Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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164 part one—chapter two

Europe. Poland-Lithuania was soon to face a full-scale Muscovian-

Cossack invasion and ght not only for Kiev, but also for Smolensk and

then Vilnius and Lwów as well. For both Warsaw and Baghchasaray,

the disproportional rise of Russia presented an imminent danger.

In February 1654 a Polish envoy, Mariusz Jaskólski, departed to the

Crimea taking the route through Moldavia. Having arrived at Bagh-

chasaray on 7 April, on the following day he was received by Sefer

Ghazi Agha, and the day aer by the khan. According to his instruc-

tions, Jaskólski asked for Crimean assistance against the Cossacks and

Muscovy. During the negotiations, the Tatars raised an issue unheard

since decades, namely the khan’s intention to reconquer Kazan and

Astrakhan with the help of Poland-Lithuania. is was the evidence

that the Genghisid tradition and the contacts between the Crimean

and Volgine Tatars were still alive.

469

To Warsaw, a direct Crimean

attack against Russia was preferable to a joint invasion of Ukraine

that could serve the Tatars as yet another pretext for pillaging the

Commonwealth’s provinces. During his stay in the Crimea, Jaskólski

was shown a petition sent by the Tatars from Kazan and Astrakhan,

who had asked Islam III Giray to deliver them from the tsar’s rule. In

order to further impress the Polish envoy, the Tatars made sure that

he could also witness an embassy from the Kalmyks who reportedly

proposed an alliance against Moscow, notwithstanding their former

hostility towards the Crimea.

470

Aer a month of fruitful negotiations,

Jaskólski was sent back in early May, in the company of a Crimean

envoy, Süleyman Agha.

471

469

According to the contemporary Crimean chronicle by Hadji Mehmed Senai,

it was Sefer Ghazi who inspired Khan Islam III Giray with the idea of reconquer-

ing Kazan and Astrakhan; see Senai, Historia chana Islam Gereja III, pp. 136 (Polish

translation) and

٦١ (Turkish original).

470

See Jaroslav Fedoruk, Mižnarodna dyplomatija i polityka Ukrajiny 1654–1657,

pt. 1: 1654 rik (L’viv, 1996), pp. 42, 47–48, and 217.

471

On Jaskólski’s rst embassy to Baghchasaray, see Zbigniew Wójcik, “Feudalna

Rzeczpospolita wobec umowy w Perejasławiu,” Kwartalnik Historyczny 61 (1954),

no. 3, pp. 76–109, esp. pp. 97–100; Baranowski, “Tatarszczyzna wobec wojny pol-

sko-szwedzkiej,” pp. 460–461; Sławomir Augusiewicz, “Dwa poselstwa Mariusza

Stanisława Jaskólskiego na Krym w 1654 roku,” in: Staropolski ogląd świata. Rzecz-

pospolita między okcydentalizacją a orientalizacją, vol. 1: Przestrzeń kontaktów. Edited

by F. Wolański and R. Kołodziej (Toruń, 2009): 46–60, esp. pp. 47–53; see also a

copy of the envoy’s letter from Baghchasaray, dated 2 May 1654, in Bibl. Kórn., ms.

991, fol. 483a–484b. An alternative date of Jaskólski’s arrival at Baghchasaray, namely

9 April, is proposed by Fedoruk on the basis of another, published version of the

envoy’s letter, which stated that he had arrived on ursday and not Tuesday aer

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 165

In his letter to John Casimir, brought by Süleyman Agha, Islam III

Giray invoked the recent reconciliation at Žvanec’,

472

conrmed his

friendly intentions towards Poland and assured that Crimean and

Nogay troops, strengthened by the troops stationed in Budjak, could

immediately attack the Cossacks if the latter refused to break with

Moscow. In reference to a recent Muscovian embassy that had invited

him to join a planned invasion of Poland, the khan assured that he had

declined the oer, because he regarded the plan to erase a state like

Poland from the world as shameless and contrary to the will of God,

who had created earth, heaven, and all creatures.

473

Notwithstanding its diplomatic rhetoric, the above statement dis-

closed a genuine worry concerning the rise of Russia. In his last let-

ter to John Casimir, written in June 1654, shortly before his death,

Islam III Giray was again to ask rhetorically: “we do not know where

Moscow has drawn so much strength and power from that it has not

remained in its natural [i.e., harmless] state.”

474

Easter; see Ambroży Grabowski (ed.), Ojczyste spominki, vol. 1 (Cracow, 1845), p. 131;

cf. Fedoruk, Mižnarodna dyplomatija i polityka Ukrajiny, pp. 36–37. Yet, that would

imply that the khan’s letter, brought by Jaskólski to Poland, was issued even before

his arrival at Baghchasaray (cf. n. 473 below). Süleyman Agha was probably identical

with the Crimean envoy, who traveled to Istanbul between December 1653 and April

1654 with the khan’s notication to the Porte of the Treaty of Żwaniec; see Fedoruk,

op. cit., pp. 102–103 and 111–112.

472

Referred to in the letter as the reconciliation at Kamieniec; in fact the negotia-

tions took place between Žvanec’ and nearby Kamieniec.

473

Yeri göki ve bu cümle mahluqatı yoqdan var ėden Haq Ta‘ala Hazretlerinden havf

ėtmeyüb Lėh memleketi gibi bir yurtı ortalıqdan qaldırırım deyü bu qadar maġrurluq

ile bizden ‘asker taleb ėtdügünden . . .; Bibl. Czart., ms. 609, no. 1, p. 35; for a Polish

translation by Abdullah Zihni Soysal, see idem, Jarłyki krymskie, pp. 46–48; the letter

was probably antedated, as it is dated in the second decade of Djumada I 1064 A.H.

(between 30 March and 8 April 1654), i.e., even before Jaskólski’s rst audience with

the khan. Baranowski refers to this letter as a “letter of agreement” (Pol. list przymi-

erny), yet, such qualication is ungrounded; cf. idem, “Tatarszczyzna wobec wojny

polsko-szwedzkiej,” pp. 461 and 463.

474

Mosqov bu qadar güçi ve quvveti ne yerden buldı bilmeziz kendi halinde durm-

ayub; see AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 62, t. 116, no. 450; published in Materialy dlja

istorii Krymskago xanstva, s. 856; for a poor Polish translation by Zihni Soysal, see

idem, Jarłyki krymskie, p. 39; the letter is undated but it was probably issued in mid-

June 1654, since it recalls the past embassy of Jaskólski and refers to a recent departure

of Tatar troops, headed by the qalga, against Muscovy, providing its date: 27 Redjeb,

i.e., 13 June [1654]. On the Weltanschauung of the Crimean elite in regard to the

geopolitical balance of power, cf. Kołodziejczyk [Kolodzejčik], “Krymskoe xanstvo kak

faktor stabilizacii na geopolitičeskoj karte Vostočnoj Evropy,” in: Ukraina i sosednie

gosudarstva v XVII veke. Materialy meždunarodnoj konferencii. Edited by T. Jakovleva

(St. Petersburg, 2004): 83–89, esp. pp. 85 and 88.

166 part one—chapter two

Süleyman Agha arrived at Warsaw on 24 June 1654 and was received

by the king on 27 June, during the Diet that was held in the Royal

Castle. In the following weeks, the Tatar envoy negotiated the project

of a treaty directed against Russia with Polish dignitaries. e project

was presented to the Diet on 18 July. Two days later, Süleyman Agha

swore to observe the new agreement on behalf of the khan, while John

Casimir along with the present senators and ocials took analogous

oaths in the presence of the Crimean envoy. e procedure was to be

completed by the oath of Islam III Giray taken in the presence of a

future royal envoy.

475

e instrument, negotiated and sworn in Warsaw, stipulated mutual

cooperation against Muscovy and Crimean assistance in quelling the

Cossack rebellion against Poland. Other clauses regarded mutual secu-

rity and dispatch of the customary gis to the khan. Besides, Warsaw

aimed to restore the Polish-Crimean-Ottoman condominium in Mol-

davia and Wallachia, reminiscent of the agreement of Ţuţora (1595),

with the participation of yet another actor, George Rákóczi II of Tran-

sylvania, who had assisted the Poles in expelling the Cossacks from

Moldavia in 1653.

476

Along with the treaty instrument, preserved in a

copy, also the texts of the oaths, sworn by John Casimir and the Com-

monwealth dignitaries in the presence of Süleyman Agha, are extant

in the Polish archives. Apart from the usual religious invocations, they

contain open engagements to jointly attack Muscovy.

477

In order to witness the oath of Islam III Giray, Mariusz Jaskólski

was again sent to the Crimea along with Süleyman Agha. Yet, the

peacemaking procedure was unexpectedly disturbed by the khan’s

death in late June 1654.

478

When the news reached Warsaw in August,

Jaskólski was already on his way, so he was urged to continue his trip

and sent a new instruction, ordering him to persuade the Tatars that

475

See Wójcik, “Feudalna Rzeczpospolita wobec umowy w Perejasławiu,” pp. 100–

103; Baranowski, “Tatarszczyzna wobec wojny polsko-szwedzkiej,” p. 462; Fedoruk,

Mižnarodna dyplomatija i polityka Ukrajiny, pp. 56–59; Augusiewicz, “Rokowania w

sprawie przymierza polsko-tatarskiego w roku 1654,” Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły

Pedagogicznej w Olsztynie, vol. 13: Prace historyczne, no. 2 (1998): 69–87, esp. pp.

81–82.

476

See Document 61.

477

See Documents 62 and 63.

478

e Crimean-Ottoman chronicler, Seyyid Muhammed Riza, places the khan’s

death in the rst decade of Shaban 1064 A.H., i.e., between 17 and 26 June 1654; see

idem, Es-seb‘u`s-seyyar  ahbari muluki Tatar, p. 167; cf. Smirnov, Krymskoe xanstvo,

p. 561.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 167

the royal oath was still binding and make sure that the treaty be con-

rmed by Islam III Giray’s successor.

479

e time was pressing as a

huge Muscovian army had been penetrating deep into Lithuania since

June 1654, besieging and capturing numerous fortresses, including

Smolensk that would capitulate on 29 September.

Aer Islam III Giray’s death, Mehmed IV Giray was appointed to the

throne for the second time and sent from Istanbul to Baghchasaray. In

spite of Xmel’nyc’kij’s diplomatic eorts to restore the Tatar-Cossack

alliance, the new khan decided to continue his brother’s policy. On

22 November 1654, he took a solemn oath in Jaskólski’s presence and

promised to respect the new treaty with Warsaw. When the envoy

insisted, following his instruction, that the treaty should be also con-

rmed by Tatar dignitaries, he heard from the khan and the vizier that

it was unnecessary because, unlike the Polish king, the khan was an

absolute ruler.

480

Jaskólski then received the khan’s solemn ‘ahdname

which reiterated the treaty conditions.

In his instrument, Mehmed IV Giray invoked the negotiations com-

menced during the reign of his older brother, the embassies of Sül-

eyman Agha and Mariusz Jaskólski, and his own consent to endorse

the previously reached agreement. Apart from the usual stipulations

referring to mutual friendship, the delivery of royal gis, and security

of trade, the instrument obliged John Casimir to forgive the Cossacks,

should they regret their rebellion and return under his rule. e oen-

sive character of the anti-Muscovian alliance was reected by a clause,

stipulating that:

if [. . .] by the grace and favor of His Excellency, God (may He be

exalted!), it ever falls to our lot that we conquer Astrakhan, Kazan, Terek

[i.e., Northeastern Caucasus], Tura [i.e., Siberia], or any [other] Muslim

provinces, or [any provinces] inhabited by Tatars or Nogays, neither

you, our brother, nor any of the Polish lords should interfere, as [these

conquests] will belong to us.

479

Wójcik, “Feudalna Rzeczpospolita wobec umowy w Perejasławiu,” pp. 104–106.

480

An analogous scene occurred 31 years earlier, when Mehmed III Giray demon-

strated his centralizing policy by not allowing his retinue members to swear upon the

treaty with Moscow; cf. n. 395 above. On Jaskólski’s second embassy to Baghchasaray,

see Wójcik, “Feudalna Rzeczpospolita wobec umowy w Perejasławiu,” pp. 106–108;

Baranowski, “Tatarszczyzna wobec wojny polsko-szwedzkiej,” pp. 463–465; Fedoruk,

Mižnarodna dyplomatija i polityka Ukrajiny, pp. 135–141 and 146–158; Augusiewicz,

“Dwa poselstwa Mariusza Stanisława Jaskólskiego na Krym w 1654 roku,” pp. 55–60;

see also the envoy’s diary in AGAD, Libri Legationum, no. 33, fol. 41b–45a.

168 part one—chapter two

ough hardly realistic, these aspirations reected the living memory

of the tradition of the Golden Horde, still present in the Crimea in

the mid-17th century. e above fragment also revealed the composite

character of the Girays’ political legitimism, based on the historical

claims to the Genghisid heritage, strengthened by religious and ethno-

social motives: Mehmed IV Giray thus claimed the rule over all the

Muslims once conquered by the tsars and over all the Tatar and Nogay

inhabitants of the East European and West Asian steppes. e rising

role of the Nogays, migrating to the west under the Kalmyk pressure,

in the internal making of the Crimean Khanate was best reected by

the fact that the khan made his engagement not merely on behalf of

his Tatar subjects, but also on behalf of the mirzas from the Great

Nogay and Little Nogay hordes, as well as ve Nogay clans, for the rst

time mentioned by name in a Crimean instrument of peace addressed

to a Polish king: the Oraq-oghlu, Sheydaq-oghlu, Mamay-oghlu, Or-

Membet-Bey-oghlu, and Toquz Chubar.

481

In January 1655, the Crimean and Polish allies met in the Ukraine

and defeated a Cossack-Muscovian army at Oxmativ. In the spring of

1655, when a Russian embassy arrived at Baghchasaray in vain eort

to restore the peace, Sefer Ghazi refused to acknowledge the tsar’s

claim to Little Russia (i.e., the Ukraine), expressed in the latter’s new

intitulatio, and argued that the Cossacks had remained 800 years [sic]

under the Polish rule and then seven years under the Crimean one,

hence the tsar’s pretensions were baseless.

482

Yet, the Crimean military

intervention did not bring a breakthrough in the war. By the summer

of 1655, Xmel’nyc’kij had controlled most of the Ukraine while the

Muscovian troops, assisted by the Cossacks, had conquered almost the

whole Grand Duchy of Lithuania, including Minsk and Vilnius. At that

moment, in July 1655, Charles X Gustavus of Sweden invaded Poland-

Lithuania, claiming the Polish crown from his Catholic cousin, John

Casimir. Witnessing massive defection of his subjects to the victor’s

camp, John Casimir le Poland to nd refuge in Habsburg Silesia.

e military confrontation of the years 1655–1660 came to be

known as the Second Northern War, and in the Polish historiography

481

See Document 64; on the ve aforementioned Nogay clans, see Document 64,

notes 12–16; on the Great and Little Nogay hordes, cf. n. 284 above and Document

58, n. 10.

482

See Sanin, Otnošenija Rossii i Ukrainy s Krymskim xanstvom v seredine XVII

veka, pp. 94–96.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 169

as the “Deluge.”

483

For some time, Mehmed IV Giray remained John

Casimir’s sole ally, more trustworthy than most of the king’s sub-

jects. In May and August 1655, the khan twice assured of his loyalty

through his envoy, Dedesh Agha, who was to play a major role in

the future Crimean-Polish relations. In November, the Tatars besieged

Xmel’nyc’kij and forced him to suspend hostilities with Poland, at

least for the time being. Tatar presence in the Ukraine facilitated the

defense of the last strongholds loyal to John Casimir, with Kamieniec

and Lwów at their head. Original as well as fake yarlıqs, inciting resis-

tance against foreign occupation, circulated among the nobles who

had remained loyal to John Casimir. In order to sow terror among the

Swedish troops and make them believe that Tatar reinforcements had

come, the royal troops as well as irregular guerillas adopted a war cry

hałła hałła (Allah, Allah).

484

e reinforcements came indeed in 1656, when John Casimir

returned to Poland and started a campaign to regain his kingdom.

A Crimean auxiliary corps, commanded by the khan’s former trea-

surer, Subhan Ghazi Agha, participated in the Polish-Swedish battle

over Warsaw (28–30 July 1656) and in the following campaign against

Ducal Prussia, whose duke, Frederick William Hohenzollern (also the

elector of Brandenburg), had broken his vassal allegiance to John Casi-

mir and sided with Charles X Gustavus. In the battle at Prostki (8 Octo-

ber 1656), fought between the Polish-Tatar and Swedish-Brandenburg

forces, the Tatars took prisoner Prince Bogusław Radziwiłł, a powerful

Lithuanian magnate and the leading supporter of Charles X Gustavus,

who was nevertheless set free upon the promise of ransom.

485

Polish-Tatar military cooperation was sometimes disturbed by the

fact that the Tatars barely discerned between friend or foe while pil-

laging the lands through which they marched. e Crimean invasion

of Ducal Prussia le deep traces in the local memory and was remem-

bered until the 20th century, but the Tatars were equally “well” remem-

bered in Podlachia, a Polish province through which they returned to

the Crimea aer their campaign. To be sure, their behavior was not

483

For an English monograph on this war, see Robert Frost, Aer the Deluge.

Poland-Lithuania and the Second Northern War 1655–1660 (Cambridge, 1993).

484

Baranowski, “Tatarszczyzna wobec wojny polsko-szwedzkiej,” pp. 465–473

and 478.

485

Ibidem, pp. 479–481.

170 part one—chapter two

so unusual if compared to the standards of early modern European

warfare.

In November 1656 the tsar, alarmed by the rise of Sweden, granted

armistice to John Casimir that allowed the latter to focus on his strug-

gle with Charles X Gustavus. When it seemed that the heaviest crisis

was over, an unprecendented agreement was reached on 6 December

in Radnót (today Iernut in Romania) between Charles X Gustavus and

George Rákóczi II. e signatories envisioned a partition of Poland-

Lithuania and invited Frederick William, Bohdan Xmel’nyc’kyj, and

Bogusław Radziwiłł to take their share, too. e prince of Transyl-

vania, who hosted the conference, invaded Poland in the following

year, but aer initial successes he was besieged by the Polish troops

in Podo lia and forced to capitulate on 22 July 1657. e Tatars, com-

manded by the khan, did not honor the deal and on 31 July attacked the

retreating Transylvanian army between Terebovlja (Pol. Trembowla)

and Vyšnivec’ (Pol. Wiśniowiec). Several thousands of Transylvanian

troops were enslaved, including János Kemény, le in command by

Rákóczi, who had managed to return home with a small retinue.

486

By the time of Rákóczi’s rout, the Polish king and the Crimean

khan had become the members of an exotic coalition, which also con-

sisted of the Habsburg emperor, Danish king, and . . . Ottoman sultan.

While Denmark entered the Second Northern War to settle its age-old

accounts with Sweden, the Habsburgs could not tolerate the rise of

their Protestant archenemy from the times of the irty Years’ War

486

See the letters by Sefer Ghazi Agha to the Polish chancellor, Stefan Koryciński,

and by Mehmed IV Giray to Tsar Alexis, reporting the Tatar victory over Rákóczi;

the rst one is published in Polish translation in Zihni Soysal, Jarłyki krymskie, p. 64,

the second one, dated in Zilhijje 1067 A.H. (10 September-8 October 1657), in Mate-

rialy dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva, pp. 519–522 (in Arabic script), and in Sagit

Faizov (ed.), Pis’ma xanov Islam-Gireja III i Muxammed-Gireja IV k carju Alekseju

Mixajloviču i korolju Janu Kazimiru. 1654–1658. Krymskotatarskaja diplomatika

v političeskom kontekste postperejaslavskogo vremeni (Moscow, 2003), pp. 123–135

(Latin transcription and Russian translation). On the rout of the Transylvanian army,

sometimes compared with the defeat of Mohács in Hungarian historiography, and the

fate of the captives, see Mária Ivanics, “Enslavement, slave labour and the treatment

of captives in the Crimean Khanate,” in: Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders

(Early Fieenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries). Edited by G. Dávid and P. Fodor (Leiden,

2007): 193–219, esp. pp. 204–206; eadem, “Rabszerzés és rabkiváltás a Krími Kán-

ságban a 16–17. században,” Századok 141 (2007): 1483–1514; Sándor Gebei, “Odna

diplomatičeskaja illjuzija: sud’ba sojuza Transil’vanskogo knjažestva i Zaporožskogo

Vojska (1657–1658 gg.),” in: 350–lecie unii hadziackiej (1658–2008). Edited by

T. Chynczewska-Hennel and M. Nagielski (Warsaw, 2008): 507–530, esp. pp. 509–519.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 171

at the cost of an implosion of their Catholic neighbor. e Ottoman

motives were less straightforward. Since the outbreak of Xmel’nyc’kyj’s

uprising, the Porte passively observed the East European war theatre,

tolerating the Crimean support for the Cossacks. Unlike in the 16th

century, Poland was no longer regarded an Ottoman ally as both

Sigismund III and Vladislaus IV had sided with the Habsburgs during

the irty Years’ War. Another reason for the Porte’s passivity was its

involvement in the war with Venice. Besides, the erce struggle for the

custody over the minor sultan, Mehmed IV (r. 1648–1687), resulted

in frequent changes in the post of the grand vizier and prevented

any consistent policy. Only in 1656, with the accession of Mehmed

Köprülü to the post of the grand vizier, the Porte resumed an active

northern policy. e absorption of the Ukraine to Muscovy, perceived

as an imminent danger in Baghchasaray, was probably less relevant

from Istanbul’s perspective than the rise of the unruly Transylvanian

vassal who could upset the political equilibrium in the Balkans. Evliya

Chelebi, the famous Ottoman traveler and memoirist, recorded a sul-

tan’s rman, addressed in 1657 to his uncle, Melek Ahmed Pasha, the

then governor of Očakiv, ordering him to enter Poland at the head

of his provincial troops and ght Rákóczi in alliance with the Poles

and the Crimean Tatars. Melek Ahmed promptly set out from his

seat in Silistra, but upon reaching the border fortress of Hotin, he

stopped his troops and adopted a wait-and-see policy. Only a group

of Turkish volunteers, including Evliya, entered Poland and joined a

Crimean detachment, commanded by Nureddin Adil Giray, the once

commander at Batoh. Evliya recorded his participation in the rout of

Rákóczi’s army and the warm reception of Muslim allies by the Polish

nobility and soldiers.

487

In the spring of 1658, Sebastian Machowski, a Polish cavalry ocer,

was sent to the Porte with the ocial acknowledgment of gratitude for

487

Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatname, vol. 5 (Istanbul, 1315 A.H./1897 A.D.), pp. 103–105

and 125–150; for a Russian translation of these fragments, cf. idem [Evlija Čelebi],

Kniga putešestvija (Izvlečenija iz sočinenija tureckogo putešestvennika XVII veka).

Edited by A. Tveritinova, vypusk 1: Zemli Moldavii i Ukrainy (Moscow, 1961), pp.

27–30 and 51–77; see also Kołodziejczyk, “Stosunki polsko-tureckie w połowie XVII

wieku,” in: Rzeczypospolita w latach Potopu. Edited by J. Muszyńska and J. Wijaczka

(Kielce, 1996): 41–48, esp. pp. 46–48. On Adil Giray, cf. n. 466 above; for his letter

to the tsar, attached to the khan’s letter, in which Mehmed IV Giray boasted his vic-

tory over Rákóczi (cf. n. 486 above), see Materialy dlja istorii Krymskago xanstva,

pp. 522–523. Unfortunately, the nureddin did not provide any details about his own

activity in Poland.

172 part one—chapter two

the Crimean-Ottoman rescue.

488

In the same year, the Ottoman and

Crimean troops commanded by the grand vizier and the khan rav-

aged Transylvania aiming to depose the Porte’s unruly vassal. Rákóczi

oered erce resistance, but was nally defeated and killed in 1660,

while his principality was reduced in both autonomy and size, with

the province of Várad (Rom. Oradea) being transferred under direct

Ottoman rule.

e membership of the Crimean Khanate in the international coali-

tion during the Second Northern War was sealed by solemn embassies

sent from Baghchasaray to Vienna and Copenhagen. In April 1658, a

numerous Tatar embassy arrived at Frankfurt in order to congratu-

late Leopold on his imperial accession. A following embassy arrived

in October at Vienna with the khan’s notication of his raid against

Rákóczi.

489

Another embassy was sent in May 1658 to Copenhagen. It

traveled through Poland and was headed by Meydan Ghazi, an expe-

rienced Crimean diplomat.

490

In his letter to Frederick III, Mehmed IV

Giray invoked the dramatic situation of “his brother,” John Casimir,

surrounded by Muscovian, Swedish and Transylvanian enemies

(qardaşımız Lėh qıralı Yan Qazimire etrafında olan Mosqov ve İşved

ve Erdel tüşman olub), and encouraged the Danish king to attack not

only Sweden, but also Muscovy. Interestingly, the khan also asked the

king not to send his eet to the Mediterranean in assistance to the

Venetians, who were still ghting over Crete against the Ottomans.

491

488

See the replies to this embassy by Sultan Mehmed IV and Grand Vizier Mehmed

Köprülü, issued in late June 1658; Abrahamowicz, Katalog dokumentów tureckich, pp.

340–343.

489

Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Türkei I, 130 [= old Turcica, Fasc. 64],

Conv. B (April-June 1658), fol. 52a–61b, 122a–122b; Conv. D (October–December

1658), fol. 12a–12b and 94a–94b (Sefer Ghazi’s letter brought to Frankfurt in April,

misplaced among the correspondence from December)—all letters are preserved solely

in Italian translations. Only the second embassy, headed by Ali Agha in October, is

recorded in Ivanics, “Posol’stva krymskix tatar pri Venskom dvore v 1598–1682 gg.,”

p. 236.

490

On Meydan Ghazi’s embassies to Vienna in 1655, 1656, and 1660, see Ivanics,

“Posol’stva krymskix tatar pri Venskom dvore v 1598–1682 gg.,” p. 236; in his rst

embassy to Vienna, he traveled through Poland provided with the khan’s credentials

addressed to the Polish king; see Bibl. Kórn., ms. 991, fol. 498b. Also Meydan Ghazi’s

embassy to Denmark was formally announced to the Polish king and chancellor by

Mehmed IV Giray and his vizier, Sefer Ghazi Agha; see Baranowski, “Tatarszczyzna

wobec wojny polsko-szwedzkiej,” p. 485.

491

Josef Matuz, Krimtatarische Urkunden im Reichsarchiv zu Kopenhagen. Mit his-

torisch-diplomatischen und sprachlichen Untersuchungen (Freiburg, 1976), pp. 125–

132 and facsimiles I–II.

the crimean khanate & poland-lithuania (1523–1671) 173

Frederick III not only did not attack Muscovy, but was defeated by

Charles X Gustavus. Yet, the Swedish triumph caused a rising con-

cern in Europe. Also the Dutch, with their powerful eet, joined the

anti-Swedish coalition. Retreating on all fronts, the Swedes accepted

French mediation and the Second Northern War came to an end.

According to the Treaty of Oliva (Pol. Oliwa), signed on 3 May 1660,

Poland-Lithuania resigned from a greater part of Livonia that any-

way had been occupied by the Swedes since 1621. e Polish Vasas

also resigned from their claims to the Swedish throne, although John

Casimir was allowed to keep his Swedish royal title for life. In return,

the Swedish troops evacuated all the remaining territories of Poland-

Lithuania. A side eect of the Swedish-Polish war was the sovereignty

of Hohenzollern Prussia, a former Polish tributary, acknowledged by

John Casimir already in 1657.

e Polish-Lithuanian war with Russia, suspended in 1656, was

resumed in 1658. On 16 September 1658, the Commonwealth attained

a spectacular diplomatic success as the Cossacks returned under the

royal suzerainty. e Cossack Ukraine, labeled as the Duchy of Ruthe-

nia, was to become the third, equal member of the Commonwelth,

along with Poland and Lithuania. e Orthodox bishops were to

obtain seats in the Senate, and the Cossacks, whose number was to

be augmented to 60,000, were to receive extensive autonomy, with an

elected hetman and the prospects of nobilitation for their elders. e

agreement, reached at Hadjač, even provided for the opening of two

universities with a mixed Orthodox-Catholic faculty, and free naviga-

tion on the Black Sea. e driving force, favoring reconcilement with

Poland on the Cossack side, were the rich members of the Cossack

elite, dismayed with the tsar’s patronage and still dreaming of the sta-

tus of Polish nobles. eir leader was Ivan Vyhovs’kyj, elected to the

hetmanate aer Xmel’nyc’kyj’s death in August 1657.

e tsar had no intention to resign from his recent acquisition and

hoped to incite pro-Muscovian Cossacks to rebel against Vyhovs’kyj.

When new Russian troops entered the Ukraine, they were faced by a

Cossack-Polish coalition, assisted by substantial Tatar reinforcements.

On 8 July 1659, a joint Tatar-Cossack army, commanded by Mehmed IV

Giray and Vyhovs’kyj, additionally reinforced by Polish soldiers,

obtained an impressive victory at Konotop. Although the Tatars then

raided Muscovy reaching as far as Tula, the coalition failed to remove

the Russian garrisons from the Ukraine. It soon turned out that the

compromise attained at Hadjač encountered strong opposition among