Langbein Hermann. People in Auschwitz
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were united in May 1943 and given a stable executive committee composed of
two Poles and two Austrians. In addition to all other tasks, it undertook to
deemphasize national differences in relation to the elementarydifference that
was graphically indicated by the striped uniforms of the inmates and the ss
uniforms of the murderers. Progress in this area is one of the positive achieve-
ments of the Kampfgruppe Auschwitz (Combat Group Auschwitz), as this
organization called itself.
n Besides the saving of human lives, another task in the extermination camp
forced itself on those who could think beyond themselves and the barbed
wire: not to let the truth about the extermination methods of Nazism perish
together with the victims. Ella Lingens writes that the following thought sus-
tained many inmates: ‘‘We must survive so we can tell the world what we have
seen and suffered.’’ It stands to reason that it was primarily the Poles who
were able to establish contact with the surrounding population and through it
with the underground movement active in Poland. After some time Polish in-
mates who worked outside the camp area and Polish civilians employed in the
area established a permanent contact by which a resistance movement in Cra-
cow was regularly informed about what was happening in the camp. After the
founding of the international organization in the camp, Józef Cyrankiewicz
and Stanislaw Klodzinski carried on a continuous correspondence with Cra-
cow.Theletters sent tothecamp fromtherewere destroyed afterthey hadbeen
read. In Cracow, however, 350 letters from the camp have been preserved—
just part of the extensive correspondence.
Other contacts were with neighboring Czechoslovakia. Three women who
worked in the Waffen-ss’s central construction office—Krystyna Horczak,
Waleria Walova, and Vera Foltynova, one Pole and two Czechs—secretly made
copies of plans of the camp and architects’ drawings of the crematoriums
with the built-in gas chambers, and these and other documents were sent to
Czechoslovakia. Foltynova has described the motivation for this dangerous
undertaking: ‘‘We were convinced we would never get out of that hell, and
we wanted the world to know everything some day.’’ Eventually they sent out
three original plans that were stored in duplicate in the archive of the central
construction office in the sameway and also enclosed some other information
about the camp—for example, about experiments with twins that Mengele
made. Other documents they cemented in the washroom of their block. Their
dormitory elder, the Pole Antonia Platkowska, helped them with this. The
Czechs Foltynova and Walova were Jews but had been arrestedbecause of their
activity in the Communist Party.
Maria Stromberger, a nurse in the ss infirmary, helped me send reports
about Auschwitz to my brother in Vienna, among other things an additional
254 n the prisoners
carbon copy of a secret monthly report that the ss garrison physician had dic-
tated to me. From this my brother compiled facts and dates in a flyer that was
disseminated by an underground communist group.
Because the leadership of the resistance organization had to acknowledge
that the information about exterminations sounded so incredible that it was
often bound to meet with skepticism, it decided to dispel doubts with the aid
of photographs. In 1944 the leadership in the main camp instructed Dawid
Szmulewski, who was active in the resistance movement in Birkenau, to pro-
cure photographs of the destruction. Stanislaw Klodzinski affirms that the
Polish civilian Mordarski, who worked in the camp area, smuggled a camera
into the camp. It was brought to the Sonderkommando in a food pail with a
false bottom, and pictures were taken from the roof of a crematorium. The
exposed film was brought back to the main camp where it was concealed in
a tube of toothpaste and smuggled out of the camp by Helena Daton, who
worked in the ss canteen. The photos were sent to Cracow with this covering
letter: ‘‘We are of the opinion that the photos should be enlarged and passed
on....Urgent:Send as soon as possible two rolls of metal film for a cam-
erasize6×9.Send the rolls as fast as you can!’’ These photos have become
world-famous.
The Polish resistance movement in Cracow was in touch with London.
When all connections were functioning, it sometimes happened that the bbc
reported about occurrences in Auschwitz within two days. As I have already
demonstrated, the radical change in the personnel of the camp administra-
tion in the fall of 1943 was due in part to the information disseminated about
Auschwitz. Once we noticed how sensitive the Central Office was about news
of this kind, a sensitivity that grew as the war situation became more unfavor-
able for the Germans, we systematically sent out detailed information about
the ss’s extermination program. This information did not fail to be effective
and today constitutes important documentation.
At the beginning of 1944 names and personal data of those members of the
ss who had played particularly prominent parts in the machinery of extermi-
nation were sent to London via this route, and the effect appeared promptly.
Years later Hans Hoffmann testified as follows about his colleague Gerhard
Lachmann, the notorious sssergeant in the Political Department, who was on
that list: ‘‘When I came to see him (in the Gypsy camp), he gave me his service
pistol, which was now registered in my name. He also gave me his personal
bicycle, which I was supposed to send to his sister. At that time he told me
that his name had been mentioned on theBritish radio together with five other
names in connection with crimes committed in Auschwitz. He recited those
names, but I only remember Boger. He also mentioned that he was leaving
Auschwitz for that reason and would receive a new military paybook with a
Resistance n 255
false name.’’ These demoralizing precautionary measures of the ss happened
to become known in the case of Lachmann, but it may be assumed that they
were taken in other cases as well. The ss sergeant Johann Piringer, who also
heard that broadcast, remembers that Höß and Palitzsch were also sentenced
to death on that occasion as well.
Long before that, the bbc in London had broadcast unequivocal threats
against the ss—for example, in December 1942, when the commentator had
this to say about the extermination of the Jews in connection with a report
about a debate in the House of Commons: ‘‘For those in Germany who let
themselves be misused as tools of the systematic extermination of another
race with full awareness of what they are doing, there will be no room in the
new postwar world. For such people there can be nothing but extermination.
Themembersof the ssand allothers who are participating in theplanningand
implementation of the Nazi policy of exterminating the Jews should take note
of this.’’ In Auschwitz this threat had no perceptible effect, perhaps because
at that time belief in Hitler’s victory was still too strong to let any fear arise,
but surely a broadcast of more than a year later, in which specific ss func-
tionaries were condemned to death, was very effective because it gave names
and biographical details.
Eventually the resistance movement sent out plans of the camp that in-
cluded the extermination facilities and called on the Allies to bomb these. It
was expressly stated that a decisionnot to bomb should definitely not be based
on the fear that inmates might also be killed. That this demand did reach
the Allies is documented by a telegram from the British Embassy in Bern to
the Foreign Office in London that was intercepted by the German monitoring
service on July 5, 1944. This telegram describes the campaign to exterminate
Hungarian Jews and makes this proposal among others: ‘‘Bomb the railway
lines from Hungary to Birkenau. Zero in on the facilities of the death camp.’’
The responsible authorities have never clarified why there was no such bom-
bardment, even though at that time other targets in the immediate vicinity
were reached by Allied air fleets.
In my opinion Bruno Baum went too far when he wrote shortly after the
liberation that because of the documents sent out of the camp and Allied pro-
paganda, conditions in Auschwitz improved to such an extent ‘‘that in the
end the main camp became a model camp.’’ However, such a trend may be
documented.
n The Polish underground organization in the vicinity utilized its connec-
tions to provide medicines for the prisoners. This kind of help was started
early and constantly expanded. Poles who were living near the camp regularly
gave medications to the Polish inmates on the Rajsko Garden Center detail. A
256 n the prisoners
touching letter that was smuggled out of the camp by Edward Biernacki indi-
cates the scope of this action: ‘‘In June, July, and August (evidently in 1942) I
brought around 7,500 cc vaccines as well as seventy sets of antityphus vaccine
to the inmate infirmary. Other people also do this kind of work, and their re-
sults are certainly impressive. Rest assured that we shall not disappoint you
in your wishes and hopes. For your readiness to make sacrifices and your re-
membrance, once more my heartfelt thanks.’’
In November 1942 the Polish resistance movement informed its friends in
Cracow that the officially apportioned medications met about 20 percent of
the demand and that another 10 percent were ‘‘organized’’ in the camp. The
remaining 70 percent needed in the infirmary of the main camp were covered
by medications that were smuggled into the camp. This report indicates that
these medicines did not benefit all of the patients: ‘‘Poles constitute the great-
est percentage (of patients in the infirmary of the main camp), about 50 per-
cent, and we help only them.’’ It is not certain whether this remark expresses
the nationalistic egotism of the Polish resistance group in the infirmary or
whether these words were written merely in line with the known attitude of
the Cracow organizations. In any case, they underscore the importance of the
international organization that was formed six months later. Several inmates
and a Polish woman from the vicinity lost their lives in this relief action. They
were caught smuggling and brutally put to death.
When ‘‘Aryan’’ inmates were allowed to receive packages, the resistance
organization devised a less dangerous method of smuggling medicines into
the camp. It arranged for packages containing medications to be addressed to
deceasedinmates. Polish prisoners whoworkedin theparcel office knewthese
addresses and smuggled the packages into the camp uncensored by the ss.
n Connections with the outside world were also used for the organization of
escapes. Since Himmler did not readily forgive the commandants of the con-
centration camps for high numbers of escapes, the most severe reprisals were
occasioned by flights: making the entire camp population stand in the roll call
area for up to twenty hours (after the first successful escape on July 6, 1940);
condemning comrades of the escapee to starvation in unlit bunker cells; exe-
cuting comrades in the roll call area en masse; at a later date, interning the
escapees’ parents in the camp and announcing this measure with placards.
In keeping with a proven method, the camp administration assured itself of
the capos’ collaboration in preventing escapes by punishing them if a mem-
ber of their detail had managed to escape during working hours. This caused
manya capo to protect himself by having those in his charge line up and count
off several times a day, a practice that enabled a quicker detection of any at-
tempted escape. If an escapee was captured alive, he was publicly hanged in
Resistance n 257
the camp, at least during the Höß regime. If he was shot in the pursuit, his
corpse was displayed next to the camp entrance for all to see. In addition, an
army of stool pigeons was mobilized to ferret out prisoners who had voiced
thoughts of escaping.
Despite all this there was an unbroken chain of escapes and attempted es-
capes. Höß mentions that his superior Glücks wanted to replace him twice—
‘‘and only because of the unprecedented high number of escapes that caused
the Reich Leader ss (Reichsführer-ss,orrfss, that is, Himmler) to give him
such a hard time.’’
This is confirmed by the followingpassage from thenotes madeby Grabner
in prison: ‘‘Now, however, Berlin also applied so much pressure because of
the escapes that Höß reported a greatly inflated number of inmates shot while
trying to escape in order to appease those high-level gentlemen.’’ Although
Grabner’s notes should generally be used with caution, this remark appears
credible. It comports with Höß’s report of a statement made by Himmler
whenheinspected Auschwitzin mid-July1942.Thisis what Himmlerallegedly
told him on that occasion:‘‘Theescape rate inAuschwitz is unusuallyhighand
unprecedented in any kl.Any means,any means that you employ to anticipate
and prevent escapes is all right with me! The escape epidemic at Auschwitz
must disappear!’’ As a matter of fact, documents indicate that between July
and October of that year 142 inmates were reported as shot while trying to
escape.
It was easy to inflate the statistics by commending and giving special leave
to every ss man who reported that he had prevented an escape. Since the cir-
cumstances under which he claimed to have done so were not investigated,
it became the practice to feign flights and collect the reward. This was done
most frequently with the aid of ‘‘cap tossing.’’ An inmate with little camp ex-
perience had his cap torn from his head while he worked outside the camp
and thrown beyond the cordon. Then an ss man screamed at the inmate and
ordered him to retrieve his cap. If he obeyed, he was ‘‘shot while trying to es-
cape.’’ If the inmate disobeyed, he risked being killed even more cruelly for
not following orders.
Many Green capos had been playing this game, but here, too, a generaliza-
tion would be unfair. Alex Rosenstock mentions the following episode from
Birkenau: ‘‘It was in 1942, when a great many inmates were being murdered
in a sewage gas facility. Cap tossing was a great sport there.Then a capo from
the German Reich named Hermann joined this detail. When an ss man once
again tossed an inmate’s cap over the cordon, the capo said to the inmate:
‘Don’t go, I’ll get your cap.’ He was not shot at.’’ Rosenstock also writes that
when food was distributed this capo made sure that everyone received equal
rations. Hermann wore the black triangle of an ‘‘antisocial.’’
258 n the prisoners
Sometimes reports of escapes were feigned forother reasons as well. Heinz
Brandt has given an example. In the fall of 1944 two Gypsies managed to es-
cape from a forest detail in the satellite camp Budy because the guards, who
were ethnic Germans, had fallen asleep.When they awoke and noticed the es-
cape, they shot the other nineteen members of the detail, reported a general
rebellion, and claimed that they had managed to foil the outbreak of all but
two inmates. In this way they garnered praise rather than censure.
n However, there also were many genuine and not merely feigned attempts
to escape. In the early period most of them were acts of desperation, and two
of these mass outbreaks have become known. On July 10, 1942, about fifty
inmates escaped from the penal company for men who had to dig the Königs-
graben (ditch) in Birkenau. Thirteen were shot while trying to escape, nine did
so successfully, and the rest were captured. As far as one can tell from the
names of those shot and the successful escapees, they were all Poles. Grab-
ner has stated that in those days the would-be escapees were primarily Polish
intellectuals. According to him, with the exception of the German capos, all
of the other members of the penal company were gassed. This act of despera-
tion was probably prompted by the fact that in those days therewas absolutely
no chance for a non-German to survive in the penal company.
Soon thereafter a substantial number of Russians broke out of Birkenau.
According to some reports, this happened on October 5, 1942, but Andrej
Pogoschew, a survivor, thinksitwason November6.At the eveningroll callthe
absence of two inmates was reported. As was customary, inmate functionaries
were ordered to conduct a search in the adjoining area inside the great cor-
don. In this instance the survivors of the transports of Russian prisoners of
war who, as a form of public display, enjoyed certain privileges were ordered
to participate in the search, and they used the opportunity to break out in the
foggy dusk. Broad writes that nineteen Russians fled, and Pogoschew states
that he fled with seventy comrades. He was not asked how many were later
captured by the ss. Broad says only that the pursuit was not very successful.
Kazimierz Smolen, the directorof the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, be-
lieves that over fifty people fled; he mentions that the Russians destroyed a
watchtower and that more than ten managed to escape and join a partisan
group that was active in the vicinity. Alois Staller, a German inmate func-
tionary who participated in the search, remembers that sixty-eight Russians
fled and fourteen corpses were returned to the camp.
Many survivors remember another escape. In May 1943 three Poles man-
aged to escape from the Surveying Service Commando. The Political Depart-
ment searched foraccomplices and helpers. On July 19 twelve Polish members
of the detail were hanged in the roll call area of the main camp in front of all
Resistance n 259
of the lined-up inmates, and as a deterrent the corpses were left hanging for
alongtime.
In the early period many inmates fled spontaneously, quickly exploiting a
favorable opportunity or out of despair, incurring any risk, but later on es-
capes were with increasing frequency carefully organized. The Combat Group
Auschwitz prepared in the camp maps, provisions, medicines, and addresses
of safe houses, and it established contact with Polish partisan groups in the
vicinity that were to receive the escapees. The most important thing was to
find inside the big cordon a secure hidingplace that could not even be detected
by police dogs, for as soon as a missing inmate was reported at the evening
roll call, the ss sounded an alarm. Then the big cordon inside which most de-
tails worked during the day remained in place while a search was conducted
in the area surrounded by it. If this search proved fruitless, the camp admin-
istration left the big guard chain that was normally there only during the day
in place for three nights. Thus a fugitive had to stay in a hiding place inside
the great cordon for three days and three nights and was not able to leave the
camp area until the fourth night.
The resistance movement organized numerous escapes in this fashion, but
the last and most important one failed. On many occasions two prisoners
were sent out, frequently a Pole who was supposed to communicate with the
helpers and a member of another nationality whose escape the organization
considered important. In several instances the latter were Jews, and three of
those are known to me by name.Two of them survived, but the third, who had
escaped to Warsaw, was captured by the Gestapo there.
Legends have formed around some of these escapes. A case in point is
Otto Küsel, a German inmate with the number 2 who fled from the camp
together with three Poles on December 29, 1942, in a boldly planned escape.
Nine months later Küsel was picked up inWarsaw and returned to Auschwitz,
where, fortunately for him, the newly appointed commandant Liebehenschel
had rescinded the order to execute all captured fugitives.
June 24, 1944, brought another particularly sensational escape. The Pole
Edek Galinski fled in an ss uniform together with Mala Zimetbaum, a uni-
versally respected Jewish runner and interpreter. With the help of Poles both
reached the Slovak border, but there they were captured, taken back to the
camp, and publicly executed. (Liebehenschel had already been replaced by
Baer.) In full view of the lined-up inmates of the women’s camp, Mala was
able to slash her wrists with a concealed razor blade, and with bleeding hands
she slapped the face of an ss man—a dramatic act of rebellion at the end of
a life that has remained in the memory of many.
Detlef Nebbe, the top sergeant in the commandant’s office, testified many
years later: ‘‘As is well known, safeguardingthe camp was not easy. All sorts of
260 n the prisoners
incidents had to be expected; for example, there were massive attacks by the
partisan movement. Also, some partisans tried to sneak into the camp area in
ssuniforms.’’Thatthis testimonydoesnot merelyexpressthe self-importance
of a man who loved to emphasize to German judges his ‘‘military duties’’ in
Auschwitz is indicated by the fact that in the fall of 1944 twenty-nine of the
126 members of the Polish partisan group Sosienka, which operated in the
vicinity of the camp, were fugitives from Auschwitz.
n Anumberof attempts tobreak out ofsatellite camps that were not as closely
guarded as the main camp or Birkenau have become known. When a drainage
ditch was dug in Janinagrube in the summerof 1944, the camp administration
discovered a subterranean passage that began near the latrine and went under
the fence. It found out that a German, a Russian, and a third man of unknown
nationality were planning to escape in this fashion. At a later hearing ss camp
leader Hermann Kleemann testified as follows: ‘‘One time a criminal inmate
from the German Reich was hanged because he had attempted to escape by
digging a tunnel underneath the wire fence.This was reported by the inmates
themselves because they feared the consequences.’’ The execution of a Ger-
man was unusual, and evidently this is why Kleemann remembered it more
clearly than he did the executions of other inmates.
Another attempted escape in Janinagrube, also with the aid of an under-
ground tunnel, was successful. At that time a German Green capo fled to-
gether with a young Polish Jew. This flight also happened in 1944, probably
before the failed attempt mentioned by Kleemann. Both men got as far as Es-
sen, most likely the German’s hometown. There they were captured, brought
back to the camp, and hanged in the roll call area of Janinagrube after the ss
had informed the lined-up inmates that this would be the fate of all who dared
to flee.
Josef Kierspel, the camp elder of Golleschau, recalls the flight in the sum-
mer of 1944 of the German capo Alois Reier, who was also from the Essen
area and wore a red triangle. The escape was evidently attempted through
a tunnel that had been dug from the washroom. The capo was ferreted out
and shot. Kierspel also remembers the execution of an inmate in Golleschau.
From the judgment that was read before the execution, Kierspel gathered that
after attempting to escape the inmate attacked a police officer with a knife.
This prisoner was executed in Golleschau but had not fled from this satellite
camp.
The ss camp leaderof Günthergrube, Alois Frey, testified as follows: ‘‘Dur-
ingmy presence in Günthergrube, five inmates whose nationalities I no longer
remember (they weren’t Germans in any case) were publicly hanged. Those
five had been planning to escape and had offered an ss man some money to
Resistance n 261
help them. The man contacted by them was an ethnic German from the Bal-
kans; I don’t remember his name. He notified me of the inmates’ plans, and I
made a report to Schwarz, the camp commandant.Then the five inmates were
removed from Günthergrube and publicly hanged a few weeks later.’’ Ludwig
Wörl, who was camp elder in Günthergrube at that time, remembers that four
Jews were executed, and he believes that this escape was attempted in Sep-
tember 1944. Since others have also stated that four inmates were executed,
Frey probablyerred. It is possible that the fifth inmate died—that is, was mur-
dered—in the course of the hearings. The victims were from the Auschwitz
area. One of them is reported to have called out with a noose around his neck,
‘‘Fellows, keep going, don’t be afraid!’’ This man, whose name was Fischel,
used to be a cantor’s assistant in Bedzin.
There was a similar incident in the satellite camp Fürstengrube. Henryk
Kowadlo reports that a Jewish block elder named Grimm was executed to-
gether with two prisoners because someone had revealed that they had dug
a channel for their escape. Dr. Miklos Udvardi is presumably referring to the
sameincidentwhenhe states thatin late Julyor August 1944 five or six inmates
were publicly hanged in Fürstengrube. As he remembersit, those hangedwere
Poles and Jews from Greece and Italy. Udvardi affirms that this was a con-
spiracy and that a radio transmitter was found in the block where Grimm was
block elder.
Karl Dubsky, Theodor Weil, and others remember a failed attempt to break
out of the satellite camp Jaworzno, also with the aid of a tunnel. Many of
those involved—the reports range from nineteen to twenty-nine—were pub-
licly hanged on December 6, 1943, after a Polish block elder had revealed their
preparations.The camp elderof the satellite camp Sosnowitz, probably a Nor-
wegian officer, was caught trying to escape and was hanged in the camp.
One escape has made the history books. Alfred Wetzler and Rudolf Vrba,
who escaped from Birkenau on April 7, 1944, and reached Slovakia, their
homeland, passed along their notes on Auschwitz to Jewish organizations as
well as to a representative of the Catholic church; the notes were forwarded
to the pope and Roosevelt, among others.
n Aftera careful investigation of all preserved records,Tadeusz Iwaszko, a re-
searcher at the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, was able to document 667
escapes. He showed that at least 270 escapees were captured after escaping
or were caught trying to escape. In the bunker book, the notation ‘‘back from
escape’’ marks the listing of three inmates in 1941, fifty-nine inmates in 1942,
and 119 the following year. In January 1944 five inmates were brought ‘‘back
from escape’’ to the bunker. No entries have been preserved beyond that date.
At a later date it was possible to obtain the addresses of around 100 escapees
262 n the prisoners
from Auschwitz. This means that at the very least 100 and at most 397 pris-
oners survived the flight and the subsequent life in the underground oramong
partisans.
Of the 667 prisoners who have been documented to have escaped, or tried
to escape, only sixteen were women. Female inmates were most likely to at-
tempt an escape from the penal company. For one thing, living conditions
there were such that the women were ready to run any risk, and, for another,
the penal company was for a long time housed in a satellite camp where the
supervision could not be as tightly organized as it was in the main camp or
the Birkenau complex.
It has been possible to determine the nationality of 481 of the 667 escapees.
Over 48 percent were Poles, and Russians were the second largest group, with
19 percent.This may be due to the related language thatpermitted a Russianto
communicate with Poles, to the especially brutal methods employed to anni-
hilate Russians, and finally to the fact that almost all the Russians deported to
Auschwitz were soldiers. In 1944 the approach of the Red Army must have in-
duced many a Russian to flee, and therewere an increasing numberof escapes.
Between April 19 and June 8, twenty-five Russian prisoners of war fled from
Auschwitz, almost all of them in groups. On May 22 five Russians managed
to escape together, and on May 27 another seven did.
Almost 16 percent of the fugitives were Jews. The documents do not indi-
cate from what countries they had been deported to Auschwitz, but on the
basis of known cases it may be stated that most of them were from Poland
and neighboring Slovakia. The percentage is surprisingly high when one con-
siders that for linguistic reasons many Jews had no opportunity to continue
on their own aftera successful escape. Besides, they had to cope with the anti-
Semitism of the surrounding population on whose help they depended.When
Edek Galinski was preparing to escape with Mala Zimetbaum, his friend and
compatriot Wieslaw Kielar asked him whether in an emergency they could
count on help from people in the vicinity if those people noticed Jewish fea-
tures in Mala. Well, this was not the reason for the failure of this escape; but
if Poles considered such matters, Jews certainly had to expect some trouble.
After all, imprisonment in the camp had taken the heaviest physical toll on
Jews.They were more strongly affected by a certain inhibition than those who
could escape from the lowest rung of the inmate hierarchy, an inhibition that
Elie A. Cohen has formulated as follows: ‘‘For years it was drummed into us
that we must obey orders rather than think of taking an initiative, and even-
tually I was afraid of making any personal decision.’’ This kept Cohen from
thinking of escaping in the evacuation, even though it offered the most favor-
able opportunity to do so.
Six percent of thosewho attempted an escape were Gypsies, and therewere
Resistance n 263