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Metaphysics
607
Collège
de
Clermont, Paris,
and
Cardinal Franciscus Toletus, who
was
just
completing
his
very successful commentaries
on
Aristotle's logic
and
natural
philosophy when
the De
principiis was published. Pedro
da
Fonseca
published his famous Commentarli
in
libros Metaphysicorum
at
Rome one year
after Pereira's work was
printed
and had
already conceived
the
idea
of the
Cursus
Collegii Conimbricensis.
The
understanding
of the
philosophical
enterprise which these
men
shared was,
of
course,
that
their work should
serve
the
cause
of
Catholic theology. Ignatius
Loyola
had
prescribed
that
the professors
of the
order should
follow
Aristotle
in
philosophy
and
Thomas Aquinas
in
theology,
but
they enjoyed considerable liberty
in
developing
their idea
of
a Christian philosophy. Pereira
and his
colleagues
were
at
ease with
the
mathematics
and
natural
science which
had
developed
especially
in
Italy during
the
sixteenth century
and
perfectly acquainted
with
the
philological progress which humanism
had
made
in the
study
of
Aristotle's
text. They knew
not
only Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas
and Duns Scotus,
but
also Averroes
and the
newly translated Greek
commentaries
on
Aristotle, including
the
commentaries
on the
Metaphysics
by
Alexander
of
Aphrodisias
and
Syrianus. Pereira's demand
for a
science
which
dealt with God,
the
intelligences
and the
human Soulier se was
a
part
of
the
response
of the
professors
of the
Collegio
Romano
not
only
to
Pomponazzi's
fideism,
but
also
to
contemporary theological questions,
to
the
new
approaches
to the
problem
of
God proposed
by
Lull,
Nicholas
of
Cusa
and
Ficino,
to the
philosophical
interpretations
of
classical
mythology
which
had
such
a
vogue
in the
Renaissance
and to the
efforts
of the
missionaries
of the
Jesuit
Order
in
lands
as far
away from Christianity
as
India
and
Japan.
87
Pereira's demand
for a
distinct science
of
being which would
treat
the
principles
and
transcendental properties
of
reality was,
on the
other
hand,
directly
related
to the
problem posed
by
secular Aristotelianism
in
Italy.
Loyola's
prescription
that
Jesuit
philosophers should
follow
Aristotle
was
part
of
his concern
for
sound, Catholic doctrine
in the
schools
of
the order.
At
first
the
professors
of
philosophy
in the
Collegio
Romano seem
-
like
many
of
their contemporaries
- to
have thought
that
they could simply
identify
the
doctrine
of
Aristotle with
that
of the
Catholic Church.
In
planning
the
philosophy courses
in the
Collegio
the
first problem
encountered
was not
that
of
defending Aristotle's orthodoxy,
but
rather
that
of
excluding those sections
of
his works which were
not
relevant
for
87. On Jesuit Aristotelianism and sixteenth-century metaphysics see
Lohr
1976b.
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6o8
Metaphysics
theology.
But the
threat
posed by the new Aristotelianism demanded a
more precise definition of the way in which the notion of sound doctrine
was
to be applied to the
interpretation
of Aristotle's text. Some of the
professors
of
the Order held
that
the soul is immortal not only according to
true
philosophy, but also according to the mind
of
Aristotle
himself. Others
were
willing
to admit
that
Aristotle had not proved immortality and
understood
Loyola's
prescription in the sense
that
Aristotle is to be
followed
except
where his teaching is contrary to faith or the common doctrine
of
the
scholastic doctors. Pereira belonged to the second group. As the result of a
long
controversy concerning the teaching of philosophy in the
Collegio
Romano in the course
of
which
Pereira was repeatedly accused
of
adhering
to Averroistic ideas, the
Jesuit
Order formulated principles for the choice of
philosophical opinions by its professors. Because Aristotle's principles
cannot
—
as Cajetan had pointed out some years earlier
—
have been
true
principles of philosophy if they led to false conclusions, the
Collegio
drew
the
attention
of
its teachers to the necessity
of
the search for and preservation
of
the common axioms of philosophy and theology.
Its approach amounted to an exegetical programme. Aristotle himself
had regarded the opinions of his predecessors as stuttering
attempts
to
express his own ideas and sought by the use
of
dialectics
to discover among
their theories the
true
principles
of
a question
under
discussion. In the same
way
the professors
of
the
Collegio
Romano were to seek the
true
principles
of
Aristotelian philosophy, not only the first principles
of
being,
but also the
axioms
on which Aristotle's conception
of
science
was founded. With these
epistemological
first principles in
hand
Aristotle could be
reinterpreted
or
even
rewritten to agree with the
true
principles
of
philosophy,
that
is, those
which
lead to Catholic doctrine. It was in accordance with this hermeneutic
that
Pereira defined 'first philosophy' not only as the science of being, but
also as the science of science itself. Conscious of the fact
that
the basic
problem with which scholasticism was confronted was
that
of
maintaining
the fundamental principles of its worldview, he held
that
metaphysics as
first philosophy also had the task of expounding and defending its principia
generalia
naturali
lumine
manifesta
in the face of the doubts and uncertainty
which
secular Aristotelianism had called forth.
The
project of rewriting Aristotle in accordance with the
true
principles
of
philosophy had also been taken up in Iberian universities, at first at
Valencia
- where Pereira had begun his studies - and
then
at
Alcalá
and
Salamanca. In Spain the project developed within a different context, but
the understanding of metaphysics
that
it involved agreed with Pereira's
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Metaphysics
609
conception
of
first philosophy as the science
of
the common principles
of
all
the sciences. For Spanish scholastics of the second half of the sixteenth
century the
threat
to the Christian interpretation
of
Aristotle
came not from
secular Aristotelianism, but
rather
from what they had come to regard as an
excessive
concentration on
logic
and natural philosophy in the
arts
faculties
of
their universities. Since for them metaphysics had the apologetic function
of
establishing the principles for showing the fundamental agreement
between Christian doctrine and Aristotelian philosophy, it had to be
part
of
a philosophy completely independent of revealed theology. But in Iberian
universities metaphysics was taught not as the culmination of the
arts
course, but in theology. Consequently, the effort to restore to metaphysics
its proper place in the course
of
studies implied the reformation
of
the entire
philosophical curriculum. The reform movement began at Valencia when
the university took various institutional measures similar to those taken by
the Jesuit Order in Rome. In 1540 new statutes for the
arts
faculty were
promulgated according to which metaphysics was to be read after
logic
and
natural philosophy as the
third
part
of a three-year
cycle.
In 1548 a
statute
decreed
that
Aristotle was to be interpreted according to the mind of
Thomas Aquinas. In 1587 a chair for metaphysics was established in the
arts
faculty.
88
It was as a
part
of
this reform movement
that
the great systematic works
of
the Spanish scholastics on metaphysics were composed. Medieval works
on the Metaphysics had been either literal commentaries on the text or
written in the form of questions
closely
following
Aristotle's order. The
systematic treatises
of
the late sixteenth century
—
which received the name
of
disputationes — represented a literary form which was new. They
abandoned Aristotle's aporetic arrangement and attempted to present
metaphysics per
methodum
doctrinae,
that
is, as an organic whole derived
from the first principles
of
philosophy. In the formation
of
these works the
decisions made at Valencia regarding the teaching
of
metaphysics played an
important role. The basic structure of the new disputationes metaphysicae
was
determined by the
statute
of
the university
that
the
following
books of
Aristotle's
work were to be read: 1 (the
nature
of metaphysics), v (its
terminology),
vn (the doctrine of substance) and xn (its divisions). One of
the professors in the
arts
faculty at Valencia, Bartolomé José Pascual, in his
inaugural lecture of
1565,
De optimo modo explanandi Aristotelem, also made
some suggestions for the presentation of Aristotle's doctrine which
88. See
Gallego
Salvadores
1972.
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6io
Metaphysics
influenced the structure of the new treatises. He maintained
that
in
explaining Aristotle's works one should rearrange the material in its
logical
order, add what is lacking, omit what is superfluous or has been added by
others and clarify ambiguous and obscure passages. In dealing with possible
additions he suggested a comparison between Aristotle's rules for scientific
demonstration based on first principles with Euclid's geometrical method.
In treating possible omissions he noted
that
the discussion
of
motion which
is
found both in the Physics and the Metaphysics need be dealt with only in
explaining Physics I and
that
the discussion
of
the causes which is also found
in both works could be taken up as a
part
of
the explanation
of
philosophical
terminology in Metaphysics v.
Two
other authors who made proposals for the reform of the
arts
curriculum at Valencia emphasised the importance of finding the
true
principles of Aristotelian science.
Juan
Bautista Monllor, in his paraphrase
of
the Prior Analytics
(1569),
explained
that
Aristotle's own works on the
syllogism
and the theory
of
proof
were composed according to the analytic
or resolutive method; they show how one should establish and arrange first
principles for the demonstration
of
theorems in a scientific discipline. Pedro
Juan
Nunez, in his De recta ratione conjiciendi curriculi philosophiae (published
in 1594, but probably written somewhat earlier), divided the study of
metaphysics into two parts, in a way which was similar to the division
of
the
science
proposed by Pereira. The major
part
of metaphysics deals with the
principles of things and comprises the last
three
books of the Metaphysics;
the other
part
concerns the principles of the sciences and is contained in the
earlier books of Aristotle's work. The study of speculative philosophy
should begin with this second
part,
then take up natural philosophy and
conclude with the books on the principles of things. Aristotle treated the
two
parts
of metaphysics in one work because the first principles of the
sciences
correspond to the first principles of things.
The
endeavour to reform the
arts
course by restoring to metaphysics its
role as rector of all the sciences
—
as first philosophy in Aristotle's sense
—
characterised the scholastic treatises of the Siglo de oro on this science. The
earliest printed systematic treatise on metaphysics was published at Valencia
under the title Disputatio metaphysica de ente et eius proprietatibus, in the same
year
that
the chair of metaphysics was established in the
arts
faculty.
Whereas the author
—
Diego
Mas, a Dominican friar and one
of
the leading
professors in the faculty
89
- composed works on
logic
and natural
89.
Concerning
Mas see
Lohr
1978, pp.
569—70.
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Metaphysics
611
philosophy in the form of commentaries on Aristotle's treatises, his
Disputado metaphysica is an independent
tract
which seeks to set limits to the
particular sciences and present metaphysics, the science
of
the first principles
of
all reality, as the foundation for the reform of the philosophical
curriculum. The Disputado is made up
of
a discussion
of
the concept
of
being
and the scholastic doctrine of the transcendental. In accordance with the
teaching of Thomas Aquinas, God is dealt with only as the cause of being.
To
avoid duplication, Mas relegated the discussion
of
the Aristotelian causes
to physics.
A
second treatise on metaphysics arranged secundum
ordinem
doctrinae was
published ten years later at Toledo by the Augustinian friar
Diego
de
Zúñiga.
90
This
author's
treatise is found in his Philosophiae
prima
pars, qua
metaphysica, dialéctica, rhetorica et physica declarantur, a work which forms
part
of a comprehensive plan for reforming the university curriculum in
philosophy. Zúñiga's teaching seems to have been at least in
part
a response
to attacks by contemporary sceptics against Aristotelianism; he is concerned
throughout the work to demonstrate the scientific character of the
entire
Peripatetic philosophy. At the same time the
structure
of his treatise is
clearly
dependent on university practice: it is divided into an introduction
on the concept of being, the predicables and philosophical terminology
(corresponding to books I and v
of
Aristotle's
Metaphysics) and a
treatment
of
the categories
of
substance and accident (corresponding to books vn and
xn).
Like
Pereira, Zúñiga regarded the doctrine of God as a particular
science,
distinct from metaphysics.
The
same basic
structure
may be observed in the celebrated Disputadones
metaphysicae
of
Francisco Suárez, a work which appeared in the same year as
Zúñiga's
treatise. It seems, in fact,
that
the idea of rewriting Aristotle on
metaphysics in the form
of
systematically
arranged disputations originated
with
the famous
Jesuit
theologian. Before he dedicated himself
exclusively
to the teaching
of
theology
as professor, first in the
Collegio
Romano
of
the
Order (where he was a colleague of Benito Pereira) and
then
in the
Universities of
Alcalá
and Salamanca, Suárez had taught both philosophy
and theology in various smaller
Jesuit
colleges
in Spain. In the prooemium
to the Disputadones metaphysicae, which were published during his
incumbency at Salamanca, he tells us
that
in composing the work he made
use of his lecture-course on metaphysics from this earlier period. A
reflection of these original Disputadones can be found in the Exposido in
90.
Concerning
Zúñiga
see
Lohr
1982, pp.
178-9.
Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008
Table
i.
Organisation
of
treatises
on
metaphysics
ARISTOTLE
COBOS
(1583)
MAS
(1587)
ZÚÑIGA
(1597)
SUÁREZ
(1597)
i
Subject-matter
and
dignity
of
meta-
physics
v
Philosophical
lexicon:
1—2 Principle;
3 Element;
4
Nature;
5 Necessary;
6
One,
Many;
7
Being;
8
Substance;
9
Same,
Other; 10 Contrary;
25-6
Part,
Whole;
30
Accident
i
De
ente
in
communi
i De
ente
2-5
De
passionibus
entis
6-7
De
ente
in
actu
et
potentia, necessario
et
contingenti
2
De
essentia
et
existentia
De
proprietatibus
entis
3 De uno
4
De
ventate
5
De
bonitate
LI—2
De philosophia
1.3
De eo
quod
est
i
De
natura
metaphysicae
2
De
conceptu entis
1.4
De re,
aliquo, uno, vero,
bono;
5-6
De
vero contra
académicos
et
alios
11.1—9
De
rebus singulis
et
universis (praedicabilibus)
11.10
De
toto
et
partibus;
11
De
causis; 12
De
principio
et
elemento;
13
De
natura;
14
De
necessario.
ra.
1—4
De eo
quod
est
per
accidens; 5—11
De vi et
actione;
12
De
eodem
et
diverso;
13-14
De
contrariis
3-11
De
passionibus entis:
De
unitate, veritate, bonitate
12—27
D
e
causis
VII
Substance
and its
8-10
De
substantia
principles
11-12
De
accidentibus
xii
Types
of
substance
ue
essentia
et
esse entis imiti
32
De
divisione entis creati
in
substantiam
et
accidens
33—4
De
substantia creata
35
De
immateriali substantia
36
De
substantia materiali
37-53
De
accidentibus
54
De
ente rationis
IV.
i
De
rerum generibus
IV.2
De
substantia
IV.3-8
De accidentibus
28
De
divisione entis
in
infinitum
et
finitum; 29—30
De
primo
et
increato ente;
31
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Metaphysics
613
libros Metaphysicae of one of Suarez' pupils from this period, the Jesuit
Cristobal de los
Cobos.
This work, which was composed about
five
years
earlier
than
the Disputatio metaphysica
of
Diego
Mas, first
treats
the concept
of
being and its properties, then discusses the terms, 'act' and 'potency',
'necessity' and 'contingency', and concludes with an account of the
categories of substance and accident. In his mature Disputationes Suarez
followed
this structure, but substituted a long treatise De causis for the
discussion of the terminology and expanded considerably the final section
on the divisions of substance and accident by including a treatment of the
doctrine of metaphysical entities which had developed during the Middle
Ages:
ens increatum, ens creatum immateriale and materiale.
All
of these treatises formed
part
of a collective attempt to rewrite
Aristotle's
metaphysics in accordance with the
true
principles of philos-
ophy. Their authors
followed
the suggestions of their colleagues in Rome
and Valencia concerning the proper, philosophical interpretation of
Aristotle.
They found the fundamental structure of their works in those
books
of Aristotle's Metaphysics which were prescribed for the lectures in
philosophy. They omitted the lists of metaphysical problems in books m
and xi and the matter which properly belongs to physics in books vm and
xi.
They rearranged the material, bringing together Aristotle's remarks on
the nature, dignity and subject-matter of metaphysics from books 1—iv and
vi
to form an introduction on the relationship between metaphysics and
philosophy and on the concept
of
being,
while combining the Philosopher's
scattered notes on unity and
truth
from books
iv—v
and x with the scholastic
treatise on the transcendentals to make up a tract on the properties
of
being.
They
completed these praeambula to metaphysics by adding to Aristotle's
philosophical lexicon (book v) material from books vn—ix and the Physics to
form a tract on the causes. Understanding metaphysics to be the science of
substance and its various divisions, they brought together the teaching of
books
vii and xn with some material from the Physics to form a final tract on
metaphysics proper (see table 1).
One feature set Suarez' mature Disputationes metaphysicae
apart
from the
treatises of his colleagues: his use of the now familiar distinction of reality
into
three
fundamental types: infinite, finite immaterial and finite material.
Suarez
employed this distinction not only in structuring his tract on the
divisions
of substance and accident (disp.
xxvin—LIII),
but also in
formulating his definition of the subject-matter of metaphysics as the real
being which includes God, the intelligences, material substances and real
accidents (disp.
1.1).
As we have seen, the scriptural doctrine
of
creation lies
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Metaphysics
behind this distinction; Suarez' use of it justified his description
of
his own
philosophy as Christian. Whereas the secular Aristotelians of the Italian
universities had maintained
that
for Aristotle
himself
the world was eternal,
Suarez
made the relationship
of
finite reality to the infinite, creative power
of
God the very foundation of his Christian
reinterpretation
of the
Philosopher's thought. It was his reflection on this relationship
that
led him
to define the subject-matter
of
metaphysics as real being. Finite being is
that
which
can be constituted in actual existence by God's absolute power.
Consequently, real being cannot simply be identified with actual being; it
must include possible being, not only
that
which exists, but also
that
which
can be thought of as possibly existing. Suarez attempted to clarify this
concept
of
real being as
that
which can be thought
of
as possibly existing by
distinguishing it from entia rationis, like figments and chimeras. Although
both real beings and beings of reason can have being in the intellect, the
former differ from the
latter
in
that
they are able through God's creative
power
to achieve an existence which is actual and objective outside the
intellect. Pure beings
of
reason are incapable
of
actual existence because such
concepts involve a contradiction. The concept
of
the real being which is the
subject
of
metaphysics is therefore objective in the sense
that
real being can
be thought of as possible, because its essence contains no contradictory
notes.
This
understanding of the subject-matter of metaphysics served two
purposes. On the one
hand,
it guaranteed the role of metaphysics as first
philosophy and
thus
supplied a philosophical basis for the
attempt
of the
Spanish scholastics to reform the curriculum in arts. On the other, it
restored to metaphysics the unity which was
threatened
by Pereira's
proposal to distinguish the science of being from the science of God.
Metaphysics
is first philosophy for Suarez because it explains and confirms
the axioms which are common to philosophy and theology. It shows
that
metaphysical statements are possible as scientific statements of universal
validity
because in them the individual, finite things we know are perceived
as bearers of something absolute — the absolute necessity of non-
contradiction which penetrates all reality. On the basis
of
the ultimate, most
certain axiom
of
the Aristotelian philosophy, Suarez proposed a reinterpre-
tation of Aristotle's metaphysics which would not only avoid the
errors
which
led to conclusions at variance with Christian doctrine, but also make
possible a systematic, deductive presentation
of
Christian philosophy and a
solid
reformation
of
the
arts
curriculum. But metaphysics is, for Suarez, also
the science
of
being itself, the science which deals with the
nature,
properties
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615
and divisions of all reality. As such, it shows
that
the necessity of all finite
reality is grounded in the fact
that
finite reality is a possible object
of
God's
infinite, creative power. At the same time, metaphysics is theology because
God
is the necessary being whose absolute power can bring into actual
existence those things which contain no contradictory notes. Metaphysics as
divine science is for this reason the condition of the possibility of
metaphysics both as the science of being as such and as first philosophy.
Metaphysics
is one science and not
three
because it studies all these objects
under
the one aspect
under
which they all agree. Because all real things can
be thought of
under
the aspect
that
they involve no contradiction, the
objective
concept of being
—
beyond the divisions of infinite and finite,
immaterial and material, substantial and accidental
—
is the a priori principle
of
all reality and all knowledge.
Suarez'
Disputationes metaphysicae
fixed
the method of instruction in
metaphysics for centuries, not only in Catholic schools, but also in
Protestant academies and universities. The clarity, comprehensiveness,
systematic character and originality
of
the work have often been praised. At
the same time, it must be recognised
that
Suarez stood not so much at the
beginning as at the end of a long tradition. If his work was original, its
originality consisted above all in the way in which it articulated the
tradition to respond to the sixteenth-century situation. First of all, Suarez
wrote on metaphysics not as a philosopher, but as a Catholic theologian
writing shortly after the close of the Council of Trent and
under
the
watchful
eye of the Spanish Inquisition. In the prooemium to the
Disputationes he emphasised
that
philosophy should be Christian and the
servant of revealed theology. Because in his theological teaching he had to
make use
of
the metaphysical principles which are presupposed in scholastic
theology,
he decided
—
at the time of his
return
from Rome to Spain
—
to
interrupt
his commentary on the
third
part
of
Aquinas'
Summa
(which deals
with
the Incarnation of Christ) in order to compose a systematic treatise on
metaphysics on the basis of his earlier lecture-course. The way in which
Suarez'
metaphysics was conditioned by theological concerns may be
observed in the disputations which he added in the crucial, central section of
his work: disp.
xxxi
on the essence and existence of finite being and disp.
xxxiv
on the distinction between supposite and
nature.
These disputations
were meant to form the philosophical basis of his
treatment
of the
Incarnation.
But
Suarez wrote on metaphysics not only because
of
its relevance for the
solution of specifically theological problems. The Disputationes also
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6I6
Metaphysics
represent a theologian's reply to the philosophical challenges of the
sixteenth century. In reaction to the growing scepticism which marked the
latter
part
of the century, Suarez stressed the scientific character of first
philosophy. His
attempt
to ground all knowledge in the law of non-
contradiction is no doubt to be seen in connection with the attacks of
contemporary sceptics
—
like Francisco Sanches, who was acquainted with
the
Jesuits
of
the
Collegio
Romano
—
against the Aristotelian encyclopaedia
of
the sciences. His colleague,
Diego
de Zuniga, answered the sceptics
explicitly
in his Metaphysica as a
part
of
his
treatment
of
the doctrine
of
truth
as a transcendental property of being. Moreover, in response to new
approaches to the doctrine of God and to the needs of Christian
missionaries, Suarez stressed the
natural
knowledge of God which
metaphysics provides. In doing so, he sought a middle way between Ramon
Lull's
trinitarian
approach to the problem of God and Benito Pereira's
proposed division of metaphysics into a science of being and a science of
God.
He wrote against Lull's
trinitarian
theory and attacked specifically the
supra-rational methodology which underlay it.
91
Although he rejected
Pereira's proposal,
natural
theology forms the centre about which the
Disputationes revolve (disp.
xxvm—xxx).
For Suarez the God known
through
natural
reason is the principle of a system which begins with the
primal division
of
reality into creator and created and proceeds through the
divisions
contained in finite being to reach all types and grades of reality.
Finally,
Suarez' metaphysics was meant as a response to what many
of
his
colleagues
regarded as an over-emphasis on
logic
and
natural
philosophy in
the Spanish universities of the early sixteenth century. Suarez agreed
that
the
arts
curriculum was in need
of
reform, but in his
view
reform could not
consist simply in establishing a place for metaphysics in the philosophy
course. True reform involved the transformation by the science
of
being of
the
entire
encyclopaedia of the philosophical sciences. This final and most
important
aspect of Suarez' reaction as a theologian to contemporary
philosophical challenges was as much a reply to Pomponazzi's fideism as it
was
a consequence of the Spanish situation. The secular Aristotelianism of
the Italian universities which had so divided the professors of the
Jesuit
Collegio
Romano endangered the very specific
view
of the relationship
between Christian doctrine and the Aristotelian philosophy which
characterised scholasticism. Because the fundamental doctrines
of
the faith-
the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, for example — were
thought to transcend man's
natural
powers, the scholastics maintained
that
91.
Suarez
1856—78,
1, pp.
560—73
(De Deo uno et
trino
111.1.9—12).
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