with the Americans, Australians and New Zealanders about what
contribution each would make to a quadripartite arrangement for the
defence of South-East Asia.
166
The Navy Minister, Christopher May-
hew, took the view that, if carriers could not be afforded, then the
government should an nounce a withdrawal from East of Suez. When
Healey announced in Australia in February 1966 that Britain would
maintain its commitments in the Far East, the Middle East and Africa,
Mayhew resign ed.
167
The outcome of this first Labour defence review was the 1966
Defence Whit e Paper, which stated that the security of the United
Kingdom rested mainly on preventing war in Europe and that therefore
NATO (to which Britain’s nuclear deterrent was committed) was vital
to Britain’s survival. While Britain would retain a ‘major military cap-
ability’ outside Europe, she would no longer undertake large-scale
operations except in co-operation with allies. Despite Zuckerman’s and
Trend’s advice, Healey’s compromise with regard to the carriers pre-
vailed: no new carriers were to be built, and the existing force of five
carriers would be allowed to decli ne in numbers to three ‘in a few years’
time’, but these would continue to be able to operate the Buccaneer
strike aircraft unt il 1974–5. The carrier role would gradually be taken
over by land-based aircraft for strike, reconnaissance and air defence
purposes, with helicopters operating from ships other than aircraft
carriers being responsible for the anti-submarine role.
168
A further deter ioration in the economic position in 1966 led the
Treasury to demand a review of public expenditure, including defence.
The problem was that the aggregate of public expenditure was rising
faster than GNP, and the armed forces and the East of Suez role were in
competition with Labour party commitments in respect of education,
health and housing. The Chancellor of the Exchequer suggested in
August that the ceiling for the defence budget for 1969/70 should be
lowered to £1,850 million, at 1964 prices, instead of the £2,000 million
target on which the 1964–6 defence review had been based. Given the
government’s economic policy of encouraging the movement of labour
into industry, Callaghan was also concerned at the way in which public
services were absorbing manpower, and in August 1966 he suggested
166
Trend to Prime Minister, ‘Defence review’, 18 Jan. 1966, PREM 13/800; ‘The future
of the carrier force’, memorandum by Secretary of State for Defence, OPD (66) 11,
and ‘Personal note by Secretary of State for Defence’, both 14 Jan. 1966, CAB 148/26,
TNA.
167
Defence and Overseas Policy Committee minutes, 1 Feb. 1966, CAB 148/25, TNA;
Christopher Mayhew, Britain’s Role Tomorrow (London: Hutchinson, 1967), pp. 143–
53.
168
Cmnd 2901, PP 1965–66, ix. 1, chap. II, paras. 8–9, 19; chap. III, paras. 3–7.
The hydrogen bomb, the economy and decolonisation 339