
245
IN  LOVE  AND  WAR:  1961–1969
Although Europe appeared to be the likeliest dirt patch for a major show-
down between communists and capitalists since the close of the Korean War 
in 1953, Fidel Castro, a bearded revolutionary in olive green, had changed the 
equation in 1959 by overthrowing the military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista 
in Cuba. Though Castro was not originally a communist, he was brutal, and a 
series of bumpy incidents with the United States pushed him into Khrushchev’s 
Soviet embrace. Plus, Fidel’s younger brother, Raul, was already a communist. 
The Castro brothers ran with a good friend and fellow revolutionary, Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara, an Argentine doctor who diagnosed the United States with 
a case of imperialism and prescribed communist revolution as the antidote. 
Guevara had been in Guatemala in 1954 when CIA-funded, -trained, and -led 
paramilitary forces had violently overthrown a democratically elected govern-
ment. 
He witnessed the start of an American-installed, right-wing, repressive 
government that led to civil war and 200,000 Guatemalan deaths by 1996, 
“mostly civilian lives, with an estimated 80 percent of those deaths caused 
by the U.S.-trained military.”
4
 Che Guevara had real reason to see the United 
States as an interfering, destructive force in Latin America.
From the outset, Fidel Castro’s relationship with the United States had 
been  strained.  In  1958,  the  United  States  had  supplied  Batista’s  forces 
with  weapons, and in  return  Castro’s  followers  had  taken  U.S.  Marines 
hostage. The crisis had been resolved peacefully, but it established a shaky 
basis for friendship once Fidel Castro took control in January 1959. Also, 
during the fighting against Batista’s forces, Castro had obtained weapons 
from communist Czechoslovakia with the Kremlin’s okay.
5
 Lines were be-
ing drawn. Then, in April 1959, while the American public was enjoying 
Castro’s  rumpled-bandit  look  during his  hotdog-eating,  public-relations 
tour of the States, President Eisenhower refused to meet with Castro and 
went golfing instead. More problematic for U.S.-Cuban relations than that 
diplomatic snub was Castro’s decision to nationalize foreign-owned busi-
n
esses in Cuba, most of which were U.S. corporate property. When Castro 
offered to buy the properties at the devalued rates previously claimed by 
companies like United Fruit, American enchantment with Castro eroded. 
Over a series of months, the United States slowed its purchases of Cuban 
sugar, and Castro signed an oil deal with the Soviets. Eisenhower broke 
off all relations with Castro in January 1961, just as John Kennedy was 
preparing to enter the White House. In this as with so much else, Kennedy 
inherited unresolved problems. Fidel Castro was originally a nationalist, 
not a communist. He had wanted to empower Cubans, but the schemes and 
fears of Soviets, Americans, and his own advisers had convinced him that 
in order to nationalize, he would have to communize. What is more, Castro 
never showed any reluctance when it came to stifling opposition at home.