
THE SUDAN: CONCLUSION
of the friendly societies and mutual-aid associations which have
often been important elsewhere in Africa but never became so in
the Sudan. Where the tribe did remain the dominant category of
identification, its dominance usually reflected strong ethnic and
linguistic divergencies (as with the Fur and the Beja), or the
imperatives of nomad ecology. In the south, tribalism and ethnic
exclusiveness, bolstered by 'Southern Policy', remained totally
and statically dominant, unchallenged as yet by economic devel-
opment, education, Islam or Christianity. They would probably
have been dominant even without artificial bolstering. The British
did not invent or 'manufacture' Nilotic ultra-conservatism; they
accommodated themselves to it, and used it.
In 1939 there was little obvious sign of radical change in
northern Sudanese social structure or political behaviour. This
was true even in the Gezira, where British romantic reactionaries
had greatly exaggerated the levelling effects of the scheme. Tribal
structures had hardly existed in the Gezira; and secular notables
were far less important than the leaders or agents of local or
national
turuq,
allegiance to which was unaffected by the scheme's
regimentation of its tenants. The intelligentsia, firmly rooted in
traditional society and as yet in traditional religious loyalties,
hardly constituted a new 'class'. The one genuinely revolutionary
force, militant millenarian Mahdism, had been moribund since
about 1918 and had long been dead by 1939. Yet there is also an
air of Indian summer, of calm before the storm, about the later
1930s. British administrators, like Douglas Newbold 'going on
steadily and sanely '
46
in Kordofan, or even Gillan using Congress
as a pawn in his political strategy, had no inkling of the rapidity
with which the intelligentsia were to emerge as the standard-
bearers of
a
militant and intransigent nationalism; and ultimately
as an independent force capable of challenging the political
leadership of the two great religious sayyids.
After about 1920, the British rulers of the Sudan became
intensely concerned to control its long-term socio-political devel-
opment. Wingate's administrative policy was decried as unimag-
inative and unconstructive because he had been content merely
to repress overt resistance and to promote material improvement
as the best foundation for security. Yet, ironically, it was
Wingate's success in interesting Lancashire and Whitehall in the
46
Newbold to Cottrell, 30 Match 1958: printed in Henderson, Modern Sudan, 81-2.
785
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