and dealing was that by the early 1960s most of the thirteen firms that
had produced military aircraft in the 1950s had been absorbed into
Hawker Siddeley or a new firm, British Aircraft Corporation (BAC),
and all helicopter work had been put into Westland Aircraft. Westl and
had come to dominate the British helicopter market by acquiring in-
house expertise through licensed production of American Sikorsky
designs, which had proved to be superior to government-sponsored
indigenous projects. Aero-engine work was concentrated in two firms:
Bristol Siddeley and Rolls-Royce.
94
Employment in the industry had not
fallen since 1957. In 1965 Hawker Siddeley employed 123,000 workers,
making it the second largest manufacturing firm in the United King-
dom, and BAC employed 42,000. After Rolls-Royce took over Bristol
Siddeley in 1966 it employed 88,000 workers. In comparison, total
employment in the French aircraft industry was 85,000.
95
The Labour government also undertook a major inquiry into the aircraft
industry by a committee chaired by Lord Plowden, who had been chief
executive of the Ministry of Aircraft Production during the war. Plowden
reported in 1965 that a reduction in the size of the industry was desirable as
it received far more government support than any other, and he recom-
mended collaboration with European countries in order to be able to
compete with American firms.
96
An American study in 1968 noted that
the British aircraft industry was characterised by lower labour productivity
and higher costs than in the United States, but doubted whether colla-
borative projects would reduce overall costs, citing the already expensive
Concorde project as evidence. A better alternative might be for a slimmed-
down, cost-conscious British industry to concentrate on a limited range of
projects which had been chosen on economic grounds, including export
prospects. Some types would have to be imported but the fact that the
option of domestic production existed would strengthen the hand of
British negotiators dealing with foreign firms.
97
The decision to terminate the development of fighter projects in 1957
was bitterly resented in the aircraft industry. Hawker Siddeley was
able to secure official support for a revolutionary, if subsonic, VTOL
94
Charles Gardner, British Aircraft Corporation (London: B. T. Batsford 1981), pp. 17–19,
23–8; Matthew Uttley, Westland and the British Helicopter Industry, 1945–1960 (London:
Frank Cass, 2001).
95
Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane, pp. 96–7; R. de Narbonne, ‘French challenge’,
Royal Air Force Flying Review, 18 (May 1963), 15.
96
Report of a Committee into the Aircraft Industry (Cmnd 2853), PP 1965–66, iv. 189,
paras. 205, 208, 458 and 523.
97
Merton J. Peck, ‘Science and technology’, in Richard E. Caves and associates, Britain’s
Economic Prospects (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968), pp. 448–84, at
pp. 471–6.
The hydrogen bomb, the economy and decolonisation 313