Peden G.S. Arms, Economics and British Strategy From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

(10p) on the income tax, at a time when the standard rate was 9s 6d

(47.5p), barely below its wartime level of 10s (50p). Moreover, the

services’ proposed programmes for the products of the metal-using

industries would increase from £500 million in 1953 to £570 million in

1954, making it harder to correct the adverse balance of payments on

current acc ount by increasing exports.

The Treasury’s target for the load on the metal-using industrie s was

£450 million, and a committee was set up in the Ministry of Defence

under Sir Richard Powell, the deputy secretary, to ﬁnd out what could

be done if the Global Strategy ﬁgures were reduced by 8 per cent and by

10 per cent respectively. The Powell Report showed that the Chiefs of

Staff’s strategic aims were incompatible with Britain’s economic posi-

tion, and that commitments would have to be reduced. The Chancellor

was advised by his ofﬁcials to keep def ence expenditure in 1953/4 below

£1,550 million. By deferring ﬁghter, naval and vehicle programmes, the

Minister of Defence was able to offer a ‘compromise’ plan, the cost of

which would be £1,645 million in 1953/4 and £1,698 million in 1955/6.

In November 1952 the Cabinet agreed that the defence budget for

1953/4 should be £1,610 million at current prices, but that this ﬁgure

would have to be increased to take account of an expected wage increase

in the engineering industry and the additional expense of maintaining

troops in Germany, now that the Germans were no longer requ ired to

pay for occupation costs. The load of defence orders on the metal-using

industries was not to exceed £480 million in any one year, 18 per cent

less than what would be required for the Chiefs of Staff’s global strategy.

Finally, the Cabinet instructed a committee chaired by Sir Norman

Brook, the Cabinet secretary, to conduct a radical review of the defence

effort after 1953 and to report on ways in which the defence budget

could be cut further.

Inevitably, as the next section of this chapter will

show, the Radical Review provoked inter-service competition for funds

and made consensus on strategy difﬁcult.

Given the overloading of industry, there was a need to establish

priorities in the existing rearmament progr amme to speed up deliveries

Cherwell to Prime Minister, 18 July 1952, PREM 11/49, TNA. Figures for the burden

on the metal-using industries varied. The defence departments claimed that orders were

never fulﬁlled on time, and used the ﬁgures in the text, which were 15 per cent below

the total of orders that would be placed. Cherwell, on the other hand, argued that

orders would tie up capacity even if industry failed to fulﬁl them, and used higher

ﬁgures.

Cabinet conclusions, 23 July 1952 and 7 Nov. 1952, both CAB 128/25; ‘The defence

programme’, report by Chiefs of Staff, 29 Sep. 1952, with ‘Report of the Committee on

the Defence Programme’ (Powell Report), 24 Sep. as annex, D (52) 41, CAB 131/12,

TNA.

The impacts of the atomic bomb and the Cold War 255

of the most urgent items. Consequently, a ‘super-priority’ scheme was

set up. Churchill stated in December 1951 that overriding priority, even

over exports, should be given to production of the latest types of aircraft,

ammunition for them, and the new radar chain, with its control and

reporting system, for the air def ence of the United Kingdom. In January

1952 he speciﬁed Canberra and Valiant bombers, and Hunter, Swift

and Javelin ﬁghters, as the aircraft to be given priority, although of these

types only the Canberra was in production. He also speciﬁed 20-mm

ammunition, apparently in error, as the new ﬁghters would use 30-mm

ammunition. He then added Centurion tanks to the list.

The Treasury

was suspicious of the effects of the super-priority scheme on exports –

with some reason as the Ministry of Supply, which was responsible for

operating it, sent out a standard letter to trade associations and main

contractors in March 1952, asking them to give identiﬁed contracts

priority ‘over all other work of any kind whatsoever’, including exports if

necessary.

Duncan Sandys, the minister of supply, believed that the

acceleration of selected items was his principal task.

In practice, the possibly beneﬁcial effects of the scheme were dilute d

by a tendency on the part of the services and others to add items to the

list. Nor was the list conﬁned to defence equipment. Civil airliners – the

Bristol Britannia, the de Havilland Comet and the Vickers Viscount – were

also given super-priority in December 1952. The Society of British Air-

craft Contractors and the Ministry of Supply hoped to break the American

monopoly in world markets by delivering as many of these jet or turbo-jet

aircraft as possible to foreign airlines before American jet airliners

appeared later in the decade.

The Cabinet also agreed in December

1952 to add the Vulcan and Victor medium bombers, which were still at

an early stage of development. Then in March 1953 the Minister of

Defence wrote to Churchill suggesting that a new naval ﬁghter, the N.113,

should be given super-priority to deﬂect criticism of naval aviation,

although the prototype was not due to ﬂy until January 1954 and

production was not expected until 1956/7. The head of the Treasury’s

division dealing with defence expenditure, G. P. Humphreys-Davies,

E. A. Shillito (Treasury), ‘Overriding priority for air programme’, 20 Dec. 1951; Prime

Minister to Minister of Supply, Minister of Labour and Chancellor of the Duchy of

Lancaster, 20 Jan. 1952, T 225/511, TNA.

Letter to trade association, 26 Mar. 1952, Ministry of Supply records, series 49, ﬁle 189

(AVIA 49/189), TNA.

‘Notes of a meeting to discuss super priority for certain defence contracts’, 1 Apr. 1952,

AVIA 49/190, TNA.

Additional notes for ‘Super-priority for civil aircraft’, memorandum by the Minister of

Supply, C (52) 331, 15 Dec. 1952, AVIA 49/190; Cabinet conclusions, 16 Dec. 1952,

CAB 128/25, TNA.

Arms, economics and British strategy256

observed that there was no evidence that super-priority was involving

any extra cost to the Exchequer in the ﬁeld of aircraft production (as

distinct from research and development) or doing any real harm to

exports; the addition of the N.113 to the list would strengthen the case

for cutting out other items and seemed ‘unlikely in itself to do any real

harm (or any real good)’.

As regards the production of Centurion tanks, the Ministry of Defence

had made out a case at the end of 1950 for two new factories to meet War

Ofﬁce requirements. Although the factories would make heavy demands

on building labour and on machine tools, and would require two to three

years to be brought into full production, the Treasury agreed to the

proposal, being persuaded that there was no other way to supply the

British and Commonwealth armies. The United States had no medium

tank ready for production when the Korean War broke out and could

offer only light tanks, in which the British army was not interested, until

American production of new medium tanks had met their own and

French requirements over the next three to four years; and no production

on the European continent was in sight.

In extending super-priority to

Centurion tanks Churchill had in mind more than British requirements.

He was advised by Sandys in January 1952 that, if tanks were given

overriding priority, 800 Centurions could be produced in 1952/3, of

which 200 could be sold to the American or other buyers. Sandys had

misunderstood the position; the Ministry of Defence thought it most

unlikely that more than 600 Centurions could be produced in 1952/3, of

which 110 were for a Canadian order. One thousand Centurions could be

produced in 1953/4, if given sufﬁcient priority, and the Chancellor of the

Exchequer, Butler, urged that as many as could be spared should be sold

to the Americans. Churchill, however, was not prepared to deny even

second-line Territorial formations Centurions in order to release more

than 500 tanks for the Americans. In the event this ﬁgure broadly met the

American requirement for 135 in 1952, and 200 in each of the following

two years. Even with export orders, placed or in prospect, from Com-

monwealth countries and Sweden and Switzerland, Sandys agreed with

the Chancellor that only 650 tanks should be produced in each of the

years 1953/4 and 1954/5.

Alexander to Prime Minister, 11 Mar., and G. P. Humphreys-Davies, ‘Super priority

for the N.113’, 12 Mar. 1953, T 225/511, TNA.

‘Increase of capacity for production of tanks’, DO (50) 106, 28 Dec. 1950, G. P.

Humphreys-Davies to E. G. Compton, 13 Jan., and Compton to William Armstrong,

18 Jan., 1951, T 229/850, TNA.

E. A. Shillito, ‘Tanks’, 30 Jan.; Butler to Prime Minister, 15 Feb. (draft dated 14 Feb.);

Churchill to Chancellor, Secretary of State for War and Minister of Supply, 16 Feb.;

Shillito, ‘Centurion tanks’, 18 Feb.; anon., ‘Tank production’, n.d. but July; F.F.

The impacts of the atomic bomb and the Cold War 257

The overall effect of rearmament on exports is difﬁcult to disentangle

from other factors. Britain’s share of exports of manufactures was

already declining in 1950, as it was well above the pre-war level and was

bound to fall as the German and Japanese economies reco vered from

war-time disrupt ion (see table 5.5). The fall of 3.5 percentage points in a

single year between 1950 and 1951 was not far short of the 3.9 per-

centage points in the two preceding years, 1948–50, suggesting that

rearmament did make a difference, but from 1951 to 1953 change was

gradual, suggesting that Treasury and Board of Trade attempts to

prevent defence crowding out exports had some success. Exports of

engineering products actually increased by 4 per cent between 1950 and

1951, but this was less than the 16 per cent increase between 1949 and

1950. Exports of the metal-using industries as a whole fell only slightly

as a proportion of total exports between 1950 and 1951, from 49.4 to

46.6 per cent.

Nevertheless, rearmament did check the expansion of

exports required for a sound balance of payments on current account,

and by slowing delivery dates may have made British goods more

uncompetitive than they might otherwise have been.

Table 5.5. UK share of export of manufactures from eleven

industrial countries, 1937, 1948, 1950–8

(%)

1937 21.3

1948 29.3

1950 25.4

1951 21.9

1952 21.5

1953 20.9

1954 20.5

1955 19.8

1956 19.2

1957 17.9

1958 18.2

Note:

USA, Canada, UK, West Germany, France, Italy,

Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan.

Source: London and Cambridge Economic Service, The

British Economy: Key Statistics 1900–1970 (1971), p. 17.

Turnbull, ‘Tank production’, 8 Aug., and Duncan Sandys to Alexander, 17 Nov. (all

1952), T 229/850, TNA.

Economic Survey for 1952 (Cmd 8509), PP 1951–52. xxv. 203–49, paras. 28, 30, and

table 6.

Arms, economics and British strategy258

Till Geiger has noted that increased demand for machine tools for

defence contractors disrupted investment in civil industry, but con-

cluded that there was no conclusive proof that higher investment would

have led to higher economic growth.

However, high defence expen-

diture did contribute to excess demand in the economy and to balance-

of-payments problems. Both the Labour and Conservative governments

tried to avoid an inﬂ ationary wage–price spiral by persuading the Trades

Union Congress to encourage wage restraint, and to reduce pressure on

sterling by curbing imports. Stephen Broadberry and Nicholas Crafts

have argued that such policies, while effective at a macroeconomic level,

created a non-competitive environment in whic h restrictive practices on

the shop ﬂoor, and price ﬁxing by business, ﬂourished, to the detriment

of productivity growth.

Lower defence expenditure would also have

allowed some tax relief at a time when businessmen and the Labour

government’s economic advisers were critical of the effects of direct

taxation on incentives to work harder or to take risks in new enterprises.

Britain devoted a higher proportion of her GNP to defence than her

NATO allies in Europe (see table 5.6). The total NATO average was

heavily weighted by the United States’ contribution, and all countries

except the United States were below the total NATO average after 1951.

The United States, being then largely independent of foreign sources of

Table 5.6. Defence expenditure of leading NATO countries as a percentage of GNP at factor cost,

1949–55

Calendar year

1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955

Canada 2.4 2.9 6.2 8.5 8.5 7.7 7.2

France 6.2 6.3 8.2 10.0 10.6 8.5 7.4

Germany (West) n/a n/a n/a n/a 4.9 4.7 4.8

Italy 3.9 4.2 4.7 5.0 4.2 4.5 4.1

UK 7.0 7.3 8.9 11.2 11.2 9.9 9.2

USA 5.1 5.5 10.8 14.9 14.7 12.7 11.0

Total, Europe 5.6 5.8 7.1 8.6 8.0 7.1 6.5

Total, NATO 5.1 5.4 9.7 13.0 12.4 10.7 9.4

Source: NATO Information Service, NATO Facts and Figures (Brussels, 1976), p. 294.

Geiger, Britain and the Economic Problem of the Cold War, pp. 226–36, 292, 324.

S. N. Broadberry and N. F. R. Crafts, ‘British economic policy and industrial

performance in the early postwar period’, Business History, 38 (1996), no. 4, pp. 65–91.

Daunton, Just Taxes, pp. 222–8.

The impacts of the atomic bomb and the Cold War 259

food and raw materials, and possessing the bulk of the world’s reserves of

monetary gold, as well as the currency that other countries were anxious

to obtain for their monetary reserves, could afford to run a balance-of-

payments deﬁcit on a scale that would have been inconceivable for

Britain. Britain could not have devoted as high a proportion of her GNP

to defence as the United States did from 1951 without bring ing about a

sterling crisis. Table 5.6 also shows that, despite her post-war economic

problems, and despite reductions in the defence budget after 1947,

Britain had been spending more on def ence relatively than even the

United States on the eve of rearmament in 1949 and 1950.

Global strategy

Given that British defence expenditure was pressing against the limits of

what was economically possible, reliance upon a nuclear deterrent might

seem to be a logical way of achieving secu rity at affordable cost. How-

ever, the road to the 1952 Global Strategy paper was by no means

straightforward, nor was it clear even the n wh at the implications of the

atomic bomb for defence policy would be. Planners servicing the Chiefs

of Staff Committee had been formulating long-term strategy since

before the end of the war, identifying threats, the nature of a future war,

and what measures should be taken. Since it was assum ed that war with

the United States was unthinkable, and that Germany and Japan would

be held down effec tively, the only conceivable enemy was the Soviet

Union. The planners assumed that premeditated war by the Soviet

Union was unlikely before 1956, given the time required for economic

reconstruction and for manufacturing an adequate stock of atomic

bombs.

The precise timing of when even the Americans would have

produced enough atomic bombs for an effective deterrent was uncer-

tain. The Soviet commander, Marshal Zhukov, said in 1955 that the

United States had had only ﬁve or six atomic bombs in the immediate

post-war period, and these had not had decisive signiﬁcance.

The

scientiﬁc advice given to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff’s Atomic Weapons

Sub-Committee in January 1946 was that for a long time the number of

The ﬁgures in tables 5.3 and 5.6 are not comparable, being calculated on different bases

(GDP/GNP) and for different periods (ﬁnancial/calendar years).

Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence

(London: Sherwood Press, 1988), esp. pp. 244, 289, 305, 313–15. See, for example,

‘Report by Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee on Russia’s strategic interests and

intentions’, 1 Mar. 1946, DBPO, series I, vol. VI (1991), pp. 297–301.

Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, p. 153.

Arms, economics and British strategy260

atomic bombs avail able would be so limited that only important targets,

like cities, would justify a nuclear attack.

In February 1946 the Defence Committee agreed with Attlee that

defence policy should be worked out on the assumption that Britain

would not have to ﬁght a major war during the next two or three years;

that in a future major war the Unite d States would probably be on

Britain’s side; and that no hostile ﬂeet capable of bei ng a menace to

Britain’s security would exist during the next few years.

On 2 March, in

response to a Chi efs of Staff paper expressing views on the importance of

excluding the Soviet Union from the trusteeship of any Italian colony and

of keeping the Mediterranean route open, Attlee circulated radical pro-

posals for reducing Britain’s commitments. He argued that the British

Empire had been built up in the era of sea power, which had now become

vulnerable to air power in land-locked seas like the Mediterranean, even

if one did not take account of the changes resulting from atomic weapons.

Britain would be unable to keep open the Mediterranean route in war

and, once India was independent, the re would be less reason to think in

terms of imperial communications to the East. It might be better to think

instead of the British Isles as an easterly extension of a strategic area

centred on the American continent. From this perspective, Britain could

withdraw her troops from Greece, Egypt and the rest of the Middle East

without weakening herself.

Bevin, however, argued that Britain’s pre-

sence in the Mediterranean area had more than a purely military purpose.

If British forces withdrew, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey would

fall under Soviet inﬂ uence, like Eastern Europe , and Britain would also

lose its position in the Middle East, where Iraqi oil was now ‘one of our

greatest assets’. On the other hand, in view of political difﬁculties in

Egypt and Palestine, he favoured relocating the main British base from

Egypt to Mombasa in Kenya, where it could also provide an alternative to

India for the defence of the Indian Ocean. The Chiefs of Staff responded

in April that East Africa might provide a useful reserve base, but was too

remote to serve as the Mediterranean ﬂeet’s headquarters and lacked the

infrastructure required by the army and air force.

The Chiefs of St aff’s case for a continuing presen ce in the Middle

East was based on more than imperial communications and oil. They

DCOS (AWC) (46) 1, 30 Jan. 1946, CAB 82/26, TNA.

Cabinet Defence Committee minutes, 15 Feb. 1946, CAB 131/1, TNA.

‘Future of the Italian colonies’, memorandum by the Prime Minister and Minister of

Defence, DO (46) 27, 2 Mar. 1946, CAB 131/1, TNA.

‘Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs’, DO (46) 40, 13 Mar.

1946, and ‘Location of Middle East forces’, report by the Chiefs of Staff, DO (46) 28,

CAB 131/2, TNA.

The impacts of the atomic bomb and the Cold War 261

also argued for the retention of air bases from which industrial areas in

the Urals and Western Siberia could be threa tened to deter Soviet

aggression in Western Europe. Attlee was not immediat ely persuaded,

but in January 1947 the Chiefs of Staff, led by Montgomery , threatened

to resign as a body on what they considered to be a crucial issue.

Already, in the summer of 1946, the services ’ Joint Technical Warfare

Committee was examining the use of atomic and bacteriological

weapons against the Sovie t Union, and the question of aircraft range

had drawn attention to the impo rtance of bases not only in the Middle

East but also, if possible, North-West India. In the event, politica l

obstacles to air bases in India and Pakistan after these dominions

became independent on 15 August 1947 were too great, making bases in

the Middle East seem even more important.

In any case it was not easy to liquidate commitments in the Medi-

terranean and Middle East. Even after Truman had announced in

March 1947 that the United States would take over responsibility for

helping Greece to resist Communism, British troops, to the strength of

one brigade, remained in the country until 1950, after the civil war was

over, and Britain also provided aid in the form of training and equip-

ment.

The Palestine mandate became a liability as the communal

struggle between Arab and Jew int ensiﬁed, and in September 1947 the

British Cabinet decided to transfer the problem to the United Nations

and to withdraw both troops and civil administration by mid-1948.

Continuing British inﬂuence in Jordan was secured by a treaty guar-

anteeing British bases there in return for subsidies for the Jordanian

army, the Arab Legion , which remained under British command until

1956. The major British presence was in Egypt, where military and air

bases and training grounds in the Suez Canal Zone covered a vast area.

It did not prove possible to reach an agreement with the Egyptian

government on how to replace the Anglo-Egyptian Defence Treaty of

1936 on terms that would allow the British to remain and yet be

acceptable to Egyptian public opinion. There were serious riots in 1952

and, confronted with the difﬁculty of maintaining a base in hosti le ter-

ritory, the British settled for an agreement in October 1954 whereby all

British forces would withdraw within twenty months but the Suez base

would be maintained by civilian workers to the standard required for it

to be used in war, with Britain having the right to re-ent ry in war-time

Richard Aldrich and Michael Coleman, ‘Britain and the strategic air offensive against

the Soviet Union: the question of South Asian air bases, 1945–1949’, History,74

(1989), 400–26.

Kenneth Morgan, Labour in Power 1945–51 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 252,

254.

Arms, economics and British strategy262

for the next seven years. British hopes that the United States or Com-

monwealth countries would co-operate in the defence of the Middle

East had largely evaporated by 1954. As the Americans became awa re of

Britain’s difﬁculties with Egypt they preferred to pursue an independent

policy. The Australians and New Zealanders were more concerned with

the Communist threat in South-East Asia, and South African promises

of an armou red division and aircraft to reinforce Commonwealth forces

in Egypt did not materialise.

The importance of atomic bombs in British grand strat egy was made

apparent in a major review of future defence policy by the Chiefs of Staff in

May 1947. It was assumed that, even with the help of allies, it would not be

possible to stop the Red Army from overrunning North-West Europe,

from where the United Kingdom could be subjected to attack by missiles,

as in 1944–5, but on a scale that might cause irreparable damage even

without the use of atomic weapons. However, by the expected critical

period in East–West relations, about 1956, it would be possible to achieve

rapid and decisive results by using weapons of mass destruction against key

economic targets and civil pop ulations. The power of atomic and biolo-

gical weapons was so great that ‘within the next ten years’ there was little

possibility of defensive forces reaching the standard necessary to prevent

the delivery of enough weapons of mass destruction to knock out the

United Kingdom. The only way in which to impede an enemy build-up in

Western Europe would be by air attacks, and it was doubtful if conven-

tional weapons could achieve decisive results. While the United Kingdom’s

greater vulnerability to atomic bombs and biological warfare, compared

with the Soviet Union, might be seen as an argument for an international

convention to abolish weapons of mass destruction, the Chiefs of Staff

argued that there could be no guarantee that the Soviet Union would not

be tempted to use them. In their view, the only way t o prevent their use

would be to let the Soviet Union know that it would suffer from large-scale

damage too. While the United Kingdom was the best base for mounting an

air offensive, because of the infrastructure of air bases and other resources,

the Middle East would also be important, particularly for attacks on Soviet

oil production in the Caucasus. Notwithstanding the emphasis on weapons

of mass destruction, the paper also stated that by 1956 the threat to sea

communications would also be greater than in the Second World War.

W. Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951 (Oxford: Clarendon

Press, 1984), pp. 9–10, 720–3, 731–4; David R. Devereux, The Formulation of British

Defence Policy towards the Middle East, 1948–56 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 41,

68–99, 121–41.

‘The overall strategic plan’, May 1947, DO (47) 44, reproduced in John Baylis,

Diplomacy of Pragmatism, pp. 134–49.

The impacts of the atomic bomb and the Cold War 263

As the Cold War became more threatening, plans had to be made for

a neare r future than 1956. The Chiefs of Staff were divided in February

1948 as to the best contribution Britain could make to the emerging

Western European Union (WEU). The CAS, Tedder, and the First Sea

Lord, Admiral Sir John Cunningham, believed that support for France

and the Benelux countries should be limited to air and naval forces. The

CIGS, Montgomery, argued that some contribution of land forces

would be necessary for political reasons, and proposed two divisions out

of a projected WEU total of forty-eight, but Attlee sided with Tedder

and Cunningha m.

In December 1948 the Chiefs of Staff advised

ministers that, if war broke out before July 1950, the only offensive

action that the Western Allies could take against the Soviet Union would

be from the air. The USAF had 400 strategic bom bers, but would not

have enough aircraft to spare for a major direct contribution to the

defence of Western Europe, the United Kingdom or the Middle East.

Given the short range of Bomber Command’s 160 aircraft, the British

contribution would be restricted to trying to prevent the Soviet build-up

in Western Europe and to assist in slowing the Soviet advance into the

Middle East. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would have no

atomic bombs, but that weaknesses in the United Kingdom’s air

defences would make the situation critical unless the American strategic

air offensive reduced the weight of the Soviet attack. The Chiefs of Staff

could not assess the likely effect of the air offensive because the Amer-

icans had not divulged how many atomic bombs would be available.

The Soviets were also expected to disrupt essential sea communications

by using submarines, mines and aircraft. The American-British-Cana-

dian plan aimed to defend the United Kingdom and essential sea

communications, but it was anticipated that Allied forces would be too

small to hold Western Europe or the Middle Eastern oilﬁelds, and that

all that could be attempted would be to ﬁght the enemy as far to the east

in Europe, and as far to the north and east of Egypt, as possible.

By October 1949 the Air Staff was more ambitious, arguing that the

Allies’ only hope was to bring about a collapse of the Russian war-

making machine by means of a strategic air offensive, and that Britain’s

contribution would ensure success. As Simon Ball has noted, the Air

Staff ’s reasoning was connected to awareness of the vulnerability of

Bomber Command in the defence programme.

About the same time

Michael Carver, Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy since 1945 (London:

Hutchinson, 1992), pp. 11–12.

‘Digest of plan ‘‘Speedway’’’, COS (48) 210, 16 Dec. 1948, DEFE 5/9, TNA.

S. J. Ball, The Bomber in British Strategy: Doctrine, Strategy and Britain’s World Role,

1945–1960 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), p. 26.

Arms, economics and British strategy264