Schultz D. Encyclopedia of the United States Constitution

Подождите немного. Документ загружается.

Anti-Chinese Movement in California. Berkeley:

University of California Press, 1975.

—Michael P. Fix

Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer 343

U.S. 579

(1952)

In Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, the

Supreme Court ruled that the president did not

have emergency authority to seize steel mills dur-

ing the Korean War in order to avert a strike. The

case is important in that it described the scope of

the powers of the presidency, especially during an

emergency.

Youngstown went to the Supreme Court as a

result of President Truman’s executive order that

nationalized the steel industry. Truman argued

that this nationalization was necessary because

the nation was at war in Korea and the industry

faced a national walk-out. Although Congress had

refused to allow governmental seizures of prop-

erty to prevent work stoppages when deliberating

the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Truman issued EO

10430 in an effort to ensure that the nation’s muni-

tions would not fall short. This executive order,

based on broad constitutional grounds rather than

specific statutory grounds, authorized the sec-

retary of commerce to seize the steel mills. The

Supreme Court disagreed with Truman’s broad

claims, and found that Truman had exceeded his

constitutional powers by issuing the executive

order.

This decision is noteworthy for two rea-

sons. First, Youngstown is a rare example of the

Supreme Court, or any court, hearing a case

related to a president’s issuing an executive order.

It is all the more rare in that the executive order

was overturned, as occurred in this case.

More importantly, however, is the finding of

the decision. The Court found, in a 6-3 decision,

that the president had overstepped his powers in

issuing the executive order. However, multiple

opinions were issued explaining the reasons why

the Court made its decision as such. Without

doubt, the most important of the opinions issued

in Youngstown was not the opinion of the Court,

written by Justice Hugo Black. Instead, in a con-

currence, Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote what

has become the most important doctrine to arise

from this case. In his concurrence, Jackson issued

a rough blueprint explaining when presidential

action is most likely to be upheld as constitutional

by the Supreme Court.

Jackson famously explains that the president

enjoys three levels of judicial deference, based on

congressional support of his actions. If Congress

is supportive of his actions, then the Court will

likely accept a given action; if Congress is ambiva-

lent about an action, then the Court will accept

reasonable action; if Congress has speciﬁ cally for-

bidden an action, the Court is highly unlikely to

support the actions of the president. The Supreme

Court noted that Congress had specifically for-

bidden the actions of President Truman, and

that is why the Court did not ﬁ nd in favor of the

executive.

As Justice Jackson argued, “When the President

acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-

tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,

for it includes all that he possesses in his own right

plus all that Congress may delegate. In these cir-

cumstances, and in these only, may he be said (for

what it may be worth) to personify the federal

sovereignty.”

Although only an outline of what the Supreme

Court is likely to uphold, and there have been

exceptions, the basis of Jackson’s opinion has

withstood the test of time. The president’s legal

advisers are acutely aware of the importance of

Jackson’s opinion, and may advise him of the like-

lihood that an action will be accepted. Perhaps

more importantly, the Supreme Court itself has

upheld the central argument in Jackson’s concur-

rence. In DAMES AND MOORE V. REGAN (1981), the

Supreme Court argued that because Congress had

not acted speciﬁ cally in an effort to prevent the

president from suspending payments or transfers

of Iranian assets during the Iran Hostage Cri-

sis, and in fact the “relevant Senate Committee”

had supported his action, President Carter was

justiﬁ ed in his actions. The opinion of the Court

in Dames was written by then-justice William

Hubbs Rehnquist—a former clerk for Justice

Jackson.

812 Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 812 3/20/09 2:19:27 PM

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001,

Youngstown has remained important in under-

standing the separations of power in the Constitu-

tion. For the most part, federal courts have acted

with restraint regarding presidential action, due in

large part to the PATRIOT Act and a congressio-

nal resolution allowing the president to act to limit

future attacks on Americans and American soil.

There have been a few exceptions to this general

rule, however. Perhaps the most important have

been related to President Bush’s formation and

use of a detainment center at Guantánamo Bay,

Cuba. The detainees, called enemy combatants,

have been held without trial. The Supreme Court

ruled in H

AMDI V. RUMSFELD that Hamdi, an Amer-

ican citizen, had a right to trial. Most recently, the

Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006) that

Congress, in its resolution, had in no way given

the president the authority to alter military tri-

als. Moreover, it is possible that other parts of the

opinion may be interpreted as the Court’s attempt

to limit other actions taken by the Bush admin-

istration, including actions taken by the National

Security Agency.

For more information: Marcus, Maeva. Truman

and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presi-

dential Power. Durham, N.C.: Duke University

Press, 1994; Schubert, Glendon A. The Presidency

in the Courts. Minneapolis: University of Minne-

sota Press, 1957.

—Tobias T. Gibson

youth curfew laws

Youth curfew laws are laws that place limits on

when individuals under the age of 18 may be out

in public. These laws raise First Amendment

questions regarding freedom of association.

Historically, the establishment of youth curfew

laws has stemmed from both society’s discontent

over juvenile crime and concern for the safety of

juveniles in general. Common justifications for

state intervention in juvenile affairs are: (1) pro-

tection of children from harm, (2) the reduction of

juvenile delinquency, (3) community protection,

and (4) strengthened parental authority.

Curfew laws established during the Progres-

sive Era were motivated primarily by a belief that

social decay in the community was the product of

unruly, unsupervised juveniles; curfews were seen

as a means to correct this problem. The mindset

of society during this period was that children

needed guidance and protection, and that the

state should assume that role in the absence of

adequate parental supervision. After the turn of

the century, and as juveniles gained more rights,

the states expanded their social welfare agendas

to adopt the changes occurring as juvenile rights

began to evolve.

Curfew laws are primarily local, municipal leg-

islation and typically include restricting juveniles

from being on public streets during late hours

unaccompanied by an adult; the specifics vary.

Generally, there are exceptions made for emer-

gency situations or special circumstances such as

traveling to and from one’s place of employment

and if accompanied by a parent or guardian.

At issue in Ex parte McCarver, 46 S.W. 936,

937 (1898), the ﬁ rst case to test the constitutional-

ity of youth curfew laws, was a Texas curfew ordi-

nance banning juveniles from being on the streets

after 9 p.m. without special cause. The Court held

the curfew to be unconstitutional, asserting that

it was paternalistic and an intrusion on the per-

sonal liberties of the individual. In contrast, the

Court in Baker v. Borough of Steelton, 443 U.S.

622 (1979), found that a curfew banning juveniles

from being on the streets after 9 p.m. was law-

ful, under the state’s police power. These early

cases set the foundation for future cases debating

the constitutionality of such laws.

Constitutional challenges to youth curfew laws

include alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and

Fourteenth Amendments. Opponents of juve-

nile curfew laws argue that the laws place restric-

tions on a juvenile’s First Amendment freedoms

of association and assembly, the Fourth Amend-

ment protection against unreasonable search and

seizure, and the Fourteenth Amendment right to

due process and equal protection. However,

the general consensus in state and lower federal

court decisions has been that youth curfews are

constitutional, as juveniles have limited freedom

youth curfew laws 813

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 813 3/20/09 2:19:27 PM

and are not afforded rights to the same extent

as adults. In Schall v. Martin, 513 F.Supp. 691

(SDNY, 1981), a federal district court, in uphold-

ing a juvenile curfew, explained that juveniles,

unlike adults, are always in some sort of custody

and, therefore, restrictions placed on their activi-

ties may be more extensive than that of adults.

Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), was a

signiﬁ cant Supreme Court case whose rationale

can be applied when determining the constitu-

tionality of juvenile curfew laws. The Supreme

Court’s decision included three reasons why the

constitutional rights of juveniles are not equal to

those of adults: “the peculiar vulnerability of chil-

dren; their inability to make critical decisions in

an informed, mature manner; and the importance

of the parental role in child rearing.”

At issue in Qutb v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488 (5th

Cir. 1993), was a Dallas curfew that made it a mis-

demeanor for juveniles, under the age of 17, to be

on public streets or in public places after certain

hours and without special cause. The ordinance

did permit a number of exceptions to the curfew:

If the juvenile was in the presence of an adult,

on an errand for an emergency or an errand for a

guardian, traveling to or from a place of employ-

ment, or on interstate travel, the ordinance did not

apply. Qutb claimed that the ordinance violated

both the United States and Texas constitutions.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the

curfew laws imposed by the city of Dallas were in

the best interest of the city and that any burdens

placed on the constitutional rights of minors were

minimal.

While the effectiveness of youth curfew laws

has been heavily debated, they have become

increasingly popular and widely accepted forms

of controlling juvenile delinquency. Studies on the

effectiveness of the curfews on crime and delin-

quency reduction are mixed, but politicians and

the public continue to support their imposition.

For more information: Hemmens, Craig, and

Katherine Bennett. “Out in the Street: Juvenile

Crime, Juvenile Curfews, and the Constitution.”

Gonzaga Law Review 34, no. 2 (1999): 267–327.

—Virginia Hatch

814 youth curfew laws

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 814 3/20/09 2:19:28 PM

815

ﱶﱷﱸ

Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 536 U.S. 639

(2002)

In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court afﬁ rmed,

against an establishment clause challenge,

the ability of state and local governments to estab-

lish a school voucher system that includes private

religious schools.

Due to continuing poor performance, a federal

district court in 1995 placed Cleveland’s pub-

lic school system under state control. Ohio then

passed the Pilot Project Scholarship Program,

granting two types of ﬁ nancial assistance to fami-

lies in state-controlled school systems: funds to

provide tutoring for students who remain in public

schools; and up to $2,250 in tuition aid for low-

income students in kindergarten through eighth

grade to attend a participating public, private, or

private religious school. Of the 3,700 Cleveland

students during the 1999–2000 school year who

chose tuition aid to private schools, 96.6 percent

enrolled in religious (mainly Catholic) schools.

Doris Simmons-Harris and other Ohio taxpay-

ers sued Susan Zelman, superintendent of Ohio

schools, claiming the funding for tuition to reli-

gious schools violated the First Amendment. A

district court found the program unconstitutional

under L

EMON V. KURTZMAN, 403 U.S. 602 (1971),

because it had the primary effect of advancing

religion. A divided court of appeals afﬁ rmed.

The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the

program by a 5-4 vote. Chief Justice William

Hubbs Rehnquist’s majority opinion stated the

program’s purpose was neutral and general: to

improve education in a failing system. Recipients

were chosen on a nonreligious basis, and parents

had many choices—tutoring or tuition aid, pub-

lic or private schools, religious or nonreligious

schools. The state did not coerce parents to send

their children to religious schools, the program

did not endorse religious schooling, and the 96.6

percent enrollment ﬁ gure did not include those

who chose tutoring or other public schools. Fur-

ther, government funds were not given directly to

schools but to parents. Individual decisions about

the use of these monies thus constituted “genuine

and independent private choice.”

Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred,

arguing that this ruling was consistent with

past decisions and that the program was neutral

because it provided parents many educational

options. Justice Clarence Thomas’s concur-

rence—which opens and closes with quotes from

Frederick Douglass on the importance of educa-

tion—focused on the crisis in Cleveland public

schools. He also questioned applying the estab-

lishment clause against the states instead of rely-

ing solely on free exercise.

In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote

that Cleveland’s educational crisis, the wide range

of choices under the program, and its voluntary

nature were all irrelevant to the constitutional

issue. The crucial fact was the “use of public funds

to pay for the indoctrination of thousands of gram-

mar school children.” Justice David H. Souter,

writing for all four dissenters, found the majority

opinion inconsistent with the Court’s statement in

VERSON V. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 330 U.S. 1 (1947),

that “no tax, in any amount, large or small, can

be levied to support religious activities or institu-

tions, whatever they may be called, or whatever

form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.”

Souter described the choice in this program as

“Hobsonian,” because for most children “the only

alternative” to a failing public school is attending

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 815 3/20/09 2:19:28 PM

a school of a religion not their own. Justice Ste-

phen G. Breyer, joined by Stevens and Souter,

would have struck Cleveland’s program because it

would introduce religious divisiveness and social

conﬂ ict.

For more information: Tushnet, Mark. “Vouch-

ers after Zelman,” Supreme Court Review (2002):

1–39.

—Frank J. Colucci

Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District

509 U.S. 1 (1993)

In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,

the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the estab-

lishment clause of the First Amendment

did not prevent a school system from providing a

sign-language interpreter to a deaf student attend-

ing a Catholic high school.

The case involved a request by the Zobrest

family in Tucson, Arizona, to have the school dis-

trict pay for a sign-language interpreter for their

deaf son, James, at a private Catholic high school.

Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities

Education Act (IDEA), James was disabled and

was provided a sign-language interpreter when

attending public school in earlier years.

However, when the student moved to a Cath-

olic high school, the school district said it could

not provide support to Zobrest because spending

public funds at a religious school would violate

the establishment clause principle of separation

of church and state. The Zobrest family sued,

but a federal district court and the U.S. Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the

school district.

In a 5-4 decision, Chief Justice William

Hubbs Rehnquist said that the presence of a

government-paid interpreter in a religious school

would be the result of the parents’ choice, not the

government’s intervention, and therefore would

not violate the establishment clause. Rehnquist

said the federal law determined who was dis-

abled and eligible for education assistance but

left it to each family to select the school for their

child.

He relied on two earlier rulings to reverse the

lower court and rule in Zobrest’s favor. In Muel-

ler v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), Rehnquist wrote

the Court’s decision upholding a Minnesota law

that allowed parents to deduct education expenses

from their taxes even though most of the deduc-

tions went for expenses at religious schools. In

Witters v. Washington Dept. of Services for

Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), Justice Thurgood Mar-

shall upheld state education assistance provided to

a blind student studying at a Christian college to

become a religious leader. In both cases the Court

emphasized, as it did in Zobrest, that the ﬂ ow of

public funds to religious institutions was entirely

the product of individual, private choice about

where to spend funds that were part of a generally

available aid program.

In dissents by Justices Harry A. Blackmun

and Sandra Day O’Connor, four justices faulted

Rehnquist for reaching out to decide the estab-

lishment clause issue when there were narrower

grounds on which to resolve the case. They said

the case could have been resolved by interpreting

whether the requirements of the federal IDEA

law were satisfied by making a sign-language

interpreter available at a public school. Blackmun,

joined by Justice David H. Souter, also disputed

Rehnquist’s constitutional analysis, saying the

case marked the ﬁ rst time the Court had permit-

ted a public employee to participate in “religious

indoctrination.”

For more information: Bartlett, Larry.

“Post-Zobrest: Where Are We on the Issue of

Special Education Programs and Services to Par-

ent-Placed Private School Students?” Education

Law Reporter 108, no. 1,039 (1996).

—Stephen Wermiel

Zorach v. Clausen 343 U.S. 306 (1952)

In Zorach v. Clausen, the Supreme Court upheld a

public school release program to allow students to

attend religious education off of school grounds.

The issue before the Court in Zorach was

whether the policy of the state of New York—to

allow public school students to participate in a

816 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 816 3/20/09 2:19:28 PM

program whereby they, with written permission of

their parents, may be released to leave school dur-

ing the day and go to their religious institution to

receive religious education or for religious obser-

vance—violated provisions of the First Amend-

ment that prohibited religion establishment but

guaranteed the free exercise of religion. Six jus-

tices upheld the validity of the program, citing

the absence of coercion in addition to off-campus

location and found that it did not violate the First

Amendment.

Zorach followed McCollum v. Board of Educa-

tion (333 U.S. 203 [1948]), which found that the

Illinois “released time” program, permitting inter-

ested public school students to be released from

their public school duties to attend a religious edu-

cation program conducted by a “duly constituted

religious body” in classrooms on campus, violated

the Constitution. McCollum is often taken to

have asserted a right to be free from religion in

its suggestion that the government’s ofﬁ cial stance

toward religion should be characterized by strict

separation and indifference.

Zorach established that coercion is a necessary

attribute of church-state entanglement that runs

afoul of the religion clauses, and that, absent a

showing of coercion, there is a range of permitted

accommodation of religion that does not impli-

cate the separation principle. Zorach also estab-

lished that separation need not be so complete

that it renders the state and religion “aliens to each

other, hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly.”

Not to allow accommodation would be to express

“callous indifference to religious groups,” indicat-

ing an impermissible preference for nonbelievers

over believers. Zorach gave weight to the nation’s

religious heritage in legal argument, albeit in a

constitutionally circumscribed manner.

Justice Hugo Black’s dissenting opinion noted

that, as in McCollum, the Court indicated that

where the religious instruction took place made

no difference to the case; the result in Zorach

combined church and state because the state’s

adjustments—here, of its public school sched-

ules—had the effect of aiding the religious sects

that beneﬁ ted in gaining attendants, thus indicat-

ing an impermissible preference for believers over

nonbelievers. Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion

echoed the same themes, but emphasized that

equality between irreligion and religion should be

the operating principle at work, a point that speaks

to the nonpreferentialist argument that accommo-

dations of religion in general are constitutionally

permissible so long as no religion is given a prefer-

ence over others or unavailable to others.

What Zorach is most known for is the following

statement in the opinion by Justice William O.

Douglas: “We are a religious people whose insti-

tutions presuppose a Supreme Being.” This state-

ment from Zorach has been frequently cited in

later cases where a nonpreferentialist argument is

being made, or by political activists concerned that

the United States’s Christian heritage be reﬂ ected

in its law and public policy, and not impugned.

For more information: Hitchcock, James. The

Supreme Court and Religion in American Life.

Vol. 1, The Odyssey of the Religion Clauses. Princ-

eton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004.

—Gordon A. Babst

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 436 U.S. 547

(1978)

In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, the Supreme Court

held that neither the First or Fourth Amend-

ments prohibited the police from searching the

ofﬁ ces of a newspaper, even when the newspaper

is not the subject of a criminal investigation. In this

case, the Palo Alto, California, police confronted

demonstrators at the Stanford University hospital,

which eventually led to violence and various inju-

ries. While the police were unable to identify most

of the demonstrators, the Stanford Daily, a stu-

dent newspaper, had a photographer on the scene,

and on the following day published a photo from

the confrontation. The police then secured a war-

rant to search the Daily’s ofﬁ ces for evidence that

could help identify the demonstrators.

The Stanford Daily filed suit in federal dis-

trict court under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that

its civil rights had been violated by the search

in that police searching its newsroom infringed

upon the freedom of the press in the First

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily 817

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 817 3/20/09 2:19:28 PM

Amendment and conducted an unconstitutional

search per the Fourth Amendment. The district

court agreed with the Stanford Daily, holding

that the Fourth Amendment did not allow for

the issuance of a warrant to search for materials

possessed by one not suspected of a crime, unless

a subpoena would prove to be impracticable for

the police. Additionally, the First Amendment

had some bearing in this case because a war-

rant could be issued only when there was some

showing that evidence would be destroyed or

removed from a news ofﬁ ce; otherwise, the First

Amendment’s freedom of the press would suggest

caution in granting searches of newsrooms due to

the impact said searches could have upon news-

room operations. The district court, afﬁ rmed by

the appellate court, held that neither condition

applied here—the Stanford Daily was not a sus-

pect in this case, and there was no showing that

the newspaper would destroy evidence.

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the

appellate court by 5-3 vote (Justice William J.

Brennan, Jr., not participating). Justice White,

writing for the majority, took a dim view of the

reasoning of the lower courts; in particular, White

stated Court precedent made clear that search

warrants per the Fourth Amendment are directed

not at persons but at places where things may be

seized that have a bearing upon on ongoing crimi-

nal investigation. As such, the search warrant was

not directed at the Stanford Daily, but at the

newsroom where there might be photographic

evidence of who was at the demonstration.

Furthermore, White rejected the First Amend-

ment concerns, especially those premised on the

idea that warrant-based searches would hinder

news organizations’ abilities to gather, analyze,

and disseminate news. White reminded how forc-

ing searches to be reasonable or warrants to be

granted by neutral magistrates satisﬁ ed the Con-

stitution’s framers, who were quite alarmed at

how British authorities intruded upon the colonial

press without cause. Since the framers did not pro-

hibit warrants when the press was involved, White

was loath to agree with the reasoning of the lower

courts on this issue.

In dissent, Justice Stewart was not as sanguine

as White about the effect of searches in news-

rooms. Stewart concluded that such searches were

sure to physically disrupt press operations and pos-

sibly lead to the disclosure of conﬁ dential sources.

Justice John Paul Stevens also dissented on the

grounds that, unlike the majority’s reading of the

Fourth Amendment, he believed that for a search

to be reasonable, a newspaper would have to be

under suspicion for committing a crime; in this

case, there was no evidence of that.

The Court’s ruling in Zurcher caused an outcry

among the press corps. For example, James Reston

wrote in The New York Times, on June 2, 1978, an

op-ed piece that was addressed to Justice White,

inviting him to visit his newspaper and explain

how it should handle in practical terms the inevi-

table police searches his Zurcher opinion would

encourage. Two years after the Zurcher ruling,

Congress responded by passing the Privacy Pro-

tection Act of 1980; this law made it more difﬁ cult

to obtain warrants for searches of press operations

when a member of the press was not under suspi-

cion for committing a crime.

For more information: Hutchinson, Dennis J.

The Man Who Once Was Whizzer White: A Por-

trait of Justice Byron R. White. New York: Free

Press, 1998.

—John M. Aughenbaugh

818 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 818 3/20/09 2:19:29 PM

ﱶﱷﱸ

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

BILL OF RIGHTS

OTHER AMENDMENTS TO

THE CONSTITUTION

U.S. CONSTITUTION TIME LINE

LOCATING COURT CASES

Appendixes

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 819 3/20/09 2:19:29 PM

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 820 3/20/09 2:19:29 PM

821

ﱶﱷﱸ

Action of Second Continental Congress, July 4,

1776.

The unanimous Declaration of the thirteen United

States of America.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men

are created equal, that they are endowed by their

Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among

these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happi-

ness. That to secure these rights, Governments are

instituted among Men, deriving their just powers

from the consent of the governed. That whenever

any Form of Government becomes destructive of

these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to

abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying

its foundation on such principles and organizing its

powers in such form, as to them shall seem most

likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence,

indeed, will dictate that Governments long estab-

lished should not be changed for light and transient

causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown,

that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while

evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abol-

ishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But

when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursu-

ing invariably the same Object, evinces a design to

reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their

right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government,

and to provide new Guards for their future security.

Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colo-

nies; and such is now the necessity which constrains

them to alter their former Systems of Government.

The history of the present King of Great Britain is a

history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all hav-

ing in direct object the establishment of an absolute

Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be

submitted to a candid world.

HE has refused his Assent to Laws, the most

wholesome and necessary for the public good.

HE has forbidden his Governors to pass Laws of

immediate and pressing importance, unless sus-

pended in their operation till his Assent should be

obtained; and when so suspended, he has utterly

neglected to attend to them.

HE has refused to pass other Laws for the accom-

modation of large districts of people, unless those

people would relinquish the right of Representa-

tion in the Legislature, a right inestimable to them

and formidable to tyrants only.

HE has called together legislative bodies at places

unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the

depository of their public Records, for the sole

purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with

his measures.

HE has dissolved Representative Houses repeat-

edly, for opposing with manly ﬁ rmness his inva-

sions on the rights of the people.

HE has refused for a long time, after such dis-

solutions, to cause others to be elected; whereby

the Legislative powers, incapable of Annihila-

tion, have returned to the People at large for their

exercise; the State remaining in the mean time

exposed to all the dangers of invasion from with-

out, and convulsion within.

HE has endeavoured to prevent the population

of these States; for that purpose obstructing the

Laws of Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to

pass others to encourage their migrations hither,

and raising the conditions of new Appropriations

of Lands.

DECLARATION OF

INDEPENDENCE

821

vi+904_EofUSConsti-v2.indd 821 3/20/09 2:19:29 PM