Sultanov B.K. Kazakhstan Today

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A compromise was the decision to suggest that Kazakhstan would

chair the organisation in 2010 instead of the requested 2009. This

delay was linked to the opportunity to conduct greater reforms in the

political, judicial and social spheres and the need to prepare Kazakh

ofﬁ cials for work in OSCE structures.

The then chairman Finland’s invitation to Kazakhstan to take part

in the OSCE troika of chairs from 2008 to draft OSCE long-term pro-

grammes was unprecedented. As a result, Kazakhstan, having entered

OSCE structures two years ahead of its chairmanship, received the real

possibility of not only acquiring work experience but also drawing

the organisation’s attention to Central Asia’s topical problems.

Moreover, Kazakhstan joined the troika at a difﬁ cult time of its

development. The global economic crisis damaged the entire system

of international relations. The OSCE, despite being an inﬂ uential

organisation, still cannot play a primary role in solving modern

conﬂ icts.

The OSCE managed to establish a dialogue in the era of the bipolar

world and after the demise of the USSR it retained its signiﬁ cance,

helping newly independent countries of the former Soviet Union

establish themselves. The organisation now needs to ﬁ nd new forms

of cooperation and attach new understanding to the experience ac-

cumulated because adequate responses to modern challenges are

possibly only if it changes radically.

From the very beginning the OSCE’s activities evolved in three

aspects – military and political, economic and humanitarian. The

ﬁ rst two spheres developed relatively steadily, while the third started

causing heated debate at the end of the 20

century, because it turned

into a kind of political school of democratic transformations in post-

Soviet countries.

The work of the OSCE showed a misbalance between functional

and geographical factors. Economic and military dimensions were

practically duplicated and overlapped by the activities of the EU and

NATO, while the humanitarian aspect with the Council of Europe.

These organisations adopted speciﬁ c decisions in these spheres,

whereas the OSCE held more advisory meetings of member states

and its documents remained declarations.

Geographically the OSCE, which has 56 members of North Ameri-

can, European and former Soviet countries, worked mainly in the

countries of the former Soviet bloc through its Ofﬁ ce for Democratic

Institutions and Human Rights.

The OSCE’s capability was inﬂ uenced by US domination, the

expansion of the EU and NATO, colour revolutions in post Soviet

countries, Russia’s growing role and the energy crisis. The year

2008 was the most complicated for the OSCE because the recog-

nition of Kosovo’s independence, the war between Georgia and

Russia over South Ossetia and the declaration of the independence

of Abkhazia and South Ossetia took place outside a platform for

dialogue.

The political reality is that in the global crisis with the principle

of universal security within the OSCE not implemented, it is neces-

sary to change the ideological approach to the entire security system.

This idea is shared by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Russian

President Dmitry Medvedev.

The creation of a new European security system in which CIS and

EU countries could use a new architecture of security and which will

be adequate to new challenges and threats is logically grounded and

responsive to the modern stage of global development. The OSCE’s

short-term task is to strengthen its role in the global system of inter-

national relations.

What is the uniqueness and potential of the OSCE and what can

Kazakhstan propose during its chairmanship?

Despite the current complications, the OSCE is an unusual or-

ganisation that unites North American, European and former Soviet

countries and all member states have equal rights, including the right

to chair the organisation.

The principle of consensus adopted by the OSCE allows Ka-

zakhstan and CIS countries to inﬂ uence the course of discussion and

decision-making on key security issues. At a winter session of the

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Speaker of the Kazakh parliament’s

Senate Kasymzhomart Tokayev stressed that in the modern world a

system of security and cooperation should not be considered Euro-

pean or Asian [9].

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That ensuring security is possible only to the detriment of

one’s interests is not acceptable now and this became the main

leitmotif of the assembly’s winter session in 2009. This view was

also stressed by the Kazakh and Russian delegations and during

discussions.

OSCE countries treat all initiatives proposed by Kazakhstan care-

fully. The Finnish chairman of the OSCE in 2008, Alexander Stubb,

praised Kazakh representatives’ work in the economic and environ-

mental sphere and Kazakhstan’s efforts in reforming the political

system. The country’s Path to Europe programme does not just aim

to expand political and economic cooperation and attract investment

and technologies, but also raises Kazakhstan’s relations with EU

countries to the level of strategic partnership.

It considers the security of OSCE comprehensively and it is

capable of creating a single Eurasian security system, one which is

adequate to global challenges and threats, inviting NATO, the CSTO,

the CICA, the SCO and the ASEAN to cooperate.

OSCE’s cooperation partners are: in Asia – South Korea, Thailand

and Japan; and in the Mediterranean – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,

Morocco and Tunisia.

The OSCE has the potential to prevent and solve interethnic and

religious crises, which will help overcome a clash of civilisations.

The Charter for European Security, adopted at the Istanbul summit

in 1999, gave an impetus to close cooperation with partners and there

is now the need to amend this charter and create a common Eurasian

security system.

From 2003 the main priorities of chairmanship were to reform the

OSCE, solve regional conﬂ icts, ﬁ ght terrorism and drug trafﬁ cking,

help democratic processes, counter human trafﬁ cking and promote

tolerance and freedom of religion.

At an OSCE meeting on cultural, religious and racial tolerance

in 2006, Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev set clear goals for

Kazakhstan’s chairmanship:

- taking into account the situation in Central Asia, Kazakhstan

is ready to act as a regional guarantor, ensuring genuine and long-

term security;

- Kazakhstan, with its positive experience of interethnic and

religious accord, aims to democratise its political system and as an

active member of the OSCE intends to strengthen the organisation,

taking into account the interests of all member states [10].

On 30 April 2007 in Vienna the former foreign minister, Marat Ta-

zhin, presented Kazakhstan’s vision on the development of the OSCE

[11]. In the situation of global changes and fast global processes the

priority objective of increasing the efﬁ ciency of the OSCE could be

solved through the creation of a genuine platform for dialogue that

will unite the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian spaces.

In 2007 Kazakhstan adopted political changes, amended its con-

stitution to increase the role of political parties, held an election to

parliament’s Mazhilis, continued reforms in the judicial and local

self-government spheres and started building an efﬁ cient model of

cooperation between the government and civil society.

In 2008 amendments were made to the Kazakh Laws On Political

Parties, On Elections and On the Media.

At an OSCE Parliamentary Assembly winter session, Kazakh Sen-

ate Speaker Kasymzhomart Tokayev detailed Kazakhstan’s priorities

during its OSCE chairmanship in 2010, describing them as clear and

irreversible:

- Kazakhstan aims to increase Central Asia’s signiﬁ cance in the

OSCE. The aim is to deepen common values in this part of the world.

Kazakhstan aims to make its contribution to ensuring security and

stability in Eurasia;

- Kazakhstan has strong experience in heading regional organisa-

tions, like the CIS, the SCO and the CICA. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship

of the OSCE opens up new possibilities for establishing constructive

cooperation between various regional organisations;

- as OSCE chairman Kazakhstan intends to boost the role of

the organisation as a unique platform for a dialogue between Europe

and Asia [12].

Thus, during its chairmanship Kazakhstan will focus the organ-

isation’s activities on maintaining stability in Central Asia and, as a

consequence, strengthening stability in the entire space of the OSCE.

The country also plans to take urgent measures to fulﬁ l socioeconomic

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programmes in Afghanistan; strengthen economic relations between

Central Asian countries; develop transport and transit routes in Cen-

tral Asia; and assist the rational use of water and energy resources

in the region.

Kazakhstan is also ready to share its experience of interethnic and

religious accord.

It is precisely these spheres, that are at the core of the OSCE’s

activities, that need a new vision. Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the

OSCE conﬁ rms the main principle of the organisation – the equality

of all its members and their interest in sustainable development.

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Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

3.4. Kazakhstan and Russia

For numerous, economic, political, ethnic, language, demographic,

religious and geographical reasons, Kazakhstan and Russia are ex-

tremely intertwined states. Their common border, which is the world’s

longest land border, plays an important role in this.

That over a million ethnic Kazakhs live in Russia and over 4 mil-

lion ethnic Russian live in Kazakhstan is of particular signiﬁ cance

to the development of good-neighbourly relations. This is why Ka-

zakhstan and Russian cannot help but be interested in political, trade

and economic, cultural and humanitarian and military and technical

cooperation.

The legislative basis for Kazakh-Russian relations is the Treaty

on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed by Ka-

zakhstan and Russia on 25 May 1992.

The treaty establishes that Kazakhstan and Russia, starting from

the base of the historically developed close relations between the two

states, will build their friendly relations on the principles of mutual

respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolabil-

ity of the existing borders. The treaty’s provisions on the peaceful

settlement of disputes and the non-application of force or the threat

of force, including economic and other pressure, equality and non-

interference in internal affairs, human rights and fundamental liberties,

and the voluntary observance of obligations is particularly important

[13, pp 300-311].

The logical element of the development of bilateral documents in

the political, economic and cultural and humanitarian spheres became

the Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Allied Relations, signed on

6 July 1998. This declaration is aimed at the 21

century context.

Kazakh-Russian relations were boosted by the election of Vladimir

Putin as president of Russia. A new blueprint for Russia’s foreign

policy, adopted at President Putin’s initiative on 28 June 2000, paid

particular attention to the development of good-neighbourly relations

and strategic partnerships with CIS countries.

The quick pace of Kazakh-Russian relations was continued by

the current Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev, who paid his ﬁ rst

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foreign visit to Kazakhstan on 22-23 May 2008. During the visit the

heads of the two countries signed a joint statement and intergovern-

mental agreements on cooperation in the space sphere and on the

GLONASS satellite navigation system.

President Medvedev paid his second visit to Kazakhstan on

5-6 July 2008 and took part in the celebrations of the 10

anniversary

of the Kazakh capital, Astana.

On 22 September 2008, Dmitry Medvedev paid another visit to

Kazakhstan to take part in the ﬁ fth Forum of Heads of Border Regions

of Kazakhstan and Russia entitled “The Development of Border Inter-

regional Cooperation in the Sphere of High Technology”.

The presidents held talks on bilateral cooperation in the fuel and

energy, transport and cultural and humanitarian spheres and discussed

the problems with ensuring national security and countering modern

threats and challenges at the forum.

President Medvedev’s fourth visit to Kazakhstan took place on

19-21 December 1998. An informal summit of the heads of state of

Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and

Turkmenistan was held in the settlement of Burabai. This meeting

discussed breakthrough projects to boost the efﬁ ciency of coopera-

tion between the regional organisations of the EAEC and the CSTO

that were endorsed at these organisations’ summit in Moscow on

4 February 2009.

In international relations, this level of intensity of high-level con-

tact is quite extraordinary.

Describing the state of bilateral relations at the Russian Federal

Assembly’s State Duma on 5 April 2005, Kazakh President Nursul-

tan Nazarbayev said: “Despite the well-known formula of eternal

friends and eternal interests, Kazakhstan and Russia are countries

that are destined to be eternal friends through their histories.” [14,

p 204]

This view is shared by Russian President Medvedev, who said at

the presentation of credentials by the Kazakh ambassador to Russia

on 27 February 2009, that “Russia highly values its friendship with

our strategic ally, Kazakhstan, [and] from year to year our partnership

is reaching a larger scale and is bolstered by major projects” [15].

The effectiveness of bilateral cooperation is shown by a growth

in trade between Kazakhstan and Russia that is greater than Russia’s

trade with all other countries in the region put together. In 2008,

bilateral trade reached $20bn (against $4.6bn in 2001) and it grows

by an average of 30% per year.

Kazakhstan accounts for 15% of Russia’s total trade with CIS

countries, while Russia has 24.7% of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade.

There are over 1,600 enterprises with the involvement of Russian

capital in Kazakhstan [16].

Cooperation between the border regions of the two countries has

good prospects. The sixth forum of interregional cooperation was held

in Orenburg in 2009 and it has given a new impetus to interaction

between the border regions of the two countries.

Kazakhstan and Russia have agreed to create a joint venture to

process gas from Kazakhstan’s Karachaganak gas condensate ﬁ eld

at the Orenburg Gas Processing Plant. This agreement was ratiﬁ ed

by the Kazakh parliament Senate in January 2008 and by the Russian

State Duma in July 2008.

Both countries are working on the expansion of the Caspian Pipe-

line Consortium pipeline (which Kazakhstan owns a 19% stake in)

and the Atyrau-Samara oil pipeline.

Kazakhstan has pledged to supply 17 million tonnes of oil for

the Burgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, and, it is for this reason that

Kazakhstan is interested in acquiring a stake in the project.

The establishment of three joint ventures for extracting and en-

riching uranium and designing nuclear power reactors of small and

average capacity is of particular importance.

As part of the joint projects, Kazakhstan is running its own space

programme. Cooperation with Russia will enable Kazakhstan, which

is home to the Baikonur space launching site, to enter the global mar-

ket of satellite launching services and create its own technological

basis for production.

The construction of the Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan

to Russia via Kazakhstan and a nuclear power station in Aktau and

the boosting of freight transits between western Europe and western

China are now a priority.

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Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Russia on the develop-

ment of roads linking western Europe and western China along the

St Petersburg-Kazan-Orenburg-Aktobe-Almaty-Khorgos-China route

is of strategic signiﬁ cance.

Out of Russia’s 27 regions bordering CIS countries, 12 border

Kazakhstan’s seven regions along the 7,591-km-long border. This ne-

cessitates efﬁ cient counteraction to real threats and challenges around

Kazakhstan, which is a sort of outpost of Russia and the EU.

Continuing attempts by international terrorist organisations, for

example the banned Hizb-ut Tahrir Islamic party, to create combat

cells in Kazakhstan and Russia prompts active counteraction to ter-

rorism and extremism, including as part of cooperation with Russian

intelligence services.

Kazakh and Russian intelligence services are actively cooperating

in ﬁ ghting the drug trafﬁ c from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe

and creating a drug-free belt around Afghanistan. The scale of the

drug threat is proven by the fact that the Kazakh law-enforcement

agencies seized 28.9 tonnes of drugs (including 1,693 kg of heroin)

in 2008 alone.

Illegal migration also presents a serious problem for Kazakhstan

and Russia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union, migration pro-

cesses sped up in Central Asia, like elsewhere in the former Soviet

space, because of the sharp deterioration of the socioeconomic situ-

ation in all the newly independent states and a rise in interethnic and

inter-religious tension, as well as porous borders.

Since obtaining independence in 1991, the economic and political

development of former Soviet countries has been different. As a result

of regional migration, Russia and Kazakhstan are recipient countries,

while Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are source countries.

Kazakhstan and Russia have now increased cooperation to develop

Kazakhstan’s navy in the Caspian Sea. In particular, Russia agreed

to hand over battleships and train crews, as well as build navy infra-

structure on the Caspian [17, p 94].

The countries’ interest in military cooperation was shown by the

ﬁ rst Kazakh-Russian Interaction-2008 military exercises attended

by the Kazakh and Russian ministers of defence in Almaty Oblast

on 3-11 July 2008. The second exercises were held in Russia’s Che-

lyabinsk Oblast in September. As part of agreements signed by the

two countries’ Ministries of Defence, joint war games will be held

regularly between 2009 and 2011.

Among the advantages of Kazakh-Russian relations is undoubtedly

the legal delineation of the 7,591-km-long state border between the

two countries. Kazakhstan has, by the way, also solved territorial and

border issues with all of its neighbours – China (1,740 km), Uzbekistan

(2,350 km), Kyrgyzstan (1,050 km) and Turkmenistan (400 km).

One of the main priorities in bilateral relations is cooperation in

tapping the natural resources in the Caspian Sea.

Kazakhstan was the ﬁ rst Caspian-littoral country to manage to

settle all conﬂ icts with Russia, above all, on the issue of the status

and division of the sea ﬂ oor. The Kazakh-Russian statement, signed

in January 1998, stipulated a provision that “a consensus should be

achieved based on the fair division of the Caspian Sea ﬂ oor while

the common use of the water surface, including ensuring free naviga-

tion and coordinated rules for ﬁ shery and environmental protection,

should be preserved”.

Talks on deﬁ ning the legal status of the Caspian Sea are still un-

der way. Kazakhstan’s position on this issue is clear and deﬁ nitive.

President Nazarbayev told a news conference in Baku on 24 May

2005 that there was the understanding between Kazakhstan, Russia

and Azerbaijan regarding the median line of the sea and its delimita-

tion. Kazakhstan is interested in turning the Caspian Sea into a sea

of friendship and mutually beneﬁ cial cooperation [18].

Russian-Kazakh relations are developing not just in the bilateral

format, but also multilaterally within the CIS, the EAEC, the CSTO,

the SCO and the CACO.

Kazakhstan and Russia are cooperating most closely within the

Eurasian Economic Community (one of the founding members is

Kazakhstan). The community aims at economic integration with the

creation of a free trade zone and a customs union. In the socio-hu-

manitarian sphere the country plans to conduct joint research on the

priority aspects of science and technology and harmonise the national

systems of education, science and culture.

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At the summit of the heads of EAEC member states in Dushanbe

on 6 October 2007, the leaders of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia

signed documents to set up a single customs zone and a Customs

Union. The legislative basis of the Customs Union is expected to be

ﬁ nalised in 2010.

Particular attention has been given to Kazakh-Russian cooperation

within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was established

in 1996. The member states of the organisation are China, Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Bilateral relations within the SCO include a wide range of interac-

tion in the economic, military and political and humanitarian spheres.

Attention is mainly focused on solving problems of ensuring security,

peace and stability in the SCO member states and increasing the

organisation’s role in international efforts in nuclear non-proliferation,

the ﬁ ght against terrorism and crossborder crime.

The energy sphere is a promising aspect of Kazakh-Russian co-

operation within the SCO.

Cultural and humanitarian ties are very intensive between

Kazakhstan and Russia. Sufﬁ ce it to say that the Year of Russia

in Kazakhstan and the Year of Kazakhstan in Russia were held in

2004 and 2005 respectively. A monument to Kazakh great poet

Abai was opened in Moscow in 2006. Branches of eight Russian

universities, including the Lomonosov Moscow State University,

operate in Kazakhstan.

As a result, despite the global ﬁ nancial crisis, relations between

Kazakhstan and Russia in all main aspects – the economic, political

and cultural and humanitarian spheres – are developing well. The

Plan of the Joint Actions of Kazakhstan and Russia for 2009-2010,

signed by the two heads of state, has particular signiﬁ cance for this

process.

Another synchronisation of watches on the main issues of bilateral

relations took place at a meeting of the Russian and Kazakh ministers

of foreign affairs in Moscow on 14 March 2009. This meeting praised

bilateral cooperation in all the spheres and expressed the hope for

“close interaction between the brotherly peoples of Kazakhstan and

Russia” both bilaterally and on the international stage.

The ministers stressed the need to expand cooperation in boosting

economic security, countering international terrorism, drug trafﬁ cking

and organised crime and dealing with the consequences of natural

disasters within the CIS, the CSTO and the EAEC.

Ahead of Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, it was

stressed that “Russia will fully support” Kazakhstan in this important

mission [19].

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3.5. Kazakhstan and China

Developing relations with China – both bilaterally and multilat-

erally – occupies an important place in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy

strategy.

Ancient historical ties, geographical closeness and common in-

terests in the spheres of security and economic cooperation political

meant that interaction between Kazakhstan and China was deﬁ ned

by the Kazakh leadership as priority.

After Kazakhstan declared its independence both countries showed

interest in building stable and good-neighbourly relations at a new

level. As early as on 3 January 1992 the countries established dip-

lomatic relations. The subsequent ofﬁ cial visit by Kazakh President

Nursultan Nazarbayev to China in October 1993 started regular meet-

ings between the two countries at the highest level.

One of the ﬁ rst agreements that deﬁ ned the principles of interaction

between the two countries was the Joint Declaration on the Founda-

tions of Friendly Relations between the Republic of Kazakhstan and

the People’s Republic of China which was signed during President

Nazarbayev’s meeting with President Jiang Zemin in Beijing in 1993.

Based on this document both sides immediately started solving the

problems inherited from Soviet-Chinese relations.

During the several years that followed one of delicate topics of

bilateral relations regarding the delimitation of the state border had

been discussed. As a result of signing several agreements (in Shanghai

in 1996, Moscow in 1997 and Almaty in 1998) within the Shang-

hai-Five organisation, border problems were mostly solved and the

delimitation and demarcation of all sectors of the Kazakh-Chinese

border have now been completed. Remarkably, Kazakhstan was one

of the ﬁ rst in Central Asia to solve this type of important issue in

bilateral relations.

Mutual interest in the two countries’ adherence to the principle

of mutually beneﬁ cial cooperation, non-interference in one another’s

internal affairs and the steady development of bilateral relations is

proven by the fact that the positions of Kazakhstan and China on many

bilateral and multilateral issues coincide. In particular, as a result

of insistent actions by Kazakh diplomats on nuclear issues and our

country’s status as nuclear-free power, China offered assurances of

the non-use of nuclear weapons to Kazakhstan in February 1995.

Beijing irreversibly regards the preservation of stability and order

on the country’s borders and its domestic stability as a very important

aspect of the development of cooperation with Kazakhstan [20, p 89].

At talks the countries also agreed to jointly use and protect water

resources of the crossborder Ili and Irtysh rivers.

Following the adoption of a joint declaration by the country’s

leaders during Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Kazakhstan

in 1996, Kazakh-Chinese relations rose to a new level of strategic

partnership. Jiang Zemin stressed that not only did friendship and

mutually beneﬁ cial cooperation between Kazakhstan and China cor-

respond to the fundamental interests of the two countries’ peoples,

but also beneﬁ ted peace, stability and development in Asia and the

whole world [20, p 126].

One of the key moments in cooperation between the two countries

was the adoption of the Joint Declaration between the Republic

of Kazakhstan and the People’s Republic of China on the Further

Development of All-Round Cooperation in the 21

Century during

President Nazarbayev’s ofﬁ cial visit to China in 1999. Another

important step was the common ground between both countries’

positions on security problems which was reﬂ ected in their activities

within the SCO.

As political ties strengthens steadily, so does bilateral trade and

economic cooperation. China has now become one of Kazakhstan’s

most promising trade and economic partners. Economic relations

are developing extremely rapidly between the two countries. For

example, bilateral trade between Kazakhstan and China was $368m

in 1992, whereas it reached $500m in 1997, $1bn in 1998 and about

$13.8bn in 2007. China is Kazakhstan’s second largest trade partner

behind Russia [21].

Bilaterally and multilaterally, Kazakhstan and China are conduct-

ing many strategic projects in several spheres such as energy, telecom-

munications, transport and agriculture. At the same time, Astana and

Beijing are putting effort into major projects in the non-extractive

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sectors of the economy, gradually increasing the level of products

with high value added and high technologies in bilateral trade.

An important aspect of bilateral economic trade is the energy

sphere. China’s economy is growing with unprecedented paces and

is encountering acute shortages of hydrocarbons. As a consequence,

the intensiﬁ cation of foreign energy ties with energy supplier-coun-

tries is becoming increasingly important for Beijing. In this respect

Kazakhstan, as one of the major exporters of mineral resources is of

particular interest to China.

Cooperation in the oil and gas sector is developing rapidly between

China and Kazakhstan. Chinese companies’ active involvement in

the Kazakh oil and gas sector started with China National Petroleum

Corporation’s (CNPC) purchase of a 60% stake in Kazakhstan’s

Aktobemunaigas oil and gas company in 1997.

In 2003, under bilateral intergovernmental agreements in the oil

and gas sector signed in 1997, enterprises in the two countries started

the implementation of a major project to build an oil pipeline from

Kazakhstan and China.

The ﬁ rst phase of the Atyrau-Kenkiyak oil pipeline has already

been completed, and the Atasu-Alashankou oil pipeline was completed

and commissioned in 2005, and it shipped about 6 million of oil to

China in 2008 [22]. The completion of the Kenkiyak-Kumkol and

Kumkol-Atasu pipelines is expected to link the earlier built Atyrau-

Kenkiyak and Atasu-Alashankou pipelines to unite all these Kazakh

pipelines into a single system and integrate this with China’s oil

pipeline networks.

This project was carried out by Kazakhstan’s KazMunaiGas

national oil and gas company and the CNPC. The completion of the

project at the end of 2009 has made this oil pipeline an important

tool in diversifying routes to transport energy resources to global

markets.

Over the course of Kazakh-Chinese economic cooperation, with

the steady growth in trade and freight shipment, the importance of

transport links has been growing constantly. Kazakhstan and China

have huge, untapped opportunities to cooperate in the transit transport

sphere.

As a result, the Kazakh government is taking active measures to

expand the country’s transit potential. Kazakhstan is an active member

of the UN ESCATO, SPEC and TRACECA. In order to boost transit

of freight Kazakhstan has initiated the construction of the Western

Europe-Western China transport corridor.

To this end, in early 2008 Kazakhstan and China signed an agree-

ment on opening four cargo routes:

- Urumqi-the Khorgos border post-Karaganda (Kazakhstan);

- Urumqi-the Jimunai border post-Karaganda;

- Urumqi-the Baketu border post-Karaganda;

- Urumqi-the Alashankou border post-Karaganda.

It was also decided to open three passenger routes:

- Urumqi-the Jimunai border post-Karaganda;

- Urumqi-the Baketu border post-Karaganda;

- Urumqi-the Alashankou border post-Karaganda.

Generally, the current relations between Kazakhstan and China

can be described as consistent and dynamic. The heads of the two

countries hold regular meetings and our countries’ positions on many

international and regional problems are regarded as similar.

It is worth noting the new, fourth, generation of Chinese leaders,

led by President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao who came to

power in autumn 2002, demonstrated consistency in Chinese policy

towards Kazakhstan [23, p 221]. Hu Jintao reiterated that Chinese

policy would adhere to the established course of the entire spectre of

bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and China.

In turn, President Nazarbayev stressed in his 2004 state-of-the-na-

tion address that Beijing was one of the chief political and economic

partners of Astana and that the continuing strengthening of relations

with China served as the clear and important course of Kazakhstan’s

foreign policy and that the development of good-neighbourly and

friendly relations between Beijing and Astana were Kazakhstan’s

foreign policy priorities [24].

In August 2007 ahead of the 15

anniversary of the establishment of

diplomatic relations between Kazakhstan and China, President Nazar-

bayev invited President Hu Jintao to pay an ofﬁ cial visit to Astana. During

the visit he met the country’s leaders and signed a joint statement.

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In addition to meetings between the heads of state, prime ministers

and ministers hold meetings on a bilateral and multilateral basis. On

31 October 2008, important agreements were signed during Chinese

Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to Kazakhstan, including an agreement on

cooperation in the nuclear energy sphere between the Kazatomprom

national nuclear company and China National Nuclear Corporation;

in the gas extracting and transporting sphere between KazMunaiGas

and CNPC; in the transport sphere between the Kazakhstan Temir

Zholy national railway company and The Ministry of Railways of

the People’s Republic of China.

Bilateral agreements, signed in the nuclear energy sphere, opened

up new opportunities for Kazakhstan, making it possible to switch

from exporting raw materials to taking part in the joint construction

of nuclear power plants. Beijing, in turn, received direct access to

raw materials to develop its nuclear power engineering.

Cooperation between Kazakhstan and China is not limited to the

bilateral format: the countries also maintain relations within interna-

tional organisations: the UN, the SCO and the CICA. China attaches

a particular signiﬁ cance and offers all-round support to the Kazakh

president’s initiative – the CICA and takes an active part in all meet-

ings of this organisation.

As a result, the backbone of cooperation between Kazakhstan

and China is the development of multilateral and long-term coopera-

tion. At present, along with successful political and socioeconomic

relations, cultural ties are also developing fruitfully. In the security

sphere, Kazakhstan and China are maintaining a wide consensus

and interaction, both countries making signiﬁ cant contributions to

maintaining peace and stability.

3.6. Kazakhstan’s Cooperation

with Central Asian Countries

Objectively speaking, Central Asian countries play one of the

key positions in Kazakhstan’s foreign policy strategy. Even though

in terms of trade they do not play the roles played by Russia, China

or the USA, they could potentially occupy more signiﬁ cant posi-

tions.

This is conditioned by an obvious factor of geographical proxim-

ity, which means interdependence in the transport and communica-

tions and water and energy spheres, which results in the similarity

of a whole range of foreign policy and foreign economic problems

and tasks.

Integration projects that emerged in Central Asia between 1990

and 2000 had failed to realise for various reasons. In particular, one of

the obvious reasons was linked to the frequently changing priorities

within regional initiatives.

At the same time, Kazakhstan remained a supporter of and ac-

tive player in various regional organisations. Speaking in favour of

boosting Central Asian cooperation, in 2005 Astana made yet another

proposal to its southern neighbours to deal with issues of regional

integration and ﬂ oated its idea of the creation of a Union of Central

Asian States.

It was suggested that the Treaty of Eternal Friendship, which was

signed by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan should lay the

foundation of this initiative. Astana invited Central Asian countries

to build close economic integration and move towards a common

market and a common currency in the future.

On 1-2 September 2006 at an informal summit in Astana, the

leaders of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan again

discussed regional projects that had already been considered in

multilateral forums. Kazakhstan expressed its desire to become a

regional trade, economic and investment locomotive. Astana’s key

package of proposals was to set up sectoral consortia such as water

and energy, transport and food consortia, special border zones and

joint investment structures.

158 159

Kazakhstan today

Chapter 3. Foreign Policy

Drafting coordinated approaches to regional water and energy

problems is a topical issue. Kazakhstan, along with Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan, is among the countries that face acute shortages of fresh

water, the main reserves of which are in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

This factor is becoming increasingly considerable in the expansion

of regional cooperation. Despite all Central Asian countries agreeing

on the creation of an expert group to draft a formula for using water

resources that is acceptable to everyone, regular meetings – both at

the highest and the ministerial levels – have not led to the signing of

a comprehensible agreement that would be accepted by everyone.

Generally, having received support for the idea of a possible in-

terstate association from Bishkek and Dushanbe, Astana continued

the negotiation process with Tashkent. In 2006 Uzbekistan boosted

cooperation with CIS countries and joined the EAEC and the CSTO,

which was particularly welcomed by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Central Asian countries expected signiﬁ cant political and economic

results from involvement in the EAEC, in particular, from links with

Uzbekistan, but Tashkent did not become a fully-ﬂ edged member of

this organisation and ﬁ nally stopped its membership of this organisa-

tion in November 2008.

Tashkent’s position impacts the efﬁ ciency of major regional

projects. Uzbekistan is known to have problems with all its neigh-

bours. Relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are complicated by

the situation on the borders, visa regime, migration issues, transit

and transport issues, water and energy and other problems. All this

causes tension in relations between regional countries and demands

constant attention.

The key issues of Uzbekistan’s relations with its neighbours re-

main the same. They became subjects of talks and were put on the

agenda of summits, but there has not been any signiﬁ cant movement.

It is very likely that Uzbekistan will not be able to switch to a more

intensive pattern of relations with its neighbours because of the cur-

rent structure of its economy and also for political reasons. This was

proven by Uzbek President Islam Karimov’s visit to Kazakhstan on

22-23 April 2008 when the Uzbek leader ofﬁ cially refused to back

the Kazakh initiative of uniting into a Central Asian union.

Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is developing

relatively rapidly, although there are a number of bilateral economic

problems between them. In particular, transit issues, water and energy

problems and the regulation of labour migration are always topical

for Kyrgyzstan. In turn, Kazakhstan always raises the problem of its

property in Kyrgyzstan and debts accumulated by Kyrgyz companies.

Generally, these problems can be solved and do not mar the relatively

close relations between the countries.

In 2007-2009, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan took certain political

and economic steps to boost ties. Astana, in implementing its initiative

to create the Union of Central Asian States, proposed to start gradually

moving towards this idea on a bilateral basis at the initial stages.

Kazakh business people and managers of national companies

have started actively cooperating with Kyrgyz colleagues to expand

mutually beneﬁ cial trade and economic ties.

On 26 April 2007 during Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s

visit to Kyrgyzstan an agreement on the creation of the Interstate

Council, headed by the heads of countries, was signed. The council

is responsible for a whole range of bilateral relations – political,

economic, cultural and security issues. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek

Bakiyev supported Astana’s integration initiatives which will help

regional economic cooperation.

In addition, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs has been set

up to successfully coordinate the activities of the Interstate Council.

An important indicator of the development of bilateral relations

is Kazakh companies and the capital’s involvement in the construc-

tion of the Kambarata hydropower stations and a number of other

economic projects.

During the visit the countries also established the Kyrgyz-Kazakh

Investment Fund with charter capital of $100m, which should boost

bilateral trade and economic relations. President Bakiyev’s ofﬁ cial

visit to Kazakhstan on 17-18 April 2008 strengthened these trends

and made it possible to specify a number of the above-mentioned

joint investment projects.

Kazakh-Tajik relations are also developing relatively successfully.

Astana is interested in investing in building hydropower facilities in