Telo M. European Union and New Regionalism. Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era
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European Union and New Regionalism
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foreign investment but also political dialogue and cultural relations between the
regions. The US on the other hand does not value regional relations as such, but
cannot but operate in an increasingly regionalized world. In discussing the EU-US
encounters in various regions I will follow the categorization of EU foreign policy
relations made in section 4.
To what extent has the EU control over itself? With the so called Eastern
enlargement the EU got a number of members more interested in the Atlantic
community than the European Union. This means that the commitment for
deepening is weakened and that regionness actually is on the decline. The members
joining with the ‘eastern enlargement’ were coldly received, to say the least, and as
far as Turkey is concerned the attitude in several EU countries is even hostile. In
this case the US has actively supported the Turkish candidature.
We have already (in section 4) made a distinction between EU’s relations with
the ‘near abroad’ and more far away relations. The frontier between ‘Europe’, as
organized by the EU, and surrounding areas is unclear, some of these areas (or
countries in them) being new members or applicants, others defined (through a
political discourse) as being ‘non-Europe’ (but ‘near abroad’). The area in question
is large and includes much of the post-Soviet area where Russia of course has
its interests as a reemerging great power. Since the CIS (Commonwealth of
Independent States) did not take off, the EU has also to deal with Ukraine, Belarus
and Moldova (the European part of the post-Soviet area) independently. In view
of the fear for the former superpower, but now regional power, the expectations in
these states are that the US will play a more protective role.
Here Europe does not only meet the US but above all Russia. The relations
between EU and Russia are rather similar to the ones between the EU and the
USA, in the sense that Russia also prefers bilateralism, although the EU has a
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Russia which covers human
rights, the economy, trade, security and justice issues In the rest of the post-Soviet
area, that is, the European part (except of course the Baltic subregion now part of
the EU) and Caucasus/Central Asia, the EU presence is weak (Dannreuther, 2004).
The strategic partnership between EU and Russia implies a substantive geopolitical
room for manouvre for the latter.
The Mediterranean ‘region’ has no formal existence, it is a social construction
shaped by the EU’s security concerns, particularly in the south. North Africa is
linked to France through colonial legacy. Regarding the countries involved in the
former peace process (Israel and the eastern Arab countries) the US influence is
what counts, and the EU has consequently taken a low profile. This is particularly
clear after the Hamas victory in the Palestinian election.
Few observers would consider the EU response to the Balkan crises (Bosnia,
Kosovo and Macedonia) an unqualified success. Instead the US involvement, after
some hesitation, became massive, providing a dilemma for the new Europe, since
the Balkan subregion must be seen as forming part of Europe rather than constituting
its permanent ‘near abroad’. The dividing line between what is ‘Europe’ and a ‘non-
Europe’, close enough to constitute the ‘near abroad’, is ultimately a political issue.
To define the Balkans out of Europe might be tempting but politically incorrect and
Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US models 119
also dangerous. At present Bosnia is under the protection of the EU militarily. In
the case of Kosovo, NATO played the military role (to the frustration of the US).
Today, the whole world is becoming more and more integrated through
regional formations interlinked by transregional and interregional relations. The
most important transregional/interegional complex is the Triad: North America,
Europe and East Asia. Furthermore, Southeast Asia and East Asia are increasingly
merging into one region as symbolized by the East Asia summit in Kuala Lumpur
(December 2005). This growing region is dominated by the two rival great powers,
China and Japan, with which both the US and the EU have bilateral relations. With
Japan the US has a privileged special relationship whereas China is courting the
EU. Transregional links within the Triad are constituted by APEC (Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation), and ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) as well as the various
transatlantic agreements between the US and the EU discussed in section 1.
Unsurprisingly, the Triad relations are sometimes rather tense, due to power
balance concerns, trade competition that risks degenerating into trade wars, and
the somewhat different economic ideologies in the three regions. In the new, larger
East Asia there are thus competing transregional institutions expressing the rivalry
between the EU and the US: APEC where the USA is the driver, and the ASEM
process, involving the EU and ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea (but
so far excluding Myanmar). Behind the ASEM is the felt need by European and
Asian partners to relate to and perhaps try to balance the US dominance. ASEM has
been seen as ‘the missing link’ in the Triad, since Europe had been excluded from
APEC by the US. Consequently the US is not welcome as a member in the ASEM
process. This process has been seen as instrumental in forming the APT region.
ASEAN + Three, or APT, is now emerging as a new regional formation covering
both Southeast and East Asia, and actually socially constructed in the process of
maintaining an interregional relationship between Asia and Europe (Gilson, 2002),
at the same time as being a response to various urgent needs in the regions, such
as maintaining or restoring financial stability (Higgott, 2002) and controlling
communicable diseases such as SARS (Fidler, 2004). APEC, on the other hand,
seems to be losing importance even in the area of trade liberalization (Financial
Times, Nov 14, 2006).
Central Asia is a ‘pre-regional’ area in which the US and Russia competes
for influence whereas the EU is almost absent.
9
Relations between EU and South
Asia have been rather weak, but are now becoming more important as the region
stabilizes politically and becomes successful in terms of economic dynamics. This
also means a greater US interest in the region.
Europe’s relations with Latin America were intensified in the 1990s after
a long period of neglect or simply focusing on individual countries. The EU—
Mercosur relationship, on the level of the core/intermediate relation, is another
clear example of interregionalism, since there exists an agreement between two
regional organizations (the EU-Mercosur Interregional Framework Co-operation
Agreement – EMIFCA, 1995), which is also built on three pillars, of which the
first includes a political dialogue, the second a substantive financial support to
Mercosur’s institutional development and the third economic and commercial
cooperation (Santander, 2006). The closer links between the EU and Latin America
European Union and New Regionalism
120
are growing as the US seems to lose interest in its own backyard, or perhaps is too
preoccupied with other areas.
Over the years the ACP countries have been marginalized in the European-led
interregional system, but interestingly they have made efforts to act as a collective
unit, while the EU makes efforts to regionalize and differentiate the group, the first
principle based on territorial, the other on developmental criteria (LDCs, landlocked
countries, island countries, and so on). To this confusing picture comes the fact that
the meaning of development has not remained the same from Yaoundé to Cotonou.
The trend has been towards neoliberal strategies and political conditional ties in
spite of the language of partnership. Of the African, Caribbean and Pacific regions
the US has considered Africa as a European concern.
To sum up, interregionalism, as practiced by the EU, has the purpose of building
and consolidating regional orders, whereas the US regional activities rather have
the purpose of preventing strong regional formations to grow.
Conclusion
The EU is, in terms of regionness, so far the only example of ‘an institutionalized
regional polity’, at present lingering between intergovernmentalism and
supranational governance, but with an uncertain future, due to a new wave of Euro-
scepticism and the decreased coherence and consistency following the inflow of
new members. The frustrated attempt to make a European Constitution even gave
rise to speculations about a possible break-up of the Union.
10
On the other hand, there was an agreement on a common European security
policy, marking a significant disassociation from the USA and the NATO framework.
The stress is here on prevention rather than preemption, thus holding on to ‘civilian
power’, at the same time as the transatlantic relationship is cautiously referred to
as ‘irreplacable’. The UN charter is, however, in this document described as ‘the
fundamental framework’ for international relations and international action. Thus
the EU muddles through, used as it is to be forced to act in crisis situations. As long
as joint management of various problems makes sense this is likely to continue,
adding to the ambiguity of the nature of the union.
The way the EU deals with the external world has been different from that of an
ordinary great power driven by geopolitical interests. This is because the civilian
power employed in the EU’s own region-building is also being projected in its external
relations as the preferred world order model. This thesis on a correspondence between
internal and external is clearly stated by Ian Manners with regard to normative
power: ‘The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is
the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to
act in a normative way in world politics’.
11
This concept is different from the idea of
Europe as civilian power in the sense that the latter is meant to modify the structural
conditions in which all actors operate (Telò, 2006: 228).
In spite of the ideological commitment to systemic interregionalism, weakened
over the years, it cannot be said that the EU external policy has developed in a
coherent and consistent way. On the contrary, different policies have been applied
Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US models 121
in different contexts and at different points in time by different constellations of
actors. The US, following a more consistent realist line, is dominant in most arenas,
particularly in the Middle East, Central Asia, but challenged by the EU in the US
backyard – Latin America. The element of competition with the US is particularly
obvious in the cases of Asia and Latin America (ALA), where the European
presence has increased substantively, leading to stronger actorness.
The European global interests in a more realist sense, are not hidden, though.
According to a statement from the Commission (quoted from Bretherton and Vogler,
1999:129): ‘the EU can commit itself to supporting only economic and social
organization models which contribute to the objectives of its cooperation policy
and which comply with the political and social values which it means to promote’
(Agenda, 2000). Some would call this a kind of imperialism as well (Hettne–
Söderbaum, 2005). It is rather obvious that the EU policies have failed to instill
confidence in the partners, whether Arabs, Indians, Latin Americans or Africans.
However, the outcome is, in spite of all contradictions, a pattern of governance
with its own distinctive characteristics and the potential of becoming a world order.
This world order, the outcome of multiple processes of regionalization, could be
called ‘multiregionalism’. In terms of the definition of world order suggested in
section 3 this world order would be multipolar, plurilateral (regionalized) and
compatible with established international law, in contrast to the unipolar, unilateral,
and national interest-based model proposed by the neoconservative establishment,
now less and less established, so it seems.
12
The question is to what extent the potential of the former model (Pax Europaea)
today (in contrast with two decades ago) is realized by European politicians and
other decision makers, as well as the increasingly sceptic European public. This
is a question of future European regionness and actorness, which by no means are
necessarily advancing.
Just like the US, the EU applies its own experiences in conflict resolution and
development on neighbourhood relations, as well as on the world as a whole. Two
different kinds of power, hard and civil, thus face each other. Coercion may be
replaced by influence, and imposition by dialogue. What has worked in Europe
may ultimately prove to have wider relevance. Indeed, the European model may
have relevance even if Europe no longer seems to believe in it, judging from the
debate on the new constitution.
It is important to note that the differences behind the two models do not express
varieties of national mentality – Europe versus America – but constitute contrasting
world order principles held by political groupings in both areas. It is therefore
reasonable to expect coexistence, whether uneasy or not, and the emergence of
hybrids formed somewhere between these competing world order models. Even
so, changes in the US are of much more importance. Ever since the election of the
second George W. Bush administration, there has emerged in the USA a call for
a return to multilateralism: the ‘USA and its main regional partners must begin to
prepare for life after Pax Americana’ (Kupchan, 2004). The two years remaining
after the November 2006 Congress election will have to be based on domestic (and
therefore also international) compromises. Such a shift would bring Europe and
the US closer again, but it will not eliminate the difference between the models
European Union and New Regionalism
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of interregionalism/multiregionalism and a global concert of regional powers; or
between a post-Westphalian and a neo-Westphalian world order. That the US would
be the one to make the most concessions and adaptations as compared to its current
foreign policy line is due to the fact that this line (Westphalianism) is incompatible
with the post-sovereign trend associated with globalization (post-Westphalianism).
However, in respects other than security the US, by necessity, is also becoming a
multilevel actor. Convergences or at least some compromises cannot therefore be
completely excluded.
Interregionalism thus forms part of the EU’s foreign policy, the EU being the
hub of a global pattern of interregional relations. On the other hand, if regionalism
is a global phenomenon, and there are different regionalisms in different parts of
the world, it is reasonable to expect that these emerging regions, to the extent that
they develop actorhood (with varying degrees of actorness) establish some kinds of
links with each other. Thus interregionalism can also be explained from the point of
view of the transformation of the global system.
This point is reinforced by the fact that southern regions also (ASEAN, Mercosur,
SADC) establish interregional relations, encouraged by the EU. Of course these
regions, albeit harbouring potential structural changes in world governance, are
still embryonic, and therefore it is possible to read different trends of theoretical
significance into them. In other words, the problem lies in the ontological status of what
we call interregionalism. The problem is that there is a lack of consensus regarding
interregionalism. The existing definitions to date are ad hoc and rather provisional,
not based on a systematic overview of the phenomenon to be conceptualized and
theorized.
13
To my mind it is important that the concept interregionalism is reserved
for formal relations between regions as juridical or at least quasi-juridical entities,
since this would be a new political phenomenon, signifying a post-Westphalian era. It
does not imply post-sovereignty, however, since the regions get their actorhood from
the pooling of national sovereignties. Maybe one should, in the shorter term at least,
rather talk about a neo-Westphalian phenomenon.
Interregionalism can be seen as one of the more regulated forms that
globalization may be taking. As compared to market-led globalization in a
Westphalian world of nation states, it is more rooted in territory; and in contrast
to traditional multilateralism, it is a more exclusive relationship, since access to
regional formations is limited by the principle of geographical proximity (pluri-
lateralism). Interregionalism, not to speak of multiregionalism, is a long-term, non-
linear and uncertain trend which certainly will include setbacks, the outcome of
which we can not know. It is, however, likely that interregionalism has become
a systemic feature of the world order, and that this dynamic may continue even
without the support of the EU group-to-group dialogue.
Notes
1 Multilateralism thus comes in many forms, as helpfully clarified by Mario Telò (2006).
By regional multilateralism I primarily refer to relations among regions, not intra-
regional conditions.
Interregionalism and World Order: The Diverging EU and US models 123
2 This is referred to as Old Interregionalism by Hänggi (2006:32) in contradistinction to
the New Interregionalism which is world-wide and systemic. The classic description of
the group-to-group approach can be found in Edwards & Regelsberger, 1990. The EU
group-to-group approach of course continues, albeit in diluted form, in the new era, so
the distinction must not be exaggerated (cf the discussion on old and new regionalism
in Hettne, 2005). The relevance of the old interregionalism for world order was for
instance pointed out in 1987 by the then West German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich
Genscher describing the EU approach as a ‘landmark on the road to a new world order’
(Edwards & Regelsberger, 1990: 13).
3 It was originally coined by Gunnar Sjöstedt (1977).
4 Interestingly, this difference is diminished, see Hill & Smith, 2005.
5 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index.htm.
6 The ENP covers Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine and the Palestinian
Authority. With regard to the Mediterranean, the ENP builds on the Barcelona process
and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership from 1995 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/
enp/index_en.htm).
7 See Helle Malmvig ‘An unlikely match or a marriage in the making? EU-GCC relations
in a changing seccurity environment’ , DIIS Brief November 2006 (Danish Institute for
International Studies).
8 Kennes, 1999: 27).
9 See the special issue of
International Affairs. Vol. 80, No. 3, May 2004.
10 The expectations regarding the future of the EU are highly contrasting. For a good
summary of various positions see McCormick, 2007.
11 Quoted in A. Linklater, ‘A European Civilising Process’, in C. Hill and M. Smith (eds.,
International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2005: 375).
12 The nature of a multipolar order is of course impossible to predict. Major powers except
the US and Great Britain have expressed sympathy for multipolarity (Walt, 2006: 111),
but there is also fear for the Triple Alliance of repressive powers (Mann, 2005: xxi).
13 Important steps have been taken in Söderbaum & Langenhove (2006); and Hänggi
(2006).
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PART II
Comparative Analysis of
Regional Groupings
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Chapter 6
Between Trade Regionalization
and Various Paths towards Deeper
Cooperation
Mario Telò
The second main topic of this book is the comparison between the existing regional
organizations, their complexity and ambiguities. Five main case studies are
particularly taken into account: two in the Americas (NAFTA and MERCOSUR),
one in Asia (ASEAN), and finally the African case; comparative references are
made to other regional groupings (Communidad Andina, SAARC, among others),
while always keeping the EU experience in mind as an advanced workshop of
regional cooperation and integration.
New regionalism is in many respects a multiple and highly differentiated reality,
firstly, because of the great variety of institutional and informal features it covers.
We are witnessing the revival of old regional organizations and the birth of new
ones. Such differences suggest a basic methodological question: is the observer
confronted with a variety of institutional forms of regionalism or with different
forms of the same pattern? All the chapters embrace the general idea of European
exceptionalism; namely that distinctive historical, cultural, and societal features
underpin the European path to regional integration and the unique institutions
of the EU.
1
However, the authors of this book don’t share the idea that all what
we have learned by comparative research is that the EC/EU is not an exportable
regional model. In other words, the EU is not a kind of counter-model either, while
the comparison with the successive and various kinds of European cooperation/
integration process has proven to be very useful to the international literature.
Even if against any teleological, evolutionistic, Euro-centric vision, thus far we
can distinguish between the following forms of regional groupings (combining the
inputs of several authors):
a. By regionalization we understand the different, private and public, forms
of societal and economic networking, association and cooperation within a
region. Their number and influence have increased considerably since the
early 1980s, according to the Yearbook of International Organization.
2
b. Regional fora are the first step towards dialogue among NGOs, mainly open
to civil society representatives (business community, NGOs and so on) and
intergovernmental cooperation, formal and informal, by institutionalized
bodies or looser structures.