Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)
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144 part one—chapter two
was negotiated between Murtaza’s plenipotentiary, Shahin Agha, and
Hetman Koniecpolski, to be conrmed by Murtaza in September. It
cleared some misunderstandings that had dated back to the Treaty of
Hotin and specied that the Polish king was not obliged to pay tribute
to the sultan, although he was expected to send “gis” to the khan.
e Tatars and Nogays were to be removed from Budjak, and no o-
cial posts were to be given there to Kantemir, his brother Aytemir, or
other Nogay mirzas. Both Istanbul and Warsaw were to do their best
to prevent the Tatar and Cossack raids, but it was agreed that a minor
raid would not be regarded as a cause of war. e Ottoman authorities
in Očakiv were ordered not to let the Tatars cross the Dnieper when
the latter aimed to raid Poland. e remaining clauses regulated the
Polish-Moldavian border conicts, trade, and diplomatic exchange. In
the last days of October, the new Polish-Ottoman peace was conrmed
by a solemn ‘ahdname, issued by Sultan Murad IV in Istanbul.
415
A few
days later, Djanibek Giray issued in Baghchasaray his own ‘ahdname,
conrming the Crimean peace with Poland, and sent it through his
envoy, Hasan Mirza.
e khan’s instrument, whose narratio was mixed with dispositio,
recalled the initial peace oer by Koniecpolski, the khan’s decision
to send his previous ‘ahdname through Ibrahim Bey, the accession of
Vladislaus to the Polish throne, the embassy of Stefan Narajowski who
brought the royal gis, and the khan’s decision to send a new envoy,
Hasan Mirza, along with the current instrument. Djanibek stressed
again that though the Tatars had initially planned to raid Poland, they
had changed their mind persuaded by the Polish hetman and raided
Muscovy instead. Invoking a recent rman, ordering reconciliation
with Poland, which he obtained from Murad IV, the khan ascribed
himself the merit for persuading the Porte to make peace with Poland
through his earlier correspondence with the sultan and Murtaza Pasha.
e Crimean instrument stipulated that the Tatars would maintain
peace provided that the king sent each year the customary gis to
the khan and his ocials. e merchants of both countries were to
travel safely and no harm was to touch the royal domains. e khan
announced that in fulllment of the previous royal requests Kantemir,
415
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 138–139 and 436–457
(Documents 43–45); the sultan’s ‘ahdname was dated in the rst decade of Djumada
I 1044 A.H., i.e., between 23 October and 1 November 1634.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 145
his brother Aytemir, his cousin Salman-shah, as well as other Nogays
and Tatars were ordered to leave Akkerman (i.e., Budjak).
416
Having
invoked this compliance with Warsaw’s request, Djanibek recalled the
earlier Polish promise that if the Nogays and Tatars were removed
from Budjak, also the Cossacks would be removed from the Dnieper.
e detainment of Narajowski in the Crimea was explained by the
khan’s desire to rst communicate with the Porte and only then send
back the royal envoy. Djanibek assured the king that he had never
schemed any wrong towards the Polish envoy and he had earlier like-
wise tolerated the long detainment of Ibrahim Bey in Poland-Lithuania.
e khan’s last demand was quite unusual as it stipulated that the
king should send “gi and treasure” (pişkeş ve hazine) to the Ottoman
sultan. Shortly before, in the direct Polish-Ottoman negotiations,
Koniecpolski managed to persuade Murtaza Pasha that the Polish
king had no tributary obligations towards the Porte, thus removing
the misunderstanding that had dated back to the Treaty of Hotin. e
khan was either unaware of this compromise or pretended to defend
the prestige of the Ottoman padishah more persistently than the Otto-
man dignitaries had done.
417
Like usually, the khan’s instrument was followed by a letter of his
qalga (and the future khan), Mehmed Giray, issued in the latter’s
residence at Ordu Saray and sent through a separate envoy, Mustafa
Mirza.
418
Like the khan, the qalga promised to maintain the peace with
Poland. e name of Islam Giray, the qalga’s older brother, was no
longer mentioned in the correspondence, because the Tatar prince had
been nally set free from Polish captivity.
416
In fact Kantemir, ordered to join the Ottoman campaign against Persia, ignored
the sultan’s will and remained in Budjak. Other Nogays followed Kantemir’s exam-
ple and refused to settle in the Crimea; see Berindei, “La Porte Ottomane face aux
Cosaques Zaporogues,” p. 304.
417
See Document 50; the document was dated in the second decade of Djumada I
1044 A.H., i.e., 2–11 November 1634. On the term pişkeş and the issue of tribute pay-
ing in the Polish-Ottoman relations, cf. n. 280 above and Document 50, n. 23.
418
AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 63, t. 24, no. 486; published in Materialy dlja isto-
rii Krymskago xanstva, pp. 118–119. Like the khan’s instrument, the qalga’s letter
(referred to as a yarlıq) was dated in the second decade of Djumada I 1044 A.H.,
i.e., 2–11 November 1634. Ordu Saray is identied by Abrahamowicz with Aq Mes-
djid Saray or Aq Mesdjid, a town situated near modern Simferopol, serving as the
qalga’s residence and destroyed by the Russian army in 1736; see Senai, Historia chana
Islam Gereja III, p. 153, n. 99; cf. Jankowski, A Historical-Etymological Dictionary, pp.
184–186.
146 part one—chapter two
In the last months of his reign, the aging khan regarded Kantemir
as a much greater danger than the distant Safavids, against whom the
Tatars had to ght under Ottoman orders. Djanibek even considered
to follow the steps of Shahin Giray and invite the Cossacks to jointly
attack Kantemir. When invited by Murad IV to march against Persia,
he refused giving his age as a pretext and in March 1635 was duly
dismissed and exiled to Rhodes.
419
If the Porte hoped that the new khan, Inayet Giray, a younger brother
of Tokhtamısh Giray who had remained under its protection since the
latter’s death (1608), would be more easily manageable, it proved to be
wrong. Inayet openly refused to participate in the Persian campaign
420
and endeavored to strengthen his position on the Crimean throne.
He appointed his two brothers—Hüsam and Sa‘adet Girays, the last
remaining sons of Ghazi II Giray—his qalga and nureddin, and in
June 1635 sent a new letter of agreement to Vladislaus IV.
Interestingly, Inayet’s instrument was much closer in content to
Mehmed III Giray’s ‘ahdname from 1624 than to Djanibek’s instru-
ments from 1632–1634. It began with a reference to the “pristine”
times of Mengli and Devlet Girays, when the Polish kings used to send
gis loaded on their own carts as far as Baghchasaray, not merely to
the khans, but to their relatives and ocials as well. Aer a further
reference to the treaty concluded in the times of his father, Ghazi II
Giray (i.e., the Treaty of Ţuţora), Inayet listed the conditions of peace
that were to be observed in the future by King Vladislaus: not invad-
ing Moldavia, Wallachia, and the sultan’s lands around Akkerman and
Kilia; restraining and expulsing the Cossacks from the Dnieper; paying
the customary gis to the khan and his family members, their promi-
nent aghas, and the qaraçı beys. Furthermore, the king was asked to
issue his letter of agreement and send it through his great envoy along
with the gis. At the end, the khan’s instrument contained a warning
that was missing in the earlier ‘ahdnames: if the king failed in his obli-
gations, a hundred thousand of Tatars, assisted by another hundred
thousand of Nogays, Circassians, Kabardinians, Kumyks, and others,
were to raid the royal domains “in summer as well as in winter [. . .]
with re and sword with the assistance of God and our Prophet, and
419
Cf. Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 38–39; idem,
“Geneza sojuszu kozacko-tatarskiego z 1648 r.,” pp. 281–282; Berindei, “La Porte
Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues,” p. 304; Le khanat de Crimée, p. 336.
420
is campaign was to result in the temporary Ottoman conquest of Erevan, lost
in the following year.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 147
capture the commoners and the noble ones.” “Assuming that each
Tatar would take one captive and one head of cattle—continued the
khan, adding an interesting arithmetic calculation—, you should con-
sider whether it would not exceed the value of the gis that you are to
send.” Nevertheless, in conclusion Inayet Giray repeated his intention
to maintain the peace as an optimal measure.
421
e aforementioned instrument was brought to Poland by Ghazi
Agha, referred to as a great courier. e text of the document reveals
that Ghazi Agha was to be followed by the great envoy, Rüstem Agha,
but we do not know whether the latter made his way to Poland and
whether he was provided with yet another instrument. Like usually,
the khan’s instrument was followed by the letters of other Crimean
dignitaries.
422
e Tatar embassy was received in Warsaw in October
1635 and sent back to the Crimea, although King Vladislaus refused to
appoint a great envoy as it had been requested by the khan.
423
Later in the year 1635, Inayet Giray began preparing an expedi-
tion against Kantemir. Like his predecessors, Shahin and Djanibek
Girays, he invited the Cossacks to jointly attack the Nogays. Aer a
year of preparations, in January 1637 the khan invaded Budjak. See-
ing his forces outnumbered, Kantemir took refuge in Istanbul, while
Oraq Mirza prostrated before the khan and asked for his pardon. e
remaining Nogay commanders, including Aytemir and Salman-shah,
were defeated in March 1637 and fell prisoner to the khan. Victorious
Inayet Giray ordered a resettlement of the whole Budjak horde to the
Crimea. While the khan returned home earlier, the qalga and nured-
din escorted the Nogays to the Dnieper crossing near Očakiv. ere,
the Nogays surprised their guards, killed Hüsam and Sa‘adet Girays,
and returned to Budjak. Fearing a Crimean revenge, in the summer of
1637 the Nogays approached Hetman Koniecpolski and asked for Pol-
ish protection. Oraq Mirza played a crucial role in these negotiations
as earlier he had served in the Polish campaign against Muscovy.
424
421
See Document 51.
422
e khan’s instrument is today preserved only in Polish translation; however,
the letter of Nureddin Sa‘adet Giray is preserved in original. It was issued in Bagh-
chasaray, dated in the second decade of Muharrem 1045 A.H., just like the khan’s
instrument (the latter also contains a more precise date, i.e., 29 June 1635), and sent
through a courier named Ghazi Bey; see AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 63, t. 8, no. 466.
423
Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 41–46.
424
See the letters of Krzysztof Dzierżek (the Polish envoy to the khan), Inayet
Giray, Vasile Lupu (the hospodar of Moldavia), Mikołaj Zaćwilichowski (a Polish mil-
itary commander), and Malinowski (the hetman’s envoy to the Nogays), addressed to
148 part one—chapter two
Meanwhile, Inayet Giray made his way to Istanbul in vain eort
to explain his invasion of Budjak. In an unprecedented act, Sultan
Murad IV ordered to strangulate the khan and appointed Bahadır
Giray in his place. Inayet’s archenemy, Kantemir, did not live much
longer as he was also executed by the Porte.
425
e Cossack era 1637–1653
e new khan, Bahadır Giray, persuaded the Nogays to return under
his rule, so by October 1637 they broke their negotiations with Poland.
Yet, two years later the khan was to violate his promise and execute
the main Nogay leaders, including Oraq Mirza and probably Aytemir
and Salman-shah as well. Only Azamet Mirza, Oraq’s nephew, escaped
the massacre and entered the Polish service.
426
Bahadır Giray appointed his brothers, Islam Giray (the former
prisoner in Poland) and Safa Giray, to the posts of qalga and nured-
din. e khan notied of his accession not only Warsaw and Mos-
cow, but also Vienna and Stockholm. In July 1637, Bahadır Giray
sent to Poland his envoy, Qutlu-shah Bey, provided with an instru-
ment of agreement. Qutlu-shah was accompanied by another envoy,
Hüseyin Chavush, who carried a separate instrument of agreement
issued by Qalga Islam Giray. On 24 October, the Crimean envoys
were received by Hetman Koniecpolski in Bar, and then proceeded
to the royal court in Warsaw. In analogy to Inayet Giray’s document
from 1635, Bahadır’s instrument invoked the ancient friendship dat-
ing back to the times of Mengli and Devlet Girays, on one side, and
Koniecpolski between January and July 1637 and relating the events in Budjak, as well
as the letter of the Nogay commanders oering their submission to Poland, delivered
to Koniecpolski on 19 August; published in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpol-
skiego hetmana wielkiego koronnego 1632–1646. Edited by A. Biedrzycka (Cracow,
2005), pp. 346–352, 369–370, 372–373, 395–397 and 401–402; cf. Baranowski, Sto-
sunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 48–55 and 65–75.
425
Berindei, “La Porte Ottomane face aux Cosaques Zaporogues,” pp. 305–306.
426
On this massacre, see Koniecpolski’s letter to Bishop Jakub Zadzik, dated 5 July
1639 and published in Korespondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, p. 543. Baranowski
erroneously treated this event as if it had occurred already in 1637; cf. idem, Stosunki
polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 76–79 (curiously, on p. 111 of his book Bara-
nowski refers to Aytemir as still alive in 1639); on Azamet Mirza and his later career
in Poland, cf. Miron Costin, Latopis Ziemi Mołdawskiej i inne utwory historyczne.
Translated and annotated by I. Czamańska (Poznań, 1998), p. 170.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 149
Sigismund Augustus, on the other. It also invoked the reconciliation
between Ghazi II Giray and Sigismund III, reached at Ţuţora through
the mediation of Jan Zamoyski. e khan engaged not to invade the
royal lands but in return he expected that the king would restrain his
subjects, especially the Cossacks, from attacking Moldavia, Wallachia,
Budjak as well as other provinces belonging to the Ottoman sultan
or the Crimean khan. e customary royal gis were to be sent each
year to the khan and his retinue members, and the two sides were
to provide security for traveling envoys and merchants. e qalga’s
instrument was worded similarly to the khan’s one.
427
Although Qutlu-shah arrived with a peaceful mission, he was
detained almost two years since the royal treasury lacked money for
the gis. Simultaneously, the royal side tried to appease the Tatars by
promptly sending back the remaining members of the embassy, includ-
ing Hüseyin Chavush, who was provided with a royal instrument of
agreement (list przysiężny) addressed to Qalga Islam Giray. e docu-
ment, probably issued in late November 1637, expressed royal deter-
mination to maintain the peace, though Vladislaus IV openly admitted
that he was unable to completely eradicate the Cossacks, as “even
though our troops routed them, they would hide in rivers and waters
and, having stolen through [into new places], they would [again] com-
mit harm.” e king attached some gis to his letter, but stressed that
they were granted out of his free will and not out of duty.
428
e khan’s reaction to the detainment of his envoy in Poland was
mitigated by violent events in other areas. In June 1637, shortly aer
Bahadır’s accession, the Don Cossacks conquered the Ottoman castle of
Azov (Azaq). It was a heavy blow to the prestige of the Ottoman padi-
shah, facilitated by the turmoil in Budjak and the Ottoman engagement
in the war against Persia. In 1638, the khan unwillingly participated
in the Ottoman expedition that failed to reconquer Azov. In the same
427
See Documents 52–53. On the Crimean embassy of 1637, see also Korespon-
dencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, pp. 43–44 and 423, and Baranowski, Stosunki
polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 87–88 and 116 (Baranowski erroneously
identies the qalga’s envoy who accompanied Qutlu-shah with Arslan Bey; in fact,
Arslan Bey had arrived already in the summer with the notication of Islam Giray’s
promotion to the post of qalga. Qutlu-shah was accompanied by Hüseyin Chavush,
whose name is invoked in the qalga’s instrument).
428
See Document 54; on Qutlu-shah’s detainment in Poland, see Document 54,
n. 1, and Document 55, n. 8.
150 part one—chapter two
year, Nureddin Qırım Giray, who had replaced Safa Giray aer the lat-
ter’s death, was sent to assist the Ottomans in their siege of Baghdad.
429
e Cossacks were well aware that they could not hold Azov for long.
erefore, they oered to submit the conquest to the Russian tsar,
their ocial patron and suzerain. Yet, Moscow was unprepared for a
war and assured both Istanbul and Baghchasaray that it had nothing
to do with the Cossack action. In fact, in the following years Moscow
lavished the Tatars with gis, brought by numerous embassies, and
even obtained a şartname, issued by Bahadır Giray in August 1640.
430
e more eective was the Russian diplomacy, the more likely was
a Tatar attack against Poland-Lithuania. In 1637, the Ukrainian Cos-
sacks who had assisted Inayet Giray in his invasion of Budjak returned
home with empty hands aer Inayet’s fall. eir dissatisfaction evolved
into an anti-Polish rebellion, joined by Ukrainian peasants and mer-
cilessly pacied by the Polish authorities. Many Cossacks le to the
Don and joined their brethren in ghting and raiding their Muslim
neighbors. us Istanbul and Baghchasaray had a reason to accuse the
Polish king that his subjects participated in the Azov adventure.
431
e
accusation provided the Tatars with a good excuse if they wished to
raid Poland. e khan also resented that his envoy had been detained
in Poland. When Qutlu-shah was nally released in 1639 and the khan
received the royal gis, he was in turn upset with their amount, and
the royal envoy, Krzysztof Dzierżek, was detained in the Crimea for
over one year.
432
During the rst two months of 1640, Qalga Islam
Giray, who had already known Poland quite well, led a devastating
raid into the Polish Ukraine. Koniecpolski tried to pursue the invaders
but his troops were too slow.
433
e issue of the recent Tatar raid was raised by the Polish envoy to
Istanbul, sent to the new sultan, Ibrahim. e new Ottoman ‘ahdname,
issued in May 1640, repeated the clauses of the former treaties, includ-
ing the one stipulating that “one should not permit the Polish Cos-
429
Le khanat de Crimée, p. 340.
430
See Novosel’skij, Bor’ba Moskovskogo gosudarstva s Tatarami, pp. 256–293;
Pamjatniki diplomatičeskix snošenij. . . . Edited by F. Laškov, pp. 90–94; Baranowski,
Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 98–99 and 120–122.
431
On the participation of Ukrainian (i.e., Dnieper) Cossacks in military actions
of the Don Cossacks, especially in the conquest of Azov, see Viktor Brexunenko, Sto-
sunky ukrajins’koho kozactva z Donom u XVI—seredyni XVII st. (Kiev, 1998), pp.
211–231.
432
On Dzierżek’s embassy, cf. below and Document 55, notes 10–11.
433
Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 104–113.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 151
sacks to form companionship and bring mutual aid to the Cossacks of
Muscovy.” e royal document, issued in September, was even more
precise, duly forbidding the royal subjects to join Cosacis Moschoviticis
e Dona venientibus.
434
Aer the Polish-Ottoman peace had been renewed, the khan had
no choice but to join in. In August 1640, Bahadır Giray issued his
instrument of agreement and sent to Poland through a great envoy,
Quvvat Bey. e document, referred to as ‘ahdname and simultane-
ously as yarlıq, contained a long list of accusations. Referring to the
recent Polish-Ottoman reconcilement, the khan commented with
a grievance: “although his excellency, the [Ottoman] sovereign, is a
great padishah, we are great, too; we also used to make peace with
you, our brother.” Bahadır Giray complained that his previous envoy,
Qutlu-shah Bey, had been detained in Poland for over two years while
the khan’s repeated queries about his envoy’s whereabouts had been
evasively turned down. “How could such a thing happen in an orderly
state, especially to an envoy going with a brotherly purpose?”—asked
the khan rhetorically. He hinted sarcastically that only the news of the
Ottoman conquest of Baghdad prompted the king to send the gis to
the khan. Still, their amount was disappointing and Bahadır was scan-
dalized by a remark of the royal envoy, Krzysztof Dzierżek, that the
gis had been given out of free will so the Tatars had no title to com-
plain. e khan’s last grievance regarded the Cossacks, who continued
to steal Tatar and Nogay cattle and raid the Black Sea shores of Otto-
man Rumelia, in spite of repeated royal promises to restrain them.
Nevertheless, the khan reasserted his peaceful intentions, proven by
the sharp measures that he had taken to prevent his subjects from
raiding Poland: the removal of Tatars and Nogays from the vicinity
of Akkerman and Očakiv to the Crimea, as it had been requested by
the king. In return, Bahadır expected Vladislaus to restrain the Cos-
sacks, so that they would not bring harm to any Muslim and so that
“the people dwelling on the Black Sea shores may live in peace,” and
to send each year the “customary gis” amounting to 30,000 orins—
one half in cash and one half in cloth and furs, apart from the smaller
presents for the khan and his entourage.
435
434
Kołodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations, pp. 139–141 and 458–475
(Documents 46–47), esp. pp. 466 and 471–472.
435
See Document 55, dated in Rebi II 1050 A.H., i.e., between 21 July and 18
August 1640; it was probably issued in the third decade of Rebi II like the instrument
of nureddin (cf. n. 436 below).
152 part one—chapter two
It was the Crimean custom that the khan’s instrument of peace was
usually accompanied by letters sent by the qalga, nurreddin, other
members of the Giray family, including the khan’s mother and rst
wife, as well as the Tatar and Nogay dignitaries. Yet, in 1637 also the
qalga issued a separate instrument of peace, and in 1640 a step further
was made and both the qalga and the nureddin issued separate instru-
ments, referred to as ‘ahdnames like the khan’s instrument. e ‘ahd-
name of Nureddin Qırım Giray was almost identical in content with
the khan’s one, also issued in Baghchasaray, apparently on the same
date.
436
Interestingly, it contained more Oghuz vocabulary and gram-
mar elements than the khan’s instrument.
437
e nureddin referred
to his elder brother, the khan, repeating the conditions of the latter’s
agreement with the king and conrming them in his own name. e
only notable dierence was that the amount of the royal gis was not
mentioned and Qırım Giray’s document had a shorter ending. e
nurreddin appointed his own great envoy, Devlet Ghazi, to carry this
document to Warsaw and travel along with the khan’s great envoy,
Quvvat Bey.
Also the qalga, Islam Giray, issued his ‘ahdname in a military camp
near Perekop. It was dated a few days later and sent through the qalga’s
great envoy, Arslan Agha. e instrument was less “Ottomanized” in
style than the documents of Bahadır and Qırım Girays, and contained
more references to the past. Unlike the instruments of the khan and
the nureddin, Islam Giray’s document invoked the Genghisid tradi-
tion
438
and the ancient friendship between the Crimean and Polish-
Lithuanian rulers dating back to the times of Hadji, Mengli, and Sahib
Girays as well as Sigismund Augustus. e qalga explained his recent
436
See Document 56; it was dated more precisely than the khan’s instrument, in the
third decade of Rebi II 1050 A.H., i.e., between 10 and 18 August 1640.
437
Cf. the frequency of Kipchak and Oghuz alternatives such as cibermek/göndürmek,
taqı/dahi, and the ablative endings—din/-den, on this issue, see also Chapter 1 in Part
II; Oghuz elements are commonly regarded as the signs of Ottomanization of the
Crimean chancery.
438
Interestingly, the qalga refers to himself as the commander of the right wing (oŋ
qolnıŋ) of the Khanate’s troops; in the edition of Vel’jaminov-Zernov and Faizxanov
this fragment is mistakenly “corrected” by the addition of a redundant phrase ve sol
qolnıŋ (“and of the le wing”); cf. Materialy dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva, p. 260.
According to the Genghisid tradition, the qalga commanded over the right wing of
the troops while the khan was responsible for the whole army, commanding from the
center; cf. Senai, Historia chana Islam Gereja III, pp. 151–152, n. 93. Hence, in the
khan’s intitulatio both wings should be mentioned, but in the qalga’s intitulatio only
the right wing.
the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 153
raid of the Ukraine by the continuous Cossack raids of the Crimean as
well as Ottoman lands and the inadequate value of the recently brought
royal gis. Like the khan, Islam Giray was scandalized by the remark
of the royal envoy that “one should not measure a [freely given] tip.”
Nevertheless, if the king restrained the Cossacks and sent proper gis,
the qalga would remit the past wrongs and forbid any future raids.
Remarkably, Islam’s instrument contained a clause regarding the secu-
rity of trade that was missing in the khan’s document, apparently by
omission. In conclusion, the qalga encouraged the king to contact him
in any matter and oered his mediation between the king and the
khan.
439
e Crimean envoys arrived at Warsaw in November 1640. Bahadır
Giray’s request to send him the “customary gis” amounting to 30,000
orins—in fact twice as much as the previously agreed sum—was
received at the royal court with irritation. One positive result triggered
by the request was a thorough search for ancient Ottoman and Crimean
documents, conducted in the Crown archives in Cracow and Warsaw
in order to demonstrate the envoys that the request of their lord was
baseless. e task was masterly accomplished by Samuel Otwinowski,
the best translator of Oriental languages in the Royal Chancery. In
1642, Otwinowski completed a manuscript, which contained the cop-
ies and translations of Ottoman and Crimean documents, dating back
as far as the 15th century, and was dedicated to Chancellor Piotr Gem-
bicki. Until that time, the Crimean envoys were detained in Poland.
440
Bahadır Giray had no time to react to one more detainment of
his envoy. In 1641, he participated in yet another failed Ottoman-
Crimean siege of Azov. ere, he contracted the plague and died in
October 1641. In the following year, the Cossacks received an order
from Moscow to abandon Azov, so they le the ruined fortress to the
Ottomans.
In October 1641, the Porte appointed a new khan, Mehmed IV
Giray, Bahadır’s younger brother and the former qalga of Djanibek
Giray. In March 1642, Quvvat Bey was sent back to the Crimea along
439
See Document 57, dated in the rst decade of Djumada I 1050 A.H., i.e., between
19 and 28 August 1640.
440
Baranowski, Stosunki polsko-tatarskie w latach 1632–1648, pp. 115–118; Kore-
spondencja Stanisława Koniecpolskiego, pp. 51–57. Otwinowski’s manuscript is pre-
served in Wrocław, Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich [hereaer, Bibl.
Ossol.], ms. 3555.