Richard L. Daft - Management. 9th ed., 2010

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PART 3 PLANNING230

quickly generating a wide range of alternate solutions to a problem, but it does have

some drawbacks. For one thing, people in a group often want to conform to what

others are saying, a problem sometimes referred to as groupthink. Others may be con-

cerned about pleasing the boss or impressing colleagues. In addition, many creative

people simply have social inhibitions that limit their participation in a group session

or make it dif cult to come up with ideas in a group setting. In fact, one study found

that when four people are asked to “brainstorm” individually, they typically come up

with twice as many ideas as a group of four brainstorming together.

One recent approach, electronic brainstorming, takes advantage of the group

approach while overcoming some disadvantages. Electronic brainstorming, some-

times called brainwriting, brings people together in an interactive group over a com-

puter network.

One member writes an idea, another reads it and adds other ideas,

and so on. Studies show that electronic brainstorming generates about 40 percent

more ideas than individuals brainstorming alone, and 25 to 200 percent more ideas

than regular brainstorming groups, depending on group size.

Why? Because the

process is anonymous, the sky’s the limit in terms of what people feel free to say.

People can write down their ideas immediately, avoiding the possibility that a good

idea might slip away while the person is waiting for a chance to speak in a face-to-

face group. Social inhibitions and concerns are avoided, which typically allows for

a broader range of participation. Another advantage is that electronic brainstorming

can potentially be done with groups made up of employees from around the world,

further increasing the diversity of alternatives.

Engage in Rigorous Debate

An important key to better decision making is to encourage a rigorous debate of the

issue at hand.

Good managers recognize that constructive con ict based on diver-

gent points of view can bring a problem into focus, clarify people’s ideas, stimu-

late creative thinking, create a broader understanding of issues and alternatives,

and improve decision quality.

Chuck Knight, the former CEO of Emerson Electric,

always sparked heated debates during strategic planning meetings. Knight believed

rigorous debate gave people a clearer picture of the competitive landscape and forced

managers to look at all sides of an issue, helping them reach better decisions.

Stimulating rigorous debate can be done in several ways. One way is by ensuring

that the group is diverse in terms of age and gender, functional area of expertise, hierar-

chical level, and experience with the business. Some groups assign a devil’s advocate,

who has the role of challenging the assumptions and assertions made by the group.

The devil’s advocate may force the group to rethink its approach to the problem and

avoid reaching premature conclusions. Jeffrey McKeever, CEO of MicroAge, often

plays the devil’s advocate, changing his position in the middle of a debate to ensure

that other executives don’t just go along with his opinions.

Another approach is to have group members develop as many alternatives as

they can as quickly as they can.

It allows the team to work with multiple alternatives

and encourages people to advocate ideas they might not prefer simply to encourage

debate. Still another way to encourage constructive con ict is to use a technique called

point-counterpoint, which breaks a decision-making group into two subgroups and

assigns them different, often competing responsibilities.

The groups then develop and

exchange proposals and discuss and debate the various options until they arrive at a

common set of understandings and recommendations.

Avoid Groupthink

It is important for managers to remember that some disagreement and con ict is much

healthier than blind agreement. Pressures for conformity exist in almost any group,

and particularly when people in a group like one another they tend to avoid anything

that might create disharmony. Groupthink refers to the tendency of people in groups

to suppress contrary opinions.

When people slip into groupthink, the desire for

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CHAPTER 8 MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 231

Planning

harmony outweighs concerns over decision quality. Group members emphasize main-

taining unity rather than realistically challenging problems and alternatives. People

censor their personal opinions and are reluctant to criticize the opinions of others.

Author and scholar Jerry Harvey coined the related term Abilene paradox to illustrate

the hidden pressures for conformity that can exist in groups.

Harvey tells the story

of how members of his extended family sat sweltering on the porch in 104-degree heat

in a small town about 50 miles from Abilene, Texas. When someone suggested driving

to a café in Abilene, everyone went along with the idea, even though the car was not

air conditioned. Everyone was miserable and returned home exhausted and irritable.

Later, each person admitted that they hadn’t wanted to make the trip and thought it

was a ridiculous idea. They only went because they thought the others wanted to go.

Know When to Bail

In a fast-paced environment, good managers encourage risk taking and learning from

mistakes, but they also aren’t hesitant to pull the plug on something that isn’t work-

ing. Research has found that managers and organizations often continue to invest

time and money in a solution despite strong evidence that it is not appropriate. This

tendency is referred to as escalating commitment. Managers might block or distort

negative information because they don’t want to be responsible for a bad decision,

or they might simply refuse to accept that their solution is wrong. A recent study in

Europe veri ed that even highly successful managers often miss or ignore warning

signals because they become committed to a decision and believe if they persevere

it will pay off.

As companies face increasing competition, complexity, and change,

it is important that managers don’t get so attached to their own ideas that they’re

unwilling to recognize when to move on. According to Stanford University profes-

sor Robert Sutton, the key to successful creative decision making is to “fail early, fail

often, and pull the plug early.”

ch8

A MANAGER’S ESSENTIALS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

▪ This chapter made several important points about the process of organizational

decision making. The study of decision making is important because it describes

how managers make successful strategic and operational decisions. Managers

confront many types of decisions, including programmed and nonprogrammed,

and these decisions differ according to the amount of risk, uncertainty, and ambi-

guity in the environment.

▪ Three decision-making approaches were described: the classical model, which

is an ideal, rational model of decision making; the administrative model, which

is more descriptive of how managers actually make decisions; and the political

model, which takes into consideration the discussion and coalition building that

many decisions involve.

▪ Decision making should involve six basic steps: problem recognition, diagnosis

of causes, development of alternatives, choice of an alternative, implementation

of the alternative, and feedback and evaluation. Another factor affecting decision

making is the manager’s personal decision style. The four major decision styles

are directive, analytical, conceptual, and behavioral.

▪ Being aware of common biases that cloud judgment can help managers avoid

decision traps and make better choices. Biases to watch out for include being

in uenced by initial impressions, trying to correct or justify past  awed deci-

sions, seeing only what you want to see, perpetuating the status quo, being in u-

enced by problem framing, and being overcon dent.

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PART 3 PLANNING232

1. You are a busy partner in a legal  rm, and an expe-

rienced administrative assistant complains of contin-

ued headaches, drowsiness, dry throat, and occasional

spells of fatigue and  u. She tells you she believes air

quality in the building is bad and would like some-

thing to be done. How would you respond?

2. Why do you think decision making is considered a

fundamental part of management effectiveness?

3. Explain the difference between risk and ambigu-

ity. How might decision making differ for a risky

versus an “ambiguous” situation?

4. Analyze three decisions you made over the past

six months. Which of these were programmed and

which were nonprogrammed? Which model—the

classical, administrative, or political—best describes

the approach you took to make each decision?

5. What opportunities and potential problems are

posed by the formation of more than one coalition

within an organization, each one advocating a dif-

ferent direction or alternatives? What steps can

you take as a manager to make sure that dueling

coalitions result in constructive discussion rather

than dissension?

6. Can you think of a bad decision from your own

school or work experience or from the recent busi-

ness or political news that was made in an effort to

correct or justify a past decision? As a new man-

ager, how might you resist the urge to choose a

decision alternative based on the idea that it might

correct or validate a previous decision?

7. As a new, entry-level manager, how important is it

to  nd ways to compensate for your relative lack

of experience when trying to determine which

alternative before you is most likely to succeed?

What are some ways you can meet this challenge?

8. List some possible advantages and disadvantages

to using computer technology for managerial deci-

sion making.

9. Do you think intuition is a valid approach to mak-

ing decisions in an organization? Why or why not?

How might intuition be combined with a rational

decision approach?

10. What do you think is your dominant decision

style? Is your style compatible with group tech-

niques such as brainstorming and engaging in rig-

orous debate? Discuss.

ch8

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

ch8

MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: EXPERIENTIAL EXERCISE

What’s Your Personal Decision Style?

Read each of the following questions and circle the

answer that best describes you. Think about how you

typically act in a work or school situation and mark

the answer that  rst comes to mind. There are no right

or wrong answers.

1. In performing my job or class work, I look for

a. Practical results

b. The best solution

c. Creative approaches or ideas

d. Good working conditions

2. I enjoy jobs that

a. Are technical and well-de ned

b. Have a lot of variety

c. Allow me to be independent and creative

d. Involve working closely with others

3. The people I most enjoy working with are

a. Energetic and ambitious

b. Capable and organized

c. Open to new ideas

d. Agreeable and trusting

▪ Many manager decisions are made as part of a group. In addition, involv-

ing lower level employees in decision making contributes to individual and

organizational learning. Managers can use the following guidelines to support

innovative group decision making: start with brainstorming; engage in rigor-

ous debate; avoid groupthink; and know when to bail. These techniques can

improve the quality and effectiveness of decision making in an uncertain or fast-

changing environment.

CHAPTER 8 MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 233

Planning

4. When I have a problem, I usually

a. Rely on what has worked in the past

b. Apply careful analysis

c. Consider a variety of creative approaches

d. Seek consensus with others

5. I am especially good at

a. Remembering dates and facts

b. Solving complex problems

c. Seeing many possible solutions

d. Getting along with others

6. When I don’t have much time, I

a. Make decisions and act quickly

b. Follow established plans or priorities

c. Take my time and refuse to be pressured

d. Ask others for guidance and support

7. In social situations, I generally

a. Talk to others

b. Think about what’s being discussed

c. Observe

d. Listen to the conversation

8. Other people consider me

a. Aggressive

b. Disciplined

c. Creative

d. Supportive

9. What I dislike most is

a. Not being in control

b. Doing boring work

c. Following rules

d. Being rejected by others

10. The decisions I make are usually

a. Direct and practical

b. Systematic or abstract

c. Broad and  exible

d. Sensitive to others’ needs

Scoring and Interpretation

These questions rate your personal decision style, as

described in the text and listed in Exhibit 8.5.

Count the number of a answers. They provide your

directive score.

Count the number of b answers for your analytical

score.

The number of c answers is your conceptual score.

The number of d answers is your behavioral score.

What is your dominant decision style? Are you sur-

prised, or does this result re ect the style you thought

you used most often?

SOURCE: Adapted from Alan J. Rowe and Richard O. Mason, Manag-

ing with Style: A Guide to Understanding, Assessing, and Improving

Decision Making (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1987), pp. 40–41.

The No-Show Consultant

Jeffrey Moses was facing one of the toughest decisions

of his short career as a manager with International

Consulting. Andrew Carpenter, one of his best consul-

tants, was clearly in trouble, and his problems were

affecting his work. International Consulting designs,

installs, and implements complex back-of ce software

systems for companies all over the world. About half

the consultants work out of the main of ce, while the

rest, including Carpenter, work primarily from home.

This Monday morning, Moses had gotten an irate

call from a major New York client saying Carpenter

never showed up at the company’s headquarters,

where the client had been expecting his new com-

puter system to go live for the  rst time. In calling

around to other customers on the East Coast trying to

locate the missing consultant, Moses heard other sto-

ries. Carpenter had also missed a few other appoint-

ments—all on Monday mornings—but no one had felt

the need to report it because he had called to resched-

ule. In addition, he practically came to blows with an

employee who challenged him about the capabilities

of the new system, and he inexplicably walked out of

one customer’s of ce in the middle of the day without

a word to anyone. Another client reported that the

last time he saw Carpenter he appeared to have a seri-

ous hangover. Most of the clients liked Carpenter, but

they were concerned that his behavior was increas-

ingly erratic. One client suggested that she would pre-

fer to work with someone else. As for the major New

York customer, he preferred that Andrew rather than

a new consultant  nish the project, but they were also

demanding that International eat half the $250,000

consultant’s fee.

After Moses  nally located Carpenter by calling

his next-door neighbor, Andrew confessed that he’d

had a “lost weekend” and been too drunk to get on

the plane. He then told Moses that his wife had left

ch8

MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE: ETHICAL DILEMMA

PART 3 PLANNING234

and taken their two-year-old son with her. He admit-

ted that he had been drinking a little more than usual

lately, but insisted that he was getting himself under

control and promised no more problems. “I’m really

not an alcoholic or anything,” he said. “I’ve just been

upset about Brenda leaving, and I let it get out of

hand this weekend.” Moses told Carpenter that if he

would get to New York and complete the project, all

would be forgiven.

Now, however, he wondered whether he should

really just let things slide. Moses talked to Carpenter’s

team leader about the situation and was told that the

leader was aware of his recent problems but thought

everything would smooth itself over. “Consultants with

his knowledge, level of skill, and willingness to travel

are hard to  nd. He’s well-liked among all the custom-

ers; he’ll get his act together.” However, when Moses

discussed the problem with Carolyn Walter, vice presi-

dent of operations, she argued that Carpenter should

be dismissed. “You’re under no obligation to keep him

just because you said you would,” she pointed out.

“This was a major screw-up, and it’s perfectly legal to

 re someone for absenteeism. Your calls to customers

should make it clear that this situation was not a one-

time thing. Get rid of him now before things get worse.

If you think eating half that $250,000 fee hurts now, just

think what could happen if this behavior continues.”

What Would You Do?

1. Give him a month’s notice and terminate. He’s

known as a good consultant, so he probably won’t

have any trouble  nding a new job, and you’ll avoid

any further problems associated with his emotional

dif culties and his possible alcohol problem.

2. Let it slide. Missing the New York appointment is

Carpenter’s  rst big mistake. He says he is getting

things under control, and you believe he should be

given a chance to get himself back on track.

3. Let Carpenter know that you care about what he’s

going through, but insist that he take a short paid

leave and get counseling to deal with his emotional

dif culties and evaluate the seriousness of his

problems with alcohol. If the alcohol abuse contin-

ues, require him to attend a treatment program or

 nd another job.

SOURCES: Based on information in Jeffrey L. Seglin, “The Savior

Complex,” Inc. (February 1999): 67–69; and Nora Johnson, “‘He’s Been

Beating Me,’ She Conﬁ ded,” Business Ethics (Summer 2001): 21.

Pinnacle Machine Tool Company

Don Anglos had to decide whether to trust his gut or

his head, and he had to make that decision by next

week’s board meeting. Either way, he knew he was

bound to make at least a member or two of his senior

management team unhappy.

The question at hand was whether Pinnacle Com-

pany, the small, publicly held Indiana-based machine

tool company he led as CEO, should attempt to acquire

Hoilman Inc. Hoilman was a company known for the

cutting-edge sensor technology and communications

software it had developed to monitor robotics equip-

ment. Anglos had just heard a credible rumor that

one of Pinnacle’s chief competitors was planning a

hostile takeover of the company. Coincidentally, Don

Anglos knew Hoilman well because he had recently

held exploratory talks about the possibility of a joint

venture designed to develop similar technology capa-

ble of monitoring a broad range of manufacturing

equipment. The joint venture did not work out. But

now, by acquiring Hoilman, Pinnacle could develop

software that transmitted real-time information on its

customers’ equipment, enabling it to set itself apart

by providing top-notch service far more sophisticated

than its current standard maintenance and service

contracts.

Don, a hard-charging 48-year-old,  rmly believed

that bigger was better. It was a premise that had served

his Greek immigrant father well as he built a multi-

million-dollar business from nothing by acquiring one

commercial laundry after another. The CEO had to

admit, however, that getting bigger in the machine

tool industry, currently a slow-growing sector fac-

ing increasing competition from low-priced foreign

manufacturers, was going to be a challenge. Still, he

had been convinced to sign on as Pinnacle’s CEO four

years ago not only because the company had relatively

healthy earnings, but also because his sixth sense told

him the company had growth potential. He hadn’t

been entirely sure where that potential lay, but he was

a problem-solver with a proven track record of success-

fully spotting new market opportunities. In the past, he

acted on hunches, which had paid off handsomely.

So far, Anglos had managed to modestly nudge

Pinnacle’s revenue growth and increase its market

share through aggressive pricing that successfully

kept customers from switching to several potential

foreign rivals. But those moves inevitably chipped

ch8

CASE FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 8 MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 235

Planning

away at the company’s healthy pro t margins. In

any case, he recognized he’d taken the company

down that road as far as he could. It was time for a

real change in strategy. Instead of concentrating on

manufacturing, he wanted to transform Pinnacle into

a high-tech service company. Such a drastic metamor-

phosis was going to require a new, service-oriented

corporate culture, he admitted, but it was the only

way he could see achieving the growth and pro t-

ability he envisioned. Acquiring Hoilman looked like

a good place to start, but this option would be gone if

Hoilman sold out to another  rm.

Jennifer Banks, services division head, was enthu-

siastic about both the acquisition and the new strat-

egy. “Acquiring Hoilman is the chance of a lifetime,”

she crowed. Not all the senior managers agreed. In

particular, CFO Sam Lodge advanced arguments

against the acquisition that were hard to dismiss. The

timing was wrong, he insisted. Pinnacle’s recent drop

in pro tability hadn’t escaped Wall Street’s atten-

tion, and the further negative impact on earnings that

would result from the Hoilman acquisition wasn’t

likely to make already wary investors feel any better.

But then Sam shocked Don by offering an even more

fundamental critique. “Getting into the service busi-

ness is a mistake, Don. It’s what everybody’s doing

right now. Just look at the number of our competitors

who’ve already taken steps to break into the services

market. What makes you think we’ll come out on top?

And when I look at our customers, I just don’t see

any evidence that even if they wanted to, they could

afford to buy any add-on services any time soon.”

With such a big decision, Don’s head had to agree

with Lodge’s position that was based on his usual

CFO thoroughness with number-crunching. But his

gut wasn’t so sure. Sometimes, he thought, you just

have to go with your instincts. And his instincts were

champing at the bit to go after Hoilman.

Questions

1. What steps in the decision-making process have

Don Anglos and Pinnacle taken? Which ones have

they not completed?

2. Which decision-making style best describes

Don’s approach: directive, analytical, conceptual,

or behavioral? Which style best describes Sam

Lodge’s approach?

3. Would you recommend that Pinnacle attempt to

acquire Hoilman? If so, why? If not, what alterna-

tives would you suggest?

SOURCE: Based on Paul Hemp, “Growing for Broke,” Harvard Business

Review (September 2002): 27–37.

ch8

ON THE JOB VIDEO CASE

Greensburg, Kansas: Decision

Making

It’s almost impossible to assign credit or blame to any

one person for Greensburg’s decision to rebuild the

small Kansas town as a model green community after

a tornado decimated 95 percent of its buildings. Many

folks in Greensburg would assert that whoever made

the decision, made a good one. Other residents make

a different case. It’s complicated.

Former mayor Lonnie McCollum expressed inter-

est in exploring the possibilities of running Greens-

burg’s municipal buildings on solar and wind power

well before the EF5 tornado hit in May 2004. After

the storm, he saw the tragedy as an opportunity to

reinvent the dying town and put it back on the map.

But McCollum was not the sole decision maker. He

was the leader of a small community facing endless

uncertainties. He wanted to give people a sense of

direction; something to live for. He made a decision

to lead and assert his ideas. Ultimately, the Greens-

burg City Council would have to vote on this

matter.

Some questioned whether McCollum had spent

any time coalition building. However, Greensburg

was in crisis after the storm, and the timing wasn’t

right for coalition building. McCollum had not

engaged in rational forms of the decision-making

process regarding the bene ts of turning his town

green. Before the tornado, he may have thoughtfully

weighed the pros and cons, but in the end, this wasn’t

a programmed decision. McCollum wasn’t operat-

ing from a logical place after the tornado hit. He was

using his intuition—his gut; he was passionate about

his vision for Greensburg.

While McCollum may not have built a coali-

tion, he had cultivated a  erce ally in Steve Hewitt,

Greensburg’s city administrator. Hewitt took McCol-

lum’s vision and expanded it. Like McCollum, Hewitt

believed, without a doubt, that Greensburg had an

opportunity, with green as its theme, to become a

thriving town again. The real work was convinc-

ing Greensburg’s residents and council members to

implement the proposed plan.

After multiple rounds of community meetings

in which residents engaged in rigorous debate,

PART 3 PLANNING236

ch8

BIZ FLIX VIDEO CASE

Failure to Launch

Meet Tripp (Matthew McConaughey), thirty- ve

years old, nice car, loves sailing, and lives in a nice

house—his parents’. Tripp’s attachment to his family

usually annoys any woman with whom he becomes

serious. Mother Sue (Kathy Bates) and father Al (Terry

Bradshaw) hire Paula (Sarah Jessica Parker). She spe-

cializes in detaching people like Tripp from their fam-

ilies. The term “failure to launch” refers to the failure

to move out of the family home at an earlier age.

The Bird Problem: Fast Decision Making!

This fast-moving sequence begins with the sound of a

bird chirping as it perches on a tree limb. Kit (Zooey

Deschanel) and Ace (Justin Bartha) have waited

patiently for the bird’s arrival. This bird has annoyed

Kit for many days. Ace believes that Kit only pumped

the shotgun twice. The sequence ends after the bird

leaves the house. The  lm continues with Kit and Ace

embracing and then cuts to a baseball game.

What to Watch for and Ask Yourself

▪ Does “The Bird Problem” present Kit and Ace

with a programmed or nonprogrammed decision?

What features of their decision problem led to your

choice?

▪ Assess the degree of certainty or uncertainty that

Kit and Ace face in this decision problem. What

factors set the degree of certainty or uncertainty?

▪ Review the earlier section describing the decision-

making steps. Which of those steps appears in “The

Bird Problem?” Note the examples of each step that

you see.

Greensburg’s City Council voted in favor of rebuild-

ing the town using green methods and materials. And

when the council members voted on the speci cs of

implementation, they decided to build all municipal

buildings to the Leadership in Energy and Environ-

mental Design (LEED) Platinum standard, which

is the highest nationally accepted benchmark for

the design, construction, and operation of high-

performance green buildings.

Greensburg resident Janice Haney didn’t think

the community meetings allowed enough space for

true debate. Instead, she was convinced the meetings

were token gestures toward community involvement.

Questions were raised asking if Haney was playing

devil’s advocate after the fact or if there was an atmo-

sphere of conformity cultivated so residents were

afraid to voice their true opinions. Some residents

questioned whether Hewitt and the City Council saw

what they wanted to see and heard what they wanted

to hear. Were some residents in uenced by their initial

impressions that McCollum made a passionate, solo

decision?

Considering this decision involved an entire town,

residents clearly had very different propensities for

risk. Many people were probably more risk averse

than usual because they had just lost their homes

and businesses. And while there’s plenty of rational

information regarding the bene ts of green building,

the decision still involves a degree of uncertainty and

ambiguity. No one can predict the exact costs of fos-

sil fuels in the future, nor can they calculate precisely

how much Greensburg will save through its use of

solar and wind power. Whether or not Greensburg

will be able to raise all the funds needed to rebuild

according to LEED-Platinum standards is also

uncertain.

There is no way to convince every Greensburg

resident that going green was a good decision. Per-

haps all Hewitt and the City Council can hope for is

support from a majority of residents. In their minds,

what were the alternatives? The town was dying.

Today, Greensburg is rebuilding thanks to generous

corporate sponsorships and government grants. The

town also stars in a TV show on Planet Green. The TV

show is aptly named “Greensburg.”

Discussion Questions

1. What ideas support the argument that McCollum,

Hewitt, and the City Council made good decisions?

What insights might come out of analyzing Greens-

burg’s decision-making process after the fact?

3. Were Hewitt and McCollum overcon dent in offer-

ing their solution for the town? Explain.

CHAPTER 8 MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 237

Planning

See Kenneth R. Brousseau, 1.

Michael L. Driver, Gary Hourihan,

and Rikard Larsson, “The Seasoned

Executive’s Decision Making Style,”

Harvard Business Review (February

2006): 110ff, for a discussion of how

decision-making behavior evolves

as managers progress in their

careers.

Betsy Morris, “What Makes Apple 2.

Golden?” Fortune (March 17, 2008):

68–74.

Michael V. Copeland and Owen 3.

Thomas, “Hits (& Misses),” Business

2.0 (January–February 2004): 126.

Michael V. Copeland, “Stuck in 4.

the Spin Cycle,” Business 2.0 (May

2005): 74–75; Adam Horowitz, Mark

Athitakis, Mark Lasswell, and Owen

Thomas, “101 Dumbest Moments

in Business,” Business 2.0 (January–

February 2004): 72–81.

Herbert A. Simon, 5. The New Science

of Management Decision (Englewood

Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1977),

p. 47.

Samuel Eilon, “Structuring Unstruc-6.

tured Decisions,” Omega 13 (1985):

369–377; and Max H. Bazerman,

Judgment in Managerial Decision

Making (New York: Wiley, 1986).

James G. March and Zur Shapira, 7.

“Managerial Perspectives on Risk

and Risk Taking,” Management

Science 33 (1987): 1404–1418; and

Inga Skromme Baird and Howard

Thomas, “Toward a Contingency

Model of Strategic Risk Taking,”

Academy of Management Review 10

(1985): 230–243.

Hugh Courtney, “Decision-Driven 8.

Scenarios for Assessing Four Levels

of Uncertainty,” Strategy & Leader-

ship 31, no. 1 (2003): 14–22.

Reported in David Leonhardt, 9.

“This Fed Chief May Yet Get a

Honeymoon,” The New York Times,

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Michael Pacanowsky, “Team Tools 13.

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Thomas H. Davenport and Jeanne 14.

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Julie Schlosser, “Markdown Low-15.

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James G. March and Herbert A. 18.

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Herbert A. Simon, 19. Models of Man

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and Herbert A. Simon, Administra-

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Langley, “Between ‘Paralysis by

ch8

ENDNOTES

PART 3 PLANNING238

Analysis’ and ‘Extinction by Instinct,’”

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1995): 63–76.

William B. Stevenson, Jon L. Pierce, 26.

and Lyman W. Porter, “The Concept

of ‘Coalition’ in Organization Theory

and Research,” Academy of Manage-

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George T. Doran and Jack Gunn, 27.

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Stephanie N. Mehta and Fred 28.

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James W. Fredrickson, “Effects of 29.

Decision Motive and Organizational

Performance Level on Strategic

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Management Journal 28 (1985):

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Comprehensiveness of Strategic

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(1984): 445–466; James W. Dean, Jr.,

and Mark P. Sharfman, “Procedural

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sion-Making Process,” Journal of

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agement 19, no. 2 (1993): 349–384;

and Paul J. H. Schoemaker, “Stra-

tegic Decisions in Organizations:

Rational and Behavioral Views,”

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30, no. 1 (January 1993):

107–129.

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of Management Studies 25 (1988):

131–145; and Susan E. Jackson and

Jane E. Dutton, “Discerning Threats

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Richard L. Daft, Juhani Sormumen, 31.

and Don Parks, “Chief Executive

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published manuscript, Texas A&M

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Jena McGregor, “Gospels of Failure,” 32.

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C. Kepner and B. Tregoe, 33. The Ratio-

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Nanette Byrnes, “Avon: More Than 34.

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Paul C. Nutt, “Expanding the Search 35.

for Alternatives During Strategic

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agement Executive 18, no. 4 (2004):

13–28; and P. C. Nutt, “Surprising But

True: Half the Decisions in Organi-

zations Fail,” Academy of Management

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Pallavi Gogoi and Michael Arndt, 36.

“Hamburger Hell,” BusinessWeek

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Peter Mayer, “A Surprisingly Simple 37.

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Executive Female (March–April

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Value-Focused Thinking,” Sloan

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making Machine,” Fortune (October

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mation for Strategic Decisions,

Routinely,” Strategy & Leadership 30,

no. 5 (2002): 29–34.

Ibid.40.

Jenny C. McCune, “Making

41.

Lemonade,

” Management Review

(June 1997): 49–53; and Douglas S.

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York Times, December 22, 1996.

Based on A. J. Rowe, J. D. Boulgaides, 42.

and M. R. McGrath, Managerial

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Alan J. Rowe and Richard O. Mason,

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Mark Gunther, “Jeff Zucker Faces 43.

Life Without Friends,” Fortune,

May 12, 2003, http://money.cnn.

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Hammond, Ralph L. Keeney, and

Howard Raiffa, Smart Choices: A

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(September–October 1998): 47–58;

Oren Harari, “The Thomas Lawson

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(February 1994): 58–61; Dan

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1, 2003): 83–87; Leigh Buchanan,

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and Max H. Bazerman, Judgment

in Managerial Decision Making,

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Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Strategy 45.

as Strategic Decision Making,” Sloan

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R. B. Gallupe, W. H. Cooper, M. L. 46.

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of Applied Psychology 79 (1994):

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Wellner, “A Perfect Brainstorm”; 47.

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Electronically.”

Michael A. Roberto, “Making Dif-48.

ﬁ cult Decisions in Turbulent Times,”

Ivey Business Journal (May–June

2003): 1–7.

Eisenhardt, “Strategy as Strategic 49.

Decision Making”; and David A.

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“What You Don’t Know About Mak-

ing Decisions,” Harvard Business

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Roberto, “Making Difﬁ cult Decisions 50.

in Turbulent Times.”

David M. Schweiger and William 51.

R. Sandberg, “The Utilization of

Individual Capabilities in Group

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Devil’s Advocate,” Small Business

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Doran and Gunn, “Decision Making 52.

in High-Tech Firms.

CHAPTER 8 MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING 239

Planning

Eisenhardt, “Strategy as Strategic 53.

Decision Making.”

Garvin and Roberto, “What You Don’t 54.

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Irving L. Janis, 55. Groupthink: Psycho-

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Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton

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Jerry B. Harvey, “The Abilene Para-56.

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Hans Wissema, “Driving Through 57.

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Ibid.58.