Murphy Martin. Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy & Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World
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xi
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque homeland and Freedom)
ESO External Security Organisation (hizbollah)
Eu European union
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FERIT Far East Regional Investigation Team
FDN Nicaraguan Democratic Force
FoC Flag of Convenience
Fp-25 popular Forces of April 25
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka
GI Al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya
GRp Government of the Republic of the philippines
GRT Gross Registered Tonnage
hARTS harbour Craft Transponder System
hLh “hong Kong-Luzon-hainan Island”
ICG International Crisis Group
ICS International Chamber of Shipping
IDF Israeli Defence Force
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IMB International Maritime Bureau
IMO International Maritime Organisation
IN Indian Navy
IpSp International port Security programme
IRA Irish Republican Army
IRGCN Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy
ISC Information Sharing Centre (Singapore)
ISpS International Ship and port Facility Security code
ITOCG uK International Terrorism and Organised
Crime Group
Iuu Illegal, unreported and unregulated
IWAS Irregular Warfare at Sea
JCC Joint Cargo Committee
JCG Japanese Coast Guard
JI Jemaah Islamiyah
JIATF Joint Inter-agency Task Force
JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force
JTAC uK Joint Terrorism Assessment Centre
abbreviations
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
JWC Joint War Committee
KMM Kumpulan Militan Malaysia
KSM Khalid Sheik Mohammed
LMA Lloyd’s Market Association
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
LpG Liquefied petroleum Gas
LRIT Long Range Identification and Tracking
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
LOS Law of the Sea
MALSINDO MALaysia-Singapore-INDOnesia Trilateral
Coordinated patrol agreement
MANpADS Man-portable Air Defence System
MARLO uS Maritime Liaison Office (Bahrain)
MDA Maritime Domain Awareness
MEh Marine Electronic highway
MILF Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF Moro National Liberation Front
MSTS uS Maritime Transportation Security Act
MTO uK Maritime Trade Operations (Dubai)
NGA National Geospatial Intelligence Agency
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSC National Security Council
NuMAST National union of Maritime, Aviation and
Shipping Transport Officers (now Nautilus)
OAE Operation Active Endeavour
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development
OIC Organisation of the Islamic Conference
ONI Office of Naval Intelligence
pA palestinian Authority
pFLp popular Front for the Liberation of palestine
pFLp-GC popular Front for the Liberation of palestine–
General Command
pIRA provisional Irish Republican Army
pLAN people’s Liberation Army Navy
pLF palestine Liberation Front
pLO palestine Liberation Organisation
pMC private Military Company
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pRC people’s Republic of China
pRC piracy Reporting Centre
pSC private Security Company
pSI proliferation Security Initiative
ReCAAp Regional Cooperation Agreement in Combating
piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia
RDD Radiological Dispersion Device
RMSI Regional Maritime Security Initiative
RN Royal Navy
Rp Republic of the philippines
RpG Rocket-propelled Grenade
RSN Republic of Singapore Navy
SAFE Securing America’s Future Energy
SAR Search and Rescue
SDV Swimmer Delivery Vehicle
SICS Supreme Islamic Council of Somalia
SLN Sri Lankan Navy
SOE Special Operations Executive
SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea Convention
SpSS Self propelled Semi-Submersible
SuA Convention for the Suppression of unlawful
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
TCO Transnational Crime Organisation
TEu Twenty-foot Equivalent unit (intermodal
shipping container)
TFG Transitional Federal Government (Somalia)
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia
TOC Transnational Organised Crime
uAE united Arab Emirates
uAV unmanned Aerial Vehicle
uIC union of Islamic Courts
uLCC ultra Large Crude Carrier
uN united Nations
uNCLOS united Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea
uNCTAD united Nations Conference on Trade and Development
uNSC united Nations Security Council
uS united States
abbreviations
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small boats, weak states, dirty money
uSCG united States Coast Guard
uSN united States Navy
uSV unmanned Surface Vehicle
uWIED underwater Improvised Explosive Device
VBSS Vessel Boarding, Search and Seizure
VhF Very high Frequency
VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier
VTS Vehicle Traffic Service
WBIED Water-borne Improvised Explosive Device
WTO World Trade Organisation
1
INTRODuCTION
Men prey upon each other. We can be sure that, given human nature,
when the maritime Abel slipped his boat into the water for the first time
the maritime Cain was close behind.
piracy has its roots in the past but this book will address the piracy that
is practiced today and what has been perceived as a new challenge, mari-
time terrorism. Ironically, despite its long history, contemporary piracy
also appears to be viewed by many audiences as a new problem; as if the
period which began at the end of the nineteenth century, when piracy be-
came a nursery story and later was thrown up on the silver screen, formed
an impervious barrier through which the reality of maritime depredation
could not seep into the modern era.
is perception has been moulded partly by the elimination of piracy
from the Atlantic and Mediterranean worlds (although it continued almost
without interruption in Asia), and partly by changing legal definitions.
Over the centuries piracy has taken several forms and been perpetrated for
a range of reasons, but when the law on piracy was codified in the twentieth
century the definition that was settled upon, which built upon thinking
that had its origins in the nineteenth, restricted it to acts carried out for
“private ends”, which excluded piracy’s political dimension. Consequently,
when the first act of politically inspired piracy did occur, the hijacking of
the Santa Maria in 1961, it caused consternation. Modern legal thinking
was reluctant to label the act one of piracy and therefore, retrospectively, it
was labelled terrorism.
Several commentators have rejected this categorical realignment. In the
view of James Cable, the noted diplomat and naval historian, the differ-
ence between piracy and terrorism is artificial, one that is not recognisable
in practice.
1
A similar view holds that piracy and terrorism are different
1 James Cable, Navies in Violent Peace, London: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 92-101.
2
small boats, weak states, dirty money
activities separable legally and on the basis of motivation but that the line
dividing them can become indistinct in practice.
is view has taken on particular force since the 9/11 attacks on targets
in the united States. e sheer scale of those attacks appeared to presage
a new age of mega-terrorism. e sea unquestionably offers scale. In the
search for other possible scenarios that might match the 9/11 attacks in
magnitude, attention was drawn to the vulnerability of the maritime trad-
ing system and the supposed ease with which ships could be hijacked and
used to deliver large explosive devices into ports, some of which are located
in or close to major cities. Examples were cited of pirates boarding and
hijacking large ships in the Malacca and Singapore Straits. is evidence
gave rise to the suggestion that pirates and terrorists might cooperate, or
that pirates might teach terrorists the tricks of their trade. is book will
question such a simple linkage and ask the reader to consider an altogether
more complex picture.
In some ways it will be about definitions. piracy, terrorism and a third
phenomenon that will be touched upon, organised crime, are all contested
concepts. So is the idea of weak states. State strength is obviously relative
and derives from a number of sources that while largely material are also
intellectual and moral. For the purposes of this study, weak states are those
that in varying degrees lack the capability or will to secure the lives and
property of their inhabitants from internal or external predation.
2
e aim,
when it comes to piracy and terrorism, will be to determine, as far that is
possible, whether or not each, separately or together, represent a threat to
international security. erefore, while it will look at the questions sur-
rounding their definitions it will not attempt to resolve them, addressing
instead the differences and commonalities between piracy and terrorism
and, where relevant, between piracy, terrorism and organised crime.
“Contemporary” piracy can be dated most easily from 1983, which was
the year when the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), the uN
body with responsibility for maritime matters, first commented on the in-
creased number of piracy attacks officially; whilst this is a useful datum
point attacks took place before them, and these will be alluded to, as did
the horrific ordeal of the Vietnamese “boat people”, which will be dealt
with at greater length. Maritime terrorism will be dated from the Santa
Maria incident in 1961.
2 For those wishing to explore the subject of weak states in greater depth a good
starting point is Stewart patrick. ‘Weak States and Global reats: Fact or Fic-
tion?’ e Washington Quarterly, Spring 2006, pp. 27-53.
3
introduction
e two phenomena will be examined separately for two reasons: first, to
avoid the temptation to invoke links where none exist; secondly, to ensure
that each is seen in its own context because, as in so many fields touched
by politics, context is all. For while it is natural to concentrate upon the sea
when thinking about what threats pirates or maritime terrorists can pose,
to do so is dangerously limited. power in human affairs is based on the
land. power at sea is an adjunct to, or an extension of—but not a substi-
tute for—power on land. e only reason that terrorists can use to justify
employing their limited resources at sea is that it enables them to influence
events on land more effectively. It is important, therefore, to place the acts
that have taken place at sea in the wider context of terrestrial terrorism and
ask how terrorist “effect” might be achieved from the sea, if at all.
e label “terrorism” is often applied too readily in what professor Barry
Buzan and his colleagues would regard as a form “securitisation”.
3
Whatev-
er the motive might be for the label’s application, in most cases the groups
involved in maritime “terrorism” approximate more closely to insurgents
than to terrorists. Admittedly some of the acts these groups have perpetrat-
ed have been acts of terrorism, but most have not. Giving them the blanket
label of “terrorism” serves only to obscure their purpose and their nature.
4
Terrorism is a tactic. Insurgency is an organised movement that, inspired
by political, religious or even quasi-criminal motives, uses the methods of
war and subversion to overthrown a government and achieve power.
Several of the factors that favour pirate activity also favour maritime
insurgent/terrorist activity. is coincidence is important and will be ex-
amined in greater detail.
e overriding common factor is politics. While this might be obvious
in the case of insurgency and terrorism, including the fact that weak states
are less capable of resisting insurgent or terrorist infiltration, it is possibly
less evident when it comes to piracy. roughout history, however, the
ebb and flow of pirate fortunes has been linked inextricably with the ebb
and flow of power on land, with the power and policies of states and their
3 Barry Buzan, et al, Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder and Lon-
don: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 23-6.
4 is point has been emphasised by David Kilcullen and Michael F. Morris
in their two important papers which both provide a succinct summary of the
differences between insurgency and terrorism and a strong argument in favour
of treating al-Qaeda as an insurgent movement: Kilcullen, ‘Countering glo-
bal insurgency’, e Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 28, no. 4, Aug. 2005, pp.
597-617, and Morris, ‘Al Qaeda as an insurgency’, Joint Forces Quarterly, no.
39, Fourth Quarter 2005, pp. 41-50.
4
small boats, weak states, dirty money
political leaders, strong as well as weak. In the past, as N.A.M. Rodger has
pointed out, strong kings did not need piracy and suppressed it; weak kings
tolerated it because they needed it to provide the men and the skills neces-
sary in war.
5
is was as true in pre-colonial Asia as it was in Elizabethan
England. In our own era the issues of sovereignty and the rights of nations
are just as central to difficulties over piracy suppression as they were in
the fifteenth century.
6
But money and the link between the wealth it can
bestow and political power has also been central to piracy. “piracy,” peter
Earle has written, “has always benefited from the support of unscrupulous
great men only too happy to receive bribes and cheap pirated goods at
no risk to themselves”.
7
e economic historian J.L. Anderson makes a
similar point: “roughout history, many officials at all levels of authority
have found it expedient and usually profitable to ignore or even covertly to
sponsor acts of piracy.”
8
Once again, what was true historically of England,
France and America in different periods has been recognisable in our own
times in China, Indonesia, Somalia and other states.
9
5 N.A.M. Rodger, e Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, Volume
One 660-1649, London: harperCollins, 1997, p. 116.
6 For an example of modern sensitivity see ‘Jakarta sees foreign plot behind piracy
charges’, e Business Times On-Line Edition, 20 July 2004.
7 peter Earle, e Pirate Wars, London: Methuen, 2003, pp. 20-1.
8 J.L. Anderson, ‘piracy and world history: an economic perspective on maritime
predation’ in C.R. pennell, (ed.), Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, New York:
New York up, 2001, p. 83.
9 On China see, for example, Nayan Chanda, ‘Foot in the water’, Far Eastern
Economic Review (hereafter FEER), 9 March 2000; on Indonesia see, for exam-
ple, Jon Vagg, ‘Rough seas? Contemporary piracy in South East Asia,’ British
Journal of Criminology, vol. 35, no. 1, 1995, p. 63 and Tim huxley, Disintegrat-
ing Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security, Adelphi paper 349, Oxford:
Oup for the IISS, 2002, p. 82.
Table 1. Factors favouring piracy and maritime terrorism
5
introduction
piracy is an organised crime. Even at its simplest it requires groups
or gangs to carry it out. More profitable piracy requires larger and more
sophisticated organisation. e most corrosive effect of organised crime is
corruption, which as achuk and Tangredi argue, “is the main vehicle,
and likely the most socially damaging activity, by which criminal gangs
achieve their aims.”
10
phil Williams reaches the same conclusion: “Organ-
ised crime,” he writes, “makes systematic use of corruption” and is an effect
that has not been emphasised sufficiently.
11
It is true that financial gain has undoubtedly been the main motiva-
tor for all types of criminal, including pirates, but neither has it been far
from the minds of maritime insurgents and terrorists. To do what they
do requires money. Short of funds since the main state sponsors of terror-
ism withdrew their support, insurgents and terrorists have, in many cases,
adopted not only the methods but also the mores of organised crime. Crime
corrupts, terrorism subverts and when they merge they do both.
Consequently, this book sets out to answer three questions:
1. What form does piracy take in the contemporary world?
2. What is maritime terrorism?
3. Are piracy and maritime terrorism similar or linked?
e aim is to test the proposition that piracy and maritime terrorism,
separately or together, present a threat to international security.
10 Kimberley L. achuk and Sam J. Tangredi, ‘Transnational threats and mari-
time responses’ in Sam J. Tangredi (ed.), Globalization and Maritime Power,
Washington DC: National Defence up, 2002, p. 60.
11 phil Williams, ‘Combating transnational organized crime’ in Carolyn W. pum-
phrey (ed.), Transnational reats: Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strat-
egies, Carlisle, pA: uS Army Wall College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2000, p.
186.