaucraticloreitshouldbenotedthatthevotewasunanimous;theLatin

AmericanBureauchosenottoberecordedasholdingtheviewsitwas

advocating,thuspreservingitsflexibilitywhatevertheoutcomeandprotecting

itselfshouldKorry’squestionberaisedagainafteranAllendevictory.Adecision

onPhaseII—seekingtoinfluencetheCongress—wasdeferreduntilafterthe

election.TheLatinAmericanBureaumadesurethatAmbassadorKorrywasnot

misledbytheapprovaloffunds.Itinformedhimbybackchannelthatitopposed

bothpre‐election(PhaseI)andpost‐election(PhaseII)programsonphilosophical

grounds,anditreiteratedinthestrongesttermsitsobjectiontousinganyofthe

approvedfundstohelpAlessandri.Therewasnodangerofourgettinginto

troubleinChilethroughanexcessofenthusiasmorthroughaclear‐cutstrategic

plan.OpposingAllendewithouthelpingAlessa ndrimeantstrengtheningtheweak

ChristianDemocratTomic,thusreducingthevoteoftheonlyalternativeto 

Allendewhohadachance.Acasecanthusbemadeforthepropositionthatthe

anti‐AlessandriabiasofourbureaucracyensuredanAllendevictory.



IfthefundsapprovedinMarchweremuchtoolittle,thosereluctantly

votedattheendofJunewerefartoolate.(Theywerealsotoolittle.)TheJune27

meetingtookplacebarelytwomonthsbefore theelection.Giventheneedfor

formalPresidentialapprovalandthesubsequentpaperwork,itisunlikelythatany

ofthesefundsreachedChilebeforethesecondhalfofJuly.AndthentheEmbassy

wasconstrainedbyinstructionsthatmadetheireffectiveusealmostimpossible.[

I

learnedlaterthatsomerepresentativesoftheCIAhadinformallyadvisedsomeAmerican

businessinterestsinlateJulyandAugustwheretochannelfundsduringtheelection.Thiswas

notknownattheWhiteHouseorintheStateDepartment;atanyrate,italsowastoolate.My

ownattitudewasthatanycovertactioninChileshouldbecarriedoutexclusivelybyour

government;thiswasnotafieldforprivateenterprise.Accordingly,IturneddownITT’sofferof

$1milliontohelpinfluencetheelection.Imayhaveagreedwiththeobjective,butcertainlynot

thevehicle.]

