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tor in Kazakh society. The role of the non-governmental sector in

democratising the country was legitimised at the Civil Forums held

in 2003 and 2005, which also started the creation of a systematic

mechanism for cooperation between civil society, government agen-

cies and businesses.

Finally, the third Civil Forum in October 2007 deﬁ ned the prior-

ity aspects of cooperation between the state and NGOs and drafted

mechanisms for this. Forum participants arrived at the understand-

ing of the need to build an equal dialogue between society and the

government of all levels.

“Today non-governmental organisations have great opportunities

to draft breakthrough ideas and are capable of offering invaluable as-

sistance to the state in solving many social problems. The country’s

competitiveness should be based on civil initiative that aims to develop

the economy, continue democratic transformations and improve the

country’s life,” President Nursultan Nazarbayev told the third Civil

Forum.

We should note that the president is an ideologist of the priority

development of non-governmental organisations and the establish-

ment of civil society in general and prioritises these tasks in his annual

state-of-the-nation-addresses.

During the forum NGOs secured the support of the main political

player in the country, the Nur Otan party. The party intends to lobby

the interests of NGOs, advance social programmes and laws that

encourage their development.

All in all, the state sees the non-governmental sector as a reliable

partner in solving social, economic and legal problems because the

main requirement of the current stage of development is to overcome

the autonomy of components of the political system and establish

equal cooperation.

2.10. The Media

Kazakhstan’s media market has matured after undergoing the

necessary stages of development. There are a number of reasonably

strong media outlets and media groups in the country that unite their

efforts in order to survive in ﬁ erce market competition conditions.

This process was not chaotic. It was conditioned by the purposeful

government policy on the media, the main principles of which are:

the creation of a single media space in the country; the democratic

modernisation of state-owned and private media outlets; and the

creation of conditions for ensuring political stability and interethnic

accord, information security and the efﬁ cient work of political insti-

tutions in the country.

After obtaining independence Kazakhstan faced the problems of

creating its media market. Following this, it is feasible to consider the

main stages of the formation of the Kazakh media market.

Local experts single out speciﬁ c stages of the development of the

media market in Kazakhstan.

The ﬁ rst stage, from 1991 to 1995, was characterised by state mo-

nopoly of the media when there were practically no independent media

outlets. This was a period of the beginning of the era of openness: the

media started to criticise certain aspects of the political system.

At this point, the ideology of the fourth estate and the myth about

the independent press were prevalent among Soviet and Kazakh jour-

nalists. The ﬁ rst politicised newspapers and private television chan-

nels, as well as a great number of new publications of diverse editorial

policies, emerged on the Kazakh media market at that time.

This stage started in 1991 when independent Kazakhstan adopted

its ﬁ rst legislative acts – the Law On the Press and Other Media Out-

lets, which conﬁ rmed Kazakhstan’s adherence to democracy.

Article 1 of the law pronounced freedom of press and freedom

of speech. Censorship was banned by legislation for the ﬁ rst time.

Government ofﬁ cials were also banned from involvement in editorial

issues and from hindering journalists’ professional activities.

The law also expanded journalists’ right to seek out and obtain

information, and it granted political parties, public associations and in-

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 2. Domestic Policy

122 123

dividuals the right to set up media outlets, which gave an impetus to the

formation of democratic principles of the functioning of the media.

The novelty and democratic values of the ﬁ rst media law became a

powerful factor for the rapid development of the Kazakh press. How-

ever, since this law was adopted at the very beginning of Kazakhstan’s

independence, many provisions of it quickly became obsolete, falling

behind the requirements of the time.

The media legislation helped the development of the media ﬁ eld

to an extent, but in terms of quality the media grew slowly in the

market economy.

A switch to market relations drove the prices of paper, printing and

postal services up and this hindered the development of the local media.

In April 1992 the government drafted measures to support the media in

this period, offering assistance with paper and other materials as part

of the state orders and tax breaks. In addition, the government drafted

a programme to privatise state-owned media outlets. In essence, this

started the formation of the independent media in Kazakhstan.

This stage had speciﬁ c features: the partial departure of the state

from controlling the media; the emergence of the party press; and the

high level of trust in the media by the population.

The second stage of the development of the media was between

1996 and1999. This period saw the government depart from uncondi-

tional domination of the media market and the rapid development of

the private media. At the same time, the privatisation of some media

outlets reduced the market share of the state-owned media.

Many media observers describe this period as the golden age of

the national media. This was also the ﬁ rst wave of the privatisation of

the media. New publications and television and radio stations started

to emerge on the Kazakh media market.

New outlets started using the models and formats of modern

Western journalism and tried to separate news from commentary and

making newspapers on the principles of thematic columns. Electronic

media outlets also adopted the format of live broadcasting.

This stage saw the dynamic qualitative and quantitative growth

of the media market and an increase in the role of the Kazakh media

in the country’s socio-political sphere.

This stage was characterised by: the beginning of the crystal-

lisation of Kazakhstan’s media market; the large-scale privatisation

of previously state-owned media outlets and printing enterprises; a

switch from state funding and subsidies for media outlets to state

purchase orders to conduct state media policy; and the emergence

of media groups.

Simultaneously, there was a clear trend of the politicisation of the

media and the strengthening of political and economic elite groups’

inﬂ uence on major media outlets and the media acquired the status

of a separate functional resource.

The third stage started in 1999 and ended in 2002 after the adop-

tion of another Law On the Media. The law was passed in July 1999

and consisted of 26 articles, and it was concise in its content, but very

strict about the press’s duties.

This law abolished the state monopoly to the media legislatively.

In line with this law the state retained only two means of inﬂ uencing

the media:

- legislative (administrative) leverage, which meant that the state

could intervene only if the media law were violated;

- economic (non-administrative) leverage, which was applied

through the system of the state purchase orders (the state purchase

orders were placed through tenders, in which private media outlets

could also take part).

A number of amendments to the media law in 2001 played an

important role in the development of the local press. Particular at-

tention was paid to the gradual limitation of the retransmission of

foreign television programmes by Kazakh stations. These amend-

ments aimed to protect local television which encountered great

problems competing with more developed and powerful foreign

television channels.

At the same time, it required the local electronic media expand

their volume of production and encouraged the qualitative growth of

local television products.

One of the main features of this stage was a boost in the role of

the media in the system of political and economic relations and, as a

result, their gradual loss of independence in the media system.

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 2. Domestic Policy

124 125

Having been convinced in the efﬁ ciency of information technolo-

gies, political and economic elite groups started investing in the media

market, creating their own media groups that divided practically all

national media outlets among themselves.

In general, this stage was characterised by: the clear division of

media players into pro-governmental, opposition-minded and neutral;

the signiﬁ cant increase in the media’s inﬂ uence during election cam-

paigns; the media’s involvement in rivalry between power groups; the

ﬁ nal switch to practice, apart from the administrative and economic

regulation of the activities of media outlets; the state’s increased role

in controlling media activities; and the emergence of public organisa-

tions that protect media freedom.

The fourth stage started in 2002 and is still under way. The land-

mark of this stage is the creation of the Public Council on the Media

under the Kazakh president in 2002. The council is an advisory body,

and its main objectives are: the systematic comprehensive analysis of

the activities of the media and the drafting of recommendations for

the president on building and improving state media policy.

The council has the right to request and obtain information, docu-

ments and material from government agencies and listen to reports

by government ofﬁ cials and media organisations on the observance

of the media legislation.

The main result of the council’s activities so far is the rejection

of the new edition of the Law On the Media in 2004. Even though

this draft law had undergone all stages of discussion and was ready

for signing, the president, after learning arguments put forward by

the Public Council and NGOs, decided to veto this law. President

Nazarbayev was praised for this by the international community.

On 6 February 2009 after discussions throughout 2008 there was

another important event: the president signed the Law On Adopting

Amendments and Addenda to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan

On the Media.

These amendments were initiated by the head of state. Speaking at

the opening of a parliamentary session, President Nazarbayev stressed

the need of further liberalisation in the media sphere and the removal

of excessive bureaucratic barriers.

The work on these amendments took into accounts opinions of

many media and human rights organisations, as well as media ex-

perts. The president signed the Law On Adopting Amendments and

Addenda to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan On the Media on

6 February 2009 [16].

At that time the idea of drafting the Code of Professional Ethics

for Journalists was ﬂ oated, and it was adopted at the ﬁ rst Congress

of Journalists of Kazakhstan. Organisations that protect the rights of

media workers, for example the Solidarnost (Solidarity) foundation

for protecting the rights of journalists, were set up.

In summer 2006, technical amendments were made to the Law On

the Media to improve the media situation in the country: outlets were

made to undergo the process of re-registration if their circulations,

editors-in-chief and addresses changed; the personal responsibility of

editors for the content of their outlets was increased and so on.

The main characteristics of this stage were: the adoption of the

new rules of the game in relations between the media; the increased

role of the media in political processes; and the devising of a mecha-

nism to ensure a balance between freedom of speech and the media’s

responsibility before society.

At present, the Kazakh media market is the most developed in

Central Asia. According to the Kazakh Ministry of Culture and In-

formation, as of December 2008 there were 2,810 media outlets, of

which 21% were state-owned and 79% private.

As for electronic media, there are now 63 television companies,

40 radio companies, 142 cable television operators and ﬁ ve satellite

broadcasters. In addition, there are 11 news agencies operating in

Kazakhstan at the moment. The country’s Internet community is the

region’s largest with over 2 million people.

References

1. Ашимбаев М.С. Формирование института президентства в

ходе политического транзита в Казахстане // http://www.kisi.kz

2. Президент Республики Казахстан // www.akorda.kz

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3. Современные демократические преобразования в Респуб-

лике Казахстан / Под общ. ред. Б.К. Султанова. – Алматы: КИСИ

при Президенте РК, 2008.

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этап в развитии Казахстана: Материалы «круглого стола» (22 мая

2007 г.). – Алматы, КИСИ при Президенте РК, 2007.

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формирования // Казахстан в современном мире: реалии и перс-

пективы. – Алматы: КИСИ при Президенте РК, 2008.

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ские реформы в Казахстане. – М.: Бослен, 2007.

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ность и улучшение благосостояния всех казахстанцев. Послание

Президента народу Казахстана. – Алматы, 2001.

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госостояния граждан Казахстана – главная цель государственной

политики», 6 февраля 2008 г. // http://www.akorda.kz

9. Назарбаев Н.А. Через кризис к обновлению и развитию.

Послание Президента РК народу Казахстана. 6 марта 2009 г. //

www.akorda.kz

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Казахстанская правда. – 1995, 7 марта.

11. Султанов Б.К., Абишева М.А., Морозов А.А. Закон, приня-

тый народом // Известия-Казахстан. – 2005, 30 августа.

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(с изменениями от 7 октября 1998 г.).

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рактеристика населения Республики Казахстан на современном

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либерализацию в сфере СМИ // http: // www.internews.kz

CHAPTER 3. FOREIGN POLICY

3.1. Kazakhstan’s Multi-Vector Foreign Policy

Since obtaining independence Kazakhstan’s foreign policy has

been based on a principle of multi-vector relations that was declared

by Nursultan Nazarbayev as soon as he was elected the country’s

president on 1 December 1991.

President Nazarbayev believes that the multi-vector policy means

“the development of friendly and predictable relations with all states

that play a signiﬁ cant role in global politics and represent practical

interest for our country. Kazakhstan, because of its geopolitical posi-

tion and economic potential, cannot limit itself to narrow-regional

problems. This would not be understandable to not only our multieth-

nic population but the entire international community. Kazakhstan’s

future is both in Asia and Europe, in East and West. By pursuing

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

128 129

exactly this policy will we be able to avert any manifestations of

threats to Kazakhstan’s security. We will be able to strengthen favour-

able external conditions by economic and political transformations

in our country.” [1]

This position has largely been deﬁ ned by the country’s geopolitical

position, its multiethnic and religiously diverse population and the

level of economic development as a whole.

Taking into account the current international realities the main

emphasis in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy has been placed on

ensuring an efﬁ cient security system in Central Asia which is aimed

at preventing unconventional threats and challenges (international

terrorism, religious extremism, drug trafﬁ cking and illegal migration)

posed by Afghanistan and other countries bordering the region.

In order to solve this problem Kazakhstan found it expedient to

focus on the following priority foreign policy aspects:

- involvement in interstate associations – the Conference on

Interaction and Conﬁ dence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Collective Security

Treaty Organisation (CSTO);

- strategic cooperation with Russia and China;

- friendly relations with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

and Uzbekistan;

- constructive cooperation with the USA, European Union

countries and international organisations, such as the Organisation for

Security and Cooperation Organisation (the OSCE) and NATO.

- cooperation with the countries of the Islamic world; and

- partner relations with Asia-Paciﬁ c countries.

Taking into account the situation developing in the world, we

think that a quite promising international organisation is the CICA,

whose main objective is to boost cooperation through multilateral

approaches to ensuring peace, security and stability in Asia. From

the very beginning the idea of convening the CICA was backed by

a number of Asian countries that deﬁ ne the political climate on the

continent and by leading international organisations.

The legislative basis for the Asian security system has already

been laid out, with speciﬁ c mechanisms to ensure stability in the

region. As a result, the CICA is turning into a locomotive of mutual

approaches in ﬁ ghting challenges to security in Asia and making a

signiﬁ cant contribution to ensuring peace and security in the entire

world.

The Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) is also acquiring

greater weight and reputation: it is aimed at economic integration

that envisages the creation of a free trade zone and the formation of

a customs union. At the summit of the heads of state of the EAEC

member states in Dushanbe on 6 October 2007, the leaders of Belarus,

Kazakhstan and Russia signed the documents to create the Customs

Union. The creation of the legislative basis of the Customs Union is

expected to be completed in 2010.

In order to overcome the consequences of the global economic

crisis, the summit of the EAEC in Moscow on 4 February 2009 de-

cided to set up an anti-crisis fund worth $10bn. The largest donors

are Russia ($7.5bn) and Kazakhstan ($1bn). In order to encourage

the development of hi-tech sectors the decision was taken to set up

an international centre of high technology.

The escalation of tension and the conﬂ ict situations which con-

stantly emerge on the borders of CIS countries raises the issue of

drafting joint measures to counter various phenomena that threaten

their stability and development. An important step in this direction

was the creation of the CSTO.

On 4 February 2009 the CSTO summit in Moscow decided to form

the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF). These forces should

become an efﬁ cient and universal instrument to maintain security in

the entire space of CSTO, including rebufﬁ ng military aggression,

destroying terrorists, extremists, organised crime and drug trafﬁ cking

gangs and the consequences of emergencies, if need be. The backbone

of the CRRF will be one division and one brigade of air-borne forces

(ABF) of Russia and one brigade of ABF of Kazakhstan.

Cooperation within the SCO is also acquiring particular signiﬁ -

cance and it includes a wide range of mutual actions of an economic,

military and political and humanitarian nature. At the same time, it

is necessary to stress that the SCO is not a military political bloc and

its activities are not aimed at other countries and regions. At the SCO

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

130 131

summit in Dushanbe in August 2008 particular attention was placed

on joint work on the Afghan issues. Under the auspices of the SCO

a special conference will be held on Afghanistan to discuss the ﬁ ght

against terrorism, drug trafﬁ cking and crossborder crime.

The SCO places a lot of attention on increasing economic coopera-

tion, including in the energy, transport, agricultural, trade and invest-

ment sectors, as well as the activities of an interbank association, the

SCO Business Council and the creation of a transcontinental transport

corridor between Europe and Asia.

Kazakhstan’s cooperation with regional and international integra-

tion associations shows our government’s openness and readiness

to build and develop international relations both in bilateral and

multilateral formats and on the basis of mutual respect, partnership

and prospects.

Developing bilateral economic, political, cultural and humanitarian

relations with close neighbours plays a key role in ensuring stability

and security in Central Asia and creating conditions for mutually

beneﬁ cial cooperation.

Kazakhstan and Russia, as a result of various economic, political,

ethnic, language, demographic, religious and geographical reasons

(the world’s longest land border, a signiﬁ cant share of Russian speak-

ers in Kazakhstan and ethnic Kazakhs in Russia, interest in politi-

cal and trade and economic cooperation and so on), are extremely

intertwined countries.

This is proven by bilateral trade and economic cooperation.

Kazakhstan’s trade with Russia exceeds its trade with all the other

Central Asian countries combined. In 2008, bilateral trade reached

$20bn in 2008 (against $9.5bn in 2005), and it grows by 30% a year

on average. There are over 1,600 enterprises that have the involve-

ment of Russian capital in Kazakhstan [2].

Russian-Kazakh cooperation has been developed both in bilateral

and multilateral formats – within the CIS, the EAC, the CSTO, the

SCO and the Central Asian Cooperation Organisation (CACO). It

should also be noted that relations between Kazakhstan and Russia are

a foundation for the creation of Eurasian ﬁ nancial, energy, transport

and customs infrastructure.

The signiﬁ cance the Kremlin attaches to relations with Kazakh-

stan was evidenced by the fact that his ﬁ rst foreign trip as president

of Russia Dmitry Medvedev was to Kazakhstan (in May 2008). The

special importance given to Kazakh-Russian relations is also proven

by three other visits made to Kazakhstan by President Medvedev in

2008 – in July, September and December. In 2009, bilateral talks at

the highest level were held in Moscow on 4 February as part of the

summits of the CSTO and the EAEC.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev believes Kazakh-Rus-

sian relations enjoy a high level of trust and strategic partnership. He

thinks that there are no political or economic problems between the

two countries that cannot be solved “through a constructive dialogue

and account of mutual interests” [3].

This point of view is also shared by Russian President Medvedev

who stressed at a meeting with President Nazarbayev on 4 February

2009 that Kazakhstan and Russia were developing a friendly and

allied dialogue [4].

Cooperation with China remains a priority aspect of Kazakhstan’s

foreign policy and its long-term aim is to preserve the peaceful in-

ternational situation, needed for the successful implementation of

internal modernisation in the country.

Sovereign Kazakhstan had to build its policy towards China from

scratch. President Nazarbayev, analysing the situation in those years,

said: “Both sides had been forming an image of an enemy and [their]

military doctrines declared one another as potential foe… General policy

and general propaganda had tuned us to a belief that China is enemy No

1… Kazakhstan, after obtaining independence, had to deﬁ ne its relations

with the People’s Republic of China from scratch. We had to get rid of

the legacy we inherited from party ideologists.” [5, page 221].

The Chinese leadership also showed readiness to start a large-

scale dialogue with Kazakhstan on all aspects of bilateral relations.

The former president of China, Jiang Zemin, said that China would

always be a reliable friend and good neighbour despite any changes

taking place in the world [6, pp 35-36].

Kazakh-Chinese economic cooperation is currently developing

well. In China’s foreign trade with CIS countries, Kazakhstan oc-

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

132 133

cupies second place, behind Russia. In 2007, bilateral trade reached

$9.1bn (against $3.7bn in 2005).

China shows interest in, above all else, the energy sector. The West

Kazakhstan-West China oil pipeline with a design capacity of 20 mil-

lion tonnes of oil a year is expected to be completed by 2011. Two

gas pipelines – one from Uzbekistan and the other from Turkmenistan

– are being built through Kazakhstan to China.

Developing relations (bilateral and multilateral) with Central Asian

countries – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan – is

a strategic foreign policy priority for Kazakhstan. Astana proceeds

from the fact that the regional countries are bound not only by eco-

nomic interests but the common fates of the peoples, who are in a

good sense doomed to live together in close friendship.

At a meeting of the heads of states of the CACO in Bishkek on 9

and 10 January 1997 Central Asia’s ﬁ rst trilateral Treaty of Eternal

Friendship was signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.

Article 3 of this treaty stipulates that “the parties will offer to one

another all-round support, especially in the issue of preventing threats

to independence and sovereignty and territorial integrity”.

Kazakhstan provides sizeable economic and humanitarian aid to

neighbouring countries because this helps their stability, and, as a

result, security in the region as a whole. For example, Kazakhstan’s

investment in the four other Central Asian countries exceeded $1bn

in 2008, including $628.2m that was placed in the Kyrgyz economy

and $200.8m in the Uzbek economy.

An important way of eliminating conventional and unconventional

threats to Central Asian countries is regional integration. The Kazakh

president’s initiative to set up a Union of Central Asian States is still

a topical issue. The initial stage of this project envisages the creation

of a favourable business climate in the entire territory of the region.

This may be achieved via the conclusion of intergovernmental

agreements to remove protectionist barriers to imports, exports,

investment and labour, on the one hand, and joint projects important

to the entire region, on the other.

The next stage may involve the creation of regional consortia

– food, water and energy and transport and telecommunications.

Kazakhstan favours expanding constructive interaction with the

USA, taking into account this country’s leading role in the world. Of

particular signiﬁ cance in establishing constructive relations with the

USA was the Kazakh leadership’s decision to voluntarily give up the

status of nuclear power.

This fact largely predetermined the future nature of bilateral

relations. The former US president, Bill Clinton said that the world

had been saved from another threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear

proliferation and praised President Nursultan Nazarbayev for this

[6, p 13].

This policy resulted in the memorandum, signed in Budapest on 5

December 1994, on the provision of security guarantees by the United

Kingdom, Russia and the USA which aims to ensure the long-term

security of the country.

The energy sector plays a special part in the development of eco-

nomic cooperation. One of the ﬁ rst foreign companies that started

operations in Kazakhstan was Chevron, which commenced the de-

velopment of the Tengiz oil ﬁ eld in 1993. Chevron and Mobil were

involved in the construction of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)

pipeline, which was completed in 2001. Kazakhstan joined the trans-

Caucasian Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in June 2006.

The USA is one of the largest investors in the Kazakh economy.

Direct US investment totals about $15bn. Kazakh-US trade stood at

$2,046m in 2007 (2.5% of Kazakhstan’s total foreign trade).

There are 374 Kazakh-US joint ventures and 91 representatives

of US companies registered in Kazakhstan.

Great hopes are pinned on the Kazakh-US initiative of public-

private partnership adopted in February 2008, which will support

not only US energy projects in Kazakhstan but will also attract US

investment and innovations in the non-extractive sector of the Kazakh

economy.

Maintaining relations with EU countries and expanding mutually

beneﬁ cial political and economic contacts is another of the main

foreign policy priorities of Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan, like Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, is acquiring in-

creasing importance for the EU (for example, in the energy security

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

134 135

sphere). With regard to this, the European Union and Central Asia:

Strategy for a New Partnership, adopted in 2007, stresses that new

prospects are opening up for cooperation between the EU and Central

Asia.

The EU is also interested in other issues – security (border man-

agement, migration, the ﬁ ght against organised crime, international

terrorism, trafﬁ cking in human, drugs and weapons); regional coopera-

tion; human rights; environmental protection; transport infrastructure;

education and culture.

Developing cooperation with EU countries is a very current priority

for Kazakhstan. The main sphere of cooperation is energy. Kazakhstan

is one of the EU’s main suppliers of hydrocarbons, accounting for

about 20% of its total oil and gas consumption.

Trade between Kazakhstan and the EU reached $36.4bn in 2008,

with the largest trading partners being Italy (12.6%), France (5.8%),

the Netherlands (4.5%), Germany (2.9%), Britain (2.1%) and Spain

(1%).

EU member states’ investment capabilities are of signiﬁ cant

interest to Kazakhstan. Since obtaining independence, Kazakhstan

attracted about $40bn in foreign direct investment from EU countries,

or almost 50% of the total. The main investors are the Netherlands,

Britain, France, Germany and Italy.

The bulk of this investment was placed in the energy sector.

Kazakhstan is now interested in bringing European investment to

knowledge-intensive and innovative sectors of industry. The creation

of liberal conditions for Kazakh investment in the EU is of similar

importance.

Kazakhstan is cooperating with the EU in projects like the creation

of the INOGATE project to ship oil and gas to Europe and the TRACE-

CA transport corridor from Europe to Central Asia via Caucasus and

the construction of the 8,445-km-long West Europe-West China road

corridor is expected to be completed by the end of 2013.

A special aspect of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is the chairmanship

of the OSCE in 2010. This envisages not only performing diplomatic

functions, but also implementing serious economic and political

reforms in the country.

With this aim President Nursultan Nazarbayev endorsed the Path

to Europe Programme for 2009-2011 on 29 August 2008. This pro-

gramme aims to lift Kazakhstan to the level of strategic partnership

with leading European countries, with stress made on developing

cooperation in the technological, energy, transport, trade and economic

and humanitarian spheres.

During its chairmanship of the OSCE Kazakhstan intends to

expand cooperation between this organisation and the Islamic

world. For example, at the 11

summit of the Organisation of the

Islamic Conference in Dakar on 13-14 March 2008, the former

Kazakh foreign minister, Marat Tazhin, proposed that Muslim

countries join the process of drafting the agenda of the OSCE’s

activities in 2010.

In particular, he proposed to consider the possibility of cooperation

between the two organisations on issues of migration and integration

of Muslim communities in European countries, the rights of Muslim

women and young people in Western societies, modern understanding

of international law and environmental protection [7].

Another important aspect of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is to

develop a dialogue between civilisations and religions held by the

Kazakh leadership over the past few years. Astana hosted three con-

gresses of world and traditional religions in 2003, 2006 and 2009 and

gathered spiritual leaders of the world’s major religions.

Kazakhstan initiated a forum of the foreign ministers of Muslim

and Western countries titled “Common World: Progress via Diversity”

in Astana in October 2008.

Kazakhstan attaches particular signiﬁ cance to developing coop-

eration with the inﬂ uential military and political organisation NATO,

consistently speaking for the realisation of the existing potential in

aspects such as defence policy, scientiﬁ c research, the development

of defence technologies, political and defence measures aimed at

the prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD).

The current relations between Kazakhstan and NATO are charac-

terised by positive, consistent development and are mutually beneﬁ cial

in nature, including the Partnership for Peace programme, drafted

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

136 137

to build new relations in the security sphere between NATO and its

partner.

Kazakhstan also pays particular attention to developing relations

with Muslim countries. Moreover, our country builds relations with

them not on an ideological or religious basis, but proceeding from its

national interests and common norms of international law.

Kazakhstan has already established economic and cultural coop-

eration with all leading Muslim countries. It is a member of the OIC

(since 1995) and it is cooperating with the Islamic Development Bank

and the Islamic Educational, Scientiﬁ c and Cultural Organisation.

Muslim countries, in particular Arab ones, are active in placing

investment in the Kazakh economy. However, Kazakhstan does

not just receive Arab investment, but it is also involved in cultural

exchange with the Arab world. For example, our country is funding

work to restore the Sultan Beirbars mosque in Cairo – Sultan Beibars

was a prominent ruler of Egypt in the 13

century; Kazakhstan is

also building the Abu Nasr al-Farabi historical and cultural site in

Damascus, where he is buried.

In its cooperation with Muslim countries, an important task for

Kazakhstan is to position itself as a secular country, in which religion

is separated from state and any attempts to manipulate religious is-

sues in achieving political aims will be resolutely stopped. As for the

revival of Islam in the country, it should happen as part of the general

development of culture and spirituality in Kazakhstan.

Taking into account the growing economic weight of Asia-Paciﬁ c

countries, Kazakhstan has shown signiﬁ cant interest in expanding

cooperation with Japan, India, South Korea, Pakistan, Malaysia,

Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia.

As a result, Kazakhstan, successfully pursuing its multi-vector

foreign policy, has managed to occupy a well-deserved place in the

system of international relations and claim a reputation as a reliable,

principled and predictable partner.

3.2. Kazakhstan’s Nuclear-Free Status

On obtaining independence in 1991, Kazakhstan inherited a major

arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, including 1,216 nuclear war-

heads for intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear reserves for

strategic bombers. Kazakhstan’s inherited nuclear arsenal exceeded

those of the United Kingdom, China and France put together and it

was enough to destroy everything alive on Earth completely.

Aside from the stockpiled nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan had

the necessary infrastructure and resource basis for the produc-

tion of the active components of nuclear weapons. In particular,

Kazakhstan accounts for 21% of global proven uranium reserves.

In addition, Kazakhstan had the world’s second largest nuclear

testing potential.

With such nuclear capabilities, Kazakhstan attracted attention

from global geopolitical centres immediately, especially when in the

early 1990s, despite the complicated economic situation, the country

could afford to preserve a small amount of nuclear weapons in its

warehouses. Discussions on the need to preserve nuclear potential

preoccupied Kazakh society in order to guarantee security and deter

the ambitions of potential foes.

Now, it is hard to even imagine what negative effect our country’s

decision to obtain the status of nuclear power would have had. We

have to pay tribute to the wisdom of the Kazakh leaders who withstood

pressure from local hawks and did not give in to the temptation to

show their nuclear ambitions.

On 29 August 1991 President Nazarbayev signed a historical

decree to shut down the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground. Later

Kazakhstan joined the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I, and the

Kazakh parliament ratiﬁ ed the Lisbon protocol in July 1992 and the

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in December

1993. Kazakhstan joined the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in

September 1996.

Kazakhstan was the ﬁ rst country in the CIS to withdraw all

nuclear weapons from its territory, and the last nuclear warhead that

remained underground at the Semipalatinsk nuclear testing ground on

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

138 139

27 May 1995. Since then Kazakh land has been fully free of nuclear

weapons.

Kazakhstan’s decision on voluntary give-up of the status of nuclear

power based on the principles of humanism was an unprecedented

and absolutely new step in building civilised interstate relations.

Following this, US Senator Richard Lugar speaking at a conference

in Washington on 22 February 2003 stated that Kazakhstan’s wise

and bold choice to give up nuclear weapons was in striking contrast

to events in India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, which is why the

world should particularly value the policy adopted by Kazakhstan.

He noted that if the international community were to look for suc-

cess stories in this sphere, it was sufﬁ cient to turn to Kazakhstan’s

example [8, p 400].

3.3. Kazakhstan – the Chairman of the OSCE in 2010

At the beginning 2009, Kazakhstan, along with Greece and Fin-

land, joined the OSCE troika of chairmen.

However, Kazakh representatives started working actively in the

OSCE structures as early as in 2008, ﬁ rst joining the Ofﬁ ce of the

Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, the

country then becoming deputy chairman of the OSCE Parliamentary

Assembly, heading the OSCE contact group for the Mediterranean

Partners for Cooperation and the personal representative of the OSCE

chairman-in-ofﬁ ce on combating intolerance and discrimination

against Muslims.

It is worth noting that both for Kazakhstan and the OSCE Ka-

zakhstan’s chairmanship of the organisation in 2010 is a remarkable

event. For Kazakhstan it is not just international recognition of its

achievements in domestic and foreign policy, but also the realisation

of its responsibility for their further development and readiness to

share responsibility for security in the entire space of the OSCE.

OSCE member states had to face several precedents linked to

Kazakhstan’s chairmanship: the ﬁ rst time a CIS country undergo-

ing political transformation has held this post; the country is largely

located in Asia; and the country is predominantly Muslim.

That is why it was not easy to ﬁ nd a consensus on Kazakhstan’s

chairmanship. Kazakhstan ﬁ rst put forward the idea in 2003 and set

the initial aim of achieving it in 2009. This initiative was something

unexpected by the OSCE member states.

The delay in passing decision on the chairmanship, announced in

November 2009, uncovered institutional problems in the organisation

and the discrepancy between the legislative basis and practical aspects

of its activities. It turned out that the legislative basis of the chair-

manship did not have clear criteria for assessing a hopeful country’s

correspondence to the right to chair the organisation.

It became clear that the decision on Kazakhstan’s chairmanship

was to a greater extent linked to the overcoming of Western partners’

bias towards CIS countries and to current NATO-Russia and EU-Rus-

sia relations rather than to the organisation’s legislative basis.

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy