Kolodziejczyk Dariusz. The Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania (ENG)

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204 part one—chapter three

paralized by domestic conicts. e desire to maintain peaceful recip-

rocal relations was conrmed by the exchange of embassies between

the khans Arslan and Halim Girays (reigns 1748–1756 and 1756–1758

respectively), and King Augustus III.

569

As in these years the Polish

grand hetmans, rst Józef Potocki (1735–1751) and then Jan Klemens

Branicki (1752–1771), almost traditionally headed the opposition, they

also maintained diplomatic relations with foreign courts, including

Istanbul and Baghchasaray, independently from the royal court.

570

analogy, the dissatised Giray princes and Crimean nobles maintained

contacts with Polish dignitaries and even found refuge in Poland-

Lithuania despite the protests of the khans.

e European Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 that resulted in the

Seven Years’ War caused a shock in Istanbul and Baghchasaray as their

traditional ally, France, allied with their ancient enemies, Austria and

Russia. It was Frederick II of Prussia who now tried to benet from the

Porte’s confusion and win its support in his desperate ght against the

prevailing forces of almost the whole continental Europe.

571

In Bagh-

chasaray, the Prussian agent Paul Boscamp tried to persuade Khan

Qırım Giray (r. 1758–1764) to attack Austria or Russia. Yet, in that

period St. Petersburg did its best to evade any conict with the Mus-

lim neighbors and even discouraged the Nogays from rebelling against

the khan. Also the French diplomacy, which still enjoyed considerable

respect at the Muslim courts, tried to appease their conicts with Rus-

sia in order to leave the latter a free hand to confront Prussia.

572

569

See AGAD, AKW, Dz. tat., k. 64, t. 32–36, nos. 568–574.

570

Konopczyński, Polska a Turcja 1683–1792, pp. 167–170. On the Polish inter-

nal chaos as perceived by the Ottomans, cf. my article, “e Ottoman Diplomats on

Eighteenth-Century Poland: Contempt or Discouragement?,” Oriente Moderno XVIII

n. s. (LXXIX), 1 (1999) = e Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth Century. Edited by

K. Fleet (Naples, 1999): 97–100.

571

On his overtures towards the Porte, see Kemal Beydilli, Büyük Friedrich ve

Osmanlılar: XVIII. yüzyılda Osmanlı-Prusya münâsebetleri (Istanbul, 1985).

572

Konopczyński, Polska a Turcja 1683–1792, pp. 170–171; Barbara Kellner-Heinkele,

“St. Petersburg and the Steppe Peoples. Diplomatic Correspondences of the 18th Century

from the Arxiv Vnešnej Politiki Rossijskoj Imperii in Moscow,” in: Proceedings of the

38th Permanent International Altaistic Conference (PIAC), Kawasaki, Japan: August

7–12, 1995. Edited by G. Stary (Wiesbaden, 1996): 219–236, esp. pp. 224–225 and

232–233; eadem, “Na granice vse kak obyčno: diplomatičeskaja perepiska meždu

Rossiej i Krymskimi tatarami po dokumentam Arxiva vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj

imperii (seredina XVIII v.),” in: Altaica. Sbornik statej i materialov, vol. 3 (Moscow,

1999): 33–43, esp. pp. 41–42.

in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 205

In 1763, a serious conict arose between Baghchasaray and Warsaw

aer some Tatar merchants had been robbed in Poland. Qırım Giray

gathered troops in Qavshan and warned to invade Poland, but the

conict was settled through the mediation of the French and Molda-

vian diplomats, and the Polish authorities agreed to pay an indemna-

tion to the khan. In order to prevent similar conicts in the future, a

special court was established in Braclav, analogous to a similar court

in Žvanec’ that settled border conicts between the Polish and Otto-

man subjects.

573

e death of Augustus III in October 1763 opened a new politi-

cal crisis in Poland. Upon learning of the Polish interregnum, Qırım

Giray was ready to saddle his horse and enter Poland in order to sup-

port the anti-Russian opposition, but was prevented from doing so by

the Porte.

574

As it could be expected, in 1764 the Russian troops intro-

duced to the Polish throne a tting candidate, Stanisław Poniatowski, a

former lover of Empress Catherine II, who adopted the royal name of

Stanislaus Augustus. Istanbul rst refused to acknowledge his election

and a Polish envoy, sent from the new king with the notication of his

accession, was detained on the border, but nally the Porte resolved to

maintain peace with Russia. Qırım Giray paid with his throne for his

overly open anti-Russian stand and was replaced by his nephew, Selim

III Giray. Yet, the new khan turned out to be equally anti-Russian and

573

Tadeusz Kowalski and Józef Dutkiewicz, “Jarłyk tatarski z r. 1177 H. (=1763

D.),” Rocznik Orientalistyczny 2 (1919–1924): 213–219; Konopczyński, Polska a Turcja

1683–1792, pp. 171–172. e activity of a similar border commission, established by

the Russian authorities in the fortress of St. Anne in order to settle conicts between

the Russian and Ottoman subjects, including the Crimean Tatars, is reected in the

documents from the years 1712–1743, preserved in Arxiv vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj

imperii, f. 22, op. 1 “Pograničnaja s Turciej kommissija v Retranžamente (krepost’ sv.

Anny).”

574

See the report of Aleksandr Nikiforov, the Russian consul in Baghchasaray,

dated 27 November 1763 (16 November according to the Old Style) and partly

based on the eyewitness relation of Regina Pilsztynowa, a Polish female ophtalmolo-

gist who enjoyed easy access to the khan’s palace as she cured the women from his

harem; Arxiv vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii, f. 89, op. 8, no. 1144, fol. 25a–32b;

on the unusual life and career of Pilsztynowa, cf. my article “Die Frau, die mit Män-

nern handelte. Eine Polin am Bosporus,” in: Frauen, Bilder und Gelehrte. Studien zu

Gesellscha und Künsten im Osmanischen Reich / Arts, Women and Scholars. Studies

in Ottoman Society and Cultur. Festschri Hans Georg Majer. Edited by S. Prätor

(Istanbul, 2002), vol. 1: 159–165; the events from her life aer 1760 have remained

obscure until the present day; cf. her biography by Barbara Grosfeld in PSB, vol. 32

(Wrocław etc., 1981), pp. 30–32. In February 2009, during a research in Moscow,

I was lucky to nd the aforementioned relation, describing the wherabouts of her

arrival and sojourn in Baghchasaray in 1763.

206 part one—chapter three

even ordered to close the Russian consulate that had functioned in the

Crimea since 1763.

575

Nevertheless, for the time being Baghchasaray

had to accept the status quo in Poland although it maintained close

contacts with the leaders of the anti-royal opposition from the Potocki

and Branicki families.

576

From the Confederation of Bar to the rst partition of Poland

(1768–1772); the Russo-Ottoman War (1768–1774) and the

Crimean bitter independence

In spite of the French-Russian alliance during the Seven Years’ War,

Paris observed the Russian expansion with rising concern. In 1767

Baron François de Tott, a son of a Hungarian émigré, was sent to the

Crimea as the new French consul with the task to help the French envoy

in Istanbul to incite the anti-Russian opposition among the Turks and

the Tatars. Simultaneously, a conspiracy developed in Poland directed

against both King Stanislaus Augustus and the Russian domination.

Notwithstanding their strongly proclaimed Catholicism, the conspira-

tors did not conceal their hope for Muslim assistance and assembled

close to the Ottoman border, sending emissaries to Istanbul and Bagh-

chasaray. In February 1768, a confederation was formally proclaimed

in the Podolian town of Bar under the leadership of Michał Krasiński.

In reply, the Polish troops loyal to the king along with the Russian

troops garrisoning in Poland were ordered to quell the rebellion.

577

575

Smirnov, Krymskoe xanstvo pod verxovenstvom Otomanskoj porty v XVIII v.,

pp. 80–93; Hajvoronskyj, Sozvezdie Geraev, pp. 84–87; Svitlana Andrejeva, “Žurnaly

podorožej do Krymu Oleksandra Nikiforova 1744 r. ta 1763 r. jak džerelo do vyvčennja

istoriji Pivdnja Ukrajiny,” in: Naukovi Zapysky. Zbirnyk prac’ molodyx včenyx ta aspi-

rantiv, vol. 10 (Kiev, 2005): 385–397, esp. p. 394.

576

Cf. the letter of Selim III Giray to Franciszek Salezy Potocki, the palatine of

Kiev, from April 1765, in which the khan invokes the ancient friendship between

the Girays and the Potocki family and asks the addressee to observe the Karlowitz

Treaty; Otčet Imperatorskoj Publičnoj Biblioteki za 1904 god (St. Petersburg, 1911),

pp. 123–126; see also the letter of Maqsud Giray to Jan Klemens Branicki, the Crown

grand hetman, from June or July 1767, notifying the new khan’s accession (aer the

short second reign of Arslan Giray) and arrival at Qavshan; published in Władysław

Zimnicki, “Jarłyk Maksud ben Selamet Girej Chana z r. 1767,” Rocznik Orientalistyc-

zny 8 (1931–1932): 161–166.

577

Konopczyński, Polska a Turcja 1683–1792, pp. 198–200; Fisher, e Russian

Annexation of the Crimea 1772–1783 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 29–31.

in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 207

Khan Maqsud Giray hesitated and looked at the Porte that was

divided into war and peace factions. In the spring of 1768, he replied

to Krasiński’s letter brought by an emissary, Stefan Makowiecki, in

which the confederates asked for Tatar assistance. e khan advised

them to begin the struggle, assuring them of his sympathy and promis-

ing to forward their request to Istanbul. Yet, at the same time, he urged

the adressees to unite and beware of treason as gossip of their internal

quarrels had already reached the Crimea. e khan’s worries were well

grounded as the contents of his letter were immediately made known

to the Russians and its copy is today preserved in Moscow.

578

In the summer of 1768, a detachment of Cossacks in Russian ser-

vice chased some confederates to the border town of Balta and mas-

sacred its inhabitants, including the sultan’s and the khan’s subjects.

579

is move prompted the Porte to demand the withdrawal of Russian

troops from Poland and to declare war on Russia in October 1768.

Having resolved on the war, the Ottomans reinstalled Qırım Giray,

once removed for his anti-Russian stand, to the Crimean throne.

Praised by Baron de Tott for his energy, open-mindedness, and taste

in Molière and Hungarian wine, the khan gathered the Crimean and

Ottoman troops in Qavshan, got in touch with the Polish confederates,

and invaded the Russian Ukraine in January 1769, but quickly had to

withdraw due to the extremely harsh winter. Unfortunately for the

allies’ war plans, he died soon aer and was replaced by his inexperi-

enced nephew, Devlet IV Giray.

580

578

See Arxiv vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii, f. 123, op. 3, no. 15; the extant

Russian translation was made from a Polish translation, acquired by the Russians in

Mohyliv on 28 April 1768 (the date is apparently given according to the Old Style)

and made from the Arabic-script original.

579

Balta was situated on the border river Kodyma and consisted of the northern part

under the Polish administration, initially known as Józefgród, and the southern part

under the shared Ottoman-Crimean jurisdiction; on the shared Ottoman-Crimean

suzerainty over the lands between the Dniester and the Boh, cf. n. 563 above.

580

Mémoires du Baron de Tott sur les Turcs et les Tartares (Amsterdam, 1784),

pt. 2, pp. 170–181, 202–239, 271–272, and 287–295; cf. the Polish translation: Opisy

Turków y Tatarów przez barona de Tott, vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1791), pp. 151–161, 179–212,

240–241, and 255–261. e author’s somewhat idealized image of Qırım Giray must

be yet taken with a grain of salt as he intentionally contrasted his favorite patron

with his later Turkish superiors, presented as dull Orientals in a typically “Orientalist”

fashion. De Tott’s statement that the khan was poisoned lacks convincing evidence;

cf. Smirnov, Krymskoe xanstvo pod verxovenstvom Otomanskoj porty v XVIII v., pp.

100–103.

208 part one—chapter three

e campaign of 1769 ended in failure. Instead of delivering Poland

from the Russian domination, the Ottomans faced the Russian inva-

sion of northern Moldavia and the fall of Hotin.

581

e Porte replaced

Devlet IV Giray with Kaplan II Giray, who loyally assisted the Otto-

man troops in the following year’s campaign, but his personal courage

did not prevent Muslim defeats on the Larga and Cahul (Kagul) rivers

in the summer of 1770, which enabled the Russian occupation of Mol-

davia and Budjak. At the same time, the Russian Baltic eet entered

the Mediterranean and defeated the Ottoman navy at Çeşme. Reacting

to gossip on the khan’s consent to enter negotiations with Russia, the

Ottomans replaced him with Selim III Giray, who had already reigned

between 1764 and 1767. Yet, replacing one khan with another did not

help to alter the desperate military situation of the Crimea, now sepa-

rated from the main Ottoman army by the Russian troops stationing

in Budjak and exposed to a direct Russian invasion.

582

Apart from their military victories in 1770, the Russians were also

successful in stirring up a domestic conict between the khan and his

Nogay subjects. e Nogay presence in Kuban and the northern Black

Sea steppes had been strengthened in the 17th century by numerous

waves of immigrants from the Volga, the last one having arrived in

1696. e newcomers were hardly integrated within the Khanate’s soci-

ety and their feeling of belonging to a larger Muslim community was

weakened by their numerous conicts over the rights to pasturelands

with the Tatars and earlier Nogay immigrants. In the 18th century,

the Nogays frequently rioted against the khans, asking for Russian

assistance. St. Petersburg knew how to benet from Nogay unrest in

the years of Russo-Ottoman wars, but aer the Treaty of Belgrade it

rather discouraged the Nogays from disobeying the khan.

583

With the

outbreak of the new war, St. Petersburg’s Nogay policy changed once

more and the prospects looked promising. Already in January 1769,

a Russian emissary returned from Yedisan, reporting the Nogays’

unwillingness to ght against Russia and their open conict with

581

Konopczyński, Polska a Turcja 1683–1792, pp. 214–224.

582

For a recent approach towards the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774, see Vir-

ginia Aksan, An Ottoman statesman in War and Peace. Ahmed Resmi Efendi 1700–1783

(Leiden, 1995), pp. 115–169. e author follows the Ottoman sources by referring to

the battles of Larga and Kagul as the battles of Falça and Kartal respectively; the last

term refers to a lake and plain on the Danube crossing opposite Isaccea.

583

See Bi-Arslan Kočekaev, Nogajsko-russkie otnošenija v XV–XVIII vv. (Alma-Ata,

1988), pp. 130–160; Kellner-Heinkele, “Na granice vse kak obyčno,” p. 41.

in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 209

Khan Qırım Giray, who had imprisoned ten Nogay mirzas in order to

enforce the obedience of their followers.

584

In 1770, numerous Nogays

led by a powerful leader, Djan Mambet Bey, declared independence

from Baghchasaray and joined the Russian troops ghting against the

Ottomans and the Crimeans.

585

St. Petersburg soon disenchanted its new allies as it entered into

direct negotiations with Baghchasaray, oering to honor the integrity

of the khan’s domains in return for his breaking with the Porte. e

proposal was initially rejected by both Kaplan II Giray and his succes-

sor, Selim III Giray, but the latter capitulated in July 1771, aer the

Russians had forced the defences of Perekop, captured Ottoman Caa

and entered Baghchasaray. Although oered to continue his reign as

an “independent” ruler (the Russians even invoked the Genghisid tra-

dition in order to incite the Tatars to break with the Porte), Selim III

Giray preferred to abandon the throne and le for Istanbul.

586

e

Crimean beys then elected Sahib Giray, who was ready to accept the

Russian conditions. A few months later, the Ottomans gathered all

the Giray princes present at the Porte and appointed Maqsud Giray as

an “anti-khan.” Yet, the latter was soon to resign unable to enter the

Crimea and disenchanted with the Ottoman mistrust and inadequate

support.

587

584

See Arxiv vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii, f. 123, op. 4, no. 36: a copy of the

report dated 19 January 1769 (Old Style), sent to St. Petersburg by the governor-

general of Kiev, Fedor Voejkov.

585

Cf. Fisher, e Russian Annexation of the Crimea, pp. 32–37. Djan Mambet

Bey is commonly referred to as the leader of the Yedisan Nogays, but in his docu-

ments he adopted the ocial title of “the head commander and general of the ree

Hordes” (üç ordunıŋ baş zabıtı mirmiran); see the original credential letter given

to a Nogay plenipotentiary (murahhas ve elçi), Temür Shah Mirza, appointed to

negotiate with the Russians, dated 2 June 1772 (1 Rebi I 1186 A.H.) and corrobo-

rated by Djan Mambet and eighteen other Nogay dignitaries; Arxiv vnešnej politiki

Rossijskoj imperii, f. 123, op. 2, no. 80, folder 7, fols. 8b–8a. e folder also contains

three credential letters issued separately for the plenipotentiaries of the Djemboyluk,

Yedichkul, and Budjak hordes, corroborated by their respective leaders. Contrary to

Kočekaev’s statement that these documents were composed in the Nogay language

(cf. idem, Nogajsko-russkie otnošenija, p. 183, n. 70), their language can be described as

pure Ottoman Turkish, although the scribes recorded Nogay names in their original

sounding. For instance, Djan Mambet’s name was recorded by the scribe in its Nogay

sounding (

ﺖﺒ

ﻤﻣ

نﺎﺟ), whereas his seal had its Ottomanized version engraved, namely

Djan Mehmed (

ﺪﻤﺤﻣ نﺎﺟ).

586

Fisher, e Russian Annexation of the Crimea, pp. 37–44.

587

Cf. Le khanat de Crimée, pp. 355–357.

210 part one—chapter three

In the following months, Catherine II skillfully played a comedy in

order to persuade the European public opinion that her troops invaded

the Crimea on the request of its inhabitants, in order to deliver them

from the Ottoman yoke. In November 1771, Sahib II Giray and the

Tatar people received a Russian charter, “restoring” their ancient

independence. At the same time, a Crimean delegation, headed by

the khan’s younger brother and qalga, Shahin Giray, arrived at St.

Petersburg and was sumptuously received. A mutual infatuation then

arose between the young prince and the empress, which was to largely

inuence future events.

588

On 12 November 1772, a formal treaty was

reached in the Crimean town of Qarasu Bazar, the traditional seat of

the Shirin beys, between Khan Sahib II Giray and the Russian pleni-

potentiary, General-major Evdokim Ščerbinin. On the latter’s insis-

tence, the document was also corroborated by a number of Crimean

and Nogay leaders, whose presence was to secure that the agreement

would be honored. e Crimean Khanate was to remain independent

but simultaneously allied with Russia, whose empress guaranteed its

sovereignty and the freedom of election of its future khans. Apart from

the Crimean peninsula, including the former Ottoman province of

Caa, the khans were to rule over Kuban and the steppe to the north

of Perekop, inhabited by the Nogays. Yet, no mention was made about

Budjak and other territories extending to the west from the Dnieper

that had formerly belonged to the khans. Moreover, Russia was to gar-

rison the Crimean strongholds of Kerch and Yenikale and the khan

resigned from any claims to Kabarda.

589

On 18 November 1772 (22 Shaban 1186 A.H.), Sahib II Giray issued

a Declaration of Independence, also countersigned and sealed by the

leading Tatar and Nogay notables. It was composed in Russian and

French versions, apparently both dictated by his Russian patrons. In

the French version, having announced that the Tatars and Nogays had

regained their ancient liberty (ayant par la providence divine recouvré

588

See Fisher, e Russian Annexation of the Crimea, pp. 44–46, invoking Cath-

erine’s praiseful lines on the Tatar prince in her letter sent to Voltaire.

589

On the treaty’s contents, cf. Fisher, e Russian Annexation of the Crimea,

pp. 49–51; Elena Družinina, Kjučuk-Kajnardžijskij mir 1774 goda (ego podgotovka i

zaključenie) (Moscow, 1955), pp. 204–206; Kočekaev, Nogajsko-russkie otnošenija, pp.

183–184. All these authors date its conclusion according to the Old Style, namely on

1 November.

in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 211

leur ancienne liberté et independence et s’étant formés en un État inde-

pendent de toute domination étrangere et soumis à son propre gouver-

nement), the khan declared:

Nous, conjointement avec tous les princes de Schirin et autres princes

de Crimée, avec la noblesse et le clergé, et au nom de tout le peuple de

Crimée et des chefs, peuples et familles des Nogaïs, et generalement de

tous ceux qui participent à l’hereux changement actuel du sort des Tata-

res, declarons solemnellement par les presentes devant le monde entier

et nommement devant la Sublime Porte, que [. . .] nous maintiendrons

à perpetuité l’independence la quelle appartient en propre aux peuples

Tartares, comme en ayant jouï de toute ancienneté et ne l’ayant perdue

que dans ces derniers tem[p]s; comme aussi, que nous entretiendrons

parmi nous l’ordre qui convient à un État libre et bien reglé, ainsi que le

plus propre à nous meriter la conance des puissances voisines.

590

e last sentence, although pronounced in the khan’s name, in fact

contained a direct warning of his Russian patrons that if the Tatars

misbehaved, Russia would not be obliged to tolerate their indepen-

dence. is issue was to reappear soon, but for the time-being, in

1774, Istanbul and St. Petersburg, exhausted by the war, concluded

the Treaty of Küchük Kaynardja. e treaty conrmed the indepen-

dence of the Crimean Khanate, although the Ottoman sultan retained

religious suzerainty over its Muslim inhabitants, embodied by his title

of the caliph that was formally acknowledged by Russia. e Porte also

retained the fortress of Očakiv, while the khan regained his authority

over the lands extending between the Boh and the Dniester (although

not over Budjak). On the other hand, Russia secured its recent strate-

gic conquests: the access to the Strait of Kerch with the right to gar-

rison Kerch and Yenikale, and the access to the Dnieper mouth with

the right to garrison Qılburun. e Polish issue, which had been the

immediate cause of the war, was not even mentioned in the treaty.

e Confederation of Bar had been suppressed by 1772, when Poland-

Lithuania suered the rst partition and lost territories inhabited by

four and a half million people, to be divided between Russia, Austria,

and Prussia.

590

For both the Russian and the French copies, see Arxiv vnešnej politiki Rossijskoj

imperii, f. 123, op. 3, no. 6.

212 part one—chapter three

e end of the Crimean Khanate (1783) and the demise

of Poland-Lithuania (1795)

Although despised by many of his subjects for his weak stand against

Russia, Sahib II Giray shared with his critics a concealed hatred towards

the Russian patronage. Shortly aer the peace had been announced,

the khan arrested the Russian resident in the Crimea and asked the

Porte to restore its suzerainty over the Khanate. Yet, having severed

his relations with St. Petersburg, the khan failed to gain the condence

of Istanbul. His reign was then easily challenged by his cousin and

the former khan, Devlet IV Giray, who had earlier inspired an anti-

Russian revolt among the Kuban Nogays. Aer Devlet IV Giray landed

in the Crimea, Sahib II Giray abdicated and le for Istanbul in 1775.

For the time being, St. Petersburg acknowledged Devlet IV Giray’s

accession, but in 1777 the Russian troops invaded the peninsula and

introduced to the throne Shahin Giray, the empress’ favorite and for-

mer guest. A radical program of reforms, shaped on the Russian model

and enthusiastically introduced by the new khan, provoked an outright

rebellion among his subjects. e Porte did not wish to start a new war

with Russia, but under the pressure of the street opinion, instigated

by Crimean refugees, it appointed Selim III Giray to become the khan

for the third time and provided him with auxiliary troops. Having

landed on the peninsula, Selim III Giray easily defeated Shahin Giray,

especially as the latter’s soldiers massively joined the rebellion. Yet, in

the face of another Russian intervention Selim III Giray retreated to

Istanbul in 1778. e Russo-Ottoman conict was resolved in 1779

by the Convention of Aynalı Kavak, in which the Porte recognized

Shahin Giray and in return Russia promised to remove its troops from

the Khanate. e Convention ultimately deprived the Crimean Khan-

ate of its common border with Poland as the lands between the Boh

and the Dniester were declared as belonging to the sultan, and not to

the khan.

591

Cf. Article 3 of the Treaty of Küchük Kaynardja that granted to the khan “all

the lands situated between the rivers Boh and Dniester, extending as far as the Polish

border, except for the fortress of Očakiv along with its ancient district” (in the Russian

version: vsju zemlju do pol’skoj granicy, ležaščuju meždu rekami Bugom i Dnestrom,

isključaja krepost’ Očakov s ee starym uezdom; in the Turkish version: Aqsu ve Turla

nehirleri beyninde olan cemi‘ arazi Leh memleketi hududına varınca tava’if-i merqu-

meye istirdad ve Özi qal‘esi qadimi ülkesiyle ke`l-evvel Devlet-i ‘Aliyyemiŋ taht-i tasar-

in the shade of istanbul and moscow (1671–1783) 213

Having preserved his throne thanks to the Russian troops, Shahin

Giray found himself deprived of the only major group of his subjects

that had supported him, namely the Crimean Christians, who were

removed from the Khanate by the Russians in 1778, ocially for the

sake of their own safety.

592

Not dispirited, the khan returned to his

reforms and in addition claimed his authority over the territories

extending to the west from the Boh and to the south from the Kuban

river, drawing his Russian patrons into unpleasant disputes with the

Porte. e grandiose plans did not help in increasing the khan’s popu-

larity among his own subjects. When another revolt broke out, rst

in Kuban and then in the Crimea, Shahin Giray had to seek refuge in

Russian Kerch. His brother, Bahadır Giray, assumed the reign for a

while in 1782, but the Russian troops once more “restored the order”

and reintroduced Shahin to the throne. However, for this time even

Catherine was tired with her favorite and in April 1783 the Crimea

was formally annexed to Russia.

Acknowledging its military weakness, the Porte initially recognized

the annexation, although it was a drastic rupture of the Treaty of

Küchük Kaynardja. Yet, in 1787 the Ottomans went to war, demanded

the Russian evacuation of the Crimea, and even appointed nominal

rufunda baqı qala), with Article 5 of the Convention of Aynalı Kavak, providing that

the lands between the Dniester, the Boh, the Polish border, and the Black Sea (in the

Russian version: meždu Dnestrom, Bugom, pol’skoju graniceju i Černym morem; in

the Turkish version: Buġ ta‘bir olunur Aqsu ve Leh hududı [ve] Dnyester ta‘bir olunur

Turla nehri ve Qara Deŋiz sahili beyninde) were to be deserted by the Tatars and to

return under the sultan’s authority on the condition that—apart from Očakiv—they

remained unsettled and deprived of fortications; for the Russian version of both trea-

ties, see Družinina, Kjučuk-Kajnardžijskij mir 1774 goda, pp. 349–365; for the Turk-

ish version of the treaty of 1774 contained in the instrument issued by the sultan,

see Istanbul, Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Düvel-i Ecnebiye 83/1 (Rus ecnebi deeri),

pp. 142–152; the articles are also published in Mu‘ahedat Mecmu‘ası, vol. 3 (Istanbul,

1297 A.H./1879–1880 A.D.), pp. 254–273; for the Turkish version of the Convention

of Aynalı Kavak, see Mu‘ahedat Mecmu‘ası, vol. 3, pp. 275–284.

592

A hypothesis that by this means the Russian authorities deliberately intended

to weaken Shahin’s political and economic position seems tenable but is not con-

rmed by any source material; cf. Fisher, e Russian Annexation of the Crimea,

p. 102. Many Greeks and Armenians opposed the idea of leaving their homeland; large

numbers perished in result of their forced resettlement and many others wished to

return; see “Sobytija slučivšijasja v Krymu v carstvovanie Šagin-Gereja-xana (perevod

s sovremennoj evrejskoj rukopisi sočinennoj karaimom Rabbi-Azar’ja synom Ilii).”

Edited and translated by A. Firkovič, in: Vremennik Imperatorskago Moskovskago

Obščestva istorii i drevnostej rossijskix, book 24 (1856), II. Materialy, pp. 101–134,

esp. pp. 127–129.